

1 SCR-5.2.1.10 FEP Number: H34
2 FEP Title: **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**

3 SCR-5.2.1.10.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 *The effects of **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** associated with existing, near-future,*
6 *and future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
7 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

8 SCR-5.2.1.10.2 Summary of New Information

9 The original description and screening arguments for **Borehole-Induced Solution and**
10 **Subsidence** around existing and future boreholes remain unchanged and valid. The change in
11 hydraulic conductivity within the Culebra from **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**
12 along the flow path will have no significant affect on the long-term performance of the disposal
13 system. The effects have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
14 to the performance of the disposal system. The FEP description and screening arguments have
15 been revised to include new information related to borehole-induced subsidence by recognizing
16 new and developing sinks in the region.

17 SCR-5.2.1.10.3 Screening Argument

18 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
19 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
20 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
21 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
22 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
23 precipitation.

24 SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

25 *SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

26 During the period covered by HCN FEPs, drilling within the land withdrawn for the WIPP will
27 be controlled, and boreholes will be plugged according to existing regulations. Under these
28 circumstances and during this time period, **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** at WIPP
29 is eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence to the disposal system.

30 Outside the area withdrawn for the WIPP, drilling has been regulated, but conditions of historical
31 and existing boreholes are highly variable. **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** may
32 occur in these areas, although it is expected to be limited and should not affect the disposal
33 system, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

34 Three features are required for significant **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** to occur:
35 a borehole, an energy gradient to drive unsaturated (with respect to halite) water through the
36 evaporite-bearing formations, and a conduit to allow migration of brine away from the site of
37 dissolution. Without these features, minor amounts of halite might be dissolved in the immediate

1 vicinity of a borehole, but percolating water would become saturated with respect to halite and
2 stagnant in the bottom of the drillhole, preventing further dissolution.

3 At, and in the vicinity of, the WIPP site, drillholes penetrating into, but not through, the
4 evaporite-bearing formations have little potential for dissolution. Brines coming from the Salado
5 and Castile, for example, have high total dissolved solids (TDS) and are likely to precipitate
6 halite, not dissolve more halite during passage through the borehole. Water infiltrating from the
7 surface or near-surface units may not be saturated with halite. For drillholes with a total depth in
8 halite-bearing formations, there is little potential for dissolution because the halite-bearing units
9 have very low permeability and provide little outlet for the brine created as the infiltrating water
10 fills the drillhole. ERDA 9 is the deepest drillhole in the immediate vicinity of the waste panels
11 at WIPP; the bottom of the drillhole is in the uppermost Castile Formation, with no known outlet
12 for brine at the bottom.

13 Drillholes penetrating through the evaporite-bearing formations provide possible pathways for
14 circulation of water. Underlying units in the vicinity of the WIPP site with sufficient
15 potentiometric levels or pressures to reach or move upward through the halite units generally
16 have one of two characteristics: (1) high-salinity brines, which limit or eliminate the potential
17 for dissolution of evaporites, or (2) are gas-producers. Wallace et al. (1982) analyzed natural
18 processes of dissolution of the evaporites by water from the underlying Bell Canyon Formation.
19 They concluded that brine removal in the Bell Canyon is slow, limiting the movement of
20 dissolution fronts or the creation of natural collapse features. Existing drillholes that are within
21 the boundaries of the withdrawn land and also penetrate through the evaporites are not located in
22 the immediate vicinity of the waste panels or WIPP workings.

23 There are three examples in the region that appear to demonstrate the process for *Borehole-*
24 *Induced Solution and Subsidence*, but the geohydrologic setting and drillhole completions differ
25 from those at or near the WIPP.

26 An example of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* occurred in 1980 about 160 km
27 (100 mi) southeast of the WIPP site (outside the Delaware Basin) at the Wink Sink
28 (Baumgardner et al. 1982; Johnson 1989); percolation of shallow groundwater through
29 abandoned boreholes, dissolution of the Salado, and subsidence of overlying units led to a
30 surface collapse feature 110 m (360 ft) in width and 34 m (110 ft) deep. At Wink Sink, the
31 Salado is underlain by the Tansill, Yates, and Capitan Formations, which contain vugs and
32 solution cavities through which brine could migrate. Also, the hydraulic head of the Santa Rosa
33 (the uppermost aquifer) is greater than those of the deep aquifers (Tansill, Yates, and Capitan
34 Formations), suggesting downward flow if a connection were established. A second sink (Wink
35 Sink 2) formed in May 2002, near the earlier sink (Johnson et al., in press). Its origin is similar to
36 the earlier sink. By February 2003, Wink Sink 2 had enlarged by surface collapse to a length of
37 about 305 m (1000 ft) and a width of about 198 m (650 ft).

38 A similar, though smaller, surface collapse occurred in 1998 northwest of Jal, New Mexico
39 (Powers 2000). The most likely cause of collapse appears to be dissolution of Rustler, and
40 possibly Salado, halite as relatively low salinity water from the Capitan Reef circulated through
41 breaks in the casing of a deep water supply well. Much of the annulus behind the casing through
42 the evaporite section was uncemented, and work in the well at one time indicated bent and

1 ruptured casing. The surface collapse occurred quickly, and the sink was initially about 23 m
2 (75 ft) across and a little more than 30 m (100 ft) deep. By 2001, the surface diameter was about
3 37 m (120 ft), and the sink was filled with collapse debris to about 18 m (60 ft) below the ground
4 level (Powers, in press).

5 The sinkholes near Wink, Texas, and Jal, New Mexico, occurred above the Capitan Reef (which
6 is by definition outside the Delaware Basin), and the low salinity water and relatively high
7 potentiometric levels of the Capitan Reef appear to be integral parts of the process that formed
8 these sinkholes. They are reviewed as examples of the process of evaporite dissolution and
9 subsidence related to circulation in drillholes. Nevertheless, the factors of significant low salinity
10 water and high potentiometric levels in units below the evaporites do not appear to apply at the
11 WIPP site.

12 Beauheim (1986) considered the direction of natural fluid flow through boreholes in the vicinity
13 of the WIPP. Beauheim (1986, p. 72) examined hydraulic heads measured using drill stem tests
14 in the Bell Canyon and the Culebra at well DOE-2 and concluded that the direction of flow in a
15 cased borehole open only to the Bell Canyon and the Culebra would be upward. Bell Canyon
16 waters in the vicinity of the WIPP site are saline brines (e.g., Lambert 1978; Beauheim et al.
17 1983; Mercer et al. 1987), limiting the potential for dissolution of the overlying evaporites.
18 However, dissolution of halite in the Castile and the Salado would increase the relative density of
19 the fluid in an open borehole, causing a reduction in the rate of upward flow. Potentially, the
20 direction of borehole fluid flow could reverse, but such a flow could be sustained only if
21 sufficient driving pressure, porosity, and permeability exist for fluid to flow laterally within the
22 Bell Canyon. A further potential sink for Salado-derived brine is the Capitan Limestone.
23 However, the subsurface extent of the Capitan Reef is approximately 16 km (10 mi) from the
24 WIPP at its closest point, and this unit will not provide a sink for brine derived from boreholes in
25 the vicinity of the controlled area. A similar screening argument is made for natural deep
26 dissolution in the vicinity of the WIPP (see N16, N17, and N18).

27 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* through a waste panel are considered
28 below. The principal effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* in the remaining
29 parts of the disposal system should be to change the hydraulic properties of the Culebra and other
30 rocks in the system. The features are local (limited lateral dimensions) and commonly nearly
31 circular. If subsidence occurs along the expected travel path and the transmissivity of the Culebra
32 is increased, as in the calculations conducted by Wallace (1996c), the travel times should
33 increase. If the transmissivity along the expected flow path decreased locally due to such a
34 feature, the flow path should be lengthened by travel around the feature. Thus, the effects of
35 *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* around existing abandoned boreholes, and
36 boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from PA calculations
37 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

38 SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

39 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
40 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
41 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
42 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,

1 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
2 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
3 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

4 *SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

5 Future boreholes that do not intersect the WIPP excavation do not differ in long-term behavior or
6 consequences from existing boreholes, and can be eliminated from PA on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 The condition of more apparent concern is a future borehole that intersects the WIPP excavation.
9 Seals and casings are assumed to degrade, connecting the excavation to various units. For a
10 drillhole intersecting the excavation, but not connecting to a brine reservoir or to formations
11 below the evaporites, downward flow is limited by the open volume of the disposal room(s),
12 which is dependent with time, gas generation, or brine inflow to the disposal system from the
13 Salado.

14 Maximum dissolution, and maximum increase in borehole diameter, will occur at the top of the
15 Salado; dissolution will decrease with depth as the percolating water becomes salt saturated.
16 Eventually, degraded casing and concrete plug products, clays, and other materials will fill the
17 borehole. Long-term flow through a borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in
18 disturbed performance calculations by assuming that the borehole is eventually filled by such
19 materials, which have the properties of a silty sand (see Section 6.4.7.2). However, these
20 calculations assume that the borehole diameter does not increase with time. Under the conditions
21 assumed in the SCR for the CCA for an E2 drilling event at 1,000 years, about 1,000 m³ (35,316
22 ft³) would be dissolved from the lower Rustler and upper Salado Formations. If the dissolved
23 area is approximately cylindrical or conical around the borehole, and the collapse/subsidence
24 propagates upward as occurred in breccia pipes (e.g., Snyder and Gard 1982), the diameter of the
25 collapsed or subsided area through the Culebra and other units would be a few tens of meters
26 across. Changes in hydraulic parameters for this small zone should slow travel times for any
27 hypothesized radionuclide release, as discussed for HCN occurrences. This does not change the
28 argument for low consequence due to *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* for these
29 circumstances.

30 If a drillhole through a waste panel and into deeper evaporites intercepts a Castile brine reservoir,
31 the brine has little or no capability of dissolving additional halite. The Castile brine flow is
32 considered elsewhere as part of disturbed performance. There is, however, no *Borehole-Induced*
33 *Solution and Subsidence* under this circumstance, and therefore there is no effect on
34 performance due to this EP.

35 If a borehole intercepts a waste panel and also interconnects with formations below the evaporite
36 section, fluid flow up or down is determined by several conditions and may change over a period
37 of time (e.g., as dissolution increases the fluid density in the borehole. Fluid flow downward is
38 not a concern for performance, as fluid velocities in units such as the Bell Canyon are slow and
39 should not be of concern for performance (e.g., II-G-12, 3.12.3.3.). For dissolution at the top of
40 the evaporite section (as with boreholes considered under HCN), the process can develop a
41 localized area around the borehole in which the hydraulic parameters for the Culebra and other

1 units are altered. As with boreholes considered for HCN, the local change in hydraulic
2 parameters, if it occurs along the expected flow path, would be expected to cause little change in
3 travel time and should increase the travel time.

4 In summary, the effects of ***Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*** around future abandoned
5 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
6 performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-5.2.1.11 FEP Number: H35
8 FEP Title: ***Borehole Induced Mineralization***

9 SCR-5.2.1.11.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
10 SO-C (Future)

11 *The effects of **Borehole -Induced Mineralization**, associated with existing, near-future, and*
12 *future abandoned boreholes, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
13 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

14 SCR-5.2.1.11.2 Summary of New Information

15 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
16 transport between any intersected zones. Movement of compositionally different groundwater
17 into the Culebra may lead to mineral precipitation, potentially changing porosity and
18 permeability within the unit, and affecting contaminant transport. The potential effects of
19 borehole-induced brine movement into the Culebra dolomite and mineral precipitation/
20 dissolution are discussed in FEPs H31 through H36. The original FEP description was slightly
21 modified to include an evaluation of the effects of mineral precipitation on matrix diffusion.

22 SCR-5.2.1.11.3 Screening Argument

23 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
24 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
25 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
26 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

27 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
28 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus
29 alter radionuclide migration rates in these units.

30 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
31 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
32 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
33 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
34 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
35 precipitation.

1 SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1 *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

2 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a borehole may result in changes
3 in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. For example:

- 4 • Limited calcite precipitation may occur as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately
5 surrounding the borehole, and calcite dissolution may occur as the brines migrate away
6 from the borehole due to variations in water chemistry along the flow path.
- 7 • Gypsum may be dissolved as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately surrounding the
8 borehole but may precipitate as the waters migrate through the Culebra.

9 The effects of these mass transfer processes on groundwater flow depend on the original
10 permeability structure of the Culebra rocks and the location of the mass transfer. The volumes of
11 minerals that may precipitate and/or dissolve in the Culebra as a result of the injection of Castile
12 or Salado brine through a borehole will not affect the existing spatial variability in the
13 permeability field significantly.

14 Predicted radionuclide transport rates in the Culebra assume that the dolomite matrix is
15 diffusively accessed by the contaminants. The possible inhibition of matrix diffusion by
16 secondary mineral precipitation on fracture walls, due to mixing between brines and Culebra
17 porewater, was addressed by Wang (1998). Wang showed that the volume of secondary
18 minerals precipitated due to this mechanism was too small to significantly affect matrix porosity
19 and accessibility.

20 Consequently, the effects of ***Borehole -Induced Mineralization*** on permeability and
21 groundwater flow within the Culebra, as a result of brines introduced via any existing abandoned
22 boreholes, and boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from
23 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 SCR-5.2.1.11.4 Future Human EPs

25 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
26 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
27 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
28 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
29 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
30 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
31 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

32 SCR-5.2.1.11.4.1 *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

33 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a future borehole may result in
34 changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. However, the effects
35 of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through a future borehole in the controlled area will
36 be similar to the effects of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through an existing or near-
37 future borehole (see FEP H32 and H33). Thus, ***Borehole-Induced Mineralization*** associated

1 with flow through a future borehole has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
2 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 SCR-5.2.1.12 FEP Number: H36
4 FEP Title: ***Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes***

5 SCR-5.2.1.12.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
6 DP (Future)
7 SO-C for units other than the Culebra

8 *Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of long-term flow*
9 *associated with HCN, and future abandoned boreholes are accounted for in PA calculations.*

10 SCR-5.2.1.12.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified. This FEP has been modified for editorial purposes.

12 SCR-5.2.1.12.3 Screening Argument

13 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
14 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
15 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
16 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

17 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
18 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus
19 alter radionuclide migration rates in these units.

20 SCR-5.2.1.12.3.1 *Geochemical Effects of Borehole Flow*

21 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
22 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such
23 geochemical changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the
24 affected units if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area, or if they occur as
25 a result of flow through existing boreholes within the controlled area through their effects on
26 colloid transport and sorption.

27 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
28 system. Thus, consistent with the discussion for ***Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes***
29 (H24), colloid transport as a result of flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes
30 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
31 the disposal system.

32 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
33 sorption model used accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of
34 flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes.

1 Consistent with the screening discussion in H24, the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey
2 Lake inside the controlled area as a result of flow through existing and near-future abandoned
3 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
4 performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
5 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
6 performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-5.2.1.12.4 Future Human EPs

8 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
9 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
10 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
11 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
12 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
13 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
14 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

15 SCR-5.2.1.12.4.1 *Geochemical Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes*

16 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in **Borehole-Induced**
17 **Geochemical Changes** in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such
18 geochemical changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the
19 affected units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

20 The waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Colloid
21 transport within the Culebra as a result of long-term flow associated with future abandoned
22 boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region are accounted for in PA calculations, as
23 described in Sections 6.4.3.6 and 6.4.6.2.1. Consistent with the discussion in H24, colloid
24 transport as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes that do not intersect the waste
25 disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
26 performance of the disposal system. The Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal
27 system and it is the most likely unit through which significant radionuclide transport could occur.
28 Therefore, colloid transport in units other than the Culebra, as a result of flow through future
29 abandoned boreholes, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
30 to the performance of the disposal system.

31 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
32 sorption model accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of flow
33 through future abandoned boreholes.

34 Consistent with the screening discussion in H24, the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey
35 Lake within the controlled area as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes have been
36 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
37 disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been
38 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
39 disposal system.

1 ***SCR-5.2.2 Excavation-Induced Flow***

2 SCR-5.2.2.1 FEP Number: H37

3 FEP Title: *Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Mining*

4 SCR-5.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)

5 DP (Future)

6 *Changes in groundwater flow due to HCN, and future potash mining are accounted for in PA*
7 *calculations.*

8 SCR-5.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 Changes in groundwater flow due to HCN, and future mining are included in PA calculations of
10 groundwater flow and transport through the Culebra. The FEP description and screening
11 argument have been modified slightly to reflect recent activities, but the screening decision is
12 unchanged.

13 SCR-5.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument

14 Excavation activities may result in hydrological disturbances of the disposal system. Subsidence
15 associated with excavations may affect groundwater flow patterns through increased hydraulic
16 conductivity within and between units. Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may also
17 result in changes in brine density and geochemistry in the disposal system.

18 SCR-5.2.2.1.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

19 Currently, potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of
20 the WIPP that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system.
21 Potash is mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the
22 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt in the Salado is expected to continue in the vicinity of the
23 WIPP (see Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the
24 vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be extracted in the near future.

25 SCR-5.2.2.1.3.2 *Hydrogeological Effects of Mining*

26 Potash mining in the Delaware Basin typically involves constructing vertical shafts to the
27 elevation of the ore zone and then extracting the minerals in an excavation that follows the trend
28 of the ore body. Potash has been extracted using conventional room and pillar mining,
29 secondary mining where pillars are removed, and modified long-wall mining methods. Mining
30 techniques used include drilling and blasting (used for mining langbeinite) and continuous
31 mining (commonly used for mining sylvite). The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-19)
32 reported investigations of subsidence associated with potash mining operations located near the
33 WIPP. The reported maximum total subsidence at potash mines is about 1.5 m (5 ft),
34 representing up to 66 percent of initial excavation height, with an observed angle of draw from
35 the vertical at the edge of the excavation of 58 degrees. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994 pp. 2-22
36 to 2-23) found no evidence that subsidence over local potash mines had caused fracturing
37 sufficient to connect the mining horizon to water-bearing units or the surface. However,

1 subsidence and fracturing associated with mining in the McNutt in the vicinity of the WIPP may
2 allow increased recharge to the Rustler units and affect the lateral hydraulic conductivity of
3 overlying units, such as the Culebra, which could influence the direction and magnitude of fluid
4 flow within the disposal system. Such ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*** are
5 accounted for in calculations of undisturbed performance of the disposal system. The effects of
6 any increased recharge that may be occurring are in effect included by using heads measured in
7 2000 (which should reflect that recharge) to calibrate Culebra transmissivity fields and calculate
8 transport through those fields (Beauheim 2002). Changes (increases) in Culebra transmissivity
9 are incorporated directly in the modeling of flow and transport in the Culebra (see Section
10 6.4.6.2.3).

11 Potash mining, and the associated processing outside the controlled area, have changed fluid
12 densities within the Culebra, as demonstrated by the areas of higher densities around boreholes
13 WIPP-27 and WIPP-29 (Davies 1989, p. 43). Transient groundwater flow calculations (Davies
14 1989, pp. 77 - 81) show that brine density variations to the west of the WIPP site caused by
15 historical and current potash processing operations will not persist because the rate of
16 groundwater flow in this area is fast enough to flush the high density groundwaters to the Pecos
17 River. These calculations also show that accounting for the existing brine density variations in
18 the region east of the WIPP site, where hydraulic conductivities are low, would have little effect
19 on the direction or rate of groundwater flow. Therefore, changes in fluid densities from
20 historical and current Human EPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 The distribution of existing leases and potash grades suggests that near-future mining will take
23 place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see CCA Appendix DEL). A localized
24 increase in fluid density in the Culebra, in the mined region or elsewhere outside the controlled
25 area, would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east). A
26 comparison of the relative magnitudes of the pressure gradient and the density gradient (based on
27 an analysis identical to that presented for fluid leakage to the Culebra through boreholes) shows
28 that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

29 SCR-5.2.2.1.4 Future Human EPs

30 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
31 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
32 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
33 area is discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence modeling of future
34 mining are provided in 40 CFR § 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be limited to
35 changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system. Thus,
36 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*** within the
37 controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the disturbed performance of the disposal
38 system (see Section 6.4.6.2.3).

1 SCR-5.2.2.2 FEP Number: H38
2 FEP Title: *Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining*

3 SCR-5.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 *Changes in geochemistry due to HCN potash mining have been eliminated from PA calculations*
6 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Changes in*
7 *geochemistry due to future mining have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory*
8 *grounds.*

9 SCR-5.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

10 The only natural resource being mined underground currently near WIPP is potash in the
11 McNutt, and it is the only mineral considered for future mining. Potash mining is also the only
12 excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP that could affect
13 hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. It appears unlikely that
14 underground mining will impact the site geochemistry during the time of passive institutional
15 controls, and a conclusion of no near-term consequence is screened from future events as per 40
16 CFR § 194.25. Changes have been made to the screening argument. However, the screening
17 decision remains the same.

18 SCR-5.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument

19 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

20 Potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP
21 that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. Potash is
22 mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (1.5 mi) from the boundaries of the
23 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt in the Salado is expected to continue in the vicinity of the
24 WIPP (see Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the
25 vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be extracted in the near future.

26 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.2 *Geochemical Effects of Mining*

27 Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may result in geochemical disturbances of the
28 disposal system. Some waters from the Culebra reflect the influence of current potash mining,
29 having elevated potassium to sodium ratios. However, potash mining has had no significant
30 effect on the geochemical characteristics of the disposal system. Solution mining, which
31 involves the injection of freshwater to dissolve the ore body, can be used for extracting sylvite.
32 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in greater detail by
33 D'Appolonia (1982). D'Appolonia noted that attempts to solution mine sylvite in the Delaware
34 Basin failed due to low ore grade, thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and
35 pumping injection water. See discussion for potash mining FEP H13. Thus, *Changes in*
36 *Groundwater Flow Due to Mining* (HCN) have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
37 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.3 *Future Human EPs*

2 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
 3 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
 4 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
 5 area is discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence modeling of future
 6 mining are provided in 40 CFR § 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be limited to
 7 changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system. Thus,
 8 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow due to mining within the
 9 controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the disturbed performance of the disposal
 10 system (see Section 6.4.6.2.3). Other potential effects, such as ***Changes in Groundwater Flow***
 11 ***Due to Mining***, have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

12 SCR-5.2.2.3 FEP Number H58
 13 FEP Title: ***Solution Mining for Potash***

14 SCR-5.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
 15 SO-R (future)

16 *HCN, and future **Solution Mining for Potash** has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 17 *regulatory grounds. HCN, and future solution mining for other resources have been eliminated*
 18 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

19 SCR-5.2.2.3.2 Summary of New Information

20 In the CCA, ***Solution Mining for Potash*** was not identified as a separate FEP, although all
 21 components of the solution mining process were accounted for in FEPs screening, albeit in a
 22 piecemeal fashion. For example, the drilling of the borehole necessary for solution injection or
 23 effluent recovery is addressed in FEP H8, ***Drilling For Other Resources***, mainly because the
 24 physical and mechanical effects of the drilling activity do not vary based on the type of resource
 25 being sought, nor on the final intended use of the borehole; e.g., disposal well, injection well,
 26 solution mining, or oil and gas extraction. The removal of an ore as a result of solution mining is
 27 ultimately the same as if conventional mining processes had removed the ore. Potash mining
 28 using conventional methods is addressed in FEP H13, ***Conventional Underground Potash***
 29 ***Mining***. The ultimate effect of such ore body removal is believed to be the eventual subsidence
 30 of the overlying units and the associated impact upon hydraulic conductivity. This has been
 31 demonstrated to have a negligible effect on performance of the WIPP, and is in fact accounted
 32 for in PA by EPA’s requisite treatment of potash mining above the waste area.

33 Although the original FEP baseline considered different types of mineral and petroleum resource
 34 exploration/exploitation, it did not initially consider the possibility of brine mining (solution
 35 mining), even though this has occurred in the Delaware Basin. EPA noted this oversight in their
 36 March 1997 letter requesting additional information regarding the CCA (EPA 1997). In
 37 response to this request, the DOE submitted two memos (Hicks 1997a, 1997b) that addressed
 38 both ***Solution Mining for Potash*** and solution mining for brine. In EPA’s TSD for §194.32,
 39 “Scope of Performance Assessments,” EPA noted that these memos adequately supported the
 40 screening decisions presented in the CCA.

1 For CRA-2004, solution mining has been explicitly represented within the FEPs baseline through
 2 the additions of FEP H58, *Solution Mining for Potash* and FEP H59, *Solution Mining for*
 3 *Other Resources*. The reassessment of these EPs confirms that no significant developments
 4 have occurred since the CCA, and the arguments used by Hicks remain valid. The creation of
 5 these FEPs will aid in clarifying and separating the activities related to solution mining from
 6 conventional mining for potash as addressed in FEP H13.

7 SCR-5.2.2.3.3 Screening Argument

8 Currently, no *Solution Mining for Potash* occurs in the Carlsbad Potash District (CPD). The
 9 prospect of using solution-mining techniques for extracting potash has been identified in the
 10 region, but has not been implemented. A pilot plant for secondary solution mining of sylvite in
 11 the Clayton Basin, just north of the Delaware Basin was permitted, and concept planning took
 12 place during the mid-1990s and was noted by the EPA in their Response to Comments to the
 13 CCA (EPA 1998b). Five years later, this pilot project has yet to begin. Therefore, it is
 14 premature to consider this an operational solution mining activity. More importantly, the
 15 proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin.

16 The potash reserves evaluated by Griswold and Griswold (1999) and NMBMMR (1995) at
 17 WIPP are of economic importance in only two ore zones; the 4th and the 10th and contain two
 18 minerals of economic importance, langbeinite and sylvite. The ore in the 10th ore zone is
 19 primarily sylvite with some langbeinite and the ore in the 4th zone is langbeinite with some
 20 sylvite. Langbeinite falls between gypsum and polyhalite in solubility and dissolves at a rate
 21 1000 times slower than sylvite (Heyn 1997). Halite, the predominate gangue mineral present, is
 22 much more soluble than the langbeinite. Due to the insolubility of langbeinite, sylvite is the only
 23 ore that could be mined using a solution mining process. Mining for sylvite by solutioning would
 24 cause the langbeinite to be lost because conventional mining could not be done in conjunction
 25 with a solution mining process.

26 Communiqués with IMC Global (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003), indicate that rock temperature is
 27 critical to the success of a solution-mining endeavor. IMC Global's solution mines in Michigan
 28 and Saskatchewan are at depths around 914 m (3,000 ft) or greater, at which rock temperatures
 29 are higher. The ore zones at WIPP are shallow, at depths of 457 to 549 m (1500 to 1800 ft), with
 30 fairly cool rock temperatures. David Prichard of IMC Global states that solution mining is
 31 energy intensive and the cool temperature of the rock would add to the energy costs. In addition,
 32 variable concentrations of confounding minerals (such as kainite and leonite) will cause
 33 problems with the brine chemistry.

34 Typically, solution mining is used for potash:

- 35 • when deposits are at depths in excess of 914 m (3000 ft) and rock temperatures are high
- 36 or are geologically too complex to mine profitably using conventional underground
- 37 mining techniques;
- 38 • to recover the potash pillars at the end of a mine's life; or

- 1 • when a mine is unintentionally flooded with waters from underlying or overlying rock
2 strata and conventional mining is no longer feasible.

3 Douglas W. Heyn (chief chemist of IMC Kalium) provided written testimony to EPA related to
4 the Agency's rulemaking activities on the CCA. Heyn concluded that "the rational choice for
5 extracting WIPP potash ore reserves would be by conventional room and pillar mechanical
6 means" (Heyn 1997). It is the opinion of IMC Global that no company will ever attempt solution
7 mining of the ores in or near the WIPP (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003).

8 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in detail by D'Appolonia
9 (1982) and evaluated the possible effects of *Solution Mining for Potash* or other evaporite
10 minerals. According to D'Appolonia (1982), and in agreement with Heyn (1997) of IMC Global
11 Inc, solution mining of langbeinite is not technically feasible because the ore is less soluble than
12 the surrounding evaporite minerals. Solution mining of sylvite was unsuccessfully attempted in
13 the past by the Potash Company of America and Continental Potash, both ore bodies currently
14 owned by Mississippi Chemical. Failure of solution mining was attributed to low ore grade,
15 thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and pumping injection water. Unavailability
16 of water in the area would also impede implementation of this technique. For these reasons,
17 solution mining is not currently used in the Carlsbad Potash District.

18 Serious technical and economic obstacles exist that render *Solution Mining for Potash* very
19 unlikely in the vicinity of the WIPP. Expectedly, no operational example of this technology
20 exists in the CPD; that is, *Solution Mining for Potash* is not considered a current practice in the
21 area. For this reason, consideration of solution mining on the disposal system in the future may
22 be excluded on regulatory grounds. For example, the EPA stated in their Response to
23 Comments, Section 8, Issue GG (EPA 1998b):

24 ...However, the Agency emphasizes that, in accordance with the WIPP compliance criteria,
25 solution mining does not need to be included in the PA. As previously discussed, potash solution
26 mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin. Section 194.32(b) of the rule limits
27 assessment of mining effects to excavation mining. Thus the solution mining scenarios proposed
28 are excluded on regulatory grounds after repository closure. Prior to or soon after disposal,
29 solution mining is an activity that could be considered under Section 194.32(c). However, DOE
30 found that potash solution mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin; and one pilot
31 project examining solution mining in the Basin is not substantive evidence that such mining is
32 expected to occur in the near future. (Even if mining were assumed to occur in the near future, the
33 proposed scenarios would not be possible because, even though solution mining might occur, there
34 would be no intruding borehole to provide a pathway into the repository: active institutional
35 controls would preclude such drilling during the first 100 years after disposal.) Furthermore,
36 Section 194.33(d) states that PA need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource
37 recovery (e.g. solution mining) after a borehole is drilled in the future.

38 No new data or information has become available that compromise, reduce, or invalidate the
39 project's position on whether *Solution Mining for Potash* should be included in the PA
40 calculations. Therefore, conventional mining activities will continue to be incorporated into the
41 WIPP PA as directed by the EPA Compliance Application Guidance (CAG) (EPA 1996c). It
42 remains to be seen if a viable potash solution mining project (or others like it) ever progress
43 beyond the planning phase. Construction of a facility for solution mining is an expensive
44 undertaking, and its use as a final recovery method implies that marginal (residual) ore quantities

1 are available. Because the Carlsbad Potash District mines are in their mature stages (declining)
2 of production, the significant financing required for a solution mining facility may not become
3 available. Nonetheless, at the time of this FEP reassessment, this technology is not being
4 employed. Therefore, a screening based on the future states assumption at 40 CFR § 194.25(a) is
5 appropriate for this mining technique. Further, the proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin
6 making it outside the scope of consideration.

7 SCR-5.2.2.4 FEP Number: H59
8 FEP Title: *Solution Mining for Other Resources*

9 SCR-5.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
10 SO-C (future)

11 *HCN, and future **Solution Mining for Potash** has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
12 *regulatory grounds. HCN, and future **Solution Mining for Other Resources** have been*
13 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
14 *disposal system.*

15 SCR-5.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information

16 See summary for H58.

17 SCR-5.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument

18 Brine wells (solution mining for brine) exist within the Delaware Basin, although none within
19 the vicinity of the WIPP. Sulfur extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and
20 continued for three decades at the Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas.
21 Solution mining for the purposes of creating a storage cavity has not occurred within the New
22 Mexico portion of the Delaware Basin.

23 SCR-5.2.2.4.4 Solution Mining for Brine

24 Oil and gas reserves in the Delaware Basin are located in structures within the Delaware
25 Mountain Group and lower stratigraphic units. Boreholes drilled to reach these horizons pass
26 through the Salado and Castile Formations that comprise thick halite and other evaporite units.
27 To avoid dissolution of the halite units during drilling and prior to casing of the borehole, the
28 fluid used for lubrication, rotating the drilling-bit cutters, and transporting cuttings (drilling mud)
29 must be saturated with respect to halite. Most oil- and gas-field drilling operations in the
30 Delaware Basin therefore use saturated brine (10 to 10.5 pounds per gallon) as a drilling fluid
31 until reaching the Bell Canyon Formation, where intermediate casing is set.

32 One method of providing saturated brine for drilling operations is solution mining, whereby fresh
33 water is pumped into the Salado Formation, allowed to reach saturation with respect to halite,
34 and then recovered. This manufactured brine is then transported to the drilling site by water
35 tanker.

36 Two principal techniques are used for solution mining; single-borehole operations, and doublet
37 or two-borehole operations.

1 In single-borehole operations, a borehole is drilled into the upper part of the halite unit. After
 2 casing and cementing this portion of the borehole, the borehole is extended, uncased into the
 3 halite formation. An inner pipe is installed from the surface to the base of this uncased portion
 4 of the borehole. During operation, fresh water is pumped down the annulus of the borehole.
 5 This dissolves halite over the uncased portion of the borehole, and saturated brine is forced up
 6 the inner tube to the surface.

7 In doublet operations, a pair of boreholes are drilled, cased and cemented into the upper part of
 8 the halite unit. The base of the production well is set some feet below the base of the injection
 9 well. In the absence of natural fractures or other connections between the boreholes,
 10 hydrofracturing is used to induce fractures around the injection well. During operation, fresh
 11 water is pumped down the injection well. This initially dissolves halite from the walls of the
 12 fractures and the resulting brine is then pumped from the production well. After a period of
 13 operation a cavity develops between the boreholes as the halite between fractures is removed.
 14 Because of its lower density, fresh water injected into this cavity will rise to the top and dissolve
 15 halite from the roof of the cavity. As the brine density increases it sinks within the cavern and
 16 saturated brine is extracted from the production well.

17 SCR-5.2.2.4.4.1 *Current Brine Wells within the Vicinity of WIPP*

18 Brine wells are classified as Class II injection wells. In the Delaware Basin, the process includes
 19 injecting fresh water into a salt formation to create a saturated brine solution which is then
 20 extracted and utilized as a drilling agent. These wells are tracked by the Delaware Basin Drilling
 21 Surveillance Program on a continuing basis. Supplemental information provided to the EPA in
 22 1997 showed 11 brine wells in the Delaware Basin. Since that time, additional information has
 23 shown that there are 15 brine wells within the Delaware basin, of which four are plugged and
 24 abandoned. This results in 11 currently active brine wells. Table SCR-3 provides information
 25 on these wells.

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Eddy	22S-26E-36	3001521842	City of Carlsbad #WS-1	Key Energy Services	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-03	3001520331	Tracy #3	Ray Westall	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001522574	Eugenie #WS-1	I & W Inc	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001523031	Eugenie #WS-2	I & W Inc	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-03	4230110142	Lineberry Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-82	4230130680	Chapman Ford #BR1	Herricks & Son Co.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 33-80	4230180318	Mentone Brine Station #1D	Basic Energy Services	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-28	4230180319	East Mentone Brine Station #1	Permian Brine Sales, Inc.	Plugged Brine Well

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status — Continued

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Loving	Blk 01-83	4230180320	North Mentone #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 56-30	4238900408	Orla Brine Station #1D	Mesquite SWD Inc.	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 04-08	4238920100	North Pecos Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 07-21	4238980476	Coyanosa Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 17-20	4247531742	Pyote Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 01-13	4247534514	Quito West Unit #207	Seaboard Oil Co.	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 34-174	4247582265	Barstow Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well

1 While these wells are within the Delaware Basin, none are within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
 2 nearest brine well to the WIPP is the Eugenie #WS-1, located within the city limits of Carlsbad,
 3 New Mexico. This well is approximately 48 km (30 mi) from the WIPP site.

4 **SCR-5.2.2.4.5 Solution Mining for Other Minerals**

5 Currently, there are no ongoing solution mining activities within the vicinity of WIPP. The
 6 Rustler Springs sulfur mine located in Culberson County, Texas, began operations in 1969 and
 7 continued until it was officially closed in 1999. This mine used the Frasch process to extract
 8 molten sulfur (Cunningham 1999).

9 **SCR-5.2.2.4.6 Solution Mining for Gas Storage**

10 No gas storage cavities have been solution mined within the New Mexico portion of the
 11 Delaware Basin. Five gas storage facilities exist within the general vicinity of the WIPP;
 12 however only one is within the Delaware basin. This one New Mexico Delaware Basin facility
 13 uses a depleted gas reservoir for storage and containment; it was not solution mined (Appendix
 14 DATA).

15 **SCR-5.2.2.4.7 Solution Mining for Disposal**

16 Solution mining can be used to create a disposal cavity in bedded salt. Such disposal cavities can
 17 be used for the disposal of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) or other wastes. No
 18 such cavities have been mined or operated within the vicinity of the WIPP.

19 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8 Effects of Solution Mining**

20 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.1 Subsidence**

21 Regardless of whether the single-borehole or two-borehole technique is used for solution mining,
 22 the result is a subsurface cavity which could collapse and lead to subsidence of overlying strata.
 23 Gray (1991) quoted earlier analyses that show cavity stability is relatively high if the cavity has

1 at least 15 m (50 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of cavity volume (26.9 m per
2 50,000 m³). There are two studies - discussed below - of the size of solution mining cavities in
3 the Carlsbad region. These studies concern the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine Wells and the Carlsbad
4 Brine Well and show that neither of these cavities are currently close to this critical ratio, but that
5 subsidence in the future, given continued brine extraction, is a possibility.

6 Hickerson (1991) considered the potential for subsidence resulting from operation of the
7 Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells, where fresh water is injected into a salt section at a depth of 178
8 m (583 ft) and brine is recovered through a borehole at a depth of 179 m (587 ft). The boreholes
9 are 100 m (327 ft) apart. Hickerson noted that the fresh water, being less dense than brine, tends
10 to move upwards, causing the dissolution cavern to grow preferentially upwards. Thus, the
11 dissolution cavern at the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells is approximately triangular in cross-
12 section, being bounded by the top of the salt section and larger near the injection well.
13 Hickerson estimated that brine production from 1979 until 1991 had created a cavern of about
14 $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$). The size of this cavern was estimated as 107 m (350 ft) by 47 m
15 (153 ft) at the upper surface of the cavern with a depth of 39 m (127 ft).

16 Gray (1991) investigated the potential for collapse and subsidence at the Carlsbad Brine Well.
17 Based on estimated production rates between 1976 and 1991, approximately $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times$
18 10^6 ft^3) of salt has been dissolved at this site. The well depth is 216 m (710 ft) and thus there are
19 about 64 m (210 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of capacity (112 m of overburden per
20 50,000 m³ of capacity).

21 Gray (1991) also estimated the time required for the cavity at the Carlsbad Brine Well to reach
22 the critical ratio. At an average cavity growth rate of $6.4 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per year ($2.25 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per
23 year), a further 50 years of operation would be required before cavity stability was reduced to
24 levels of concern. A similar calculation for the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine well, based on an
25 overburden of 140 m (460 ft) and an estimated average cavity growth rate of $7.9 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per
26 year ($2.8 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per year), shows that a further 15 years of operation is required before the
27 cavity reaches the critical ratio.

28 SCR-5.2.2.4.8.2 *Hydrogeological Effects*

29 In regions where solution mining takes place, the hydrogeology could be affected in a number
30 ways:

- 31 • Subsidence above a large dissolution cavity could change the vertical and lateral
32 hydraulic conductivity of overlying units.
- 33 • Extraction of fresh water from aquifers for solution mining could cause local changes in
34 pressure gradients.
- 35 • Loss of injected fresh water or extracted brine to overlying units could cause local
36 changes in pressure gradients.

37 The potential for subsidence to take place above solution mining operations in the region of
38 Carlsbad is discussed above. Some subsidence could occur in the future if brine operations

1 continue at existing wells. Resulting fracturing may change permeabilities locally in overlying
2 formations. However, because of the restricted scale of the solution mining at a particular site,
3 and the distances between such wells, such fracturing will have no significant effect on
4 hydrogeology near the WIPP.

5 Solution mining operations in the Delaware Basin extract water from shallow aquifers so that,
6 even if large drawdowns are permitted, the effects on the hydrogeology will be limited to a
7 relatively small area around the operation. Since all the active operations are more than 32 km
8 (20 mi) from the WIPP, there will be no significant effects on the hydrogeology near the WIPP.

9 Discharge plans for solution mining operations typically include provision for annual mechanical
10 integrity tests at one and one-half the normal operating pressure for four hours (OCD 1994).
11 Thus, the potential for loss of integrity and consequent leakage of freshwater or brine to
12 overlying formations is low. If, despite these annual tests, large water losses did take place, from
13 either injection or production wells, the result would be low brine yields and remedial actions
14 would most likely be taken by the operators.

15 SCR-5.2.2.4.8.3 *Geochemical Effects*

16 Solution mining operations could affect the geochemistry of surface or subsurface water near the
17 operation if there were brine leakage from storage tanks or production wells. Discharge plans for
18 solution mining operations specify the measures to be taken to prevent leakage and to mitigate
19 the effects of any that do take place. These measures include berms around tanks and annual
20 mechanical integrity testing of wells (OCD 1994). The potential for changes in geochemistry is
21 therefore low, and any brine losses that did take place would be limited by remedial actions
22 taken by the operator. In the event of leakage from a production well, the effect on geochemistry
23 of overlying formation waters would be localized and, given the distance of such wells from the
24 WIPP site, such leakage would have no significant effect on geochemistry near the WIPP.

25 SCR-5.2.2.4.9 *Conclusion of Low Consequence*

26 Brine production through solution mining takes place in the Delaware Basin, and the DOE
27 assumes it will continue in the near future.

28 Despite oil and gas exploration and production taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP site, the
29 nearest operating solution mine is more than 32 km (20 mi) from the WIPP site. These locations
30 are too far from the WIPP site for any changes in hydrogeology or geochemistry, from
31 subsidence or fresh water or brine leakage, to affect the performance of the disposal system.
32 Thus, the effects of historical, current, near-future, and future ***Solution Mining for Other***
33 ***Resources*** in the Delaware Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
34 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.2.3** *Explosion-Induced Flow*

2 SCR-5.2.3.1 FEP Number: H39

3 FEPs Title: ***Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Explosions***

4 SCR-5.2.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
5 SO-R (Future)

6 *Changes in groundwater flow due to historical explosions have been eliminated from PA*
7 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*
8 *Changes in groundwater flow due to future explosions have been eliminated from PA*
9 *calculations on regulatory grounds.*

10 SCR-5.2.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

12 SCR-5.2.3.1.3 Screening Argument

13 SCR-5.2.3.1.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

14 The small-scale explosions that have been used in the Delaware Basin to fracture oil- and
15 natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery have been too deep to have disturbed the
16 hydrology of the disposal system (see FEP H19).

17 Also, as discussed in *Underground Nuclear Device Testing* (H20), the Delaware Basin has been
18 used for an isolated nuclear test (Project Gnome), approximately 13 km (8 mi) southwest of the
19 WIPP waste disposal region. An induced zone of increased permeability was observed to extend
20 46 m (150 ft) laterally from the point of the explosion. The increase in permeability was
21 primarily associated with motions and separations along bedding planes, the major pre-existing
22 weaknesses in the rock. This region of increased permeability is too far from the WIPP site to
23 have had a significant effect on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal system. Thus,
24 ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions*** in the past have been eliminated from PA
25 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 SCR-5.2.3.1.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

27 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of
28 future human actions to mining and drilling. Also, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs
29 need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling
30 of a future borehole. Therefore, ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions*** in the future
31 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.3 Geomorphological Events and Processes**

2 ***SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes***

3 SCR-5.3.1.1 FEP Number: H40
4 FEP Title: ***Land Use Changes***

5 SCR-5.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
6 SO-R (Future)

7 ***Land Use Changes*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 SCR-5.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
10 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
11 This FEP discussion has been updated with additional information about industrial land uses in
12 the region.

13 SCR-5.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument

14 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
15 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
16 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
17 through H46.

18 SCR-5.3.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

19 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
20 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
21 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
22 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
23 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
24 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
25 potash and WIPP) and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
26 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

27 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
28 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately
29 10 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash
30 Draw, and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in
31 Nash Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East
32 site, the youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
33 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
34 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
35 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
36 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
37 Culebra flow models. The Culebra transmissivity fields developed for the CRA used water

1 levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus, the effects of brine disposal
2 at the tailings piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are
3 expected to continue in the near future.

4 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
5 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
6 Therefore, consistent with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), **Land Use**
7 **Changes** in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA
8 calculations on regulatory grounds.

9 SCR-5.3.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

10 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
11 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
12 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
13 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no
14 future **Land Use Changes** need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
15 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

16 SCR-5.3.1.2 FEP Number: H41

17 FEP Title: Surface Disruptions

18 Future **Surface Disruptions** not affecting hydrogeologic or geologic conditions have been
19 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Future tailings ponds, if situated in
20 Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta) heads, similar to existing ones.
21 Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be expected to alter Culebra heads
22 because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate through the low-permeability
23 lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the Culebra during the 100 years or
24 less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA calculations already include the
25 present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as well as the effects of future
26 potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much greater potential to alter flow
27 than changes in head), future potash tailings ponds may be screened out on the basis of low
28 consequence.

29 SCR-5.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN) 30 SO-R (Future)

31 *The effects of HCN **Surface Disruptions** have been screened out on the basis of low consequence*
32 *if they have no potential to affect the disposal system, or are implicitly included in PA*
33 *calculations when they might affect the disposal system. The effects of future **Surface***
34 ***Disruptions** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

35 SCR-5.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

36 The screening argument for **Surface Disruptions** has changed. Per the original screening
37 decision, surface activities in the vicinity of the WIPP site have disrupted the surface, but most
38 surface activities have no potential to affect the disposal system and are, therefore, screened out
39 on the basis of low consequence. However, the effects of the activity capable of altering the

1 disposal system (disposal of potash effluent) are included in our modeling of current conditions
2 (i.e., heads) at and around the site. Therefore, the screening decision has been changed from
3 SO-C to UP for HCN. Discussion regarding these anthropogenic effects is found in Section
4 2.2.1.4.2.2 of the CRA. There are no planned changes to land use in the vicinity of the WIPP in
5 the near future, and future events that might disrupt the surface at the WIPP site are screened out
6 on the basis of regulatory criteria.

7 SCR-5.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument

8 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
9 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
10 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
11 through H46.

12 SCR-5.3.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

13 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
14 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
15 Additionally, a number of *Archeological Investigations* have taken place within the controlled
16 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
17 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
18 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
19 potash and WIPP) and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
20 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

21 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
22 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately 10
23 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash Draw,
24 and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in Nash
25 Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East site, the
26 youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
27 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
28 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
29 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
30 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
31 Culebra flow models. The Culebra transmissivity fields developed for the CRA used water
32 levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus, the effects of brine disposal
33 at the tailings piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are
34 expected to continue in the near future.

35 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
36 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
37 Therefore, consistent with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), *Land Use*
38 *Changes* in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA
39 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 SCR-5.3.1.2.5 Future Human EPs

2 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
3 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
4 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
5 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no
6 future **Land Use Changes** need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
7 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 Future **Surface Disruptions** not affecting hydrogeologic or geologic conditions have been
9 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Future tailings ponds, if situated in
10 Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta) heads, similar to existing ones.
11 Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be expected to alter Culebra heads
12 because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate through the low-permeability
13 lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the Culebra during the 100 years or
14 less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA calculations already include the
15 present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as well as the effects of future
16 potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much greater potential to alter flow
17 than changes in head), future potash tailings ponds may be screened out on the basis of low
18 consequence.

19 **SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological Events and Processes**

20 **SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use**

21 SCR-5.4.1.1 FEP Number(s): H42, H43, and H44
22 FEP Title(s): **Damming of Streams and Rivers** (H42)
23 **Reservoirs** (H43)
24 **Irrigation** (H44)

25 SCR-5.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
26 SO-R (Future)

27 *The effects of HCN **Damming of Streams and Rivers, Reservoirs, and Irrigation** have been*
28 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
29 *disposal system. Future **Damming of Streams and Rivers, Reservoirs, and Irrigation** have been*
30 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

31 SCR-5.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

32 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. Changes have been made for
33 editorial purposes.

34 SCR-5.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

35 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
36 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
37 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake.

1 SCR-5.4.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

2 In the WIPP area, two topographically low features, the Pecos River and Nash Draw, are
 3 sufficiently large to warrant consideration for damming. Dams and **Reservoirs** already exist
 4 along the Pecos River. However, the Pecos River is far enough from the waste panels (19 km
 5 [12 mi]) that the effects of **Damming of Streams and Rivers**, and **Reservoirs** can be eliminated
 6 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
 7 Nash Draw is not currently dammed, and based on current hydrological and climatic conditions,
 8 there is no reason to believe it will be dammed in the near future.

9 **Irrigation** uses water from rivers, lakes, impoundments, and wells to supplement the rainfall in
 10 an area to grow crops. **Irrigation** in arid environments needs to be efficient and involves the
 11 spreading of a relatively thin layer of water for uptake by plants, so little water would be
 12 expected to infiltrate beyond the root zone. However, some water added to the surface may
 13 infiltrate and reach the water table, affecting groundwater flow patterns. **Irrigation** currently
 14 takes place on a small scale within the Delaware Basin but not in the vicinity of the WIPP, and
 15 the extent of **Irrigation** is not expected to change in the near future. Such **Irrigation** has no
 16 significant effect on the characteristics of the disposal system. Thus, the effects of **Irrigation**
 17 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
 18 of the disposal system.

19 SCR-5.4.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

20 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a), that
 21 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
 22 Therefore, the effects of future **Damming of Streams and Rivers, Reservoirs, and Irrigation**
 23 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

24 SCR-5.4.1.2 FEP Number: H45
 25 FEP Title: Lake Usage

26 SCR-5.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
 27 SO-R (Future)

28 *The effects of Lake Usage have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

29 SCR-5.4.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
 31 editorial purposes.

32 SCR-5.4.1.2.3 Screening Argument

33 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 34 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 35 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
 36 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry. Note that the
 37 potential effects of geomorphological changes through land use are discussed in H40 and H41.

1 SCR-5.4.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

2 As discussed in Section 2.2.2, there are no major natural lakes or ponds within 8 km (5 mi) of the
3 site. To the northwest, west, and southwest, Red Lake, Lindsey Lake, and Laguna Grande de la
4 Sal are more than 8 km (5 mi) from the site, at elevations of 914 to 1,006 m (3,000 to 3,300 ft).
5 Laguna Gatuña, Laguna Tonto, Laguna Plata, and Laguna Toston are playas more than 16 km
6 (10 mi) north and are at elevations of 1,050 m (3,450 ft) or higher.

7 Waters from these lakes are of limited use. Therefore human activities associated with lakes
8 have been screened out of PA calculations based on regulatory grounds supported by 194.32(c)
9 and 194.54(b).

10 SCR-5.4.1.2.5 Future Human EPs

11 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a), that
12 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
13 Therefore, the effects of future **Lake Usage** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
14 regulatory grounds.

15 SCR-5.4.1.3 FEP Number: H46

16 FEP Title: **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities**

17 SCR-5.4.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
18 SO-R (Future)

19 *The effects of HCN **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities** have been*
20 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
21 *disposal system. Future **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities** have*
22 *been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

23 SCR-5.4.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

24 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
25 editorial purposes.

26 SCR-5.4.1.3.3 Screening Argument

27 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
28 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
29 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
30 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry.

31 SCR-5.4.1.3.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

32 Potash mining effluent and runoff from oil fields have altered soil and surface water chemistry in
33 the vicinity of the WIPP. However, the performance of the disposal will not be sensitive to soil
34 and surface water chemistry. Therefore, **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human**
35 **Activities** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the

1 performance of the disposal system. The effects of effluent from potash processing on
2 groundwater flow are discussed in H37.

3 SCR-5.4.1.3.5 Future Human EPs

4 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) that
5 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
6 Therefore, the effects of future *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities*
7 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.5 Climatic Events and Processes**

9 ***SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change***

10 SCR-5.5.1.1 FEP Number(s): H47, H48, and H49
11 FEP Title: ***Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)***
12 ***Acid Rain (H48)***
13 ***Damage to the Ozone (N49)***

14 SCR-5.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
15 SO-R (Future)

16 *The effects of anthropogenic climate change (Acid Rain, Greenhouse Gas Effects, and Damage*
17 *to the Ozone layer) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

18 SCR-5.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
20 editorial purposes.

21 SCR-5.5.1.1.3 Anthropogenic Climate Change

22 The effects of the current climate and natural climatic change are accounted for in PA
23 calculations, as discussed in Section 6.4.9. However, human activities may also affect the future
24 climate and thereby influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. The effects of
25 anthropogenic climate change may be on a local to regional scale (*Acid Rain (H48)*) or on a
26 regional to global scale (*Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)* and *Damage to the Ozone layer (H49)*).
27 Of these anthropogenic effects, only the *Greenhouse Gas Effect* could influence groundwater
28 recharge in the WIPP region. However, consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR
29 § 194.25, compliance assessments and PAs need not consider indirect anthropogenic effects on
30 disposal system performance. Therefore, the effects of anthropogenic climate change have been
31 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.6 Marine Events and Processes**

2 ***SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities***

3 SCR-5.6.1.1.1 FEP Number(s): H50, H51 & H52
4 FEP Title(s): *Coastal Water Use* (H50)
5 *Seawater Use* (H51)
6 *Estuarine Water* (H52)

7 SCR-5.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
8 SO-R (Future)

9 *HCN, and future Coastal Water Use, Seawater Use, and Estuarine Water use have been*
10 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

11 SCR-5.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
13 editorial purposes.

14 SCR-5.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument

15 This section discusses the potential for Human EPs related to marine activities to affect
16 infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP.

17 SCR-5.6.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

18 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the nearest seas, and hydrological conditions
19 in the vicinity of the WIPP have not been affected by marine activities. Furthermore, consistent
20 with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), consideration of HCN human
21 activities is limited to those activities that have occurred or are expected to occur in the vicinity
22 of the disposal system. Therefore, Human EPs related to marine activities (such as *Coastal*
23 *Water Use, Seawater Use, and Estuarine Water* use) have been eliminated from PA calculations
24 on regulatory grounds.

25 SCR-5.6.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

26 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) that
27 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
28 Therefore, the effects of future marine activities (such as *Coastal Water Use, Seawater Use, and*
29 *Estuarine Water* use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

30 **SCR-5.7 Ecological Events and Processes**

31 ***SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities***

32 SCR-5.7.1.1 FEP Number(s): H53, H54, and H55
33 FEP Title(s): *Arable Farming* (H53)

1 **Ranching (H54)**
2 **Fish Farming (H55)**

3 SCR-5.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 *The effects of HCN **Ranching** and **Arable Farming** have been eliminated from PA calculations*
6 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effects of*
7 *changes in future **Ranching** and **Arable Farming** practices have been eliminated from PA*
8 *calculations on regulatory grounds. **Fish Farming** has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
9 *regulatory grounds.*

10 SCR-5.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

12 SCR-5.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument

13 Agricultural activities could affect infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the
14 WIPP. Also, application of acids, oxidants, and nitrates during agricultural practice could alter
15 groundwater geochemistry.

16 SCR-5.7.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

17 Grazing leases exist for all land sections immediately surrounding the WIPP and grazing occurs
18 within the controlled area (see Section 2.3.2.2). Although grazing and related crop production
19 have had some control on the vegetation at the WIPP site, these activities are unlikely to have
20 affected subsurface hydrological or geochemical conditions. The climate, soil quality, and lack
21 of suitable water sources all mitigate against agricultural development of the region in the near
22 future. Therefore, the effects of HCN **Ranching** and **Arable Farming** have been eliminated
23 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
24 Consistent with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), agricultural
25 activities, such as **Fish Farming**, that have not taken place and are not expected to take place in
26 the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on
27 regulatory grounds.

28 SCR-5.7.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

29 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) that
30 limit the scope of consideration of future human activities in PAs to mining and drilling. Also,
31 the criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a) concerned with predictions of the future states of society
32 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
33 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.” Therefore, the effects
34 of changes in future agricultural practices (such as **Ranching**, **Arable Farming**, and **Fish**
35 **Farming**) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development**

2 SCR-5.7.2.1 FEP Number: H56

3 FEP Title: **Demographic Change and Urban Development**

4 SCR-5.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
5 SO-R (Future)

6 *Demographic Change and Urban Development in the near future and in the future have been*
7 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

8 SCR-5.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 SCR-5.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument

11 Social and technological changes in the future could result in the development of new
12 communities and new activities in the vicinity of the WIPP that could have an impact on the
13 performance of the disposal system.

14 Demography in the WIPP vicinity is discussed in Section 2.3.2.1. The community nearest to the
15 WIPP site is the town of Loving, 29 km (18 mi) west-southwest of the site center. There are no
16 existing plans for urban developments in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.
17 Furthermore, the criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states
18 of society, requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the
19 future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.” Therefore,
20 **Demographic Change and Urban Development** in the vicinity of the WIPP and technological
21 developments have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

22 SCR-5.7.2.2 FEP Number: H57

23 FEP Title: **Loss of Records**

24 SCR-5.7.2.2.1 Screening Decision: NA (HCN)
25 DP (Future)

26 *Loss of Records in the future is accounted for in PA calculations.*

27 SCR-5.7.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

28 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Changes have been made for editorial
29 purposes.

30 SCR-5.7.2.2.3 Screening Argument

31 Human activities will be prevented from occurring within the controlled area in the near future.
32 However, PAs must consider the potential effects of human activities that might take place
33 within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to eliminate

1 completely the possibility of human intrusion. Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.41(b), the DOE
 2 assumes no credit for active institutional controls for more than 100 years after disposal. Also,
 3 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.43(c), the DOE originally assumed in the CCA that passive
 4 institutional controls do not eliminate the likelihood of future human intrusion entirely. The
 5 provisions at 40 CFR 194.43(c) allow credit for passive institutional controls by reducing the
 6 likelihood of human intrusions for several hundred years. In DOE (1996a), the DOE took credit
 7 for these controls that include records retention by reducing the probability of intrusion for the
 8 first 600 years after active controls cease. EPA disallowed this credit during the original
 9 certification (EPA 1998a). DOE no longer takes credit for passive institutional controls in PA,
 10 effectively assuming that all public records and archives relating to the repository are lost 100
 11 years after closure. Therefore, DOE continues to include the **Loss of Records** FEP within PA
 12 and does not include credit for passive institutional controls.

13 **SCR-6.0 WASTE AND REPOSITORY-INDUCED FEPS**

14 This section presents screening arguments and decisions for waste- and repository-induced FEPs.
 15 Of the original 108 waste- and repository-induced FEPs, 61 remain unchanged, 43 were updated
 16 with new information or were edited for clarity and completeness, three screening decisions were
 17 changed, and one FEP was deleted from the baseline by combining with other, more appropriate
 18 FEPs.

19 **SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics**

20 ***SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics***

21 SCR-6.1.1.1 FEP Number: W1
 22 FEP Title: **Disposal Geometry**

23 SCR-6.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

24 *The WIPP repository **Disposal Geometry** is accounted for in PA calculations.*

25 SCR-6.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 Representation of the repository within the PA has changed since the CCA; however, the
 27 screening argument and decision remain unchanged. **Disposal Geometry** is accounted for in PA
 28 calculations.

29 SCR-6.1.1.2 Screening Argument

30 **Disposal Geometry** is described in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 and is accounted for in the setup of PA
 31 calculations (Section 6.4.2).

1 **SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics**

2 SCR-6.1.2.1 FEP Number: W2 and W3
3 FEP Title: **Waste Inventory**
4 **Heterogeneity of Waste Forms**

5 SCR-6.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The **Waste Inventory** and **Heterogeneity of Waste Forms** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
9 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
10 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

11 SCR-6.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument

12 Waste characteristics, comprising the **Waste Inventory** and the **Heterogeneity of Waste Forms**,
13 are described in Chapter 4.0. The waste inventory is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving
14 the dissolved actinide source term and gas generation rates (Sections 6.4.3.5 and 6.4.3.3). The
15 distribution of contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste within
16 the repository leads to room scale heterogeneity of the waste forms, which is accounted for in PA
17 calculations when considering the potential activity of waste material encountered during
18 inadvertent borehole intrusion (Section 6.4.7).

19 **SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics**

20 SCR-6.1.3.1 FEP Number: W4
21 FEP Title: **Container Form**

22 SCR-6.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C - Beneficial

23 *The **Container Form** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence*
24 *to the performance of the disposal system.*

25 SCR-6.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 The inventories of container materials (i.e., steel and plastic liners) are included in WIPP long-
27 term PAs as input parameters of the gas generation model (Wang and Brush 1996). The
28 **Container Form** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of its beneficial effect on
29 retarding radionuclide release. The PAs assume instantaneous container failure and waste
30 dissolution according to the source-term model. The screening argument has been modified to
31 incorporate additional information, although the screening decision has not changed.

1 SCR-6.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument

2 As in the CCA, the CRA calculations show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base
3 materials will remain undegraded over 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). For all undisturbed
4 cases, at least 30 percent of the steels will remain uncorroded at the end of 10,000 years. In
5 addition, it is assumed in both CCA and CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial
6 degradation of plastic container materials in 75 percent of PA realizations (Wang and Brush
7 1996). All these undegraded container materials will (1) prevent the contact between brine and
8 radionuclides; (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide transport due to high tortuosity
9 along the flow pathways and, as a result, increase opportunities for metallic Fe and corrosion
10 products to beneficially reduce radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, the container
11 form can be eliminated on the basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport.
12 Both CCA and CRA assume instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to
13 the source-term model. In CCA Appendix WCL, a minimum quantity of metallic Fe was
14 specified to ensure sufficient reactants to reduce radionuclides to lower and less soluble
15 oxidation states. This requirement is met as long as there are no substantial changes in container
16 materials. The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F)
17 indicates that the density of steel in container materials currently reported by the sites has an
18 average value of 170 kg/m^3 . This is an increase over what was reported for the CCA (139 to 230
19 kg/m^3)(8.6 to 14.3 lb/ft^3). Therefore, the current inventory estimates indicate that there is a
20 sufficient quantity of metallic iron to ensure reduction of radionuclides to lower and less soluble
21 oxidation states. The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F)
22 indicates that the density of plastic liners currently reported by the sites has an average value of
23 16 kg/m^3 . This is a decrease from 26 to 21 kg/m^3 (1.6 to 1.3 lb/ft^3) reported in the CCA.

24 SCR-6.1.3.2 FEP Number: W5
25 FEP Title: *Container Material Inventory*

26 SCR-6.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

27 *The **Container Material Inventory** is accounted for in PA calculations.*

28 SCR-6.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information has been identified that relates to the screening of this FEP. Since this FEP
30 is accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA; however,
31 the screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in
32 Chapter 6.0.

33 SCR-6.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument

34 The **Container Material Inventory** is described in Chapter 4.0, and is accounted for in PA
35 calculations through the estimation of gas generation rates (Section 6.4.3.3).

1 **SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics**

2 SCR-6.1.4.1 FEP Number: W6 and W7
3 FEP Title: **Seal Geometry (W6)**
4 **Seal Physical Properties (W7)**

5 SCR-6.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The **Seal Geometry and Seal Physical Properties** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified that relates to the screening of these FEPs. Since these
9 FEP are accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA,
10 however the screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation are described in
11 Section 6.4.4.

12 SCR-6.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument

13 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including **Seal Geometry** and
14 **Seal Physical Properties**, are described in Section 3.3.2 and are accounted for in PA calculations
15 through the representation of the seal system in BRAGFLO and the permeabilities assigned to
16 the seal materials (Section 6.4.4).

17 SCR-6.1.4.2 FEPs Number: W8
18 FEP Title: **Seal Chemical Composition**

19 SCR-6.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

20 *The **Seal Chemical Composition** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
21 *beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

22 SCR-6.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information

23 In the CCA, **Seal Chemical Composition** was screened out on the basis of predicted beneficial
24 consequences, which are not credited in PA calculations. Recent publications provide support
25 for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement seals and the brine will
26 be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system, through sorption and
27 sequestration of radionuclides. Ignoring adsorption simplifies the PA calculations, and is
28 expected to produce somewhat more conservative results. However, because little or no upward
29 flow is predicted to occur through the seals, the overall effect on PA results may not be
30 significant.

31 The original FEP description has been modified slightly to include supporting evidence for the
32 argument that chemical interactions between the cement seals and the brine will be of beneficial
33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument

2 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including *Seal Geometry* and
3 *Seal Physical Properties*, are described in CCA Chapter 3.0 and are accounted for in PA
4 calculations through the representation of the seal system in BRAGFLO and the permeabilities
5 assigned to the seal materials. The effect of shaft *Seal Chemical Composition* on actinide
6 speciation and mobility has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 SCR-6.1.4.2.4 Repository Seals

9 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
10 alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
11 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
12 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 - 325). At high pH values, the speciation and
13 adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced
14 in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in
15 dissolved form.

16 Several recent publications describe strong actinide (or actinide analog) sorption by cement
17 (Altenheinhaese et al. 1994; Wierczinski et al. 1998; Pointeau et al. 2001), or sequestration by
18 incorporation into cement alteration phases (Gougar et al. 1996, Dickson and Glasser 2000).
19 These provide support for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement
20 seals and the brine will be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 ***SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics***

24 SCR-6.1.5.1 FEP Number: W9
25 FEP Title: *Backfill Physical Properties*

26 SCR-6.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

27 *Backfill Physical Properties have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
28 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

29 SCR-6.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. Changes have been made for
31 editorial purposes.

32 SCR-6.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument

33 A chemical backfill is being added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
34 backfill characteristics were previously described in CCA Appendix BACK with additional
35 information contained in Appendix BARRIERS. The mechanical and thermal effects of backfill

1 are discussed in W35 and W72 respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA
2 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill
3 will result in an initial permeability for the disposal room lower than that of an empty cavity, so
4 neglecting the hydrological effects of backfill is a conservative assumption with regard to brine
5 inflow and radionuclide migration. Thus, ***Backfill Physical Properties*** have been eliminated
6 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-6.1.5.2 FEP Number: W10
8 FEP Title: ***Backfill Chemical Composition***

9 SCR-6.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

10 *The ***Backfill Chemical Composition*** is accounted for in PA calculations.*

11 SCR-6.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. Changes have been made for
13 editorial purposes.

14 SCR-6.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument

15 A chemical backfill is added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
16 backfill characteristics are described in Section 6.4.3.4. The mechanical and thermal effects of
17 backfill are discussed in FEP W35 and FEP W72, respectively, where they have been eliminated
18 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
19 ***Backfill Chemical Composition*** is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving the dissolved and
20 colloidal actinide source terms (Section 6.4.3).

21 ***SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics***

22 SCR-6.1.6.1 FEPs Number: W11
23 FEP Title: ***Post-Closure Monitoring***

24 SCR-6.1.6.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

25 *The potential effects of ***Post-Closure Monitoring*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
26 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

27 SCR-6.1.6.1.2 Summary of New Information

28 The FEP screening argument has been modified to include reference to 40 CFR 194.42(d).
29 Compliance with this requirement ensures that ***Post-Closure Monitoring*** is not detrimental to the
30 performance of the repository. No changes have been proposed to the ***Post-Closure Monitoring***
31 program as presented in the CCA. The pre-closure monitoring program has not identified a
32 condition relating to the act of monitoring that would be detrimental to the performance of the
33 repository after closure (Annual Site Environmental Reports and Annual Compliance Monitoring
34 Parameter Assessments). No changes have been made to the FEP description, screening
35 argument, or screening decision.

1 SCR-6.1.6.1.3 Screening Argument

2 ***Post-Closure Monitoring*** is required by 40 CFR § 191.14(b) as an assurance requirement to
3 “detect substantial and detrimental deviations from expected performance.” The DOE has
4 designed the monitoring program (see CCA Appendix MON) so that the monitoring methods
5 employed are not detrimental to the performance of the disposal system (40 CFR 194.42(d)).
6 Non-intrusive monitoring techniques are used so that ***Post-Closure Monitoring*** would not
7 impact containment or require remedial activities. In summary, the effects of monitoring have
8 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.2 Radiological Features, Events, and Processes**

11 ***SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat***

12 SCR-6.2.1.1 FEP Number: W12
13 FEP Title: ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth***

14 SCR-6.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

15 ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*** are accounted for in PA calculations.

16 SCR-6.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

17 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. No changes have been made.

18 SCR-6.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument

19 ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*** are accounted for in PA calculations (see Section 6.4.12.4).

20 SCR-6.2.1.2 FEP Number: W13
21 FEP Title: ***Heat From Radioactive Decay***

22 SCR-6.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

23 *The effects of temperature increases as a result of radioactive decay have been eliminated from*
24 *PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

25 SCR-6.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

26 WIPP transportation restrictions do not allow the thermal load of the WIPP to exceed 10
27 kW/acre (NRC 2002). Transportation requirements restrict the thermal load from RH-TRU
28 waste containers to no more than 300 watts per container (NRC 2002). However, the limit on
29 the surface dose equivalent rate of the RH-TRU containers (1,000 rem/hr) is more restrictive and
30 equates to a thermal load of only about 60 watts per container. Based on the thermal loads
31 permitted, the maximum temperature rise in the repository from radioactive decay heat should be
32 less than 2°C (3.6°F). The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment
33 F) indicates that the radionuclide inventory is lower than previously estimated for the CCA.

1 Thus, all CRA radioactive decay heating screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA
2 screening arguments.

3 SCR-6.2.1.3 Screening Argument

4 Radioactive decay of the waste emplaced in the repository will generate heat. The importance of
5 ***Heat from Radioactive Decay*** depends on the effects that the induced temperature changes
6 would have on mechanics (W29 - W31), fluid flow (W40 and W41), and geochemical processes
7 (W44 through W75). For example, extreme temperature increases could result in thermally
8 induced fracturing, regional uplift, or thermally driven flow of gas and brine in the vicinity of the
9 repository.

10 The design basis for the WIPP requires that the thermal loading does not exceed 10 kW per acre.
11 Transportation restrictions also require that the thermal power generated by waste in an RH-TRU
12 container shall not exceed 300 watts (NRC 2002).

13 The DOE has conducted numerous studies related to ***Heat from Radioactive Decay***. The
14 following presents a brief summary of these past analyses. First, a numerical study to calculate
15 induced temperature distributions and regional uplift is reported in DOE (1980 pp. 9-149 to 9-
16 150). This study involved estimation of the thermal power of CH-TRU waste containers. The
17 DOE (1980 pp. 9-149) analysis assumed the following:

- 18 • All CH-TRU waste drums and boxes contain the maximum permissible quantity of
19 plutonium. The fissionable radionuclide content for CH-TRU waste containers was
20 assumed to be no greater than 200 grams per 0.21 m^3 (7 ounces per 7.4 ft^3) drum and 350
21 grams per 1.8 m^3 (12.3 ounces per 63.6 ft^3) standard waste box (plutonium-239 fissile
22 gram equivalents).
- 23 • The plutonium in CH-TRU waste containers is weapons grade material producing heat at
24 0.0024 watts per gram. Thus, the thermal power of a drum is approximately 0.5 watts
25 and that of a box is approximately 0.8 watts.
- 26 • Approximately $3.7 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^3$ ($1.3 \times 10^7 \text{ ft}^3$) of CH-TRU waste are distributed within a
27 repository enclosing an area of $7.3 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^2$ ($7.9 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^2$). This is a conservative
28 assumption in terms of quantity and density of waste within the repository, because the
29 maximum capacity of the WIPP is $1.756 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^3$ ($6.2 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$) for all waste (as
30 specified by the Land Withdrawal Act [LWA]) to be placed in an enclosed area of
31 approximately $5.1 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^2$ (16 mi^2).
- 32 • Half of the CH-TRU waste volume is placed in drums and half in boxes so that the
33 repository will contain approximately 900,000 drums and 900,000 boxes. Thus, a
34 calculated thermal power of 0.7 watts per square meter (2.8 kW/acre) of heat is generated
35 by the CH-TRU waste.
- 36 • Insufficient RH-TRU waste would be emplaced in the repository to influence the total
37 thermal load.

1 Under these assumptions, Thorne and Rudeen (1981) estimated the long-term temperature
2 response of the disposal system to waste emplacement. Calculations assumed a uniform initial
3 power density of 2.8 kW/acre (0.7 W/m²) which decreases over time. Thorne and Rudeen (1981)
4 attributed this thermal load to RH-TRU waste, but the DOE (1980), more appropriately,
5 attributed this thermal load to CH-TRU waste based on the assumptions listed above. Thorne and
6 Rudeen (1981) estimated the maximum rise in temperature at the center of a repository to be
7 1.6°C (2.9°F) at 80 years after waste emplacement.

8 More recently, Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated the maximum thermal power of an RH-
9 TRU waste container. The Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis involved inverse shielding
10 calculations to evaluate the thermal power of an RH-TRU container corresponding to the
11 maximum permissible surface dose of 1000 rem per hour. The following calculational steps
12 were taken in the Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis:

- 13 • Calculate the absorbed dose rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the maximum
14 surface dose equivalent rate of 1000 rem per hour. Beta and alpha radiation are not
15 included in this calculation because such particles will not penetrate the waste matrix or
16 the container in significant quantities. Neutrons are not included in the analysis because
17 the maximum dose rate from neutrons is 270 millirem per hour, and the corresponding
18 neutron heating rate will be insignificant.
- 19 • Calculate the exposure rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the absorbed dose rate
20 for gamma radiation.
- 21 • Calculate the gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container corresponding to
22 the exposure rate for gamma radiation. Assuming the gamma energy is 1.0 megaelectron
23 volts, the maximum allowable gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container
24 is about 5.8×10^8 gamma rays per square centimeter per second.
- 25 • Determine the distributed gamma source strength, or gamma activity, in an RH-TRU
26 container from the surface gamma flux density. The source is assumed to be shielded
27 such that the gamma flux is attenuated by the container and by absorbing material in the
28 container. The level of shielding depends on the matrix density. Scattering of the
29 gamma flux, with loss of energy, is also accounted for in this calculation through
30 inclusion of a gamma buildup factor. The distributed gamma source strength is
31 determined assuming a uniform source in a right cylindrical container. The maximum
32 total gamma source (gamma curies) is then calculated for a RH-TRU container
33 containing 0.89 m³ (31.4 ft³) of waste. For the waste of greatest expected density (about
34 6,000 kg/m³ (360 lb/ft³), the gamma source is about 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³).
- 35 • Calculate the total curie load of a RH-TRU container (including alpha and beta radiation)
36 from the gamma load. The ratio of the total curie load to the gamma curie load was
37 estimated through examination of the radionuclide inventory presented in CCA Appendix
38 BIR. The gamma curie load and the total curie load for each radionuclide listed in the
39 WIPP BIR were summed. Based on these summed loads the ratio of total curie load to
40 gamma curie load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be 1.01.

- 1 • Calculate the thermal load of a RH-TRU container from the total curie load. The ratio of
2 thermal load to curie load was estimated through examination of the radionuclide
3 inventory presented in CCA Appendix BIR. The thermal load and the total curie load for
4 each radionuclide listed in the WIPP inventory were summed. Based on these summed
5 loads the ratio of thermal load to curie load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be about
6 0.0037 watts per curie. For a gamma source of 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³), the maximum
7 permissible thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). Thus, the
8 maximum thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 60 W, and the transportation
9 limit of 300 W will not be achieved.

10 Note that Sanchez and Trelue (1996) calculated the average thermal load for a RH-TRU
11 container to be less than 1 W. Also, the total RH-TRU heat load is less than 10 percent of the
12 total heat load in the WIPP. Thus, the total thermal load of the RH-TRU waste will not
13 significantly affect the average rise in temperature in the repository resulting from decay of
14 CH-TRU waste.

15 Temperature increases will be greater at locations where the thermal power of an RH-TRU
16 container is 60 W, if any such containers are emplaced. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated
17 the temperature increase at the surface of a 60 W RH-TRU waste container. Their analysis
18 involved solution of a steady-state thermal conduction problem with a constant heat source term
19 of 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). These conditions represent conservative assumptions because the thermal
20 load will decrease with time as the radioactive waste decays. The temperature increase at the
21 surface of the container was calculated to be about 3°C (5.4°F).

22 In summary, analysis has shown that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository,
23 due to radioactive decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste, will be less than 2°C (3.6°F).
24 Temperature increases of about 3°C (5.4°F) may occur in the vicinity of RH-TRU containers
25 with the highest allowable thermal load of about 60 watts (based on the maximum allowable
26 surface dose equivalent for RH-TRU containers). Potential heat generation from nuclear
27 criticality is discussed in W14 and exothermic reactions and the effects of repository temperature
28 changes on mechanics are discussed in the set of FEPs grouped as W29, W30, W31, W72, and
29 W73. These FEPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
30 to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The previous FEPs screening arguments for the CCA used a bounding radioactivity heat load of
32 0.5 watts/drum for the CH-TRU waste containers. With a total CH-TRU volume of 168,500 m³
33 (~5,950,000 ft³) this corresponds to approximately 810,000 55-gallon drum equivalents with a
34 corresponding heat load of > 400 kW used for the CCA FEPs screening arguments. From
35 Sanchez and Trelue (1996), it can be seen that a realistic assessment of the heat load, based on
36 radionuclide inventory data in the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (TWBIR) is less
37 than 100 kW. Thus, the CCA FEPs incorporate a factor of safety of at least four.

38 Since the 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F) indicates that
39 the radionuclide inventory is lower than that previously estimated for the CCA), all CRA-2004
40 radioactive decay heating screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA screening
41 arguments. Verification of the fact that heat loads for the CRA-2004 are less than those for the

1 CCA is provided in Djordjevic (2003). Djordjevic (2003) is a recalculation of the work of
2 Sanchez and Trelue (1996) using radionuclide data from Appendix DATA, Attachment F.

3 SCR-6.2.1.4 FEPs Number: W14
4 FEPs Title: **Nuclear Criticality: Heat**

5 SCR-6.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

6 **Nuclear Criticality** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
7 occurrence over 10,000 years.

8 SCR-6.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

9 Heat generated via **Nuclear Criticality** was screened out based on the low probability that a
10 criticality event would occur. The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of fissile
11 material (Appendix DATA, Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
12 quantity is 43 percent lower than previously estimated in CCA TWBIR Rev 3. Thus, all CRA-
13 2004 criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening
14 arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

15 SCR-6.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument

16 **Nuclear Criticality** refers to a sustained fission reaction that may occur if fissile radionuclides
17 reach both a sufficiently high concentration and total mass (where the latter parameter includes
18 the influence of enrichment of the fissile radionuclides). In the subsurface, the primary effect of
19 a nuclear reaction is the production of heat.

20 Nuclear criticality (near and far field) was eliminated from PA calculations for the WIPP for
21 waste contaminated with TRU radionuclides. The probability for criticality within the repository
22 is low (there are no mechanisms for concentrating fissile radionuclides dispersed amongst the
23 waste). Possible mechanisms for concentration in the waste disposal region include high
24 solubility, compaction, sorption, and precipitation. First, the maximum solubility of ²³⁹Pu in the
25 WIPP repository, the most abundant fissile radionuclide, is orders of magnitude lower than
26 necessary to create a critical solution. The same is true for ²³⁵U, the other primary fissile
27 radionuclide. Second, the waste is assumed to be compacted by repository processes to one
28 fourth its original volume. This compaction is still an order of magnitude too disperse (many
29 orders of magnitude too disperse if neutron absorbers that prevent criticality (for example, ²³⁸U)
30 are included). Third, any potential sorbents in the waste would be fairly uniformly distributed
31 throughout the waste disposal region; consequently, concentration of fissile radionuclides in
32 localized areas through sorption is improbable. Fourth, precipitation requires significant
33 localized changes in brine chemistry; small local variations are insufficient to separate
34 substantial amounts of ²³⁹Pu from other actinides in the waste disposal region (for example, 11
35 times more ²³⁸U is present than ²³⁹Pu).

36 Criticality away from the repository (following an inadvertent human intrusion) has a low
37 probability because (1) the amount of fissile material transported from the repository is small; (2)
38 host rock media have small porosities (insufficient for generation of sizable precipitation zone);
39 and (3) no credible mechanism exists for the concentrating fissile material during transport (the

1 natural tendency is for transported to be dispersed). As discussed in Section 6.4.6.2 and CCA
 2 Appendix PA, Attachment MASS Section MASS.15, the dolomite porosity consists of
 3 intergranular porosity, vugs, microscopic fractures, and macroscopic fractures. As discussed in
 4 Section 6.4.5.2, porosity in the marker beds consists of partially healed fractures that may dilate
 5 as pressure increases. Advective flow in both units occurs mostly through macroscopic
 6 fractures. Consequently, any potential deposition through precipitation or sorption is constrained
 7 by the depth to which precipitation and sorption occur away from fractures. This geometry is not
 8 favorable for fission reactions and eliminates the possibility of criticality. Thus, **Nuclear**
 9 **Criticality** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
 10 occurrence.

11 Screening arguments made in Rechar et al. (1996) are represented in greater detail in Rechar et
 12 al. (2000, 2001). A major finding among the analysis results in the screening arguments is the
 13 determination that fissile material would need to be reconcentrated by three orders of magnitude
 14 in order to be considered in a criticality scenario. These previous arguments were based on
 15 radionuclide information from Revision 3 of the TWBIR (DOE 1996b). Of the 135
 16 radionuclides presented in that TWBIR database, only 17 are possible contributors to fissile
 17 material. Table SCR-4 identifies these nuclides along with their conversion factors for specific
 18 activity and ^{239}Pu fissile gram equivalents (^{239}Pu fissile gram equivalent (FGE) per ANSI/ANS-
 19 18.5).

20 Radioactivity inventories for the fissile radionuclides used in the CCA and CRA-2004 are
 21 presented in Table SCR-5. Also shown in Table SCR-5 are the corresponding FGE inventories.
 22 Key amongst the information presented in this table is updated information for the WIPP
 23 disposal inventory of fissile material (Appendix DATA, Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates
 24 that the expected WIPP-scale quantity is 43 percent lower than previously estimated in TWBIR
 25 Rev. 3. Thus, all CRA-2004 criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the
 26 previous CCA screening arguments (Rechar et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

27 ***SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties***

28 SCR-6.2.2.1 FEP Number: W15, W16, and W17
 29 FEP Title: ***Radiological Effects on Waste (W15)***
 30 ***Radiological Effects on Containers (W16)***
 31 ***Radiological Effects on Seals (W17)***

32 SCR-6.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

33 ***Radiological Effects on the Properties of the Waste, Container, and Seals have been eliminated***
 34 ***from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.***

35 SCR-6.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

36 The FEPs screening argument has been updated by referencing new radiological waste data. The
 37 screening decision for these FEPs has not been affected or changed by these new data.

Table SCR-4. Properties of Fissile Radionuclides in the Actinide Series

Nuclide ID	Atomic Number	Atomic Number	Half-Life ⁽¹⁾ (sec)	Mass Excess Value ⁽²⁾ (MeV)	Atomic Weight ⁽³⁾ (gm/mole)	Specific Activity ⁽⁴⁾ (Ci/gm)	Fissile Gram Equivalent Factor ⁽⁵⁾ (²³⁹ Pu)
²³³ U	92	233	5.0020E+12	36.914	233.040	9.6763E-03	1.00E+00
²³⁵ U	92	235	2.2210E+16	40.916	235.044	2.1611E-06	1.00E+00
²³⁷ Np	93	237	6.7530E+13	44.868	237.048	7.0476E-04	1.50E-02
²³⁸ Pu	94	238	2.7690E+09	46.160	238.050	1.7115E+01	1.13E-01
²³⁹ Pu	94	239	7.5940E+11	48.585	239.052	6.2146E-02	1.00E+00
²⁴⁰ Pu	94	240	2.0630E+11	50.122	240.054	2.2781E-01	2.25E-02
²⁴¹ Pu	94	241	4.5440E+08	52.952	241.057	1.0300E+02	2.25E+00
²⁴² Pu	94	242	1.2210E+13	54.714	242.059	3.8171E-03	7.50E-03
²⁴¹ Am	95	241	1.3640E+10	52.931	241.057	3.4312E+00	1.87E-02
^{242m} Am	95	242	4.7970E+09	55.513	242.060	9.7159E+00	3.46E+01
²⁴³ Am	95	243	2.3290E+11	57.171	243.061	1.9929E-01	1.29E-02
²⁴³ Cm	96	243	8.9940E+08	57.177	243.061	5.1607E+01	5.00E+00
²⁴⁴ Cm	96	244	5.7150E+08	58.449	244.063	8.0883E+01	9.00E-02
²⁴⁵ Cm	96	245	2.6820E+11	60.998	245.065	1.7165E-01	1.50E+01
²⁴⁷ Cm	96	247	4.9230E+14	65.528	247.070	9.2752E-05	5.00E-01
²⁴⁹ Cf	98	249	1.1060E+10	69.718	249.075	4.0953E+00	4.50E+01
²⁵¹ Cf	98	251	2.8340E+10	74.128	251.080	1.5855E+00	9.00E+01

- ¹ Half-life data originally taken from ORIGEN2 decay library (Croff 1980). Data values presented in Ref. Sanchez 1996 (WIPP WPO# 037404).
- ² Mass excess values originally taken from Nuclear Wallet Cards (Tuli 1985). Data values presented in Ref. Sanchez 1996 (WIPP WPO# 037404).
- ³ Atomic weight calculated from: ATWT (AMU) = AN (atomic mass number) – ME (mass difference in MeV, ME of C¹² = 0) / 931.4943 (MeV per AMU, Parrington et al. 1996, pg. 58).
- ⁴ Specific Activity calculated from: A' = (Na ln(2))/(ATWT half-life), Ref. Turner 1992, pg. 64 and A (Ci/gm) = A' (Bq/gm) / 3.7E+10 (Bq/Ci), Turner 1992, pg. 43, where Na = Avogadro's number = 6.02213676E+23 (atom/mole, Parrington, pg.59).
- ⁵ FGE (²³⁹Pu based) data values from NuPac 1989 (TRUPACT-II SAR/Table 10.1/pg. 1.3.7-51 (data originally from Ref. ANSI/ANS-8.15 1981).

1

Table SCR-5. Fissile Equivalents of Radionuclides in the Actinide Series

Nuclide ID	Radioactivity Inventory ⁽¹⁾ (Ci)				Nuclide Fissile Mass ⁽²⁾ (FGE- ²³⁹ Pu)			
	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)
²³³ U	1.95E+03	1.95E+03	1.27E+03	1.27E+03	2.02E+05	2.02E+05	1.31E+05	1.32E+05
²³⁵ U	1.74E+01	1.75E+01	2.26E+00	2.28E+00	8.05E+06	8.10E+06	1.05E+06	1.06E+06
²³⁷ Np	5.90E+01	6.49E+01	5.46E+00	1.01E+01	1.26E+03	1.38E+03	1.16E+02	2.14E+02
²³⁸ Pu	2.61E+06	1.94E+06	1.61E+06	1.25E+06	1.72E+04	1.28E+04	1.07E+04	8.27E+03
²³⁹ Pu	7.96E+05	7.95E+05	6.66E+05	6.64E+05	1.28E+07	1.28E+07	1.07E+07	1.07E+07
²⁴⁰ Pu	2.15E+05	2.14E+05	1.09E+05	1.09E+05	2.12E+04	2.11E+04	1.07E+04	1.07E+04
²⁴¹ Pu	2.45E+06	3.94E+05	2.51E+06	5.38E+05	5.35E+04	8.61E+03	5.49E+04	1.18E+04

Table SCR-5. Fissile Equivalents of Radionuclides in the Actinide Series — Continued

Nuclide ID	Radioactivity Inventory ⁽¹⁾ (Ci)				Nuclide Fissile Mass ⁽²⁾ (FGE- ²³⁹ Pu)			
	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)
²⁴² Pu	1.17E+03	1.17E+03	2.71E+01	2.71E+01	2.30E+03	2.30E+03	5.33E+01	5.32E+01
²⁴¹ Am	4.48E+05	4.88E+05	4.15E+05	4.58E+05	2.44E+03	2.66E+03	2.26E+03	2.50E+03
^{242m} Am	1.75E+00	1.47E+00	2.44E-01	2.11E-01	6.23E+00	5.23E+00	8.67E-01	7.50E-01
²⁴³ Am	3.26E+01	3.25E+01	2.18E+01	2.17E+01	2.11E+00	2.10E+00	1.41E+00	1.41E+00
²⁴³ Cm	5.23E+01	2.07E+01	8.87E-01	4.07E-01	5.07E+00	2.01E+00	8.59E-02	3.94E-02
²⁴⁴ Cm	3.18E+04	7.44E+03	1.18E+04	2.51E+03	3.54E+01	8.28E+00	1.32E+01	2.79E+00
²⁴⁵ Cm	1.15E-02	1.15E-02	1.90E-02	1.92E-02	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.66E+00	1.68E+00
²⁴⁷ Cm	3.21E-09	9.51E-09	9.44E+00	9.45E+00	1.73E-05	5.13E-05	5.09E+04	5.09E+04
²⁴⁹ Cf	6.87E-02	6.38E-02	7.72E-02	7.24E-02	7.55E-01	7.01E-01	8.48E-01	7.96E-01
²⁵¹ Cf	3.78E-03	3.67E-03	5.23E-04	5.10E-04	2.15E-01	2.08E-01	2.97E-02	2.90E-02
				Σ	2.11E+07	2.12E+07	1.20E+07	1.20E+07

¹ TWBIR Rev. 3 data values originally from DOE 1996b. Data values presented in Sanchez 1997, pp. 27-30. TWBIR 2003 Update 2002 (beginning of calendar year) data from Appendix DATA, Attachment F. TWBIR 2002 Update 2033 (end of calendar year) data from Leigh 2003a.

² ²³⁹Pu Fissile Gram Equivalents calculated from: FGE(²³⁹Pu) = Inventory (Ci) * FGE Factor (from Table 1) / A'(Ci/gm, from Table 1).

1 SCR-6.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument

2 Ionizing radiation can change the physical properties of many materials. Strong radiation fields
 3 could lead to damage of waste matrices, brittleness of the metal containers, and disruption of any
 4 crystalline structure in the seals. The low level of activity of the waste in the WIPP is unlikely to
 5 generate a strong radiation field. According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide
 6 inventory decreased from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA,
 7 Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small decrease will not change the original
 8 screening argument. In addition, PA calculations assume instantaneous container failure and
 9 waste dissolution according to the source-term model (see Sections 6.4.3.4, 6.4.3.5, and 6.4.3.6.
 10 Therefore, ***Radiological Effects on the Properties of the Waste, Container, and Seals*** have been
 11 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 12 disposal system.

13 SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical Features, Events, and Processes

14 SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes

15 SCR-6.3.1.1 FEP Number: W18 and W19
 16 FEP Title: ***Disturbed Rock Zone (W18)***
 17 ***Excavation-Induced Change in Stress (W19)***

1 SCR-6.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

2 *Excavation-induced host rock fracturing through formation of a disturbed rock zone (DRZ) and*
3 *changes in stress are accounted for in PA calculations.*

4 SCR-6.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

5 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs. No changes have been made
6 since the CRA.

7 SCR-6.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument

8 Construction of the repository has caused local *excavation-induced changes in stress* in the
9 surrounding rock as discussed in Section 3.3.1.5. This has led to failure of intact rock around the
10 opening, creating a DRZ of fractures. On completion of the WIPP excavation, the extent of the
11 induced stress field perturbation will be sufficient to have caused dilation and fracturing in the
12 anhydrite layers a and b, MB139, and, possibly, MB138. The creation of the DRZ around the
13 excavation and the disturbance of the anhydrite layers and marker beds will alter the
14 permeability and effective porosity of the rock around the repository, providing enhanced
15 pathways for flow of gas and brine between the waste-filled rooms and the nearby interbeds.
16 This excavation-induced, host-rock fracturing is accounted for in PA calculations (Section
17 6.4.5.3).

18 The DRZ around repository shafts could provide pathways for flow from the repository to
19 hydraulically conductive units above the repository horizon. The effectiveness of long-term
20 shaft seals is dependent upon the seals providing sufficient backstress for salt creep to heal the
21 DRZ around them, so that connected flow paths out of the repository horizon will cease to exist.
22 These factors are considered in the current seal design.

23 SCR-6.3.1.2 FEP Number: W20 and W21
24 FEP Title: *Salt Creep (W20)*
25 *Change in the Stress Field (W21)*

26 SCR-6.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

27 *Salt Creep in the Salado and resultant Changes in the Stress Field are accounted for in PA*
28 *calculations.*

29 SCR-6.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs. No changes have been made
31 since CRA-2004.

32 SCR-6.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument

33 *Salt Creep* will lead to *Changes in the Stress Field*, compaction of the waste and containers, and
34 consolidation of the long-term components of the sealing system. It will also tend to close
35 fractures in the DRZ, leading to reductions in porosity and permeability, increases in pore fluid

1 pressure, and reductions in fluid flow rates in the repository. **Salt Creep** in the Salado is
 2 accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.1). The long-term repository seal system relies
 3 on the consolidation of the crushed-salt seal material and healing of the DRZ around the seals to
 4 achieve a low permeability under stresses induced by salt creep. Seal performance is discussed
 5 further in FEPs W36 and W37.

6 SCR-6.3.1.3 FEP Number: W22
 7 FEP Title: **Roof Falls**

8 SCR-6.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision: UP

9 *The potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA calculations.*

10 SCR-6.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP. No changes have been made since
 12 the CRA.

13 SCR-6.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument

14 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized **Roof Falls** in the first few hundred years. If
 15 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
 16 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
 17 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
 18 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep. In the long term,
 19 the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor because **Salt Creep** will reduce the
 20 void space and the potential for **Roof Falls** as well as leading to healing of any roof material that
 21 has fallen into the rooms. However, because of uncertainty in the process by which the disposal
 22 room DRZ heals, the flow model used in the PA assumes that a higher permeability zone
 23 remains for the long term. Thus, the potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted
 24 for in PA calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

25 SCR-6.3.1.4 FEP Number(s): W23 and W24
 26 FEP Title(s): **Subsidence (W23)**
 27 **Large Scale Rock Fracturing (W24)**

28 SCR-6.3.1.4.1 Screening Decision(s): SO-C (W23)
 29 SO-P (W24)

30 *Fracturing within units overlying the Salado and surface displacement caused by **Subsidence***
 31 *associated with repository closure have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
 32 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The potential for excavation or*
 33 *repository-induced **Subsidence** to create **Large-Scale Rock Fracturing** and fluid flow paths*
 34 *between the repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations*
 35 *on the basis of the low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

1 SCR-6.3.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

2 The DOE acknowledges that proximal **Roof Falls** (see W22, Appendix SCR, Section SCR.2.3.3)
3 will occur and minor subsidence of stratigraphic units overlying the Salado at WIPP could occur.
4 Subsidence of geologic formations overlying the WIPP due to **Salt Creep** is shown to be only
5 modestly perturbed and the consequence is captured by the uncertainty employed in the PA.
6 **Roof Falls** and large-scale **Subsidence** have therefore been screened out of the PA calculations
7 based upon low consequence. The potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted
8 for in PA calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.
9 Continuous survey data, reported annually, reaffirm that **Subsidence** is minimal and near the
10 accuracy of the survey itself (COMPs, annual reports). Changes for clarity and editorial
11 purposes have been made to the screening argument.

12 SCR-6.3.1.4.3 Screening Argument

13 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized **Roof Falls** in the first few hundred years. If
14 instability of the DRZ causes **Roof Falls**, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt
15 the anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
16 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
17 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep and the local
18 lithologies. In the long term, the effects of **Roof Falls** in the repository are likely to be minor
19 because **Salt Creep** will reduce the void space and the potential for roof falls as well as leading to
20 healing of any roof material that has fallen into the rooms. Because of uncertainty in the process
21 by which the disposal room DRZ heals, the flow model used in the PA assumed that a higher
22 permeability zone remained for the long term. The PAVT modified the DRZ permeability to a
23 sampled range. Thus, the potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted for in PA
24 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

25 The amount of **Subsidence** that can occur as a result of **Salt Creep** closure or roof collapse in the
26 WIPP excavation depends primarily on the volume of excavated rock, the initial and compressed
27 porosities of the various emplaced materials (waste, backfill, panel and drift closures, and seals),
28 the amount of inward creep of the repository walls, and the gas and fluid pressures within the
29 repository. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994) has analyzed potential excavation-induced
30 subsidence with the primary objective of determining the geomechanical advantage of
31 backfilling the WIPP excavation. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to 3-23) used mass
32 conservation calculations, the influence function method, the National Coal Board empirical
33 method, and the two-dimensional, finite-difference code, Fast Lagrangian Analysis of Continua
34 (FLAC) to estimate **Subsidence** for conditions ranging from no backfill to emplacement of a
35 highly compacted crushed salt backfill. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-23) also
36 investigated **Subsidence** at potash mines located near the WIPP site to gain insight into the
37 expected **Subsidence** conditions at the WIPP and to calibrate the subsidence calculation
38 methods.

39 Subsidence over potash mines will be much greater than subsidence over the WIPP because of
40 the significant differences in stratigraphic position, depth, extraction ratio, and layout. The
41 WIPP site is located stratigraphically lower than the lowest potash mine, which is near the base
42 of the McNutt Potash Member (hereafter called the McNutt). At the WIPP site, the base of the

1 McNutt is about 150 m (490 ft) above the repository horizon. Also, the WIPP rock extraction
2 ratio in the waste disposal region will be about 22 percent, as compared to 65 percent for the
3 lowest extraction ratios within potash mines investigated by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p.
4 2-17).

5 The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-22) reported the maximum total *Subsidence* at potash mines
6 to be about 1.5 m (5 ft). This level of *Subsidence* has been observed to have caused surface
7 fractures. However, the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-23) found no evidence that *Subsidence*
8 over potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient to connect the mining horizon to water-
9 bearing units or the landsurface. The level of disturbance caused by *Subsidence* above the WIPP
10 repository will be less than that associated with potash mining and thus, by analogy, will not
11 create fluid flow paths between the repository and the overlying units.

12 The various *Subsidence* calculation methods used by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to
13 3-23) provided similar and consistent results, which support the premise that *Subsidence* over
14 the WIPP will be less than *Subsidence* over potash mines. Estimates of maximum *Subsidence* at
15 the land surface for the cases of no backfill and highly compacted backfill are 0.62 m (2 ft) and
16 0.52 m (1.7 ft), respectively. The mass conservation method gave the upper bound estimate of
17 *Subsidence* in each case. The surface topography in the WIPP area varies by more than 3 m (10
18 ft), so the expected amount of repository-induced *Subsidence* will not create a basin, and will not
19 affect surface hydrology significantly. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, Table 3-13) also
20 estimated *Subsidence* at the depth of the Culebra using the FLAC model, for the case of an
21 empty repository (containing no waste or backfill). The FLAC analysis assumed the Salado to
22 be halite and the Culebra to have anhydrite material parameters.

23 Maximum *Subsidence* at the Culebra was estimated to be 0.56 m (1.8 ft). The vertical strain was
24 concentrated in the Salado above the repository. Vertical strain was less than 0.01 percent in
25 units overlying the Salado and was close to zero in the Culebra (Westinghouse 1994, Figure
26 3-40). The maximum horizontal displacement in the Culebra was estimated to be 0.02 m (0.08
27 ft), with a maximum tensile horizontal strain of 0.007 percent. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994,
28 4-1 to 4-2) concluded that the induced strains in the Culebra will be uniformly distributed
29 because no large-scale faults or discontinuities are present in the vicinity of the WIPP.
30 Furthermore, strains of this magnitude would not be expected to cause extensive fracturing.

31 At the WIPP site, the Culebra hydraulic conductivity varies spatially over approximately four
32 orders of magnitude, from 1×10^{-8} m (3.2×10^{-8} ft) per second (0.4 m (1.3 ft) per year) to $1 \times$
33 10^{-5} m (3.2×10^{-5} ft) per second (Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD). Where transmissive
34 horizontal fractures exist, hydraulic conductivity in the Culebra is dominated by flow through the
35 fractures. An induced tensile vertical strain may result in an increase in fracture aperture and
36 corresponding increases in hydraulic conductivity. The magnitude of increase in hydraulic
37 conductivity can be estimated by approximating the hydrological behavior of the Culebra with a
38 simple conceptual model of fluid flow through a series of parallel fractures with uniform
39 properties. A conservative estimate of the change in hydraulic conductivity can be made by
40 assuming that all the vertical strain is translated to fracture opening (and none to rock
41 expansion). This method for evaluating changes in hydraulic conductivity is similar to that used
42 by the EPA in estimating the effects of subsidence caused by potash mining (Peake 1996; EPA
43 1996b).

1 The equivalent porous medium hydraulic conductivity, K (meters per second), of a system of
 2 parallel fractures can be calculated assuming the cubic law for fluid flow (Witherspoon et al.
 3 1980):

$$4 \quad K = \frac{w^3 \rho g N}{12 \mu D}, \quad (10)$$

5 where w is the fracture aperture, ρ is the fluid density (taken to be 1,000 kg/m³), g is the
 6 acceleration due to gravity (9.79 m (32 ft) per second squared), μ is the fluid viscosity (taken as
 7 0.001 pascal seconds), D is the effective Culebra thickness (7.7 m (26.3 ft)), and N is the number
 8 of fractures. For 10 fractures with a fracture aperture, w , of 6×10^{-5} m (2×10^{-4} ft), the Culebra
 9 hydraulic conductivity, K , is approximately 7 m per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second).
 10 The values of the parameters used in this calculation are within the range of those expected for
 11 the Culebra at the WIPP site (Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD).

12 The amount of opening of each fracture as a result of subsidence-induced tensile vertical strain,
 13 ε , (assuming rigid rock) is $D\varepsilon/N$ meters. Thus, for a vertical strain of 0.0001, the fracture
 14 aperture, w , becomes approximately 1.4×10^{-4} m. The Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , then
 15 increases to approximately 85 m (279 ft) per year (2.7×10^{-6} m (8.9×10^{-6} ft) per second). Thus,
 16 on the basis of a conservative estimate of vertical strain, the hydraulic conductivity of the
 17 Culebra may increase by an order of magnitude. In the PA calculations, multiple realizations of
 18 the Culebra transmissivity field are generated as a means of accounting for spatial variability and
 19 uncertainty (Appendix TFIELD). A change in hydraulic conductivity of one order of magnitude
 20 through vertical strain is within the range of uncertainty incorporated in the Culebra
 21 transmissivity field through these multiple realizations. Thus, changes in the horizontal
 22 component of Culebra hydraulic conductivity resulting from repository-induced subsidence have
 23 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 A similar calculation can be performed to estimate the change in vertical hydraulic conductivity
 25 in the Culebra as a result of a horizontal strain of 0.00007 m/m (Westinghouse 1994, p. 3-20).
 26 Assuming this strain to be distributed over about 1,000 fractures (neglecting rock expansion),
 27 with zero initial aperture, in a lateral extent of the Culebra of about 800 m (2,625 ft)
 28 (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-39), then the subsidence-induced fracture aperture is
 29 approximately 6×10^{-5} m (1.9×10^{-4} ft). Using the values for ρ , g , and μ , above, the vertical
 30 hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra can then be calculated, through an equation similar to
 31 above, to be 7 m (23 ft) per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second). Thus, vertical hydraulic
 32 conductivity in the Culebra may be created as a result of repository-induced **Subsidence**,
 33 although this is expected to be insignificant.

34 In summary, as a result of observations of **Subsidence** associated with potash mines in the
 35 vicinity of the WIPP, the potential for **Subsidence** to create fluid flow paths between the
 36 repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
 37 of low probability. The effects of repository-induced **Subsidence** on hydraulic conductivity in
 38 the Culebra have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 39 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes**

2 SCR-6.3.2.1 FEP Number: W25 and W26
3 FEP Title: **Disruption Due to Gas Effects (W25)**
4 **Pressurization (W26)**

5 SCR-6.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The mechanical effects of gas generation through **Pressurization** and **Disruption Due to Gas***
7 *flow are accounted for in PA calculations.*

8 SCR-6.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified relating to these FEPs. No changes have been made.

10 SCR-6.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument

11 The mechanical effects of gas generation, including the slowing of creep closure of the
12 repository due to gas **Pressurization**, and the fracturing of interbeds in the Salado through
13 **Disruption Due to Gas Effects** are accounted for in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.2 and
14 6.4.3.1).

15 **SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions**

16 SCR-6.3.3.1 FEP Number: W27
17 FEP Title: **Gas Explosions**

18 SCR-6.3.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

19 *The potential effects of **Gas Explosions** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

20 SCR-6.3.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
22 made to this FEP.

23 Explosive gas mixtures could collect in the head space above the waste in a closed panel. The
24 most explosive gas mixture potentially generated will be a mixture of hydrogen, methane, and
25 oxygen which will convert to CO₂ and water on ignition. This means that there is little
26 likelihood of a **Gas Explosion** in the long term, because the rooms and panels are expected to
27 become anoxic and oxygen depleted. Compaction through salt creep will also greatly reduce any
28 void space in which the gas can accumulate. Analysis (see Appendix BARRIERS, Attachment
29 PCS) indicates that the most explosive mixture of hydrogen, methane, and oxygen will be
30 present in the void space approximately 20 years after panel-closure emplacement. This
31 possibility of an explosion prior to the occurrence of anoxic conditions is considered in the
32 design of the operational panel closure. The effect of such an explosion on the DRZ is expected
33 to be no more severe than a **Roof Fall** which is accounted for in the PA calculations (FEP W22).

1 SCR-6.3.3.2 FEP Number: W28
2 FEP Title: *Nuclear Explosions*

3 SCR-6.3.3.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

4 *Nuclear Explosions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability*
5 *of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

6 SCR-6.3.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 Editorial changes have been made for clarity as well as separating the two FEPs within the
8 original SCR text into discrete arguments. Additional information is referenced to support the
9 conclusions.

10 SCR-6.3.3.2.3 Screening Argument

11 Nuclear explosions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
12 occurrence over 10,000 years. For a *Nuclear Explosions* to occur, a critical mass of Pu would
13 have to undergo rapid compression to a high density. Even if a critical mass of Pu could form in
14 the system, there is no mechanism for rapid compression. Radioactivity inventories for the
15 fissile radionuclides used in DOE (1996a) and CRA-2004 are presented in Table SCR-6. The
16 updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of fissile material (Appendix DATA,
17 Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale quantity is 43 percent lower
18 than previously estimated in TWBIR Rev. 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus, all CRA-2004 criticality
19 screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments
20 (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

21 **SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects**

22 SCR-6.3.4.1 FEP Number: W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73
23 FEP Title: *Thermal Effects on Material Properties (W29)*
24 *Thermally-Induced Stress Changes (W30)*
25 *Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components (W31)*
26 *Exothermic Reactions (W72)*
27 *Concrete Hydration (W73)*

28 SCR-6.3.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

29 *The effects of **Thermally Induced Stress, Differing Thermal Expansion of Components, and***
30 ***Thermal Effects on Material Properties** in the repository have been eliminated from PA*
31 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.*

32 *The thermal effects of exothermic reactions, including **Concrete Hydration**, have been*
33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
34 *disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.3.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 All potential sources of heat and elevated temperature have been evaluated and found not to
3 produce high enough temperature changes to affect the repository's performance. Sources of
4 heat within the repository include radioactive decay and exothermic chemical reactions such as
5 backfill hydration and metal corrosion. The rates of these exothermic reactions are limited by
6 the availability of brine in the repository. **Concrete Hydration** in the seals is a significant source
7 of heat, but it is relatively short-lived. Energy released by the hydration of the seal concrete
8 could raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately 53°C (127°F), and that of the
9 surrounding salt to approximately 38°C (100°F), one week after seal emplacement. Elevated
10 temperatures will persist for a short period of time, perhaps a few years or a few decades. The
11 thermal stresses from these temperatures and the temperatures in the concrete itself have been
12 calculated to be below the design compressive strength for the concrete. Thus, thermal stresses
13 should not degrade the long-term performance of the seals. In general, the various sources of
14 heat do not appear to be great enough to jeopardize the performance of the disposal system.

15 The original FEP descriptions have been changed slightly to include the effects of water release
16 during carbonation of the backfill, and the effects of formation of metastable hydrated carbonate
17 minerals.

18 SCR-6.3.4.1.3 Screening Argument

19 **Thermally Induced Stress** could result in pathways for groundwater flow in the DRZ, in the
20 anhydrite layers and marker beds, and through seals, or it could enhance existing pathways.
21 Conversely, elevated temperatures will accelerate the rate of **Salt Creep** and mitigate fracture
22 development. Thermal expansion could also result in uplift of the rock and ground surface
23 overlying the repository, and thermal buoyancy forces could lift the waste upward in the salt
24 rock.

25 The distributions of thermal stress and strain changes depend on the induced temperature field
26 and the **Differing Thermal Expansion of Components** of the repository, which depends on the
27 components' elastic properties. Potentially, **Thermal Effects on Material Properties** (such as
28 permeability and porosity) could affect the behavior of the repository.

29 **Radioactive decay** (W13), **Nuclear Criticality** (W14), and **Exothermic Reactions** (W72 and
30 W73) are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository. According to the new inventory
31 data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases increases from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66
32 $\times 10^6$ curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small
33 change will not result in a significant deviation from the possible temperature rise predicted in
34 the CCA. Exothermic reactions in the WIPP repository include MgO hydration, MgO
35 carbonation, Al corrosion, and **Cement Hydration** (Bennett et al. 1996). Wang (1996) has
36 shown that the temperature rise by an individual reaction is proportional to \sqrt{VM} , where V is
37 the maximum rate of brine inflow into a waste panel for a reaction limited by brine inflow (or a
38 specified maximum reaction rate for a reaction limited by its own kinetics) and M is the quantity
39 of the reactant. MgO hydration, cement hydration, and Al corrosion are assumed to be limited by
40 brine inflow, because they all consume water and have high reaction rates. For these reactions,
41 the calculated temperature rises need to be updated for the changes in both brine inflow rate and

1 waste inventory. According to the CRA-2004 PA calculations, the average brine inflow rate
 2 upon a human intrusion is 156 m³/year (204 yd³/year), with a maximum value of 332 m³/year
 3 (434 yd³/year). In the CCA, the maximum brine inflow rate was assumed to be 200 m³/year (261
 4 yd³/year). With the new rate of 332 m³/year (434 yd³/year), it is estimated that the temperature
 5 rise by each exothermic reaction is increased by 29 percent if the quantity of reactant remains the
 6 same. Changes in the amounts of reactants are tabulated in Table SCR-6.

7 **Table SCR-6. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA**

Inventory	CCA	CRA	Change
MgO (tons)	85,600 ¹	72,760 (because of the elimination of mini-sacks) ^a	-15%
Cellulosics (tons)	5,940 ²	8,120 ³	37%
Plastics (tons)	3,740 ²	8,120 ³	117%
Rubber (tons)	1,100 ²	1,960 ³	78%
Aluminum alloys (tons)	1,980 ²	1,960 ³	-1%
Cement (tons)	8,540 ²	9,971 ⁵	17%

¹ U.S. DOE (2001)

² U.S. DOE (1996b). Only CH wastes are considered. Total volume of CH wastes is 1.1×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

³ Appendix DATA, Attachment F. Only CH wastes are considered. Total volume of CH waste is 1.4×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

⁴ This estimate is derived from data in Leigh (2003b) includes both reacted and unreacted cement. ($1.2e7$ kg x $1.4e5/168485$ /1000 kg/ton = 9971 tons cement)

8 Similarly, MgO carbonation, which consumes *Carbon Dioxide*, is limited by *Carbon Dioxide*
 9 generation from microbial degradation. Given a biodegradation rate constant, the total CO₂
 10 generated per year is proportional to the total quantity of biodegradable materials in the
 11 repository. The inventory of biodegradable materials has been changed from 13,398 (5,940 + 1.7
 12 × 3,740 + 1,100)1 tons to 23,884 (8,120 + 1.7 × 8,120 + 1,960)1 tons of equivalent cellulosics
 13 (Wang and Brush 1996a and 1996b). This increase in biodegradeable materials corresponds to a
 14 proportional increase in CO₂ generation. For MgO carbonation and microbial degradation, the
 15 calculated temperature rises have been updated for the changes in both microbial gas generation
 16 and waste inventory and are presented in Table SCR-7.

17 Temperature rises (°C) by exothermic reactions are revised as follows:

18 **Table SCR-7. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises**

Reactant	CCA ¹	CRA1
MgO hydration	< 4.5	< 4.7
Backfill Carbonation	< 0.6	< 0.7
Microbial degradation	< 0.8	< 1.4
Aluminum corrosion	< 6.0	< 6.8
Cement hydration	< 2.0	< 2.5

¹ All values are shown in degrees Celsius

¹The 1.7 molar conversion rate for plastic is based on analyses presented in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b).

1 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in a
 2 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F) above ambient room
 3 temperature (about 27°C (80°F)) (Bennett et al. 1996). A temperature rise of 6°C (10.8°F)
 4 represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of exothermic
 5 reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by exothermic reactions
 6 for CRA-2004 are still less than 10°C (18°F) (as shown in Table SCR-7). Such small temperature
 7 changes cannot affect material properties. Thus, *Thermal Effects on Material Properties* in the
 8 repository have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 9 performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties**

11 SCR-6.3.5.1 FEP Number: W32, W36, W37 and W39
 12 FEP Title: Consolidation of Waste (W32)
 13 Consolidation of Seals (W36)
 14 Mechanical Degradation of Seals (W37)
 15 Underground Boreholes (W39)

16 SCR-6.3.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

17 *Consolidation of Waste* is accounted for in PA calculations. *Consolidation of Seals* and
 18 *Mechanical Degradation of Seals* are accounted for in PA calculations. Flow through isolated,
 19 unsealed *Underground Boreholes* is accounted for in PA calculations.

20 SCR-6.3.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 No new information has been identified for these FEPs; however, because they are accounted for
 22 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used the CCA). No information has been
 23 identified that would change the screening decision of UP. Changes in implementation (if any)
 24 are described in Chapter 6.0.

25 SCR-6.3.6.1.3 Screening Argument

26 *Consolidation of Waste* is accounted for in PA calculations in the modeling of creep closure of
 27 the disposal room (Section 6.4.3.1).

28 *Mechanical Degradation of Seals* and *Consolidation of Seals* are accounted for in PA
 29 calculations through the permeability range assumed for the seal system (Section 6.4.4).

30 The site investigation program has also involved the drilling of boreholes from within the
 31 excavated part of the repository. Following their use for monitoring or other purposes, these
 32 *Underground Boreholes* will be sealed where practical, and *Salt Creep* will also serve to
 33 consolidate the seals and to close the boreholes. Any boreholes that remain unsealed will
 34 connect the repository to anhydrite interbeds within the Salado, and thus provide potential
 35 pathways for radionuclide transport. PA calculations account for fluid flow to and from the
 36 interbeds by assuming that the DRZ has a permanently enhanced permeability that allows flow
 37 of repository brines into specific anhydrite layers and interbeds. This treatment is also
 38 considered to account for the effects of any unsealed boreholes.

1 SCR-6.3.5.2 FEP Number: W33
2 FEP Title: *Movement of Containers*

3 SCR-6.3.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
5 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 SCR-6.3.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
8 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The FEP description has been updated to
9 reflect new waste inventory data (waste density).

10 SCR-6.3.5.2.3 Screening Argument

11 *Movement of Waste Containers* placed in salt may occur as a result two buoyancy mechanisms
12 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978): (1) the density contrast between the waste container and the
13 surrounding salt, and (2) the temperature contrast between a salt volume that includes a heat
14 source and the surrounding unheated salt. When the density of the waste container is greater
15 than the density of the surrounding salt, the container sinks relative to the salt; whereas when the
16 salt density is greater than the container density, the container rises relative to the salt. Similarly,
17 when a discrete volume of salt within a large salt mass is heated, the heat raises the temperature
18 of the discrete volume above that of the surrounding salt thereby inducing density contrasts and
19 buoyant forces that initiate upward flow of the heated salt volume. In a repository setting, the
20 source of the heat may be radioactive decay of the waste itself or exothermic reactions of the
21 backfill materials and waste constituents, e.g., MgO hydration, MgO carbonation, aluminum
22 corrosion, cement hydration, and calcium oxide hydration.

23 For the CCA, the density of the compacted waste and the grain density of the halite in the Salado
24 were assumed to be 2,000 kg/m³ and 2,163 kg/m³, respectively. Because this density contrast is
25 small, the movement of containers relative to the salt was considered minimal, particularly when
26 drag forces on the waste containers were also considered. In addition, vertical movement
27 initiated in response to thermally-induced density changes for high-level waste containers of a
28 similar density to those at the WIPP were calculated to be approximately 0.35 m (1 ft) (Dawson
29 and Tillerson 1978, p. 22). This calculated movement was considered conservative given that
30 containers at the WIPP will generate much less heat and will, therefore, move less. As a result,
31 container movement was eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequences to
32 the performance of the disposal system.

33 The calculations performed for DOE (1996a) were based on estimates of the waste inventory.
34 However, with the initiation of waste disposal, actual waste inventory is tracked and future waste
35 stream inventories have been refined. Based on an evaluation of these data, two factors may
36 affect the conclusions reached in DOE (1996a) concerning container movement.

37 The first factor is changes in density of the waste form. For the most part, waste density will
38 remain as assumed in the CCA. According to new *inventory* data (Appendix DATA, Attachment
39 F), the revised waste density has changed by at most 10 percent (lower). Some future waste

1 streams may however be more highly compacted, perhaps having a density roughly three times
2 greater than that assumed in the CCA. In calculations of container movement, Dawson and
3 Tillerson (1978, p. 22) varied container density by nearly a factor of three (from 2,000 kg/m³
4 (125 lb/ft³) to 5,800 kg/m³ (362 lb/ft³)) and found that an individual dense container could move
5 vertically as much as about 28 m (92 ft). Given the geologic environment of the WIPP, a
6 container would likely encounter a dense stiff unit (such as an anhydrite stringer) that would
7 arrest further movement far short of this upper bound; however, because of the massive thickness
8 of the Salado salt, even a movement of 28 m (92 ft) would have little impact on performance.

9 The second inventory factor that could affect container movement is the composition of the
10 waste (and backfills) relative to its heat production. Radioactive decay, ***Nuclear Criticality***, and
11 exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository. According to the
12 new inventory data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6 (CCA) to $6.66 \times$
13 10^6 curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small change
14 will not result in a significant deviation from the possible temperature rise predicted in the CCA.
15 As shown in Section SCR.6.3.4 (FEPs W72 and W73), temperature rises from exothermic
16 reactions are quite small (see Table SCR-7). Note that the revised maximum temperature rises
17 by exothermic reactions are still less than 10°C (18°F).

18 Based on the small differences between the temperature and density assumed in the CCA
19 compared to those determined using *new inventory* data (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), the
20 conclusion about the importance of container movement reported in the CCA will not be
21 affected, even when more highly compacted future waste streams are considered. Also, the
22 effects of the revised maximum temperature rise and higher density future waste streams on
23 container movement are competing factors (high density waste will sink, whereas the higher
24 temperature waste-salt volume will rise) that may result in even less movement. Therefore,
25 ***Movement of Waste Containers*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
26 consequence.

27 SCR-6.3.5.3 FEP Number: W34
28 FEP Title: ***Container Integrity***

29 SCR-6.3.6.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

30 ***Container Integrity*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 SCR-6.3.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

33 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP. Editorial changes have been made
34 to the FEP screening argument.

35 SCR-6.3.5.3.3 Screening Argument

36 ***Container Integrity*** is required only for waste transportation. As in the CCA, the CRA-2004
37 calculations show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain
38 undegraded over 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). For all undisturbed cases, at least 30
39 percent of the steels will remain uncorroded at the end of 10,000 years. In addition, it is assumed

1 in both CCA and CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial degradation of plastic
 2 container materials in 75 percent of PA realizations (Wang and Brush 1996). All these
 3 undegraded container materials will (1) prevent the contact between brine and radionuclides; and
 4 (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide transport due to high tortuosity along the flow
 5 pathways and, as a result, increase opportunities for metallic iron and corrosion products to
 6 beneficially reduce radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, the **Container Integrity**
 7 can be eliminated on the basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. Both
 8 **CCA** and CRA-2004 assume instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to
 9 the source-term model.

10 SCR-6.3.5.4 FEP Number: W35
 11 FEP Title: **Mechanical Effects of Backfill**

12 SCR-6.3.5.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The **Mechanical Effects of Backfill** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
 14 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.3.5.4.2 Summary of New Information

16 In 2001, MgO mini-sacks were eliminated from the repository, which decreases the backfill to
 17 waste volume ratio (EPA 2001). Although the backfill will provide additional resistance to creep
 18 closure, most of the resistance will be provided by the waste. Therefore, inclusion of backfill
 19 would not significantly reduce the total **Subsidence** in the waste rooms, and screening based on
 20 low consequence is appropriate. The screening argument has been updated to reflect the
 21 elimination of minisacks.

22 SCR-6.3.5.4.3 Screening Argument

23 The chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room will act to resist creep closure.
 24 However, calculations have shown that because of the high porosity and low stiffness of the
 25 waste and the high waste to potential backfill volume, inclusion of backfill does not significantly
 26 decrease the total subsidence in the waste emplacement area or disposal room (Westinghouse
 27 1994). Since 2001, DOE has eliminated MgO mini sacks from the repository reducing the total
 28 inventory from 85,600 short tons to 74,000 short tons, which further reduces the potential
 29 backfill volume (EPA 2001). Therefore, the **Mechanical Effects of Backfill** have been
 30 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 31 disposal system.

32 SCR-6.3.5.5 FEP Number: W38
 33 FEP Title: **Investigation Boreholes**

34 SCR-6.3.5.5.1 Screening Decision: NA

35 SCR-6.3.5.5.2 Summary of New Information

36 The effects of **Investigation Boreholes** (whether sealed or not) that penetrate the disposal
 37 horizon but do not intersect the waste panels are encompassed by the arguments made in **Natural**

1 ***Borehole Fluid Flow*** (H31) and ***Flow Through Undetected Boreholes*** (H33). FEP W38 has
2 been deleted from the FEPs baseline because it is redundant. The effects of drillholes drilled
3 from the underground are accounted for in PA by assumptions about the permeability of the
4 DRZ. ***Natural Borehole Fluid Flow*** (H31) and ***Flow Through Undetected Boreholes*** (H33)
5 encompass the effects of W38. Therefore, W38, ***Investigation Boreholes***, has been deleted from
6 the FEPs Baseline.

7 **SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic Features, Events, and Processes**

8 ***SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow***

9 SCR-6.4.1.1 FEP Number: W40 and W41
10 FEP Title: ***Brine Inflow (W40)***
11 ***Wicking (W41)***

12 SCR-6.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

13 *Two-phase brine and gas flow and capillary rise (wicking) in the repository and the Salado are*
14 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

15 SCR-6.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. No changes have been made to
17 the screening decisions or screening arguments.

18 SCR-6.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

19 ***Brine Inflow*** to the repository may occur through the DRZ, impure halite, anhydrite layers, or
20 clay layers. Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of
21 brine that flows into the rooms and drifts. Two-phase flow of brine and gas in the repository and
22 the Salado is accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.2).

23 Capillary rise (or ***Wicking***) is a potential mechanism for liquid migration through unsaturated
24 zones in the repository. Capillary rise in the waste material could affect gas generation rates,
25 which are dependent on water availability. Potential releases due to drilling intrusion are also
26 influenced by brine saturations and therefore by ***Wicking***. Capillary rise is therefore accounted
27 for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.2).

28 ***SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation***

29 SCR-6.4.2.1 FEP Number: W42
30 FEP Title: ***Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production***

31 SCR-6.4.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

32 *Fluid flow in the repository and Salado due to gas production is accounted for in PA*
33 *calculations.*

1 SCR-6.4.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
3 made.

4 SCR-6.4.2.1.3 Screening Argument

5 Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of brine that flows
6 into the rooms and drifts. Gas may flow from the repository through the DRZ, impure halite,
7 anhydrite layers, or clay layers. The amount of water available for reactions and microbial
8 activity will impact the amounts and types of gases produced (W44 through W55). Gas
9 generation rates, and therefore repository pressure, may change as the water content of the
10 repository changes. Pressure changes and **Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production** in the repository
11 and the Salado are accounted for in PA calculations through modeling the two-phase flow
12 (Section 6.4.3.2).

13 **SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects**

14 SCR-6.4.3.1 FEP Number: W43
15 FEP Title: Convection

16 SCR-6.4.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

17 *Convection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the*
18 *performance of the disposal system.*

19 SCR-6.4.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

20 No new information has been identified relative to the screening of this FEP. The FEP
21 description has been updated and modified for editorial purposes.

22 SCR-6.4.3.1.3 Screening Argument

23 Temperature differentials in the repository could initiate **Convection**. The resulting thermally-
24 induced brine flow or thermally-induced two-phase flow could influence contaminant transport.
25 Potentially, thermal gradients in the disposal rooms could drive the movement of water vapor.
26 For example, temperature increases around waste located at the edges of the rooms could cause
27 evaporation of water entering from the DRZ. This water vapor could condense on cooler waste
28 containers in the rooms and could contribute to brine formation, corrosion, and gas generation.

29 **Nuclear Criticality** (W13), **Radioactive Decay** (W14), and **Exothermic Reactions** (W72) are
30 three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository.

31 The characteristic velocity, V_i , for convective flow of fluid component I in an unsaturated porous
32 medium is given by (from Hicks 1996);

33
$$V_i \approx -\frac{k_i}{\mu_i}(\alpha_i \rho_i g \Delta T), \quad (11)$$

1 where α_i (per degree) is the coefficient of expansion of the i^{th} component, k_i is the intrinsic
2 permeability (square meters), μ_i is the fluid viscosity (pascal second), ρ_{i0} (kilograms per cubic
3 meter) is the fluid density at a reference point, g is the acceleration of gravity, and ΔT is the
4 change in temperature. This velocity may be evaluated for the brine and gas phases expected in
5 the waste disposal region.

6 For a temperature increase of 10°C (18°F), the characteristic velocity for convective flow of
7 brine in the DRZ around the concrete shaft seals is approximately 7×10^{-4} m (2.3×10^{-3} ft) per
8 year (2×10^{-11} m (6.6×10^{-11} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for convective flow
9 of gas in the DRZ is approximately 1×10^{-3} m (3.2×10^{-3} ft) per year (3×10^{-11} m (9.8×10^{-11}
10 ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). For a temperature increase of 25°C (45°F), the characteristic
11 velocity for convective flow of brine in the concrete seals is approximately 2×10^{-7} m ($6.5 \times$
12 10^{-7} ft) per year (6×10^{-15} m (1.9×10^{-14} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for
13 convective flow of gas in the concrete seals is approximately 3×10^{-7} m (9.8×10^{-7} ft) per year
14 (8×10^{-15} m (2.6×10^{-4} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). These values of Darcy velocity are much
15 smaller than the expected values associated with **Brine Inflow** to the disposal rooms of fluid
16 flow resulting from gas generation. In addition, the buoyancy forces generated by smaller
17 temperature contrasts in the DRZ, resulting from backfill and **Concrete Hydration** and
18 **Radioactive Decay**, will be short-lived and insignificant compared to the other driving forces for
19 fluid flow. The short-term concrete seals will be designed to function as barriers to fluid flow for
20 at least 100 years after emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al.
21 1995). Thus, temperature increases associated with **Concrete Hydration** will not result in
22 significant buoyancy driven fluid flow through the concrete seal system. In summary,
23 temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermal **cConvection**.
24 Furthermore, the induced temperature gradients will be insufficient to generate water vapor and
25 drive significant moisture migration.

26 Temperature effects on fluid viscosity would be most significant in the DRZ surrounding the
27 hydrating concrete seals (where temperatures of approximately 38°C (100°F) are expected). The
28 viscosity of pure water decreases by about 19 percent over a temperature range of between 27°C
29 (80°F) and 38°C (100°F) (Batchelor 1973, p. 596). Although at a temperature of 27°C (80°F),
30 the viscosity of Salado brine is about twice that of pure water (Rechard et al. 1990, a-19), the
31 magnitude of the variation in brine viscosity between 27°C (80°F) and 38°C (100°F) will be
32 similar to the magnitude of the variation in viscosity of pure water. The viscosity of air over this
33 temperature range varies by less than seven percent (Batchelor 1973, p. 594) and the viscosity of
34 gas in the waste disposal region over this temperature range is also likely to vary by less than
35 seven percent. The Darcy fluid flow velocity for a porous medium is inversely proportional to
36 the fluid viscosity. Thus, increases in brine and gas flow rates may occur as a result of viscosity
37 variations in the vicinity of the concrete seals. However, these viscosity variations will persist
38 only for a short period in which temperatures are elevated, and, thus, the expected variations in
39 brine and gas viscosity in the waste disposal region will not affect the long-term performance of
40 the disposal system significantly.

41 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in a
42 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F). A temperature rise of 6°C
43 (10.8°F) represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of

1 ***Exothermic Reactions*** occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by
2 ***Exothermic Reactions*** for CRA-2004 are still less than 10 °C (18°F) (as shown in Table SCR-7).
3 Such small temperature changes cannot affect material properties.

4 In summary, temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermally-
5 induced two-phase flow. Thermal ***cConvection*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
6 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical Features, Events, and Processes**

8 ***SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation***

9 SCR-6.5.1.1 FEP Number: W44, W45, and W48
10 FEP Titles: ***Degradation of Organic Material (W44)***
11 ***Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation (W45)***
12 ***Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation (W48)***

13 SCR-6.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

14 *Microbial gas generation from degradation of organic material is accounted for in PA*
15 *calculations, and the ***Effects of Temperature and Biofilm Formation on Microbial Gas****
16 ****Generation*** are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.*

17 SCR-6.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. Editorial changes
19 have been made to the screening argument. The screening decision remains unchanged.

20 SCR-6.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument

21 Microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic materials,
22 will produce mainly CO₂, but also nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen, and
23 methane. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon the nature of the microbial
24 populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas
25 generation from ***Degradation of Organic Material*** is accounted for in PA calculations.

26 The following subsections discuss the effects of temperature, pressure, radiation, and biofilms on
27 gas production rates via their control of microbial gas generation processes.

28 SCR-6.5.1.1.3.1 *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation*

29 Calculations and experimental studies of induced temperature distributions within the repository
30 have been undertaken and are described in FEPs W29, W30, and W31. Numerical analysis
31 suggests that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository caused by radioactive
32 decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste is likely to be less than 3 °C (5.4°F) (FEP W13).

33 Temperature increases resulting from ***Exothermic Reactions*** are discussed in FEPs W72 and
34 W73. Potentially the most significant ***Exothermic Reactions*** are ***Concrete Hydration***, backfill

1 hydration, and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature
2 of the concrete to approximately 53°C (127°F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately
3 38°C (100°F) one week after seal emplacement (W73).

4 As discussed in FEPs W72 and W73, the maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels as a
5 consequence of backfill hydration will be less than 5.3°C (9.5°F), resulting from **Brine Inflow**
6 following a drilling intrusion into a waste disposal panel. Note that active institutional controls
7 will prevent drilling within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. By this time, any
8 heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration will have decreased
9 substantially, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will have reduced to close to initial
10 values.

11 Under similar conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in
12 a short-lived (two years) temperature rise of about 7.9°C (14.2°F) (see W72). These calculated
13 maximum heat generation rates resulting from aluminum corrosion and backfill hydration could
14 not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation assumes
15 that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus, the temperature rise of
16 10°C (18°F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
17 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously.

18 Relatively few data exist on the **Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation** under
19 expected WIPP conditions. Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates
20 observed during a range of experiments. Increases in temperature from ambient up to 40°C
21 (104°F) or 50°C (122°F) were reported to increase gas production, mainly via the degradation of
22 cellulosic waste under either aerobic or anaerobic conditions (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Above 70°C
23 (158°F), however, gas generation rates were generally observed to decrease. The experiments
24 were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical conditions and for different
25 substrates, representing likely states within the repository. Gas generation rates were presented
26 as ranges with upper and lower bounds as estimates of uncertainty (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Later
27 experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation rate data reported
28 by Molecke (1979). These experiments investigated microbial gas generation under a wide
29 range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the presence of
30 microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional nutrients,
31 electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. These experiments were
32 carried out at a reference temperature of 30°C (86°F), based on the average temperature
33 expected in the repository. Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived
34 from available experimental data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The effects of
35 temperature on microbial gas generation are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates
36 used.

37 SCR-6.5.1.1.3.2 *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation*

38 The location of microbial activity within the repository is likely to be controlled by the
39 availability of substrates and nutrients. Biofilms may develop on surfaces where nutrients are
40 concentrated. They consist of one or more layers of cells with extracellular polymeric material
41 and serve to maintain an optimum environment for growth. Within such a biofilm ecosystem,

1 nutrient retention and recycling maximize microbe numbers on the surface (see, for example,
2 Stroes-Gascoyne and West 1994, pp. 9 – 10).

3 Biofilms can form on almost any moist surface, but their development is likely to be restricted in
4 porous materials. Even so, their development is possible at locations throughout the disposal
5 system. The *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation* may affect disposal system
6 performance through control of microbial population size and their effects on radionuclide
7 transport.

8 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates observed during a range of
9 experimental studies. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and
10 chemical conditions and for different substrates representing likely states within the repository.
11 However, the effect of biofilm formation in these experiments was uncertain. Molecke (1979, p.
12 7), presented gas generation rates as ranges, with upper and lower bounds as estimates of
13 uncertainty. Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation
14 rate data reported by Molecke (1979). Their experiments investigated microbial gas generation
15 under a wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the
16 presence of microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional
17 nutrients, electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. Under the more
18 favorable conditions for microbial growth established during the experiments, the development
19 of populations of halophilic microbes and associated biofilms was evidenced by observation of
20 an extracellular, carotenoid pigment, bacterioruberin, in the culture bottles (Francis and Gillow
21 1994, p. 59). Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available
22 experimental data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial*
23 *Gas Generation* rates are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates.

24 Biofilms may also influence contaminant transport rates through their capacity to retain and thus
25 retard both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. This effect is not accounted for in PA
26 calculations, but is considered potentially beneficial to calculated disposal system performance.
27 Microbial transport is discussed in FEP W87.

28 SCR-6.5.1.2 FEP Number: W46

29 FEP Title: *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation*

30 SCR-6.5.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

31 *The Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation has been eliminated from PA calculations*
32 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

33 SCR-6.5.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

34 The FEP screening argument has been updated, however the screening decision has not changed.

35 SCR-6.5.1.2.3 Screening Argument

36 Directly relevant to WIPP conditions, the gas generation experiments with actual waste
37 components at Argonne National Laboratory provide no indication of any enhancement of
38 pressured nitrogen atmosphere (2150 psia) on microbial gas generation (Felicione et al. 2001). In

1 addition, microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic
2 materials in the repository, will produce mainly CO₂ and methane with minor amounts of
3 nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen sulfide. The accumulation of these gaseous species will
4 contribute the total pressure in the repository. Increases in the partial pressures of these reaction
5 products could potentially limit gas generation reactions. However, such an effect is not taken
6 into account in WIPP PA calculations. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon
7 the nature of the microbial populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates
8 present. Microbial gas generation from *Degradation of Organic Material* (W44) is accounted
9 for in PA calculations.

10 Chemical reactions may occur depending on, among other things, the concentrations of available
11 reactants, the presence of catalysts and the accumulation of reaction products, the biological
12 activity, and the prevailing conditions (for example, temperature and pressure). Reactions that
13 involve the production or consumption of gases are often particularly influenced by pressure
14 because of the high molar volume of gases. The effect of high total pressures on chemical
15 reactions is generally to reduce or limit further gas generation.

16 Few data exist from which the *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* reactions that
17 may occur in the WIPP can be assessed and quantified. Studies of microbial activity in deep-sea
18 environments suggest (for example, Kato et al. 1994, p. 94) that microbial gas generation
19 reactions are less likely to be limited by increasing pressures in the disposal rooms than are
20 inorganic gas generation reactions (for example, corrosion). Consequently, the *Effects of*
21 *Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
22 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 SCR-6.5.1.3 FEP Number: W47

24 FEP Title: *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation*

25 SCR-6.5.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

26 *The Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation has been eliminated from PA*
27 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.5.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

29 The FEP screening argument has been updated to reflect the new radionuclide inventory,
30 although the screening decision has not changed.

31 SCR-6.5.1.3.3 Screening Argument

32 Radiation may slow down microbial gas generation rates, but such an effect is not taken into
33 account in WIPP PA calculations. According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide
34 inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA,
35 Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small change will not affect the original
36 screening argument.

37 Experiments investigating microbial gas generation rates suggest that the effects of alpha
38 radiation from TRU waste is not likely to have significant effects on microbial activity (Barnhart

1 et al. 1980; Francis 1985). Consequently, the *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas*
2 *Generation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
3 performance of the disposal system.

4 SCR-6.5.1.4 FEP Number: W49 and W51
5 FEP Title: *Gasses from Metal Corrosion*
6 *Chemical Effects of Corrosion*

7 SCR-6.5.1.4.1 Screening Decision: UP

8 *Gas generation from metal corrosion is accounted for in PA calculations, and the effects of*
9 *chemical changes from metal corrosion are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.*

10 SCR-6.5.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. They have been modified only
12 from an editorial perspective, and have not changed since the CCA.

13 SCR-6.5.1.4.3 Screening Argument

14 Oxidic corrosion of waste drums and metallic waste will occur at early times following closure of
15 the repository and will deplete its oxygen content. Anoxic corrosion will follow the oxidic phase
16 and will produce hydrogen, while consuming water. *Gasses from Metal Corrosion* are accounted
17 for in PA calculations.

18 The predominant *Chemical Effect of Corrosion* reactions on the environment of disposal rooms
19 will be to lower the oxidation state of the brines and maintain reducing conditions.

20 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized gas generation rates that were observed during a range of
21 experiments. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical
22 conditions representing likely states within the repository. Later experiments reported by
23 Telander and Westerman (1993) support the gas generation rate data reported by Molecke
24 (1979). Their experiments investigated gas generation from corrosion under a wide range of
25 possible conditions in the repository. The studies included corrosion of low-carbon steel waste
26 packaging materials in synthetic brines, representative of intergranular Salado brines at the
27 repository horizon, under anoxic (reducing) conditions.

28 Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available experimental
29 data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The effects of chemical changes from metal corrosion
30 are, therefore, accounted for in PA calculations.

31 SCR-6.5.1.5 FEP Number: W50
32 FEP Title: *Galvanic Coupling* (within the repository)

33 SCR-6.5.1.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

34 *The effects of Galvanic Coupling have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
35 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.5.1.5.2 Summary of New Information

2 The original screening argument confused *Galvanic Coupling* internal and external to the
3 repository (see W95). As such, the original screening decision for *Galvanic Coupling* was
4 screened out on probability however, it is more appropriate to screen this FEP on consequence.
5 The screening decision has therefore been changes to SO-C and a clear distinction between
6 which FEP considers internal and external coupling was included in the FEP discussions.

7 Consideration *Galvanic Coupling* (W50), is restricted to consideration of effects between or
8 among materials within the repository. *Galvanic Coupling* with materials outside the repository
9 is considered in *Galvanic Coupling* (W95).

10 *Galvanic Coupling* (within the repository) is unlikely to occur on a large scale. On a very small
11 scale, *Galvanic Coupling* could occur whenever two dissimilar metals are in contact and a
12 conducting medium is present. However, the resulting corrosion would cause the same effects as
13 the other corrosion processes already included in the assessments. Thus, *Galvanic Coupling*, as
14 a distinct corrosion mechanism, would have negligible effects on repository performance.

15 *Galvanic Coupling* has been screened out on the basis of low consequence. No new information
16 has become available that affects the screening argument; the FEP screening argument and
17 screening decision remain unchanged.

18 SCR-6.5.1.5.3 Screening Argument

19 *Galvanic Coupling* (i.e. establishing an electrical current through chemical processes) could lead
20 to the propagation of electric potential gradients between metals in the waste form, canisters, and
21 other metals external to the waste form, potentially influencing corrosion processes, gas
22 generation rates and chemical migration.

23 Metallic ore bodies external to the repository are nonexistent (CCA Appendix GCR) and
24 therefore galvanic coupling between the waste and metals external to the repository would not
25 occur. However, a variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and
26 containers, creating a potential for formation of galvanic cells over short distances. As an
27 example, the presence of copper could influence rates of hydrogen gas production resulting from
28 the corrosion of iron. The interactions between metals depend upon their physical disposition
29 and the prevailing solution conditions, including pH and salinity. Good physical and electrical
30 contact between the metals is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells.

31 Consequently, given the preponderance of iron over other metals within the repository and the
32 likely passivation of many nonferrous materials, the influence of these electrochemical
33 interactions on corrosion, and therefore gas generation, is expected to be minimal. Therefore, the
34 effects of *Galvanic Coupling* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
35 consequence.

1 SCR-6.5.1.6 FEP Number: W52
2 FEP Title: *Radiolysis of Brine*

3 SCR-6.5.1.6.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Gas generation from **Radiolysis of Brine** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
5 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*


6 SCR-6.5.1.6.2 Summary of New Information

7 No new information is available relative to this FEP and screening decision. The screening
8 argument has been modified for editorial purposes.

9 SCR-6.5.1.6.3 Screening Argument

10 ***Radiolysis of Brine** in the WIPP disposal rooms, and of water in the waste, will lead to the*
11 *production of gases and may significantly affect the oxygen content of the rooms. This in turn*
12 *will affect the prevailing chemical conditions and potentially the concentrations of radionuclides*
13 *that may be mobilized in the brines.*

14 The overall reaction for the radiolysis of water in the waste and brine is



16 However, the production of intermediate oxygen-bearing species that may subsequently undergo
17 reduction will lead to reduced oxygen gas yields. The remainder of this section is concerned
18 with the physical effects of gas generation by radiolysis of brine.

19 Reed et al. (1993) studied radiolytic gas generation during experiments lasting between 155 and
20 182 days. These experiments involved both synthetic brines similar to those sampled from the
21 Salado at the WIPP repository horizon, and brines occurring in reservoirs in the Castile, as well
22 as real brines sampled from the Salado in the repository workings. The brines were spiked with
23 $^{239}\text{Pu}(\text{VI})$ at concentrations between 6.9×10^{-9} and 3.4×10^{-4} molal. During these relatively
24 short-term experiments, hydrogen gas was observed as the product of radiolysis. Oxygen gas
25 was not observed; this was attributed to the formation of intermediate oxygen-bearing species.
26 However, given sufficient exposure to alpha-emission, oxygen production may reach 50 percent
27 that of hydrogen.

28 An estimate of the potential rate of gas generation due to the radiolysis of brine, R_{RAD} , can be
29 made by making the following assumptions:

- 30
- 31 • Gas production occurs following the reaction above, so that 1.5 moles of gas are
generated for each mole of water consumed.
 - 32 • Gas production occurs as a result of the alpha decay of ^{239}Pu .
 - 33 • ^{239}Pu concentrations in the disposal room brines are controlled by solubility equilibria.

- All of the dissolved plutonium is ^{239}Pu .

R_{RAD} is then given by

$$R_{\text{RAD}} = \frac{Y_g C_{\text{Pu}} S A_{\text{Pu}} \bar{E}_\alpha V_B}{N_D N_A} \quad (13)$$

$$R_{\text{RAD}} = \frac{\left(\frac{1.5 \text{ molecule gas}}{\text{molecule H}_2\text{O}} \right) \left(3.15 \times 10^7 \frac{\text{sec}}{\text{yr}} \right) \left(3 \times 10^{-4} \frac{\text{mol}}{\text{L}} \right) \left(5.42 \times 10^{11} \frac{\text{Bq}}{\text{mol}} \right) \left(5.15 \times 10^6 \frac{\text{eV}}{\text{dis}} \right) \left(\frac{0.015 \text{ H}_2\text{O}}{100 \text{ eV}} \right) \left(4.36 \times 10^8 \text{ L} \right)}{\left(8 \times 10^5 \text{ drums} \right) \left(6.022 \times 10^{23} \frac{\text{molecules}}{\text{mole}} \right)} \quad (14)$$

R = rate of gas production (moles per drum per year)

Y_g = radiolytic gas yield, in number of moles of gas produced per number of water molecules consumed

C_{Pu} = maximum dissolved concentration of plutonium (molar)

$S A_{\text{Pu}}$ = specific activity of ^{239}Pu (5.42×10^{11} becquerels per mole)

\bar{E}_α = average energy of α -particles emitted during ^{239}Pu decay (5.15×10^6 eV)

G = number of water molecules split per 100 eV of energy transferred from alpha-particles

V_B = volume of brine in the repository (liters)

N_D = number of CH drums in the repository ($\sim 8 \times 10^5$)

N_A = Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} molecules per mole)

The value of G used in this calculation has been set at 0.015, the upper limit of the range of values observed (0.011 to 0.015) during experimental studies of the effects of radiation on WIPP brines (Reed et al. 1993). A maximum estimate of the volume of brine that could potentially be present in the disposal region has been made from its excavated volume of $436,000 \text{ m}^3$ ($520,266 \text{ yd}^3$). This estimate, in particular, is considered to be highly conservative because it makes no allowance for creep closure of the excavation, or for the volume of waste and backfill that will be emplaced, and takes no account of factors that may limit brine inflow. These parameter values lead to an estimate of the potential rate of gas production due to the **Radiolysis of Brine** of 0.6 moles per drum per year.

Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30°C (86°F) and 14.8 MPa (lithostatic pressure), this is equivalent to approximately 6.8×10^4 liters (1.8×10^4 gallons) per year.

Potential gas production rates from other processes that will occur in the repository are significantly greater than this. For example, under water-saturated conditions, microbial degradation of cellulosic waste has the potential to yield between 1.3×10^6 and 3.8×10^7 liters (3.4×10^5 and 1.0×10^7 gallons) per year; anoxic corrosion of steels has the potential to yield up to 6.3×10^5 liters (1.6×10^5 gallons) per year.

1 In addition to the assessment of the potential rate of gas generation by *Radiolysis of Brine* given
2 above, a study of the likely consequences on disposal system performance has been undertaken
3 by Vaughn et al. (1995). A model was implemented in BRAGFLO to estimate radiolytic gas
4 generation in the disposal region according to the equation above.

5 A set of BRAGFLO simulations was performed to assess the magnitude of the influence of the
6 *Radiolysis of Brine* on contaminant migration to the accessible environment. The calculations
7 considered radiolysis of water by 15 isotopes of Th, Pu, U, and Am. Conditional complementary
8 cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of normalized contaminated brine releases to the
9 Culebra via a human intrusion borehole and the shaft system, as well as releases to the
10 subsurface boundary of the accessible environment via the Salado interbeds, were constructed
11 and compared to the corresponding baseline CCDFs calculated excluding radiolysis. The
12 comparisons indicated that *Radiolysis of Brine* does not significantly affect releases to the
13 Culebra or the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment under disturbed or undisturbed
14 conditions (Vaughn et al. 1995). Although the analysis of Vaughn et al. (1995) used data that are
15 different than those used in the PA calculations, estimates of total gas volumes in the repository
16 are similar to those considered in the analysis performed by Vaughn et al. (1995).

17 Therefore, gas generation by *Radiolysis of Brine* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
18 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 SCR-6.5.1.7 FEP Number: W53
20 FEP Title: *Radiolysis of Cellulose*

21 SCR-6.5.1.7.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

22 *Gas generation from Radiolysis of Cellulose has been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
23 *basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

24 SCR-6.5.1.7.2 Summary of New Information

25 This FEP has been updated with new inventory data related to cellulose content. In addition, the
26 screening argument has been modified by the inclusion of gas generation information from the
27 WIPP transportation program.

28 SCR-6.5.1.7.3 Screening Argument

29 Molecke (1979) compared experimental data on gas production rates caused by *Radiolysis of*
30 *Cellulose* and other waste materials with gas generation rates by other processes including
31 bacterial (microbial) waste degradation. The comparative gas generation rates reported by
32 Molecke (1979, p. 4) are given in terms of most probable ranges, using units of moles per year
33 per drum, for drums of 0.21 m³ (0.27 yd³) in volume. A most probable range of 0.005 to 0.011
34 moles per year per drum is reported for gas generation due to radiolysis of cellulosic material
35 (Molecke 1979, p. 4). As a comparison, a most probable range of 0.0 to 5.5 moles per year per
36 drum is reported for gas generation by bacterial degradation of waste.

37 The data reported by Molecke (1979) are consistent with more recent gas generation
38 investigations made under the WIPP program, and indicate that radiolysis of cellulosic materials

1 will generate significantly less gas than other gas generation processes. Gas generation from
2 radiolysis of cellulose therefore can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
3 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

4 Radiolytic gas generation is controlled by the radioactivity of wastes and the waste properties.
5 According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6
6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent
7 decrease. Interestingly, the radionuclide inventory in the CH-TRU waste, which accounts for the
8 most volume of WIPP wastes, decreases from 6.42×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 5.33×10^6 curies
9 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F). Such a small change will not affect radiolytic gas generation.
10 However, the new inventory data indicates a 7 percent increase in the density of cellulose in
11 waste materials (Appendix DATA, Attachment F). Because the additional cellulose component
12 is mainly derived from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) wastes, which
13 have relatively low radioactivity, the increase in total cellulose quantity will not significantly
14 affect the prediction of total radiolytic gas generation.

15 Radiolytic gas generation is also limited by transportation requirements, which state that the
16 hydrogen generated in the innermost layer of confinement must be no more than five percent
17 over 60 days (DOE 2000). Thus, the maximum rate allowed for transportation is 0.201 m^3 per
18 drum \times five percent \times 1000 L/m^3 per 60 days \times 365 days per year = 61 L per drum per year,
19 smaller than the maximum microbial gas generation rate. Note that this estimate is very
20 conservative and the actual rates are even smaller. It is a general consensus within the
21 international research community that the effect of radiolytic gas generation on the long-term
22 performance of a low/intermediate level waste repository is negligible (Rodwell et al. 1999).

23 SCR-6.5.1.8 FEP Number: W54
24 FEP Title: **Helium Gas Production**

25 SCR-6.5.1.8.1 Screening Decision: SO-C


26 *Gas generation from helium production has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
27 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.5.1.8.2 Summary of New Information

29 The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
30 radionuclide activity (2.48 million curies of TRU isotopes) is less than previously estimated in
31 TWBIR Rev 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus, the **Helium Gas Production** argument for CRA-2004 is
32 conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening argument. The FEP screening argument
33 and screening decision remain unchanged except for editorial changes.

34 SCR-6.5.1.8.3 Screening Argument

35 **Helium Gas Production** will occur by the reduction of α -particles (helium nuclei) emitted from
36 the waste. The maximum amount of helium that could be produced can be calculated from the
37 number α -particles generated during radioactive decay. The α -particles are converted to helium
38 gas by the following reaction:



For the screening argument used in the CCA, the inventory (I) that may be emplaced in the repository is approximately 4.07 million curies or 1.5×10^{17} becquerels (see CCA Appendix BIR). Assuming that the inventory continues to yield α -particles at this rate throughout the 10,000-year regulatory period the maximum rate of helium gas produced (R_{He}) may be calculated from

$$R_{\text{He}} = \frac{I \left(\frac{1 \text{ He atom}}{\alpha\text{-decay}} \right)}{N_A} \quad (16)$$

R_{He} is the rate of **Helium Gas Production** in the repository (mole per second)

I is the waste inventory, 1.5×10^{17} becquerels, assuming that 1 becquerel is equal to 1 α -decay per second, and N_A is Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} atoms per mole). These assumptions regarding the inventory lead to maximum estimates for helium production because some of the radionuclides will decay by beta and gamma emission.

R_{He} is approximately 5.5×10^{-7} moles per second based on an alpha-emitting inventory of 4.07 million curies. Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30°C (86°F) and 14.8 MPa or 146 atm (lithostatic pressure), yields approximately 1.3 liters (0.34 gallons) per year.

Gas production rates by microbial degradation of organic materials and anoxic corrosion of steel are likely to be significantly greater than 1.3 liters per year. For example, anoxic corrosion of steels is estimated to yield 0 to 6.3×10^5 liters of hydrogen per year (Section 6.4, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS). Even if gas production by **Microbes** and corrosion was minimal and helium production dominated gas generation, the effects would be of low consequence because of the low total volume.

The effects of **Helium Gas Production** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.1.9 FEP Number: W55
 FEP Title: **Radioactive Gases**

SCR-6.5.1.9.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

*The formation and transport of **Radioactive Gases** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

SCR-6.5.1.9.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has become available that affects the screening argument; the FEP screening decision remains unchanged. Additional information has been added to the screening discussions.

1 SCR-6.5.1.9.3 Screening Argument

2 Based on the composition of the anticipated waste inventory as described in Appendix DATA,
3 Attachment F, the *Radioactive Gases* that will be generated in the repository are radon and
4 carbon-14 labeled CO₂ and methane (CH₄).

5 Appendix DATA, Attachment F indicates that a small amount of carbon-14, 0.73 grams, or 3.26
6 curies, will be disposed in the WIPP. This amount is insignificant in comparison with the 40
7 CFR § 191.13 cumulative release limit for carbon-14.

8 Notwithstanding this comparison, consideration of transport of *Radioactive Gases* could
9 potentially be necessary in respect of the 40 CFR § 191.15 individual protection requirements.
10 carbon-14 may partition into CO₂ and methane formed during microbial degradation of cellulosic
11 and other organic wastes (for example, rubbers and plastics). However, total fugacities of CO₂ in
12 the repository are expected to be very low because of the action of the MgO backfill which will
13 lead to incorporation of CO₂ in solid magnesite. Similarly, interaction of CO₂ with cementitious
14 wastes will limit CO₂ fugacities by the formation of solid calcium carbonate. Thus, because of
15 the formation of solid carbonate phases in the repository, significant transport of carbon-14 as
16 carbon dioxide-14 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
17 the performance of the disposal system.

18 Potentially significant volumes of methane may be produced during the microbial degradation of
19 cellulosic waste. However, volumes of methane-14 will be small given the low total inventory
20 of carbon-14, and the tendency of carbon-14 to be incorporated into solid carbonate phases in the
21 repository. Therefore, although transport of carbon-14 could occur as methane-14, this effect has
22 been eliminated from the current PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
23 performance of the disposal system.

24 Radon gas will contain proportions of the alpha emitters ²¹⁹Rn, ²²⁰Rn, and ²²²Rn. All of these
25 have short half-lives, but ²²²Rn is potentially the most important because it is produced from the
26 abundant waste isotope, ²³⁸Pu, and because it has the longest half-life of the radon isotopes (≈ 4
27 days). ²²²radon will exhibit secular equilibrium with its parent ²²⁶Rn, which has a half-life of
28 1600 years. Consequently, ²²²Rn will be produced throughout the 10,000-year regulatory time
29 period. Conservative analysis of the potential ²²²Rn inventory suggests activities of less than 716
30 curies at 10,000 years (Bennett 1996).

31 Direct comparison of the estimated level of ²²²Rn activity with the release limits specified in 40
32 CFR § 191.13 cannot be made because the release limits do not cover radionuclides with half-
33 lives less than 20 years. For this reason, production of radon gas can be eliminated from the PA
34 calculations on regulatory grounds. Notwithstanding this regulatory argument, the small
35 potential radon inventory means that the formation and transport of radon gas can also be
36 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
37 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.2 Speciation**

2 SCR-6.5.2.1 FEP Number: W56
 3 FEP Title: **Speciation**

4 SCR-6.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – Disposal Room
 5 UP – Culebra
 6 SO-C – Beneficial – Shaft Seals

7 *Chemical **Speciation** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide*
 8 *solubility in the disposal rooms, and the degree of chemical retardation estimated during*
 9 *contaminant transport. The effects of cementitious seals on chemical **Speciation** have been*
 10 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the*
 11 *disposal system.*

12 SCR-6.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

13 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. It has been
 14 modified for editorial purposes.

15 SCR-6.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument

16 Chemical **Speciation** refers to the form in which elements occur under a particular set of
 17 chemical or environmental conditions. Conditions affecting chemical **Speciation** include the
 18 temperature, pressure, and salinity (ionic strength) of the water in question. The importance of
 19 chemical speciation lies in its control of the geochemical reactions likely to occur and the
 20 consequences for actinide mobility.

21 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.1 *Disposal Room*

22 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in any brines present in the disposal rooms
 23 after repository closure will depend on the stability of the chemical species that form under the
 24 prevailing conditions (for example, temperature, pressure, and ionic strength). The method used
 25 to derive radionuclide solubilities in the disposal rooms (see Section 6.4.3.5) considers the
 26 expected conditions. The MgO backfill will buffer pH values in the disposal room to between 9
 27 and 10. Thus, chemical **Speciation** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of
 28 radionuclide solubility in the disposal rooms.

29 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.2 *Repository Seals*

30 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
 31 alter the chemical **Speciation** of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
 32 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
 33 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 – 325). At high pH values, the **Speciation**
 34 and adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are
 35 reduced in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of
 36 radionuclides in dissolved form. The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry

1 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
2 performance of the disposal system.

3 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.3 *Culebra*

4 Chemical ***Speciation*** will affect actinide retardation in the Culebra. The dependence of actinide
5 retardation on ***Speciation*** in the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations by sampling over
6 ranges of distribution coefficients (K_{ds}). The ranges of K_{ds} are based on the range of
7 groundwater compositions and ***Speciation*** in the Culebra, including consideration of
8 nonradionuclide solutes. The methodology used to simulate sorption in the Culebra is described
9 in Section 6.4.6.2.1.

10 SCR-6.5.2.2 FEP Number: W57
11 FEP Title: ***Kinetics of Speciation***

12 SCR-6.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The effects of reaction kinetics in chemical speciation reactions have been eliminated from PA*
14 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information that would change the screening argument has arisen since the submission
17 of the CCA. The original screening discussions have been edited for clarity of expression.

18 SCR-6.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument

19 Chemical ***Speciation*** of actinides describes the composition and relative distribution of dissolved
20 species, such as the hydrated metal ion, or complexes, whether with organic or inorganic ligands.
21 Conditions affecting chemical ***Speciation*** include temperature, ionic strength, ligand
22 concentration and pH of the solution. Some ligands, such as hydroxide, may act to decrease
23 actinide solubility, while others, such as citrate, frequently have the opposite influence, often
24 increasing actinide solubility.

25 SCR-6.5.2.2.4 Disposal Room Equilibrium Conditions

26 The concentrations of radionuclides that can be dissolved in brines within the disposal rooms
27 will depend on the thermodynamic stabilities and solubilities of the respective metal complexes.
28 The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) calculations and database input used to determine the
29 brine solubilities of radionuclides takes into account the expected conditions, including
30 temperature, ionic strength, pH, and ligand concentration. The chemical ***Speciation at***
31 ***equilibrium*** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the
32 disposal rooms.

33 SCR-6.5.2.2.5 Kinetics of Complex Formation

34 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or
35 actinide bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and

1 contaminated objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of
 2 dissolved radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition, and by the kinetics of
 3 dissolution of the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation.
 4 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
 5 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and ethylene
 6 diamine tetra-acetate (EDTA) are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a
 7 second, an inconsequentially short time increment on the scale of the 10,000-year regulatory
 8 period. Reactions of these types are generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to
 9 measure the reaction rates; as a practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate
 10 when metal solutions are combined with ligand solutions. As a result, the rate of approach to an
 11 equilibrium distribution of solution species takes place much more rapidly than dissolution,
 12 making the dissolution reaction the rate limiting step. The effects of reaction kinetics in aqueous
 13 systems are discussed by Lasaga et al. (1994) who suggest that in contrast to many
 14 heterogeneous reactions, homogeneous aqueous geochemical ***Speciation*** reactions involving
 15 relatively small inorganic species occur rapidly and are accurately described by thermodynamic
 16 equilibrium models that neglect explicit consideration of reaction kinetics.

17 For that reason, the rate at which solution species approach equilibrium distribution is of no
 18 consequence to repository performance. ***Kinetics of Chemical Speciation*** may be eliminated
 19 from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

20 ***SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution***

21 SCR-6.5.3.1 FEP Number: W58, W59, and W60
 22 FEP Title: ***Dissolution of Waste (W58)***
 23 ***Precipitation of Secondary Minerals (W59)***
 24 ***Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution (W60)***

25 SCR-6.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – W58
 26 SO-C Beneficial – W59
 27 SO-C – W60

28 *Waste dissolution and the release of radionuclides in the disposal rooms are accounted for in PA*
 29 *calculations. The formation of radionuclide bearing precipitates from groundwaters and brines*
 30 *and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 31 *the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effect of*
 32 *reaction kinetics in controlling the rate of waste dissolution within the disposal rooms has been*
 33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the*
 34 *disposal system.*

35 SCR-6.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

36 ***Precipitation of Secondary Minerals*** in the disposal room and in geologic units will lead to
 37 reductions in nuclide concentrations via the sequestration of radionuclides by coprecipitation and
 38 by encapsulation of radionuclide precipitates, and will retard radionuclide transport through
 39 sorption. Within the disposal room, metal oxides/oxy-hydroxides will form by corrosion of
 40 waste packages and waste components; brucite will form by hydration of MgO backfill;

1 carbonate minerals will form by carbonation of MgO backfill and cement phases; secondary
2 cement alteration phases will form through brine-cement waste form interactions; and chloride
3 and sulfate minerals will be precipitated due to water uptake during hydration and corrosion
4 reactions. In geologic units above the repository, iron oxides/oxy-hydroxides, carbonates,
5 sulfates may form as groundwaters mix. Mineral precipitation in geologic units above the
6 repository is assumed to be uniform, and in addition to sorbing or sequestering radionuclides,
7 will be beneficial by reducing permeability and slowing the groundwater flow.

8 During the original WIPP Certification, the EPA questioned the screening argument for ***Kinetics***
9 ***of Precipitation and Dissolution***. The EPA stated in EPA TSD Scope of Performance
10 Assessment regarding ***Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution***:

11 The screening argument in SCR.2.5.3 appears reasonable to EPA. Initially, EPA thought the
12 argument appeared questionable because the CCA assumed that precipitation reactions are always
13 rapid and complete. As a result, the EPA questioned the gas pressures in the repository, the
14 chemical conditions, and the actinide solubilities. The DOE has since submitted experimental
15 results indicating that the predicted reactions occur and time frames are somewhat rapid. The EPA
16 reconsidered this assessment and concluded that the precipitation assumptions are necessary (and
17 conservative), and are supported by experimental data.

18 Other than that stated above, no new information that would change the screening argument has
19 arisen since the submission of the CCA. The original text has been edited for clarity of
20 expression.

21 SCR-6.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument

22 ***Dissolution of Waste and Precipitation of Secondary Minerals*** control the concentrations of
23 radionuclides in brines and can influence rates of contaminant transport. Waste dissolution is
24 accounted for in PA calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from
25 groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated
26 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
27 system.

28 At low temperatures, precipitation and dissolution reactions are caused by changes in fluid
29 chemistry that result in chemical undersaturation or oversaturation (Bruno and Sandino 1987).
30 Precipitation can be divided into two stages: nucleation and crystal growth. Following
31 nucleation, growth rates depend on the rates of surface processes and the transport of materials to
32 the growth site. Mineral dissolution often depends on whether a surface reaction or transport of
33 material away from the reaction site act as the rate controlling process. The former case may
34 cause selective dissolution along crystallographically controlled features, whereas the latter may
35 induce rapid bulk dissolution (Berner 1981). Thus, a range of kinetic behaviors will be exhibited
36 by different mineral precipitation and dissolution reactions in geochemical systems.

37 SCR-6.5.3.1.3.1 Disposal Room

38 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or
39 actinide-bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and
40 contaminated objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of
41 dissolved radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition, and by the kinetics of

1 dissolution of the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation.
 2 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
 3 carbonated and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA
 4 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in less than one second, which is infinitesimally
 5 small on the time scale of the 10,000 year regulatory period. The rate at which thermodynamic
 6 equilibrium is approached between solution composition and the solubility controlling solid
 7 phases will be limited by rate of dissolution of the solid materials in the waste. As a result, until
 8 equilibrium is reached, the solution concentration of the actinides will be lower than the
 9 concentration that is predicted based upon equilibrium of the solution phase components with the
 10 solubility limiting solid phases. The WIPP actinide source term model, which describes
 11 interactions of the waste and brine, is described in detail in Section 6.4.3.5. The assumption of
 12 instantaneous equilibrium in waste dissolution reactions is a conservative approach, yielding
 13 maximum concentration estimates for radionuclides in the disposal rooms because a time
 14 weighted average resulting from a kinetically accurate estimate of solution compositions would
 15 have lower concentrations at early times. Waste dissolution at the thermodynamic equilibrium
 16 solubility limit is accounted for in PA calculations. However, the *Kinetics of Dissolution* within
 17 the disposal rooms has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 18 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3.2** *Geological Units*

20 During groundwater flow, radionuclide precipitation processes that occur will lead to reduced
 21 contaminant transport. No credit is given in PA calculations to the potentially beneficial
 22 occurrence of *Precipitation of Secondary Minerals*. The formation of radionuclide-bearing
 23 precipitates from groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have
 24 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to disposal system
 25 performance. As a result *Kinetics of Precipitation* also has been eliminated from PA
 26 calculations because no credit is taken for precipitation reactions.

27 **SCR-6.5.4** *Sorption*

28 SCR-6.5.4.1 FEP Number: W61, W62, and W63
 29 FEP Title: *Actinide Sorption (W61)*
 30 *Kinetics of Sorption (W62)*
 31 *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces (W63)*

32 SCR-6.5.4.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – (W61, W62) In the Culebra & Dewey Lake
 33 SO-C – Beneficial – (W61, W61) In the Disposal Room,
 34 Shaft Seals, Panel Closures, Other Geologic Units
 35 UP – (W63)

36 *Sorption within the disposal rooms, which would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations,*
 37 *has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the*
 38 *performance of the disposal system. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel*
 39 *closures have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the*
 40 *performance of the disposal system. Sorption within the Culebra and the Dewey Lake is*
 41 *accounted for in PA calculations. Sorption processes within other geological units of the*

1 *disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial*
2 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Mobile adsorbents (for example,*
3 *microbes and humic acids), and the sorption of radionuclides at their surfaces, are accounted for*
4 *in PA calculations in the estimates of the concentrations of actinides that may be carried. The*
5 *potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes and of **Changes in Sorptive***
6 ***Surfaces** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.5.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
9 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
10 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

11 SCR-6.5.4.1.3 Screening Argument

12 Sorption may be defined as the accumulation of matter at the interface between a solid and an
13 aqueous solution. Within PA calculations, including those made for the WIPP, the use of
14 isotherm representations of *Actinide Sorption* prevails because of their computational simplicity
15 in comparison with other models (Serne 1992, pp. 238 – 239).

16 The mechanisms that control the *Kinetics of Sorption* processes are, in general, poorly
17 understood. Often, sorption of inorganic ions on mineral surfaces is a two-step process
18 consisting of a short period (typically minutes) of diffusion-controlled, rapid uptake, followed by
19 slower processes (typically weeks to months) including surface rearrangement, aggregation and
20 precipitation, and solid solution formation (Davis and Kent 1990, 202). Available data
21 concerning rates of sorption reactions involving the important radionuclides indicate that, in
22 general, a range of kinetic behavior is to be expected.

23 The relevance to the WIPP of sorption reaction kinetics lies in their effects on chemical
24 transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to static surfaces of the disposal system such as seals
25 and host rocks acts to retard chemical transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to potentially
26 mobile surfaces, such as colloids, however, may act to enhance chemical transport, particularly if
27 the kinetics of contaminant desorption are slow or the process is irreversible (nonequilibrium).

28 The following subsections discuss sorption in the disposal rooms, shaft seals, panel closures, the
29 Culebra, and other geological units of the WIPP disposal system. Sorption on colloids,
30 *Microbes*, and particulate material is also discussed.

31 SCR-6.5.4.1.3.1 *Disposal Room*

32 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in waters entering the disposal room will be
33 controlled by a combination of sorption and dissolution reactions. However, because sorption
34 processes are surface phenomena, the amount of material that is likely to be involved in sorption
35 mass transfer processes will be small relative to that involved in the bulk dissolution of waste.
36 WIPP PA calculations therefore assume that dissolution reactions control radionuclide
37 concentrations. Sorption on waste, containers, and backfill within the disposal rooms, which
38 would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations, has been eliminated from PA calculations on
39 the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.5.4.1.4 Shaft Seals and Panel Closures

2 Chapter 3.0 and CCA Appendix SEAL describe the seals that are to be placed at various
3 locations in the access shafts and waste panel access tunnels. The materials to be used include
4 crushed salt, bentonite clay, and cementitious grouts. Of these, the latter two in particular
5 possess significant sorption capacities. No credit is given for the influence of sorption processes
6 that may occur in seal materials and their likely beneficial effects on radionuclide migration
7 rates. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel closures have been eliminated
8 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
9 system.

10 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.1 *Culebra*

11 Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in Section 6.4.6.2.
12 The model used comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm approximation, employing
13 constructed cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of distribution coefficients (K_{ds}) applicable
14 to dolomite in the Culebra. The potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes are
15 encompassed in the ranges of K_{ds} used. The geochemical speciation of the Culebra
16 groundwaters and the effects of *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces* are implicitly accounted for in PA
17 calculations for the WIPP in the ranges of K_{ds} used.

18 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.2 *Other Geological Units*

19 During groundwater flow, any radionuclide sorption processes that occur between dissolved or
20 colloidal actinides and rock surfaces will lead to reduced rates of contaminant transport. The
21 sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter
22 it from being released to the accessible environment over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995).
23 Thus, sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in
24 Section 6.4.6.6. No credit is given to the potentially beneficial occurrence of sorption in other
25 geological units outside the Culebra. Sorption processes within other geological units of the
26 disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
27 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

28 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.3 *Sorption on Colloids, Microbes, and Particulate Material*

29 The interactions of sorption processes with colloidal, microbial, or particulate transport are
30 complex. Neglecting sorption of contaminants on immobile surfaces in the repository shafts and
31 Salado (for example, the clays of the Salado interbeds) is a conservative approach because it
32 leads to overestimated transport rates. However, neglecting sorption on potentially mobile
33 adsorbents (for example, microbes and humic acids) cannot be shown to be conservative with
34 respect to potential releases, because mobile adsorbents may act to transport radionuclides
35 sorbed to them. Consequently, the concentrations of actinides that may be carried by mobile
36 adsorbents are accounted for in PA calculations (see Section 6.4.3.6).

1 **SCR-6.5.5** *Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry*

2 SCR-6.5.5.1 FEP Number: W64 and W66
3 FEP Title: *Effects of Metal Corrosion*
4 *Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*

5 SCR-6.5.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The effects of reduction-oxidation reactions related to metal corrosion on reduction-oxidation*
7 *conditions are accounted for in PA calculations. Reduction-oxidation reaction kinetics are*
8 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

9 SCR-6.5.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

10 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. The screening arguments have not
11 changed. Editorial changes have been made to the discussion.

12 SCR-6.5.5.1.3 Screening Argument

13 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.1 *Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*

14 In general, investigation of the reduction-oxidation couples present in aqueous geochemical
15 systems suggests that most reduction-oxidation reactions are not in thermodynamic equilibrium
16 (Wolery 1992, 27). The lack of data characterizing the rates of reactions among trace element
17 reduction-oxidation couples leads to uncertainty in elemental speciation. This uncertainty in
18 ***Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*** is accounted for in PA calculations in the dissolved actinide
19 source term model (see Section 6.4.3.5), which estimates the probabilities that particular
20 actinides occur in certain oxidation states.

21 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.2 *Corrosion*

22 Other than gas generation, which is discussed in FEPs W44 through W55, the main ***Effect of***
23 ***Metal Corrosion*** will be to influence the chemical conditions that prevail within the repository.
24 Ferrous metals will be the most abundant metals in the WIPP, and these will corrode on contact
25 with any brines entering the repository. Initially, corrosion will occur under oxidic conditions
26 owing to the atmospheric oxygen present in the repository at the time of closure. However,
27 consumption of the available oxygen by corrosion reactions will rapidly lead to anoxic
28 (reducing) conditions. These changes and controls on conditions within the repository will affect
29 the chemical ***Speciation*** of the brines and may affect the oxidation states of the actinides present.
30 Changes to the oxidation states of the actinides will lead to changes in the concentrations that
31 may be mobilized during brine flow. The oxidation states of the actinides are accounted for in
32 PA calculations by the use of parameters that describe probabilities that the actinides exist in
33 particular oxidation states and, as a result, the likely actinide concentrations. Therefore, the
34 ***Effect of Metal Corrosion*** are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 SCR-6.5.5.2 FEP Number: W65
2 FEP Title: **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**

3 SCR-6.5.5.2.1 Screening Decision: *SO-P*

4 *The migration of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** through the repository has been eliminated from*
5 *PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

6 SCR-6.5.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 Large-scale reduction-oxidation fronts have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
8 low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years. There is no new information that would change
9 the screening decision. Editorial changes have been made to the FEP text to remove reference to
10 other FEP descriptions, screening arguments and screening decisions.

11 SCR-6.5.5.2.3 Screening Argument

12 The development of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** in the disposal system may affect the
13 chemistry and migration of radionuclides. **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** separate regions that
14 may be characterized, in broad terms, as having different oxidation potentials. On either side of
15 a **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**, the behavior of reduction-oxidation-sensitive elements may be
16 controlled by different geochemical reactions. Elements that exhibit the greatest range of
17 oxidation states (for example, uranium, neptunium, and plutonium) will be the most affected by
18 **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** development and migration. The migration of **Reduction-**
19 **Oxidation Fronts** may occur as a result of diffusion processes, or in response to groundwater
20 flow, but will be restricted by the occurrence of heterogeneous buffering reactions (for example,
21 mineral dissolution and precipitation reactions). Indeed, these buffering reactions cause the
22 typically sharp, distinct nature of reduction-oxidation fronts.

23 Of greater significance is the possibility that the flow of fluids having different oxidation
24 potentials from those established within the repository might lead to the development and
25 migration of a large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**. **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** have been
26 observed in natural systems to be the loci for both the mobilization and concentration of
27 radionuclides, such as uranium. For example, during investigations at two uranium deposits at
28 Poços de Caldas, Brazil, uranium was observed by Waber (1991) to be concentrated along
29 **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** at the onset of reducing conditions by its precipitation as uranium
30 oxide. In contrast, studies of the Alligator Rivers uranium deposit in Australia by Snelling
31 (1992) indicated that the movement of the relatively oxidized weathered zone downwards
32 through the primary ore body as the deposit was eroded and gradually exhumed led to the
33 formation of secondary uranyl-silicate minerals and the mobilization of uranium in its more
34 soluble uranium (VI) form in near-surface waters. The geochemical evidence from these sites
35 suggests that the **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** had migrated only slowly, at most on the order of
36 a few tens of meters per million years. These rates of migration were controlled by a range of
37 factors, including the rates of erosion, infiltration of oxidizing waters, geochemical reactions, and
38 diffusion processes.

39 The migration of large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** through the repository as a result of
40 regional fluid flow is considered unlikely over the regulatory period on the basis of comparison

1 with the slow rates of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** migration suggested by natural system
 2 studies. This comparison is considered conservative because the relatively impermeable nature
 3 of the Salado suggests that **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** migration rates at the WIPP are likely to
 4 be slower than those observed in the more permeable lithologies of the natural systems studied.
 5 Large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations
 6 on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

7 SCR-6.5.5.3 FEP Number: W67
 8 FEP Title: **Localized Reducing Zones**

9 SCR-6.5.5.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

10 *The formation of **Localized Reducing Zones** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
 11 *basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

12 SCR-6.5.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

13 The FEP screening argument has been modified from that presented the CCA to include a more
 14 complete description of the description has been updated.

15 SCR-6.5.5.3.3 Screening Argument

16 The dominant reduction reactions in the repository include steel corrosion and microbial
 17 degradation. The following bounding calculation shows that molecular diffusion alone will be
 18 sufficient to mix brine chemistry over a distance of meters and therefore the formation of
 19 **Localized Reducing Zones** in the repository is of low consequence.

20 The diffusion of a chemical species in a porous medium can be described by Fick's equation
 21 (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.132):

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial X} \left(D_{eff} \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} \right) \quad (17)$$

23 where C is the concentration of the diffusing chemical species; t is the time; X is the distance;
 24 and D_{eff} is the effective diffusivity of the chemical species in a given porous medium. D_{eff} is
 25 related to the porosity (ϕ) of the medium by (e.g., Oelkers, 1996):


$$D_{eff} = \phi^2 D \quad (18)$$

27 where D is the diffusivity of the species in pure solution. The D values for most aqueous species
 28 at room temperatures fall into a narrow range, and 10^{-5} cm² (1.5×10^{-6} in²) per second is a good
 29 approximation (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.138). From the WIPP PA calculations
 30 (Bean et al. 1996, p.7-29; WIPP PA Department, 1993, Equation B-8), the porosity in the WIPP
 31 waste panels after room closure is calculated to be 0.4 to 0.7. From Equation (19), the effective
 32 diffusivity D_{eff} in the waste is estimated to be $2 \sim 5 \times 10^{-6}$ cm² (7×10^{-7} in²) per second ($= 6 \sim 16$
 33 $\times 10^{-3}$ m²/year).

1 Given a time scale of T , the typical diffusion penetration distance (L) can be determined by
 2 scaling:

3
$$L = \sqrt{D_{eff}T} . \tag{19}$$

4 Using Equation (20), the diffusion penetration distance in the WIPP can be calculated as a
 5 function of diffusion time, as shown in Figure SCR-1.



6 **Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion**
 7 **Time**
 8

9 Direct brine release requires the repository gas pressure to be at least 8 MPA (Stoelzel et al.
 10 1996). The CRA calculations show that it will take at least 100 years for the repository pressure
 11 to reach this critical value by gas generation processes. Over this time scale, according to
 12 Equation (20) and Figure SCR-1, molecular diffusion alone can mix brine composition
 13 effectively at least over a distance of ~ 1 m (3.3 ft).

14 The above calculation assumes diffusion only through liquid water. This assumption is
 15 applicable to steel corrosion, the humid rate of which is zero. Note that microbial reactions can
 16 also consume or release gaseous species. The diffusion of a gaseous species is much faster than
 17 an aqueous one. Thus, molecular diffusion can homogenize microbial reactions even at a much
 18 large scale.

19 The height of waste stacks in the repository after room closure (h) can be calculated by:

$$h = \frac{h_0(1-\phi_0)}{1-\phi} \quad (20)$$

where h_0 and ϕ_0 are the initial height of waste stacks and the initial porosity of wastes, which are assumed to be 4 m and 0.88, respectively, in the WIPP PA. For $\phi = 0.4 - 0.7$, h is estimated to be 0.8 to 1.4 m. This means that molecular diffusion alone can homogenize redox reaction in the vertical dimension of the repository. Therefore, the formation of localized reducing zone is unlikely. The general repository environment will become reducing shortly after room closure, due to metal corrosion and microbial reactions. Therefore, **Localized Reducing Zones** can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation**

10 SCR-6.5.6.1 FEP Number: W68, W69, and W71
 11 FEP Title: **Organic Complexation** (W68)
 12 **Organic Ligands** (W69)
 13 **Kinetics of Organic Complexation** (W71)

14 SCR-6.5.6.1.1 Screening Decision: UP W68 and W69
 15 SO-C W71

16 *The effects of anthropogenic **Organic Complexation** reactions, including the effects of **Organic***
 17 ***Ligands**, humic, and fulvic acids, have been incorporated in the PA calculations. The kinetics of*
 18 *organic ligand complexation is screened out because the rate at which **Organic Ligands** are*
 19 *complexed to actinide is so fast that it has no consequence to repository performance.*

20 SCR-6.5.6.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 The **Organic Complexation** was screened out for the CCA PA, on the basis that transition metals
 22 (in particular **iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium**, and **manganese**, present in waste drum steel)
 23 would compete effectively with the actinides for the binding sites on the organic ligands, thus
 24 preventing significant complexation of actinides organics. Although the CRA-2004 calculations
 25 include the effects of **Organic Ligands** (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate) on actinide
 26 solubility calculations, based on a revised thermodynamic database, the rate at which **Organic**
 27 **Ligands** are complexed to actinides is of no consequence to repository performance. Kinetics of
 28 **Organic Ligands** complexation may be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no
 29 consequence.

30 SCR-6.5.6.1.3 Screening Argument

31 From a PA standpoint, the most important actinides are Th, U, Np, Pu, and Am. Dissolved
 32 thorium, uranium, neptunium, plutonium, and americium will speciate essentially entirely as
 33 Th(IV), U(IV) or U(VI), Np(IV) or Np(V), Pu(III) or Pu(IV), and Am(III) under the strongly
 34 reducing conditions expected due to the presence of Fe(II) and microbes. (Section SOTERM-33
 35 – SOTERM-36).

1 Some **Organic Ligands** can increase the actinide solubilities. An estimate of the complexing
2 agents in the transuranic solidified waste forms scheduled for disposal in WIPP is presented in
3 Appendix DATA, Attachment F Table DATA-F-3.2-24. Acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA
4 were determined to be the only water-soluble and actinide complexing organic ligands present in
5 significant quantities in the TWBIR. These ligands and their complexation with actinides
6 (Th(IV), U(VI), Np(V), and Am(III)) in a variety of ionic strength media were studied at Florida
7 State University (FSU) (Choppin et al. 2001). The FSU studies showed that acetate, citrate,
8 oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved actinide concentrations.
9 Lactate behavior was also studied at FSU because it appeared in the preliminary inventory of
10 nonradioactive constituents of the TRU waste to be emplaced in the WIPP (Brush 1990); lactate
11 did not appear in the TWBIR, nor does it appear in the 2003 update to the TWBIR (Appendix
12 DATA, Attachment F).

13 The solubility of the actinides is calculated using FMT, a computer code for calculating actinide
14 concentration limits based on thermodynamic parameters. The parameters for FMT are derived
15 both from experimental investigations specifically designed to provide parameter values for this
16 model and from the published literature.

17 • Although the FSU experimental work on **Organic Ligands** complexation showed that
18 acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved
19 actinide concentrations, SNL did not include the results in the FMT calculations for the
20 CCA PA because (1) the thermodynamic database for **Organic Complexation** of
21 actinides was not considered adequate at the time, and (2) side-calculations using
22 thermodynamic data for low-ionic-strength NaCl solutions showed that transition metals
23 (in particular iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium, and manganese present in waste drum
24 steel) would compete effectively with the actinides for the binding sites on the **Organic**
25 **Ligands**, thus preventing significant complexation of actinides organics (Appendix PA,
26 Attachment SOTERM , Sections SOTERM-36 - SOTERM-41).

27 The CRA-2004 calculations include the effects of organic ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and
28 oxalate) on actinide solubilities in the FMT calculations (Brush and Xiong 2003). The FMT
29 database includes all of the results of experimental studies (Choppin et al. 2001) required to
30 predict the complexation of dissolved An(III), An(IV), and An(V) species by acetate, citrate,
31 EDTA, and oxalate (Giambalvo 2002a, 2002b).

32 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
33 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands, such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA,
34 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an inconsequentially short
35 time increment on the scale of the 10,000-year regulatory period. Reactions of these types are
36 generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure the reaction rates; as a
37 practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal solutions are
38 combined with ligand solutions.

39 For that reason, the rate at which **Organic Ligands** are complexed to actinide is of no
40 consequence to repository performance. **Kinetics of Organic Complexation** may be eliminated
41 from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

1 SCR-6.5.6.2 FEP Number: W70
2 FEP Title: *Humic and Fulvic Acids*

3 SCR-6.5.6.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

4 *The presence of **Humic and Fulvic Acids** is incorporated in PA calculations.*

5 SCR-6.5.6.2.2 Summary of New Information

6 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Editorial changes have been made to the
7 discussion.

8 SCR-6.5.6.2.3 Screening Argument

9 The occurrence of *Humic and Fulvic Acids* is incorporated in PA calculations in the models for
10 radionuclide transport by humic colloids (see Section 6.4.6.2.2).

11 ***SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties***

12 SCR-6.5.7.1 FEP Number: W74 and W76
13 FEP Title: *Chemical Degradation of Seals (W74)*
14 *Microbial Growth on Concrete (W76)*

15 SCR-6.5.7.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

16 *The effects of **Chemical Degradation of Seals** and of **Microbial Growth on Concrete** are*
17 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

18 SCR-6.5.7.1.2 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
20 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in DOE (1996a); however the
21 screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in
22 Chapter 6.0.

23 SCR-6.5.7.1.3 Screening Argument

24 The concrete used in the seal systems will degrade due to chemical reaction with the infiltrating
25 groundwater. Degradation could lead to an increase in permeability of the seal system. The
26 main uncertainties with regard to cement degradation rates at the WIPP are the effects of
27 groundwater chemistry, the exact nature of the cementitious phases present, and the rates of brine
28 infiltration. The PA calculations take a conservative approach to these uncertainties by assuming
29 a large increase in permeability of the concrete seals only a few hundred years after closure.
30 These permeability values are based on seal design considerations and consider the potential
31 effects of degradation processes. Therefore, the effects of *Chemical Degradation of Seals* are
32 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

1 Concrete can be inhabited by alkalophilic bacteria, which could produce acids, thereby
2 accelerating the seal degradation process. Nitrification processes, which will produce nitric acid,
3 tend to be aerobic, and will be further limited at the WIPP by the low availability of ammonium
4 in the brines (Pedersen and Karlsson 1995, 75). Because of the limitations on growth because of
5 the chemical conditions, it is likely that the effects of *Microbial Growth on Concrete* will be
6 small. The effects of such microbial activity on seal properties are, therefore, implicitly
7 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

8 SCR-6.5.7.2 FEP Number: W75
9 FEP Title: *Chemical Degradation of Backfill*

10 SCR-6.5.7.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

11 *The effects on material properties of the **Chemical Degradation of Backfill** have been*
12 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.*

13 SCR-6.5.7.2.2 Summary of New Information

14 As MgO degrades chemically, its physical properties change. Previously, DOE provided a paper
15 by Bynum et al. (1997), which summarizes the experimental results pertaining to chemical
16 degradation of backfill acquired by 1997. The most current MgO data, obtained after the CCA,
17 are summarized in the 2001 MRS Proceedings paper by Snider (2001). The current data show
18 that new MgO will essentially behave as it was designed. Changes have been made to the FEP
19 discussion to reference new experimental results and for editorial purposes.

20 SCR-6.5.7.2.3 Screening Argument

21 Degradation of the chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room is a prerequisite
22 of their function in buffering the chemical environment of the disposal room. However, the
23 chemical reactions (Snider 2001) and dissolution involved will change the physical properties of
24 the material. Because the mechanical and hydraulic characteristics of the backfill have been
25 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
26 disposal system, the effects of the *Chemical Degradation of Backfill* on material properties have
27 been eliminated from PA calculations on the same basis.

28 **SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode Features, Events, and Processes**

29 *SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport*

30 SCR-6.6.1.1 FEP Number: W77
31 FEP Title: *Solute Transport*

32 SCR-6.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

33 *Transport of dissolved radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-6.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
 3 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
 4 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Sections 6.4.5.4 and
 5 6.4.6.2.1.

6 SCR-6.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument

7 ***Solute Transport*** may occur by advection, dispersion, and diffusion down chemical potential
 8 gradients, and is accounted for in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.4 and 6.4.6.2.1).

9 SCR-6.6.1.2 FEP Number: W78, W79, W80, and W81
 10 FEP Title: ***Colloidal Transport*** (W78)
 11 ***Colloidal Formation and Stability*** (W79)
 12 ***Colloidal Filtration*** (W80)
 13 ***Colloidal Sorption*** (W81)

14 SCR-6.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

15 *Formation of colloids, transport of colloidal radionuclides, and colloid retardation through*
 16 *filtration and sorption are accounted for in PA calculations.*

17 SCR-6.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
 19 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
 20 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Sections 6.4.3.6
 21 and 6.4.6.2.2.

22 SCR-6.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument

23 Colloids typically have sizes of between 1 nm and 1 μm and may form stable dispersions in
 24 groundwaters. ***Colloid Formation and Stability*** depends on their composition and the prevailing
 25 chemical conditions (for example, salinity). Depending on their size, ***Colloid Transport*** may
 26 occur at different rates than those of fully dissolved species. They may be physically excluded
 27 from fine porous media, and their migration may be accelerated through fractured media in
 28 channels where velocities are greatest. However, they can also interact with the host rocks
 29 during transport and become retarded. These interactions may be of a chemical or physical
 30 nature and include electrostatic effects, leading to ***Colloid Sorption***, and sieving leading to
 31 ***Colloid Filtration*** and pore blocking. ***Colloid Formation and Stability*** is accounted for in PA
 32 calculations through estimates of colloid numbers in the disposal room based on the prevailing
 33 chemical conditions (Section 6.4.3.6). Colloid sorption, filtration, and transport in the Culebra
 34 are accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2.2).

1 **SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport**

2 SCR-6.6.2.1 FEP Number: W82, W83, W84, W85, and W86
 3 FEP Title: Suspension of Particles (W82)
 4 Rinse (W83)
 5 Cuttings (W84)
 6 Cavings (W85)
 7 Spallings (W86)

8 SCR-6.6.2.1.1 Screening Decision: DP W82, W84, W85, W86
 9 SO-C W83

10 *The formation of particulates through **Rinse** and subsequent transport of radionuclides in*
 11 *groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for undisturbed conditions on*
 12 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The transport of*
 13 *radionuclides as particulates (**Cuttings, Cavings, and Spallings**) during penetration of the*
 14 *repository by a borehole, is accounted for in PA calculations.*

15 SCR-6.6.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 ***Suspensions of Particles** larger than colloids are generally unstable and do not persist for very*
 17 *long. The **Rinse** process likely cannot occur under undisturbed conditions because brine flow*
 18 *would not be rapid enough to create a suspension of particles and transport them to the accessible*
 19 *environment. The only reasonable conditions under which suspensions could be formed would*
 20 *be during a drilling event with particles of waste suspended in the drilling fluid are carried to the*
 21 *surface. This effect is covered in PA. Editorial changes have been made to the discussion.*

22 SCR-6.6.2.1.3 Screening Argument

23 ***Suspensions of Particles** that have sizes larger than colloids are unstable because the particles*
 24 *undergo gravitational settling. It is unlikely that brine flow will be rapid enough within the*
 25 *WIPP disposal rooms to generate particulate suspensions through **Rinse** and transport under*
 26 *undisturbed conditions. Mobilization of suspensions would effect a local and minor*
 27 *redistribution of radionuclides within the room and would not result in increased radionuclide*
 28 *transport from the repository. The formation of particulates through **Rinse** and transport of*
 29 *radionuclides in groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for*
 30 *undisturbed conditions on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal*
 31 *system.*

32 *Inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by a borehole could result in transport of waste*
 33 *material to the ground surface through drilling-induced flow and blowouts (FEPs H21 and H23).*
 34 *This waste could include material intersected by the drill bit (**Cuttings**), material eroded from the*
 35 *borehole wall by circulating drilling fluid (**Cavings**), and material that enters the borehole as the*
 36 *repository depressurizes (**Spallings**). Transport of radionuclides by these materials and in brine*
 37 *is accounted for in PA calculations and is discussed in Section 6.4.7.1.*

1 **SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport**

2 SCR-6.6.3.1 FEP Number: W87
3 FEP Title: **Microbial Transport**

4 SCR-6.6.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

5 *Transport of radionuclides bound to microbes is accounted for in PA calculations.*

6 SCR-6.6.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
8 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
9 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

10 SCR-6.6.3.1.3 Screening Argument

11 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
12 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.
13 Because of their colloidal size, microbes, and any radionuclides bound to them, may be
14 transported at different rates than radionuclides in solution. **Microbial Transport** of
15 radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2.2).

16 SCR-6.6.3.2 FEP Number: W88
17 FEP Title: **Biofilms**

18 SCR-6.6.3.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

19 *The effects of **Biofilms** on microbial transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
20 *basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

21 SCR-6.6.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

22 The effects of **Biofilms** on **Microbial Transport** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
23 the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The discussion of
24 this FEP has been updated with recent experimental work.

25 SCR-6.6.3.2.3 Screening Argument

26 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
27 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.

28 **Biofilms** may influence microbial and radionuclide transport rates through their capacity to
29 retain, and therefore retard, both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. The formation of
30 **Biofilms** in deep subsurface environments such as in the WIPP is controversial. Since the
31 microbial degradation experiments at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) bracket expected
32 repository conditions, the potential effect of **Biofilms** formation on microbial degradation and
33 transport, if any, has been captured in the PA parameters derived from those experiments

1 (Francis and Gillow 1994; Francis et. al 1997; Francis and Gillow 2000; Gillow and Francis
2 2001a; Gillow and Francis 2001b; Gillow and Francis 2002a; Gillow and Francis 2002b). As a
3 matter of fact, no apparent formation of stable biofilms was observed in the BNL experiments.
4 The formation of *Biofilms* tends to reduce cell suspension and mobility. This effect has been
5 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
6 disposal system.

7 ***SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport***

8 SCR-6.6.4.1 FEP Number: W89
9 FEP Title: *Transport of Radioactive Gases*

10 SCR-6.6.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

11 *The **Transport of Radioactive Gases** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
12 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

13 SCR-6.6.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

14 This FEP discussion has been updated to include recent inventory information. The screening
15 decision has not changed.

16 SCR-6.6.4.1.3 Screening Argument

17 The production and potential *Transport of Radioactive Gases* are eliminated from PA
18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
19 Transportable radioactive gases are comprised mainly of isotopes of radon and carbon-14.
20 Radon gases are eliminated from PA because their inventory is small (<20 Ci; Appendix DATA,
21 Attachment F) and their half-lives are short (<4 days), resulting in insignificant potential for
22 release from the repository. The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of carbon-
23 14 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale quantity (3.3 Ci) is
24 70 percent lower than previously estimated (~13 Ci) in the TWBIR Rev 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus,
25 all CRA-2004 screening arguments for carbon-14 are conservatively bounded by the previous
26 CCA screening arguments.

27 ***SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes***

28 ***SCR-6.7.1 Advection***

29 SCR-6.7.1.1 FEP Number: W90
30 FEP Title: *Advection*

31 SCR-6.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

32 *Advection of contaminants is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-6.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
3 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
4 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

5 SCR-6.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument

6 **Advection** (that is, the transport of dissolved and solid material by flowing fluid) is accounted for
7 in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.4 and 6.4.6.2).

8 **SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion**

9 SCR-6.7.2.1 FEP Number: W91 and W92
10 FEP Title: **Diffusion (W91)**
11 **Matrix Diffusion (W92)**

12 SCR-6.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

13 **Diffusion of contaminants and retardation by Matrix Diffusion are accounted for in PA**
14 **calculations.**

15 SCR-6.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
17 PA, the implementation may differ from that used the CCA, although the screening decision has
18 not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

19 SCR-6.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument

20 **Diffusion** (that is, the movement of molecules or particles both parallel to and transverse to the
21 direction of advection in response to Brownian forces) and, more specifically **matrix diffusion**,
22 whereby movement is transverse to the direction of advection within a fracture and into the
23 surrounding rock matrix, are accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2).

24 **SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena**

25 SCR-6.7.3.1 FEP Number: W93
26 FEP Title: **Soret Effect**

27 SCR-6.7.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

28 **The effects of thermochemical transport phenomena (the Soret Effect) have been eliminated**
29 **from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.**

30 SCR-6.7.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

31 There is no new information available that affects the screening decision; only minor editorial
32 changes have been made to the FEP discussion.

1 SCR-6.7.3.1.3 Screening Argument

2 According to Fick's law, the diffusion flux of a solute is proportional to the solute concentration
3 gradient. In the presence of a temperature gradient there will also be a solute flux proportional to
4 the temperature gradient (the *Soret Effect*). Thus, the total solute flux, J , in a liquid phase may
5 be expressed as

$$6 \quad J = - D \nabla C - N D \nabla T, \quad (21)$$

7 where C is the solute concentration, T is the temperature of the liquid, D is the solute diffusion
8 coefficient, and

$$9 \quad N = S_T C(1-C), \quad (22)$$

10 in which S_T is the Soret coefficient. The mass conservation equation for solute diffusion in a
11 liquid is then

$$12 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot (D \nabla C + N D \nabla T). \quad (23)$$

13 When temperature gradients exist in solutions with both light and heavy solute molecules, the
14 heavier molecules tend to concentrate in the colder regions of the solution. Typically, large
15 temperature gradients are required for Soret diffusion to be significant compared to Fickian
16 diffusion.

17 *Radioactive Decay, Nuclear Criticality, and Exothermic Reactions* are three possible sources of
18 heat in the WIPP repository. The DOE (1980) estimated that radioactive decay of CH-TRU
19 waste will result in a maximum temperature rise at the center of the repository of 1.6°C (2.9°F)
20 at 80 years after waste emplacement. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) have shown that the total
21 thermal load of RH-TRU waste will not significantly affect the average temperature increase in
22 the repository. Temperature increases of about 3°C (5.4°F) may occur at the locations of RH-
23 TRU containers with maximum thermal power (60 W). Such temperature increases are likely to
24 be short-lived on the time scale of the 10,000 year regulatory period because of the rapid decay
25 of heat-producing nuclides in RH-TRU waste, such as ^{137}Cs , ^{90}Sr , ^{241}Pu , and ^{147}Pm , whose half-
26 lives are approximately 30, 29, 14, and 3 years, respectively. Soret diffusion generated by such
27 temperature gradients will be negligible compared to other radionuclide transport mechanisms.

28 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in W72. Potentially the
29 most significant exothermic reactions are **Concrete Hydration**, backfill hydration, and
30 **Aluminum Corrosion**. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the
31 concrete to approximately 50°C (122°F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38°C
32 (100°F) one week after seal emplacement.

33 However, the concrete seals will act as barriers to fluid flow for at least 100 years after
34 emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995). As a result, short-
35 term temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant Soret
36 diffusion through the seal system.

1 The maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels will be less than 5°C (9°F) as a
2 consequence of backfill hydration. Note that active institutional controls will prevent drilling
3 within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. Heat generation by radioactive decay and
4 concrete seal hydration will have decreased substantially after 100 years, and the temperatures in
5 the disposal panels will have decreased nearly to the temperature of the undisturbed host rock.

6 If the repository were to be inundated following a drilling intrusion, aluminum corrosion could,
7 at most, result in a short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F). These
8 calculated maximum heat generation rates resulting from aluminum corrosion and backfill
9 hydration could not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each
10 calculation assumes that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus, the
11 temperature rise of 6°C (10.8°F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of a
12 combination of exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Temperature increases of this
13 magnitude will not result in significant Soret diffusion within the disposal system.

14 The limited magnitude and spatial scale of temperature gradients in the disposal system indicate
15 that Soret diffusion will be insignificant, allowing the effects of thermochemical transport (*Soret*
16 *Effect*) to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
17 performance of the disposal system.

18 ***SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena***

19 SCR-6.7.4.1 FEP Number: W94
20 FEP Title: ***Electrochemical Effects***

21 SCR-6.7.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

22 *The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by electrochemical reactions have*
23 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
24 *disposal system.*

25 SCR-6.7.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
27 modified for editorial purposes.

28 SCR-6.7.4.1.3 Screening Argument

29 The variety of waste metals and metal packaging in the repository may allow galvanic cells
30 spanning short distances to be established. The interactions among the metals depend upon their
31 physical characteristics and the chemical conditions in the repository. For example, good
32 physical and electrical contact, which is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells, may be
33 impeded by electrically nonconductive waste materials. Additionally, in order to establish a
34 galvanic cell, it is necessary that the metals have different values for standard reduction
35 potentials. For example, a galvanic cell is not expected to be formed by contact of two segments
36 of metals with identical compositions. As a result, galvanic cells can only be established by
37 contact of dissimilar metals, as might happen due to contact between a waste drum and the
38 contents, or between contents within a waste package. The localized nature of electrochemical

1 transport is restricted to the size scale over which galvanic cells can develop, i.e., on the order of
2 size of waste packages. Since the possible range of transport is restricted by the physical extent
3 of galvanic activity, ***Electrochemical Effects*** cannot act as long-range transport mechanisms for
4 radionuclides and therefore are of no consequence to the performance of the repository.

5 SCR-6.7.4.2 FEP Number: W95
6 FEP Title: ***Galvanic Coupling***

7 SCR-6.7.4.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

8 *The effects of ***Galvanic Coupling*** between the waste and metals external to the repository on*
9 *transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of*
10 *occurrence over 10,000 years.*

11 SCR-6.7.4.2.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
13 modified for editorial purposes.

14 SCR-6.7.4.2.3 Screening Argument

15 With regard to the WIPP, ***Galvanic Coupling*** refers to the establishment of galvanic cells
16 between metals in the waste form, canisters, and other metals external to the waste form.

17 Long range electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a result of groundwater
18 flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of electric potential gradients may be
19 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
20 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
21 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
22 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of electric potentials is usually less than about 100
23 millivolts and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet
24 (Telford et al. 1976). Metals external to the waste form can include natural metallic ore bodies
25 in the host rock. However, metallic ore bodies and metallic sulfide ores do not exist in the region
26 of the repository (CCA Appendix GCR). As a result, galvanic coupling between the waste and
27 metallic materials outside the repository cannot occur. Therefore, ***Galvanic Coupling*** is
28 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

29 SCR-6.7.4.3 FEP Number: W96
30 FEP Title: ***Electrophoresis***

31 SCR-6.7.4.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

32 *The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by ***Electrophoresis*** have been*
33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
34 *disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.7.4.3.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
3 modified for editorial purposes.

4 SCR-6.7.4.3.3 Screening Argument

5 Long range (in terms of distance) electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a
6 result of groundwater flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of potentials may be
7 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
8 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
9 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
10 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of such potentials is usually less than about 100 millivolts
11 and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet (Telford et al.
12 1976, p. 458). Short range potential gradients due to corrosion of metals within the waste may
13 be set up over distances that are restricted to the size scale of the waste packages.

14 A variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and metal packaging,
15 which may allow electrochemical cells to be established over short distances. The types of
16 interactions that will occur depend on the metals involved, their physical characteristics, and the
17 prevailing solution conditions. Electrochemical cells that may be established will be small
18 relative to the size of the repository, limiting the extent to which migration of contaminants by
19 **Electrophoresis** can occur. The electric field gradients will be of small magnitude and confined
20 to regions of electrochemical activity in the area immediately surrounding the waste material.
21 As a result, **Electrophoretic Effects** on migration behavior due to both long and short range
22 potential gradients have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
23 to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena**

25 SCR-6.7.5.1 FEP Number: W97
26 FEP Title: Chemical Gradients

27 SCR-6.7.5.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

28 *The effects of enhanced diffusion across **Chemical Gradients** have been eliminated from PAs on*
29 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

30 SCR-6.7.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

31 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
32 modified for editorial purposes.

33 SCR-6.7.5.1.3 Screening Argument

34 **Chemical Gradients** within the disposal system, whether induced naturally or resulting from
35 repository material and waste emplacement, may influence the transport of contaminants.
36 Gradients will exist at interfaces between different repository materials and between repository

1 and geological materials. Distinct chemical regimes will be established within concrete seals and
2 adjoining host rocks. Similarly, **Chemical Gradients** will exist between the waste and the
3 surrounding rocks of the Salado. Other **Chemical Gradients** may exist due to the juxtaposition
4 of relatively dilute groundwaters and brines or between groundwaters with different
5 compositions. Natural gradients currently exist between different groundwaters in the Culebra.

6 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of **Chemical Gradients** that occur at material
7 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
8 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Processes that may be induced by **Chemical**
9 **Gradients** at material boundaries include the formation or destabilization of colloids. For
10 example, cementitious materials that will be emplaced in the WIPP as part of the waste and the
11 seals contain colloidal-sized materials, such as calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and alkaline pore
12 fluids. **Chemical Gradients** will exist between the pore fluids in the cementitious materials and
13 the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these interfaces may lead to the
14 generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type. Colloidal compositions may
15 include calcium and magnesium oxides, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum silicates,
16 calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Experimental investigations of the stability of
17 inorganic, mineral fragment colloidal dispersions have been carried out as part of the WIPP
18 colloid-facilitated actinide transport program (Papenguth and Behl 1996). Results of the
19 investigations indicate that the salinities of the WIPP brines are sufficient to cause destabilization
20 of mineral fragment colloidal dispersions. Therefore, concentrations of colloidal suspensions
21 originating from concrete within the repository are expected to be extremely low, and are
22 considered in PA calculations.

23 SCR-6.7.5.2 FEP Number: W98
24 FEP Title: ***Osmotic Processes***

25 SCR-6.7.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

26 *The effects of **Osmotic Processes** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
27 *beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.7.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
30 modified for editorial purposes.

31 SCR-6.7.5.2.3 Screening Argument

32 **Osmotic Processes**, i.e., diffusion of water through a semi permeable or differentially permeable
33 membrane in response to a concentration gradient, may occur at interfaces between waters of
34 different salinities. **Osmotic Processes** can occur if waters of different salinities and/or
35 compositions exist on either side of a particular lithology such as clay, or a lithological boundary
36 that behaves as a semipermeable membrane. At the WIPP, clay layers within the Salado may act
37 as semi permeable membranes across which **Osmotic Processes** may occur.

38 In the absence of a semipermeable membrane, water will move from the more dilute water into
39 the more saline water. However, the migration of dissolved contaminants across an interface

1 may be restricted depending upon the nature of the membrane. A hydrological gradient across a
2 semi permeable membrane may either enhance or oppose water movement by osmosis
3 depending on the direction and magnitude of the gradient. Dissolved contaminants that cannot
4 pass through a semi-permeable membrane may be moved towards the membrane and
5 concentrated along the interface when advection dominates over osmosis and reverse osmosis
6 occurs. Thus, both osmosis and reverse osmosis can restrict the migration of dissolved
7 contaminants and possibly lead to concentration along interfaces between different water bodies.
8 The effects of *Osmotic Processes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
9 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 SCR-6.7.5.3 FEP Number: W99
11 FEP Title: *Alpha Recoil*

12 SCR-6.7.5.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The effects of Alpha-Recoil Processes on radionuclide transport have been eliminated from PA*
14 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.7.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
17 modified for editorial purposes.

18 SCR-6.7.5.3.3 Screening Argument

19 Alpha particles are emitted with sufficiently high energies that daughter nuclides recoil
20 appreciably to conserve system momentum. For example, ^{238}U decays to ^{234}Th with emission of
21 a 4.1 MeV alpha particle. The law of conservation of momentum requires that the daughter
22 nuclide, ^{234}Th , recoils in the opposite direction with an energy of approximately 0.07 MeV. The
23 energy is great enough to break chemical bonds or cause ^{234}Th to move a short distance through
24 a crystal lattice. If the ^{234}Th is close enough to the surface of the crystal, it will be ejected into
25 the surroundings. ^{234}Th decays to ^{234}Pa which decays to ^{234}U with respective half-lives of 24.1
26 days and 1.17 minutes. The recoil and decay processes can lead to the apparent preferential
27 dissolution or leaching of ^{234}U relative to ^{238}U from crystal structures and amorphous or adsorbed
28 phases. Preferential leaching may be enhanced due to radiation damage to the host phase
29 resulting from earlier radioactive decay events. Consequently, ^{234}U sometimes exhibits
30 enhanced transport behavior relative to ^{238}U .

31 The influence of *Alpha-Recoil* processes on radionuclide transport through natural geologic
32 media is dependent on many site-specific factors, such as mineralogy, geometry, and
33 microstructure of the rocks, as well as geometrical constraints on the type of groundwater flow,
34 e.g., porous or fracture flow. Studies of natural radionuclide-bearing groundwater systems often
35 fail to discern a measurable effect of alpha-recoil processes on radionuclide transport above the
36 background uncertainty introduced by the spatial heterogeneity of the geological system.
37 Consequently, the effects of the *Alpha-Recoil* processes that occur on radionuclide transport are
38 thought to be minor. These effects have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
39 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.7.5.4 FEP Number: W100
2 FEP Title: *Enhanced Diffusion*

3 SCR-6.7.5.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Enhanced Diffusion is a possible consequence of Chemical Gradients that occur at material*
5 *boundaries. However, the distances over which Enhanced Diffusion could occur will be small*
6 *in comparison to the size of the disposal system. Therefore, the effects of Enhanced Diffusion*
7 *across Chemical Gradients at material boundaries have been eliminated from PAs on the basis*
8 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

9 SCR-6.7.5.4.2 Summary of New Information

10 **Enhanced Diffusion** only occurs where there are higher than average chemical gradients. The
11 spatial extent of chemical gradients should be quite limited and as enhanced diffusion occurs, it
12 will tend to reduce the chemical gradient. Thus, the driving force for the enhanced diffusion will
13 be reduced and eventually eliminated as the system approaches steady state or equilibrium
14 conditions. Due to the limited spatial extent of enhanced diffusion, its effect on radionuclide
15 transport should be small.

16 The effects of **Enhanced Diffusion** across **Chemical Gradients** at material boundaries have been
17 eliminated from PAs on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
18 Changes have been made to the FEP discussion for clarity and editorial purposes.

19 SCR-6.7.5.4.3 Screening Argument

20 Processes that may be induced by **Chemical Gradients** at material boundaries include the
21 formation or destabilization of colloids. For example, cementitious materials, emplaced in the
22 WIPP as part of the waste and the seals, contain colloidal-sized phases such as calcium-silicate-
23 hydrate gels, and alkaline pore fluids. **Chemical Gradients** will exist between the pore fluids in
24 the cementitious materials and the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these
25 interfaces may lead to the generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type.
26 Colloidal compositions may include calcium and MgOr, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum
27 silicates, calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Concentrations of colloidal suspensions
28 originating from concrete within the repository are considered in PA calculations even though
29 expected to be extremely low.

30 Distinct interfaces between waters of different salinities and different densities may limit mixing
31 of the water bodies and affect flow and contaminant transport. Such effects have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system.

34 **SCR-6.8 Ecological Features, Events, and Processes**

35 **SCR-6.8.1 Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake**

36 SCR-6.8.1.1 FEP Number: W101, W102, and W103
37 FEP Title: *Plant Uptake (W101)*

1 *Animal Uptake (W102)*
2 *Accumulation in Soils (W103)*

3 SCR-6.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R
4 SO-C for 40 CFR 191.15

5 *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils have been eliminated from*
6 *compliance assessment calculations for 40 CFR § 191.15 on the basis of low consequence.*
7 *Plant Uptake and Animal Uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA*
8 *calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on regulatory grounds. Accumulation in Soils within the*
9 *controlled area has been eliminated from PA calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on the basis of*
10 *beneficial consequences.*

11 SCR-6.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

12 DOE has stated that FEPs related to *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils*
13 *have been eliminated from the compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low*
14 *consequence. DOE indicated that the screening of these FEPs is justified based upon the results*
15 *of PA calculations, which show that releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed*
16 *conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite beds within the Salado Formation.*
17 *PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in 40 CFR*
18 *§ 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore,*
19 *FEPs that relate to Plant Uptake and Animal Uptake in the accessible environment have been*
20 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

21 SCR-6.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument

22 The results of the calculations presented in Section 6.5 show that releases to the accessible
23 environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral releases through the DRZ at
24 repository depth. Thus, for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s individual protection
25 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15, FEPs that relate to *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and*
26 *Accumulation in Soils* have been eliminated from compliance assessment calculations on the
27 basis of low consequence.

28 Performance assessments for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release
29 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible
30 environment. Therefore, FEPs that relate to *plant uptake and animal uptake* in the accessible
31 environment have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. *Accumulation*
32 *in Soils* that may occur within the controlled area would reduce releases to the accessible
33 environment and can, therefore, be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
34 consequence.

35 ***SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake***

36 SCR-6.8.2.1 FEP Number(s): W104, W105, W106, W107, and W108
37 FEP Title(s): *Ingestion (W104)*
38 *Inhalation (W105)*
39 *Irradiation (W106)*

1 *Dermal Sorption (W107)*
2 *Injection (W108)*

3 SCR-6.8.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R
4 SO-C for 40 CFR § 191.15

5 *Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection have been eliminated from*
6 *compliance assessment calculations for 40 CFR § 191.15 and Subpart C of 40 CFR Part 191 on*
7 *the basis of low consequence. FEPs that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment*
8 *have been eliminated from PA calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on regulatory grounds.*

9 SCR-6.8.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

10 The DOE stated in the CCA that the results of the PA calculations indicate that releases to the
11 accessible environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral migration through
12 anhydrite beds within the Salado Formation. The DOE further stated that based upon the
13 bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance with EPA's individual protection
14 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15 and the groundwater protection requirements in Subpart C of
15 40 CFR § 191, these abovementioned exposure pathways were found to be of low consequence.
16 However, the analysis did not include analysis of doses from other potential exposure pathways
17 such as stock consumption or irrigation. These weaknesses were remedied by DOE's submittal
18 of a more detailed dose analysis, which included all of the appropriate additional pathways (DOE
19 1997c).

20 In both the PAVT and the CCA calculations (DOE 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) a very conservative
21 bounding-analysis approach was used to estimate potential doses. Using this approach, the
22 calculated maximum potential dose (millirems) to any internal organ due to beta particle and
23 photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides in drinking water was 2.9×10^{-4} in the PAVT
24 and 4.2×10^{-3} for the CCA. Further, the annual effective dose equivalent to the total body due to
25 beta particle and photon radioactivity is 1.5×10^{-5} in the CCA and 2.3×10^{-4} for the CCA. All
26 of these values are well below the acceptable standard of 4 millirems per year as specified in 40
27 CFR § 141.16(a). Finally, the calculated maximum potential doses (millirems) to an individual
28 due to meat consumption, vegetable consumption, and inhalation of resuspended irrigated soil
29 are 2.7×10^{-7} , 0.031, and 2.1×10^{-5} , respectively, in the PAVT and 3.3×10^{-8} , 0.46, 3.1×10^{-4} ,
30 respectively, in the CCA. All of these values are well below the individual protection standard,
31 an annual committed effective dose of 15 millirems as specified in 40 CFR § 191.15(a).
32 Therefore, the original screening decisions remain valid, and no changes have been made to the
33 FEP screening arguments or decisions.

34 SCR-6.8.2.1.3 Screening Argument

35 As described in Section 8.1.1, releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed
36 conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite interbeds within the Salado.
37 Because of the bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance with the EPA's individual
38 protection requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15 and the groundwater protection requirements in
39 Subpart C of 40 CFR Part 191 (see Sections 8.1.2.2 and 8.2.3), FEPs that relate to human uptake

1 by *Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection* have been eliminated
2 from compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence.

3 Performance assessments for evaluating compliance with the EPA's cumulative release
4 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible
5 environment. Therefore, FEPs that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment have
6 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

7

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