
**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix SCR-2009
Feature, Event, and Process Screening for PA**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix SCR-2009
Feature, Event, and Process Screening for PA

Table of Contents

SCR-1.0 Introduction..... SCR-1

SCR-2.0 Basis for FEPs Screening Process..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.1 Requirement for FEPs..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.2 FEPs List Development for the CCA..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.3 Criteria for Screening of FEPs and Categorization of Retained FEPs..... SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.1 Regulation (SO-R)..... SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.2 Probability of Occurrence of a FEP Leading to Significant
 Release of Radionuclides (SO-P) SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.3 Potential Consequences Associated with the Occurrence of the
 FEPs (SO-C) SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.4 UP FEPs SCR-7

 SCR-2.3.5 DP FEPs SCR-7

 SCR-2.4 FEPs Categories and Timeframes SCR-7

 SCR-2.4.1 Description of Natural FEPs SCR-8

 SCR-2.4.2 Description of Human-Induced EPs..... SCR-8

 SCR-2.4.3 Description of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs..... SCR-11

SCR-3.0 FEPs SCR-12

SCR-4.0 Screening of Natural FEPs SCR-26

 SCR-4.1 Geological FEPs..... SCR-26

 SCR-4.1.1 Stratigraphy SCR-26

 SCR-4.1.2 Tectonics SCR-27

 SCR-4.1.3 Structural FEPs..... SCR-30

 SCR-4.1.4 Crustal Process SCR-37

 SCR-4.1.5 Geochemical Processes SCR-39

 SCR-4.2 Subsurface Hydrological FEPs SCR-44

 SCR-4.2.1 Groundwater Characteristics SCR-44

 SCR-4.2.2 Changes in Groundwater Flow..... SCR-46

 SCR-4.3 Subsurface Geochemical FEPs SCR-49

 SCR-4.3.1 Groundwater Geochemistry SCR-49

 SCR-4.4 Geomorphological FEPs SCR-53

 SCR-4.4.1 Physiography SCR-53

 SCR-4.5 Surface Hydrological FEPs..... SCR-59

 SCR-4.5.1 Depositional Processes..... SCR-59

 SCR-4.5.2 Streams and Lakes..... SCR-60

 SCR-4.5.3 Groundwater Recharge and Discharge..... SCR-61

 SCR-4.6 Climate EPs..... SCR-63

 SCR-4.6.1 Climate and Climate Changes SCR-63

 SCR-4.7 Marine FEPs..... SCR-65

 SCR-4.7.1 Seas, Sedimentation, and Level Changes..... SCR-65

 SCR-4.8 Ecological FEPs SCR-66

 SCR-4.8.1 Flora and Fauna SCR-66

SCR-5.0 Screening of Human-Induced EPs	SCR-69
SCR-5.1 Human-Induced Geological EPs	SCR-69
SCR-5.1.1 Drilling	SCR-69
SCR-5.1.2 Excavation Activities	SCR-74
SCR-5.1.3 Subsurface Explosions	SCR-77
SCR-5.2 Subsurface Hydrological and Geochemical EPs	SCR-79
SCR-5.2.1 Borehole Fluid Flow	SCR-79
SCR-5.2.2 Excavation-Induced Flow	SCR-113
SCR-5.2.3 Explosion-Induced Flow	SCR-123
SCR-5.3 Geomorphological EPS	SCR-124
SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes	SCR-124
SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological EPs	SCR-127
SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use	SCR-127
SCR-5.5 Climatic EPs	SCR-130
SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change	SCR-130
SCR-5.6 Marine EPs	SCR-131
SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities	SCR-131
SCR-5.7 Ecological EPs	SCR-132
SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities	SCR-132
SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development	SCR-133
SCR-6.0 Waste and Repository-Induced FEPs	SCR-135
SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics	SCR-136
SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics	SCR-137
SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics	SCR-139
SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics	SCR-140
SCR-6.2 Radiological FEPs	SCR-140
SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat	SCR-140
SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties	SCR-146
SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical FEPs	SCR-146
SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes	SCR-146
SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes	SCR-151
SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions	SCR-152
SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects	SCR-153
SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties	SCR-156
SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic FEPs	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects	SCR-161
SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical FEPs	SCR-163
SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation	SCR-163
SCR-6.5.2 Speciation	SCR-174
SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution	SCR-176
SCR-6.5.4 Sorption	SCR-178

SCR-6.5.5 Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry	SCR-180
SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation	SCR-184
SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties	SCR-186
SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode FEPs.....	SCR-187
SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport	SCR-187
SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport	SCR-189
SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport.....	SCR-190
SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport	SCR-191
SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes	SCR-191
SCR-6.7.1 Advection	SCR-191
SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion.....	SCR-192
SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena.....	SCR-192
SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena.....	SCR-194
SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena	SCR-196
SCR-6.8 Ecological FEPs	SCR-200
SCR-6.8.1 Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake.....	SCR-200
SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake.....	SCR-201
SCR-7.0 References.....	SCR-202

List of Figures

Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion Time	SCR-183
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List of Tables

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004.....	SCR-2
Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results	SCR-12
Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status.....	SCR-120
Table SCR-4. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA-2009	SCR-154
Table SCR-5. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises.....	SCR-155

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

µm	micrometer
AIC	active institutional controls
BNL	Brookhaven National Laboratory
Bq	becquerels
CAG	Compliance Application Guidance
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CDF	cumulative distribution function
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curie
cm	centimeter
CPD	Carlsbad Potash District
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
DFR	driving force ratio
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DP	disturbed performance
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
EP	event and process
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERMS	Electronic Record Management System
FEP	feature, event, and process
FLAC	Fast Lagrangian Analysis Continua
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
FSU	Florida State University
ft	foot
ft ²	square foot
ft ³	cubic foot
g	gram
gal	gallon

gpm	gallons per minute
H	human-initiated
HCN	historic, current, and near-future
hr	hour
IB	inside boundary
in	inch
K _d	retardation distribution coefficient
kg	kilogram
kg/m ³	kilograms per cubic meter
km	kilometer
km ²	square kilometer
kW	kilowatt
L	liter
lb/gal	pounds per gallon
LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
m	meter
m ²	square meter
m ³	cubic meter
Ma BP	million years before present
MB	marker bed
MeV	megaelectron volt
mi	mile
mL	milliliter
MPa	megapascal
MPI	Mississippi Potash Inc.
mV	millivolt
N	natural
NMBMMR	New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources
OB	outside boundary
oz	ounce
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test

PIC	passive institutional control
ppm	parts per million
psi	pounds per square inch
psia	pounds per square inch absolute
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
s	second
SKI	Statens Kärnkraftinspektion
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SO-C	screened-out consequence
SO-P	screened-out probability
SO-R	screened-out regulatory
T field	transmissivity field
TRU	transuranic
TSD	Technical Support Document
TWBIR	Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
UP	undisturbed performance
V	volt
W	waste and repository-induced
W	watt
W/Ci	watts per curie
W/g	watts per gram
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WPO	WIPP Project Office
yd ³	cubic yard
yr	year

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Al	aluminum
Am	americium
An	actinide
C	carbon
CH ₄	methane
CO ₂	carbon dioxide

Cs	cesium
EDTA	ethylenediaminetetraacetate
Fe	iron
MgO	magnesium oxide
Np	neptunium
Pm	promethium
Pu	plutonium
Rn	radon
Sr	strontium
Th	thorium
U	uranium

1 **SCR-1.0 Introduction**

2 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has developed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in
3 southeastern New Mexico for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by defense
4 programs. In May of 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified that the
5 WIPP would meet the disposal standards (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, p.
6 27405) established in 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C (U.S. Environmental Protection
7 Agency 1993), thereby allowing the WIPP to begin waste disposal operations. This certification
8 was based, in part, on performance assessment (PA) calculations that were included in the
9 DOE's Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996). These
10 calculations demonstrate that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible
11 environment will not exceed those allowed by the EPA standard.

12 The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (U.S. Congress 1992) requires the WIPP to be
13 recertified (demonstrating continued compliance with the disposal standards) every five years.
14 As such, the DOE prepared the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S.
15 Department of Energy 2004), which demonstrated that the WIPP complied with the EPA's
16 requirements for radioactive waste disposal. The CRA-2004 included changes to the WIPP long-
17 term compliance baseline since the CCA. Similarly, and in compliance with the recertification
18 rules, the DOE has prepared the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) that
19 documents changes since the CRA-2004, and demonstrates compliance with the long-term
20 disposal requirements of 40 CFR Part 191 and the compliance criteria of 40 CFR Part 194.

21 To assure that PA calculations account for important aspects of the disposal system, features,
22 events, and processes (FEPs) considered to be potentially important to the disposal system are
23 identified. These FEPs are used as a tool for determining what phenomena and components of
24 the disposal system can and should be dealt with in PA calculations. For the WIPP CCA, a
25 systematic process was used to compile, analyze, screen, and document FEPs for use in PA. The
26 FEP screening process used in the CCA, the CRA-2004, and the CRA-2009 is described in detail
27 in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. For recertification applications, this process evaluates any
28 new information that may have impacts on or present inconsistencies to those screening
29 arguments and decisions presented since the last certification or recertification. The FEPs
30 baseline is managed according to Sandia Activity/Project Specific Procedure 9-4, *Performing*
31 *FEPs Baseline Impact Assessment for Planned or Unplanned Changes* (Revision 1) (Kirkes
32 2006). For the CRA-2009, a reassessment of FEPs concluded that of the 235 FEPs considered
33 for the CRA-2004, 188 have not been changed, 35 have been updated with new information, 10
34 have been split into 20 similar, but more descriptive FEPs, 1 screening argument has been
35 changed to correct errors discovered during review, and 1 has had its screening decision
36 changed. Therefore, there are 245 WIPP FEPs for the CRA-2009. Note that none of these new
37 or updated FEPs require changes to PA models or codes; existing models represent these FEPs in
38 their current configurations.

39 Table SCR-1 lists the FEPs that have been added, separated, or had screening decision changes
40 since the CRA-2004.

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
FEPs Combined or Separated		
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal – Outside Boundary (OB)	Name changed to “Liquid Waste Disposal Boundary – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB	Name changed to “Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage – OB	Name changed to “Hydrocarbon Storage – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
FEPs With Changed Screening Decisions		
H41	Surface Disruptions	Screening changed from screened-out regulatory (SO-R) to screened-out consequence (SO-C) because of inconsistency with screening rationale.
New FEPs for CRA-2009		
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal – Inside Boundary (IB)	New FEP; separated from H27. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions pertaining to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – IB	New FEP; separated from H28. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage – IB	New FEP; separated from H29. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.

^a H = Human-induced FEP.^b W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004 (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	New FEP; separated from W6. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	New FEP; separated from W7. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	New FEP; separated from W8. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W112	Radiological Effects on Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W17. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W36. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W37. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W74. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.

^a H = Human-induced FEP.^b W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

1 **SCR-2.0 Basis for FEPs Screening Process**

2 **SCR-2.1 Requirement for FEPs**

3 The origin of FEPs is related to the EPA's radioactive waste disposal standard's requirement to
4 use PA methodology. The DOE was required to demonstrate that the WIPP complied with the
5 containment requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993).
6 These requirements state that the DOE must use PA to demonstrate that the probabilities of
7 cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system during the 10,000 years following
8 closure will fall below specified limits. The PA analyses supporting this determination must be
9 quantitative and must consider uncertainties caused by all significant processes and events that
10 may affect the disposal system, including inadvertent human intrusion into the repository during
11 the future. The scope of PA is further defined by the EPA at 40 CFR § 194.32 (U.S.
12 Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), which states,

13 Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:

- 14 (1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of
15 processes and events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may
16 affect the disposal system;
- 17 (2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and
18 events included in performance assessments; and
- 19 (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of
20 processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section were
21 not included in performance assessment results provided in any compliance
22 application.

23 Therefore, the PA methodology includes a process that compiles a comprehensive list of the
24 FEPs that are potentially relevant to disposal system performance. Those FEPs shown by
25 screening analysis to have the potential to affect performance are represented in scenarios and
26 quantitative calculations using a system of linked computer models to describe the interaction of
27 the repository with the natural system, both with and without human intrusion. For the CCA, the
28 DOE first compiled a comprehensive list of FEPs, which was then subjected to a screening
29 process that eventually lead to the set of FEPs used in PA to demonstrate the WIPP's compliance
30 with the long-term disposal standards.

31 **SCR-2.2 FEPs List Development for the CCA**

32 As a starting point, the DOE assembled a list of potentially relevant FEPs from the compilation
33 developed by Stenhouse, Chapman, and Sumerling (1993) for the Swedish Nuclear Power
34 Inspectorate (Statens Kärnkraftinspektion, or SKI). The SKI list was based on a series of FEP
35 lists developed for other disposal programs and is considered the best-documented and most
36 comprehensive starting point for the WIPP. For the SKI study, an initial raw FEP list was
37 compiled based on nine different FEP identification studies.

38 The compilers of the SKI list eliminated a number of FEPs as irrelevant to the particular disposal
39 concept under consideration in Sweden. These FEPs were reinstated for the WIPP effort, and

1 several FEPs on the SKI list were subdivided to facilitate screening for the WIPP. Finally, to
2 ensure comprehensiveness, other FEPs specific to the WIPP were added based on review of key
3 project documents and broad examination of the preliminary WIPP list by both project
4 participants and stakeholders. The initial unedited list is contained in the CCA, Appendix SCR,
5 Attachment 1. The initial unedited FEP list was restructured and revised to derive the
6 comprehensive WIPP FEP list used in the CCA. The number of FEPs was reduced to 237 in the
7 CCA to eliminate the ambiguities presented in a generic list. Restructuring the list did not
8 remove any substantive issues from the discussion. As discussed in more detail in the CCA,
9 Appendix SCR, Attachment 1, the following steps were used to reduce the initial unedited list to
10 the appropriate WIPP FEP list used in the CCA.

- 11 • References to subsystems were eliminated because the SKI subsystem classification was
12 not appropriate for the WIPP disposal concept. For example, in contrast to the Swedish
13 disposal concept, canister integrity does not have a role in post-operational performance
14 of the WIPP, and the terms near-field, far-field, and biosphere are not unequivocally
15 defined for the WIPP site.
- 16 • Duplicate FEPs were eliminated. Duplicate FEPs arose in the SKI list because individual
17 FEPs could act in different subsystems. FEPs had a single entry in the CCA list whether
18 they were applicable to several parts of the disposal system or to a single part only (for
19 example, the FEP Gas Effects). Disruption appears in the seals, backfill, waste, canister,
20 and near-field subsystems in the initial FEP list. These FEPs are represented by a single
21 FEP, Disruption Due to Gas Effects.
- 22 • FEPs that are not relevant to the WIPP design or inventory were eliminated. Examples
23 include FEPs related to high-level waste, copper canisters, and bentonite backfill.
- 24 • FEPs relating to engineering design changes were eliminated because they were not
25 relevant to a compliance application based on the DOE's design for the WIPP.
- 26 • FEPs relating to constructional, operational, and decommissioning errors were
27 eliminated. The DOE has administrative and quality control procedures to ensure that the
28 facility will be constructed, operated, and decommissioned properly.
- 29 • Detailed FEPs relating to processes in the surface environment were aggregated into a
30 small number of generalized FEPs. For example, the SKI list includes the biosphere
31 FEPs Inhalation of Salt Particles, Smoking, Showers and Humidifiers, Inhalation and
32 Biotic Material, Household Dust and Fumes, Deposition (Wet and Dry), Inhalation and
33 Soils and Sediments, Inhalation and Gases and Vapors (Indoor and Outdoor), and
34 Suspension in Air, which are represented by the FEP Inhalation.
- 35 • FEPs relating to the containment of hazardous metals, volatile organic compounds, and
36 other chemicals that are not regulated by Part 191 were not included.
- 37 • A few FEPs have been renamed to be consistent with terms used to describe specific
38 WIPP processes (for example, Wicking, Brine Inflow).

1 These steps resulted in a list of WIPP-relevant FEPs retained for further consideration in the first
2 certification PA. These FEPs were screened to determine which would be included in the PA
3 models and scenarios for the CCA PA.

4 **SCR-2.3 Criteria for Screening of FEPs and Categorization of Retained FEPs**

5 The purpose of FEP screening is to identify those FEPs that should be accounted for in PA
6 calculations, and those FEPs that need not be considered further. The DOE's process of
7 removing FEPs from consideration in PA calculations involved the structured application of
8 explicit screening criteria. The criteria used to screen out FEPs are explicit regulatory exclusion
9 (SO-R), probability (SO-P), or consequence (SO-C). All three criteria are derived from
10 regulatory requirements. FEPs not screened out as SO-R, SO-P, or SO-C were retained for
11 inclusion in PA calculations and are classified as either undisturbed performance (UP) or
12 disturbed performance (DP) FEPs.

13 **SCR-2.3.1 Regulation (SO-R)**

14 Specific FEP screening criteria are stated in Part 191 and Part 194. Such screening criteria
15 relating to the applicability of particular FEPs represent screening decisions made by the EPA.
16 That is, in the process of developing and demonstrating the feasibility of the Part 191 standard
17 and the Part 194 criteria, the EPA considered and made conclusions on the relevance,
18 consequence, and probability of particular FEPs occurring. In so doing, it allowed some FEPs to
19 be eliminated from consideration.

20 **SCR-2.3.2 Probability of Occurrence of a FEP Leading to Significant** 21 **Release of Radionuclides (SO-P)**

22 Low-probability events can be excluded on the basis of the criterion provided in 40 CFR
23 § 194.32(d), which states, "performance assessments need not consider processes and events that
24 have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years." In practice, for most FEPs
25 screened out on the basis of low probability of occurrence, it has not been possible to estimate a
26 meaningful quantitative probability. In the absence of quantitative probability estimates, a
27 qualitative argument was used.

28 **SCR-2.3.3 Potential Consequences Associated with the Occurrence of the** 29 **FEPs (SO-C)**

30 The DOE recognizes two uses for this criterion:

- 31 1. FEPs can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of insignificant consequence.
32 Consequence can refer to effects on the repository or site or to radiological consequence. In
33 particular, 40 CFR § 194.34(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a) states, "The
34 results of performance assessments shall be assembled into 'complementary, cumulative
35 distribution functions' (CCDFs) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of
36 cumulative release caused by all significant processes and events." The DOE has omitted
37 events and processes (EPs) from PA calculations where there is a reasonable expectation that

1 the remaining probability distribution of cumulative releases would not be significantly
2 changed by such omissions.

3 2. FEPs that are potentially beneficial to subsystem performance may be eliminated from PA
4 calculations if necessary to simplify the analysis. This argument may be used when there is
5 uncertainty as to exactly how the FEP should be incorporated into assessment calculations or
6 when incorporation would incur unreasonable difficulties.

7 In some cases, the effects of the particular event or process occurring, although not necessarily
8 insignificant, can be shown to lie within the range of uncertainty of another FEP already
9 accounted for in the PA calculations. In such cases, the event or process may be included in PA
10 calculations implicitly, within the range of uncertainty associated with the included FEP.

11 Although some FEPs could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of more than one
12 criterion, the most practical screening criterion was used for classification. In particular, a
13 regulatory screening classification was used in preference to a probability or consequence
14 screening classification. FEPs that have not been screened out based on any of the three criteria
15 were included in the PA.

16 **SCR-2.3.4 UP FEPs**

17 FEPs classified as UP are accounted for in calculations of UP of the disposal system. UP is
18 defined in 40 CFR § 191.12 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) as “the predicted
19 behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior,
20 if the disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural
21 events.” The UP FEPs are accounted for in the PA calculations to evaluate compliance with the
22 containment requirements in section 191.13. Undisturbed PA calculations are also used to
23 demonstrate compliance with the individual and groundwater protection requirements of 40 CFR
24 § 191.15 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) and Part 191 Subpart C, respectively.

25 **SCR-2.3.5 DP FEPs**

26 The FEPs classified as DP are accounted for only in assessment calculations for DP. The DP
27 FEPs that remain following the screening process relate to the potential disruptive effects of
28 future drilling and mining events in the controlled area. Consideration of both DP and UP FEPs
29 is required to evaluate compliance with section 191.13.

30 **SCR-2.4 FEPs Categories and Timeframes**

31 In the following sections, FEPs are discussed under the categories Natural FEPs, Human-Induced
32 EPs, and Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs. (IDs of Natural FEPs begin with “N,” and IDs
33 of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs begin with “W.”) The FEPs are also considered within
34 time frames during which they may occur. Because of the regulatory requirements concerning
35 human activities, two time periods were used when evaluating human-induced EPs. These time
36 frames were defined as Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human Activities (HCN) and Future
37 Human Activities (Future). These time frames are also discussed in the following section.

1 **SCR-2.4.1 Description of Natural FEPs**

2 Natural FEPs are those that relate to hydrologic, geologic, and climate conditions that have the
3 potential to affect long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system over the regulatory time
4 frame. These FEPs do not include the impacts of other human-related activities such as the
5 effect of boreholes on FEPs related to natural changes in groundwater chemistry. Only natural
6 FEPs are included in the screening process.

7 Consistent with section 194.32(d), the DOE has screened out several natural FEPs from PA
8 calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence at or near the WIPP site. In
9 particular, natural events for which there is no evidence indicating that they have occurred within
10 the Delaware Basin have been screened on this basis. For FEPs analysis, the probabilities of
11 occurrence of these events are assumed to be zero. Quantitative, nonzero probabilities for such
12 events, based on numbers of occurrences, cannot be ascribed without considering regions much
13 larger than the Delaware Basin, thus neglecting established geological understanding of the FEPs
14 that occur within particular geographical provinces.

15 In considering the overall geological setting of the Delaware Basin, the DOE has eliminated
16 many FEPs from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence. FEPs that have had little
17 effect on the characteristics of the region in the past are expected to be of low consequence for
18 the regulatory time period.

19 **SCR-2.4.2 Description of Human-Induced EPs**

20 Human-induced EPs (Human EPs) are those associated with human activities in the past, present,
21 and future. The EPA provided guidance in their regulations concerning which human activities
22 are to be considered, their severity, and the manner in which to include them in the future
23 predictions.

24 The scope of PAs is clarified with respect to human-induced EPs in section 194.32. At 40 CFR
25 § 194.32(a), the EPA states,

26 Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and
27 shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

28 Thus PAs must include consideration of human-induced EPs relating to mining and drilling
29 activities that might take place during the regulatory time frame. In particular, PAs must
30 consider the potential effects of such activities that might take place within the controlled area at
31 a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to completely eliminate the possibility of
32 human intrusion.

33 Further criteria concerning the scope of PAs are provided at 40 CFR § 194.32(c):

34 Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any
35 activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to
36 occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but
37 shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be
38 reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may be
39 used for fluid injection activities.

1 In order to implement the criteria in section 194.32 relating to the scope of PAs, the DOE has
 2 divided human activities into three categories: (1) human activities currently taking place and
 3 those that took place prior to the time of the compliance application, (2) human activities that
 4 might be initiated in the near future after submission of the compliance application, and (3)
 5 human activities that might be initiated after repository closure. The first two categories of EPs,
 6 corresponding to the HCN time frame, are considered under UP, and EPs in the third category,
 7 which belong to the Future time frame, may lead to DP conditions. A description of these three
 8 categories follows.

- 9 1. Historical and current human activities include resource-extraction activities that have
 10 historically taken place and are currently taking place outside the controlled area. These
 11 activities are of potential significance insofar as they could affect the geological,
 12 hydrological, or geochemical characteristics of the disposal system or groundwater flow
 13 pathways outside the disposal system. Current human activities taking place within the
 14 controlled area are essentially those associated with development of the WIPP repository.
 15 Historic human activities include existing boreholes.
- 16 2. Near-future human activities include resource-extraction activities that may be expected to
 17 occur outside the controlled area based on existing plans and leases. Thus the near future
 18 includes the expected lives of existing mines and oil and gas fields, and the expected lives of
 19 new mines and oil and gas fields that the DOE expects will be developed based on existing
 20 plans and leases. These activities are of potential significance insofar as they could affect the
 21 geological, hydrological, or geochemical characteristics of the disposal system or
 22 groundwater flow pathways outside the disposal system. The only human activities expected
 23 to occur within the controlled area in the near future are those associated with development
 24 of the WIPP repository. The DOE expects that any activity initiated in the near future, based
 25 on existing plans and leases, will be initiated prior to repository closure. Activities initiated
 26 prior to repository closure are assumed to continue until their completion.
- 27 3. Future human activities include activities that might be initiated within or outside the
 28 controlled area after repository closure. This includes drilling and mining for resources
 29 within the disposal system at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to
 30 completely eliminate the possibility of such activities. Future human activities could
 31 influence the transport of contaminants within and outside the disposal system by directly
 32 removing waste from the disposal system or altering the geological, hydrological, or
 33 geochemical characteristics of the disposal system.

34 **SCR-2.4.2.1 Scope of Future Human Activities in PA**

35 PAs must consider the effects of future human activities on the performance of the disposal
 36 system. The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a),
 37 which limits the scope of consideration of future human activities in PAs to mining and drilling.

38 **SCR-2.4.2.1.1 Criteria Concerning Future Mining**

39 The EPA provides the following additional criteria concerning the type of future mining that
 40 should be considered by the DOE in 40 CFR § 194.32(b):

1 Assessments of mining effects may be limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the
2 hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining
3 shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time
4 frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in
5 quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be
6 completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly
7 calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only
8 once during the regulatory time frame.

9 Thus consideration of future mining may be limited to mining within the controlled area at the
10 locations of resources that are similar in quality and type to those currently extracted from the
11 Delaware Basin. Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in
12 quality similar to that currently mined from underground deposits elsewhere in the Delaware
13 Basin. The hydrogeological impacts of future potash mining within the controlled area are
14 accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal system. Consistent with section
15 194.32(b), all economically recoverable resources in the vicinity of the disposal system (outside
16 the controlled area) are assumed to be extracted in the near future.

17 **SCR-2.4.2.1.2 Criteria Concerning Future Drilling**

18 With respect to consideration of future drilling, in the preamble to Part 194, the EPA

19 ...reasoned that while the resources drilled for today may not be the same as those drilled for in
20 the future, the present rates at which these boreholes are drilled can nonetheless provide an
21 estimate of the future rate at which boreholes will be drilled.

22 Criteria concerning the consideration of future deep and shallow drilling in PAs are provided in
23 40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a). The EPA also provides a
24 criterion in 40 CFR § 194.33(d) concerning the use of future boreholes subsequent to drilling:

25 With respect to future drilling events, performance assessments need not analyze the effects of
26 techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.

27 Thus PAs need not consider the effects of techniques used for resource extraction and recovery
28 that would occur subsequent to the drilling of a borehole in the future. These activities are
29 screened SO-R.

30 The EPA provides an additional criterion that limits the severity of human intrusion scenarios
31 that must be considered in PAs. In 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1) the EPA states,

32 Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources (other than those resources
33 provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste)
34 is the most severe human intrusion scenario.

35 **SCR-2.4.2.1.3 Screening of Future Human EPs**

36 Future Human EPs accounted for in PA calculations for the WIPP are those associated with
37 mining and deep drilling within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot
38 be assumed to completely eliminate the possibility of such activities. All other future Human
39 EPs, if not eliminated from PA calculations based on regulation, have been eliminated based on
40 low consequence or low probability. For example, the effects of future shallow drilling within

1 the controlled area were eliminated from CCA PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
2 to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-2.4.3 Description of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs**

4 The waste- and repository-induced FEPs are those that relate specifically to the waste material,
5 waste containers, shaft seals, magnesium oxide (MgO) backfill, panel closures, repository
6 structures, and investigation boreholes. All FEPs related to radionuclide chemistry and
7 radionuclide migration are included in this category. The FEPs related to radionuclide transport
8 resulting from future borehole intersections of the WIPP excavation are defined as waste- and
9 repository-induced FEPs.

1 **SCR-3.0 FEPs**

2 The reassessment of FEPs (Kirkes 2008) results in a new FEPs baseline for CRA-2009. As
 3 discussed in Section SCR-1.0, 189 of the 235 WIPP FEPs have not changed since the
 4 CRA-2004. However, 35 FEPs required updates to their FEP descriptions and/or screening
 5 arguments, 10 FEPs have been split into 20 similar but more descriptive FEPs, and 1 FEP has
 6 had its screening decision changed. The single screening decision change does not result in a
 7 new FEP incorporated into PA calculations; the FEP continues to be screened out of PA. Thus
 8 the CRA-2009 evaluates 245 WIPP FEPs.

9 Table SCR-2 outlines the results of the assessment, and subsequent sections of this document
 10 present the actual screening decisions and supporting arguments. Those FEPs not separated by
 11 gridlines in the first column of Table SCR-2 have been addressed by group because of close
 12 similarity with other FEPs within that group. This grouping process was formerly used in the
 13 CCA and also by the EPA in their Technical Support Document (TSD) for section 194.32 (U.S.
 14 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N1	Stratigraphy	No	No change.	UP
N2	Brine Reservoirs	No	No change.	DP
N3	Changes in Regional Stress	No	No change.	SO-C
N4	Regional Tectonics	No	No change.	SO-C
N5	Regional Uplift and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C
N6	Salt Deformation	No	No change.	SO-P
N7	Diapirism	No	No change.	SO-P
N8	Formation of Fractures	No	No change.	SO-P UP (Repository)
N9	Changes in Fracture Properties	No	No change.	SO-C UP (Near Repository)
N10	Formation of New Faults	No	No change.	SO-P
N11	Fault Movement	No	No change.	SO-P
N12	Seismic Activity	No	Updated with new seismic data.	UP
N13	Volcanic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N14	Magmatic Activity	No	No change.	SO-C
N15	Metamorphic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N16	Shallow Dissolution	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

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Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N18	Deep Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-P
N20	Breccia Pipes	No	No change.	SO-P
N21	Collapse Breccias	No	No change.	SO-P
N22	Fracture Infills	No	No change.	SO-C - Beneficial
N23	Saturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N24	Unsaturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N25	Fracture Flow	No	No change.	UP
N27	Effects of Preferential Pathways	No	No change.	UP
N26	Density effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N28	Thermal effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N29	Saline Intrusion [Hydrogeological Effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N30	Freshwater Intrusion [Hydrogeological effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N31	Hydrological Response to Earthquakes	No	No change.	SO-C
N32	Natural Gas Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-P
N33	Groundwater Geochemistry	No	No change.	UP
N34	Saline Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N38	Effects of Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
N35	Freshwater Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N36	Changes in Groundwater Eh	No	No change.	SO-C
N37	Changes in Groundwater pH	No	No change.	SO-C
N39	Physiography	No	No change.	UP
N40	Impact of a Large Meteorite	No	Errors identified in screening argument corrected; no change in screening decision.	SO-P
N41	Mechanical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N42	Chemical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N43	Aeolian Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

2

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N44	Fluvial Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N45	Mass Wasting [Erosion]	No	No change.	SO-C
N46	Aeolian Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N47	Fluvial Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N48	Lacustrine Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N49	Mass Wasting [Deposition]	No	No change.	SO-C
N50	Soil Development	No	No change.	SO-C
N51	Stream and River Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N52	Surface Water Bodies	No	No change.	SO-C
N53	Groundwater Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N54	Groundwater Recharge	No	No change.	UP
N55	Infiltration	No	No change.	UP
N56	Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N57	Lake Formation	No	No change.	SO-C
N58	River Flooding	No	No change.	SO-C
N59	Precipitation (e.g. Rainfall)	No	No change.	UP
N60	Temperature	No	No change.	UP
N61	Climate Change	No	No change.	UP
N62	Glaciation	No	No change.	SO-P
N63	Permafrost	No	No change.	SO-P
N64	Seas and Oceans	No	No change.	SO-C
N65	Estuaries	No	No change.	SO-C
N66	Coastal Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N67	Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N68	Sea Level Changes	No	No change.	SO-C
N69	Plants	No	No change.	SO-C
N70	Animals	No	No change.	SO-C
N71	Microbes	No	No change.	SO-C (UP - for colloidal effects and gas generation)
N72	Natural Ecological Development	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H1	Oil and Gas Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H2	Potash Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H4	Oil and Gas Exploitation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H8	Other Resources	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H9	Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H3	Water Resources Exploration	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H5	Groundwater Exploitation	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H6	Archaeological Investigations	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H7	Geothermal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H10	Liquid Waste Disposal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H11	Hydrocarbon Storage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H12	Deliberate Drilling Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H13	Conventional Underground Potash Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H14	Other Resources (mining for)	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H15	Tunneling	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H16	Construction of Underground Facilities (for Example Storage, Disposal, Accommodation)	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H17	Archaeological Excavations	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H18	Deliberate Mining Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H19	Explosions for Resource Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H20	Underground Nuclear Device Testing	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H21	Drilling Fluid Flow	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H22	Drilling Fluid Loss	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H23	Blowouts	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H24	Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H25	Oil and Gas Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H26	Groundwater Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H27, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H28, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H29, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H30	Fluid-injection Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H31	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels) DP (Future, holes penetrating panels)
H32	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) DP (Future)
H34	Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H35	Borehole-Induced Mineralization	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H36	Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future) SO-C (for units other than the Culebra)
H37	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H38	Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H39	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H40	Land Use Changes	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H41	Surface Disruptions	Yes	Screening decision changed from SO-R to SO-C to remove inconsistency with rationale.	UP (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H42	Damming of Streams or Rivers	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H43	Reservoirs	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H44	Irrigation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H45	Lake Usage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H46	Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H47	Greenhouse Gas Effects	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H48	Acid Rain	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H49	Damage to the Ozone Layer	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H50	Coastal Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H51	Sea water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H52	Estuarine Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H53	Arable Farming	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H54	Ranching	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H55	Fish Farming	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H56	Demographic Change and Urban Development	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H57	Loss of Records	No	No change.	NA (HCN) DP (Future)
H58	Solution Mining for Potash	No	Updated with information regarding solution activities and plans in the region.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H59	Solution Mining for Other Resources	No	Updated with new information regarding brine wells in the region.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
W1	Disposal Geometry	No	No change.	UP
W2	Waste Inventory	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	UP
W3	Heterogeneity of Waste Forms	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	DP
W4	Container Form	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C – Beneficial
W5	Container Material Inventory	No	No change.	UP
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	N/A – new FEP.	Split from W6 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	N/A – new FEP	Split from W7 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	SO-C Beneficial
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	N/A – new FEP	Split from W8 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C Beneficial

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W9	Backfill Physical Properties	No	No change.	SO-C
W10	Backfill Chemical Composition	No	No change.	UP
W11	Post-Closure Monitoring	No	No change.	SO-C
W12	Radionuclide Decay and In-Growth	No	No change.	UP
W13	Heat from Radioactive Decay	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C
W14	Nuclear Criticality: Heat	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W15	Radiological Effects on Waste	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W16	Radiological Effects on Containers	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	No	FEP title changed to be specific to shaft seals; screening argument updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W112	Radionuclide Effects on Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W17 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C
W18	Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ)	No	No change.	UP
W19	Excavation-Induced Changes in Stress	No	No change.	UP
W20	Salt Creep	No	No change.	UP
W21	Changes in the Stress Field	No	No change.	UP
W22	Roof Falls	No	No change.	UP
W23	Subsidence	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-C
W24	Large Scale Rock Fracturing	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-P
W25	Disruption Due to Gas Effects	No	No change.	UP
W26	Pressurization	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W27	Gas Explosions	No	No change.	UP
W28	Nuclear Explosions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W29	Thermal Effects on Material Properties	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W30	Thermally-Induced Stress Changes	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W31	Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W72	Exothermic Reactions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W73	Concrete Hydration	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W32	Consolidation of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W39	Underground Boreholes	No	No change.	UP
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W36 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W37 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W33	Movement of Containers	No	Updated to reference new inventory data.	SO-C
W34	Container Integrity	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W35	Mechanical Effects of Backfill	No	Screening argument updated to reflect reduction in MgO.	SO-C
W40	Brine Inflow	No	No change.	UP
W41	Wicking	No	No change.	UP
W42	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production	No	No change.	UP
W43	Convection	No	No change.	SO-C
W44	Degradation of Organic Material	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W45	Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W48	Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W46	Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation	No	No change.	SO-C
W47	Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W49	Gases from Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W51	Chemical Effects of Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W50	Galvanic Coupling (Within the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-C
W52	Radiolysis of Brine	No	No change.	SO-C
W53	Radiolysis of Cellulose	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W54	Helium Gas Production	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W55	Radioactive Gases	No	Reference made to CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W56	Speciation	No	No change.	UP in disposal rooms and Culebra. SO-C elsewhere, and SO-C Beneficial in cementitious seals
W57	Kinetics of Speciation	No	No change.	SO-C
W58	Dissolution of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W59	Precipitation of Secondary Minerals	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W60	Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
W61	Actinide Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W62	Kinetics of Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W63	Changes in Sorptive Surfaces	No	No change.	UP
W64	Effects of Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W66	Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics	No	No change.	UP
W65	Reduction-Oxidation Fronts	No	No change.	SO-P
W67	Localized Reducing Zones	No	No change.	SO-C
W68	Organic Complexation	No	No change.	UP
W69	Organic Ligands	No	No change.	UP
W71	Kinetics of Organic Complexation	No	No change.	SO-C
W70	Humic and Fulvic Acids	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W76	Microbial Growth on Concrete	No	No change.	UP
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W74 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W75	Chemical Degradation of Backfill	No	No change.	SO-C
W77	Solute Transport	No	No change.	UP
W78	Colloid Transport	No	No change.	UP
W79	Colloid Formation and Stability	No	No change.	UP
W80	Colloid Filtration	No	No change.	UP
W81	Colloid Sorption	No	No change.	UP
W82	Suspensions of Particles	No	No change.	DP
W83	Rinse	No	No change.	SO-C
W84	Cuttings	No	No change.	DP
W85	Cavings	No	No change.	DP
W86	Spallings	No	No change.	DP
W87	Microbial Transport	No	No change.	UP
W88	Biofilms	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W89	Transport of Radioactive Gases	No	Screening argument updated with CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C
W90	Advection	No	No change.	UP
W91	Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W92	Matrix Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W93	Soret Effect	No	New thermal values added for aluminum corrosion.	SO-C
W94	Electrochemical Effects	No	No change.	SO-C
W95	Galvanic Coupling (Outside the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-P
W96	Electrophoresis	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W97	Chemical Gradients	No	No change.	SO-C
W98	Osmotic Processes	No	No change.	SO-C
W99	Alpha Recoil	No	No change.	SO-C
W100	Enhanced Diffusion	No	No change.	SO-C
W101	Plant Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W102	Animal Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W103	Accumulation in Soils	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W104	Ingestion	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W105	Inhalation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W106	Irradiation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W107	Dermal Sorption	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W108	Injection	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

1 **SCR-4.0 Screening of Natural FEPs**

2 This section presents the screening arguments and decisions for natural FEPs. Natural FEPs may
3 be important to the performance of the disposal system. Screening of natural FEPs is done in the
4 absence of human influences on the FEPs. Of the 70 natural FEPs, 68 remain completely
5 unchanged, one has had errors corrected in the screening argument, and one has been updated to
6 include additional information. No screening decisions (classifications) for natural FEPs were
7 changed, and no additional natural FEPs have been identified.

8 **SCR-4.1 Geological FEPs**

9 **SCR-4.1.1 Stratigraphy**

10 **SCR-4.1.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N1 and N2

11 **FEP Titles:** *Stratigraphy* (N1)
12 *Brine Reservoir* (N2)

13 **SCR-4.1.1.2 Screening Decision:** UP (N1)

14 DP (N2)

15 The *Stratigraphy* of the geological formations in the region of the WIPP is accounted for in PA
16 calculations. The presence of *Brine Reservoirs* in the Castile Formation (hereafter referred to as
17 the Castile) is accounted for in PA calculations.

18 **SCR-4.1.1.2.1 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

20 **SCR-4.1.1.2.2 Screening Argument**

21 The stratigraphy and geology of the region around the WIPP, including the distribution and
22 characteristics of pressurized brine reservoirs in the Castile, are discussed in detail in the CCA,
23 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.3. The stratigraphy of the geological formations in the region of the
24 WIPP is accounted for in PA calculations through the setup of the model geometries (Appendix
25 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.1). The presence of brine reservoirs is accounted for in the treatment
26 of inadvertent drilling (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.10).

1 **SCR-4.1.2 Tectonics**

2 **SCR-4.1.2.1 FEP Numbers:** N3, N4, and N5

3 **FEP Titles:** *Changes in Regional Stress* (N3)

4 *Regional Tectonics* (N4)

5 *Regional Uplift and Subsidence* (N5)

6 **SCR-4.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of *Regional Tectonics*, *Regional Uplift and Subsidence*, and *Change in Regional*
8 *Stress* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
9 performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-4.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

12 **SCR-4.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

13 Regional tectonics encompasses two related issues of concern: the overall level of regional stress
14 and whether any significant changes in regional stress might occur.

15 The tectonic setting and structural features of the area around the WIPP are described in the
16 CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5. In summary, there is no geological evidence for Quaternary
17 regional tectonics in the Delaware Basin. The eastward tilting of the region has been dated as
18 mid-Miocene to Pliocene by King (1948, pp. 120–21) and is associated with the uplift of the
19 Guadalupe Mountains to the west. Fault zones along the eastern margin of the basin, where it
20 flanks the Central Basin Platform, were active during the Late Permian. Evidence for this
21 includes the displacement of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the Rustler) observed
22 by Holt and Powers (1988, pp. 4–14) and the thinning of the Dewey Lake Redbeds Formation
23 (hereafter referred to as the Dewey Lake) reported by Schiel (1994). There is, however, no
24 surface displacement along the trend of these fault zones, indicating that there has been no
25 significant Quaternary movement. Other faults identified within the evaporite sequence of the
26 Delaware Basin are inferred by Barrows' figures in Borns et al. (1983, pp. 58–60) to be the result
27 of salt deformation rather than regional tectonic processes. According to Muehlberger, Belcher,
28 and Goetz (1978, p. 338), the nearest faults on which Quaternary movement has been identified
29 lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains and are of minor regional significance. The effects
30 of regional tectonics and changes in regional stress have therefore been eliminated from PA
31 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 There are no reported stress measurements from the Delaware Basin, but a low-level, regional
33 stress regime with low deviatoric stress has been inferred from the geological setting of the area
34 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5). The inferred low level of regional stress and the lack
35 of Quaternary tectonic activity indicate that regional tectonics and any changes in regional stress
36 will be minor and therefore of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Even
37 if rates of regional tectonic movement experienced over the past 10 million years continue, the
38 extent of regional uplift and subsidence over the next 10,000 years would only be about several

1 feet (ft) (approximately 1 meter [m]). This amount of uplift or subsidence would not lead to a
2 breach of the Salado because the salt would deform plastically to accommodate this slow rate of
3 movement. Uniform regional uplift or a small increase in regional dip consistent with this past
4 rate could give rise to downcutting by rivers and streams in the region. The extent of this
5 downcutting would be little more than the extent of uplift, and reducing the overburden by 1 or
6 2 m would have no significant effect on groundwater flow or contaminant transport in units
7 above or below the Salado. Thus the effects of regional uplift and subsidence have been
8 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-4.1.2.1.4 Tectonic Setting and Site Structural Features**

11 The DOE has screened out, on the basis of either probability or consequence or both, all tectonic,
12 magmatic, and structural processes. The screening discussions can be found in the CCA,
13 Appendix SCR. The information needed for this screening is included here and covers (1)
14 regional tectonic processes such as subsidence, uplift, and basin tilting; (2) magmatic processes
15 such as igneous intrusion and events such as volcanism; and (3) structural processes such as
16 faulting and loading and unloading of the rocks because of long-term sedimentation or erosion.
17 Discussions of structural events, such as earthquakes, are considered to the extent that they may
18 create new faults or activate old faults. The seismicity of the area is considered in the CCA,
19 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.6 for the purposes of determining seismic design parameters for the
20 facility.

21 **SCR-4.1.2.1.5 Tectonics**

22 The processes and features included in this section are those more traditionally considered part of
23 tectonics—processes that develop the broad-scale features of the earth. Salt dissolution is a
24 different process that can develop some features resembling those of tectonics.

25 Most broad-scale structural elements of the area around the WIPP developed during the Late
26 Paleozoic (see the CCA, Appendix GCR, pp. 3-58 through 3-77). There is little historical or
27 geological evidence of significant tectonic activity in the vicinity, and the level of stress in the
28 region is low. The entire region tilted slightly during the Tertiary, and activity related to Basin
29 and Range tectonics formed major structures southwest of the area. Seismic activity is
30 specifically addressed in a separate section.

31 Broad subsidence began in the area as early as the Ordovician, developing a sag called the
32 Tobosa Basin. By Late Pennsylvanian to Early Permian time, the Central Basin Platform
33 developed (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-19), separating the Tobosa Basin into two parts:
34 the Delaware Basin to the west and the Midland Basin to the east. The Permian Basin refers to
35 the collective set of depositional basins in the area during the Permian Period. Southwest of the
36 Delaware Basin, the Diablo Platform began developing either in the Late Pennsylvanian or Early
37 Permian. The Marathon Uplift and Ouachita tectonic belt limited the southern extent of the
38 Delaware Basin.

39 According to Brokaw et al. (1972, p. 30), pre-Ochoan sedimentary rocks in the Delaware Basin
40 show evidence of gentle downwarping during deposition, while Ochoan and younger rocks do

1 not. A relatively uniform eastward tilt, generally from about 14 to 19 meters per kilometer
2 (m/km) (75 to 100 feet per mile [ft/mi]), has been superimposed on the sedimentary sequence.
3 King (1948, pp. 108 and 121) generally attributes the uplift of the Guadalupe and Delaware
4 mountains along the west side of the Delaware Basin to the later Cenozoic, though he also notes
5 that some faults along the west margin of the Guadalupe Mountains have displaced Quaternary
6 gravels.

7 King (1948, p. 144) also infers the uplift from the Pliocene-age deposits of the Llano Estacado.
8 Subsequent studies of the Ogallala of the Llano Estacado show that it varies in age from Miocene
9 (about 12 million years before present) to Pliocene (Hawley 1993). This is the most likely range
10 for uplift of the Guadalupe Mountains and broad tilting to the east of the Delaware Basin
11 sequence.

12 Analysis of the present regional stress field indicates that the Delaware Basin lies within the
13 Southern Great Plains stress province. This province is a transition zone between the extensional
14 stress regime to the west and the region of compressive stress to the east. An interpretation by
15 Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 350) of the available data indicates that the level of stress in the
16 Southern Great Plains stress province is low. Changes to the tectonic setting, such as the
17 development of subduction zones and a consequent change in the driving forces, would take
18 much longer than 10,000 years to occur.

19 To the west of the Southern Great Plains province is the Basin and Range province, or
20 Cordilleran Extension province, where according to Zoback and Zoback (1991, pp. 348–51)
21 normal faulting is the characteristic style of deformation. The eastern boundary of the Basin and
22 Range province is marked by the Rio Grande Rift. Sanford, Jakasha, and Cash (1991, p. 230)
23 note that, as a geological structure, the Rift extends beyond the relatively narrow
24 geomorphological feature seen at the surface, with a magnetic anomaly at least 500 km (300 mi)
25 wide. On this basis, the Rio Grande Rift can be regarded as a system of axial grabens along a
26 major north-south trending structural uplift (a continuation of the Southern Rocky Mountains).
27 The magnetic anomaly extends beneath the Southern Great Plains stress province, and regional-
28 scale uplift of about 1,000 m (3,300 ft) over the past 10 million years also extends into eastern
29 New Mexico.

30 To the east of the Southern Great Plains province is the large Mid-Plate province that
31 encompasses central and eastern regions of the conterminous United States and the Atlantic
32 basin west of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Mid-Plate province is characterized by low levels of
33 paleo- and historic seismicity. Where Quaternary faulting has occurred, it is generally strike-slip
34 and appears to be associated with the reactivation of older structural elements.

35 Zoback et al. (1991) report no stress measurements from the Delaware Basin. The stress field in
36 the Southern Great Plains stress province has been defined from borehole measurements in west
37 Texas and from volcanic lineaments in northern New Mexico. These measurements were
38 interpreted by Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 353) to indicate that the least principal horizontal
39 stress is oriented north-northeast and south-southwest and that most of the province is
40 characterized by an extensional stress regime.

1 There is an abrupt change between the orientation of the least principal horizontal stress in the
2 Southern Great Plains and the west-northwest orientation of the least principal horizontal stress
3 characteristic of the Rio Grande Rift. In addition to the geological indications of a transition
4 zone as described above, Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134) point out that there is also evidence
5 for a sharp boundary between these two provinces. This is reinforced by the change in crustal
6 thickness from about 40 km (24 mi) beneath the Colorado Plateau to about 50 km (30 mi) or
7 more beneath the Southern Great Plains east of the Rio Grande Rift. The base of the crust within
8 the Rio Grande Rift is poorly defined but is shallower than that of the Colorado Plateau
9 (Thompson and Zoback 1979, p. 152). There is also markedly lower heat flow in the Southern
10 Great Plains (typically $< 60 \text{ m W m}^{-2}$) reported by Blackwell, Steele, and Carter (1991, p. 428)
11 compared with that in the Rio Grande Rift (typically $> 80 \text{ m W m}^{-2}$) reported by Reiter, Barroll,
12 and Minier (1991, p. 463).

13 On the eastern boundary of the Southern Great Plains province, there is only a small rotation in
14 the direction of the least principal horizontal stress. There is, however, a change from an
15 extensional, normal faulting regime to a compressive, strike-slip faulting regime in the Mid-Plate
16 province. According to Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134), the available data indicate that this
17 change is not abrupt and that the Southern Great Plains province can be viewed as a marginal
18 part of the Mid-Plate province.

19 **SCR-4.1.3 Structural FEPs**

20 **SCR-4.1.3.1 Deformation**

21 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N6 and N7
22 **FEP Titles:** *Salt Deformation* (N6)
23 *Diapirism* (N7)

24 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

25 Natural *Salt Deformation* and *Diapirism* at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 yrs on a scale
26 severe enough to significantly affect performance of the disposal system have been eliminated
27 from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence.

28 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

30 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3.1 Deformation

32 Some of the evaporites in the northern Delaware Basin have been deformed and it has been
33 proposed that the likely mechanism for deformation is gravity foundering of the more dense
34 anhydrites in less dense halite (e.g., Anderson and Powers 1978, Jones 1981, Borns et al. 1983,
35 and Borns 1987). Diapirism occurs when the deformation is penetrative, i.e., halite beds disrupt
36 overlying anhydrites. As Anderson and Powers (1978) suggested, this may have happened
37 northeast of the WIPP at the location of drillhole ERDA-6. This is the only location where
38 diapirism has been suggested for the evaporites of the northern Delaware Basin. The geologic
39 situation suggests that deformation occurred before the Miocene-Pliocene Ogallala Formation
40 was deposited (Jones 1981). Mechanical modeling is consistent with salt deformation occurring

1 over about 700,000 yrs to form the deformed features known in the northern part of the WIPP
2 site (Borns et al. 1983). The DOE drew the conclusion that evaporites at the WIPP site deform
3 too slowly to affect performance of the disposal system.

4 Because brine reservoirs appear to be associated with deformation, Powers et al. (1996) prepared
5 detailed structure elevation maps of various units from the base of the Castile upward through
6 the evaporites in the northern Delaware Basin. Drillholes are far more numerous for this study
7 than at the time of the study by Anderson and Powers (1978). Subdivisions of the Castile appear
8 to be continuous in the vicinity of ERDA-6 and at ERDA-6. There is little justification for
9 interpreting diapiric piercement at that site. The location and distribution of evaporite
10 deformation in the area of the WIPP site is similar to that proposed by earlier studies (e.g.,
11 Anderson and Powers 1978, Borns et al. 1983, Borns and Shaffer 1985).

12 Surface domal features at the northwestern end of Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior
13 to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but extensive geophysical studies were conducted of
14 these features as part of early WIPP studies (see Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were
15 drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not
16 related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and Gard 1982).

17 A more recent study of structure for the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation
18 (hereafter referred to as the Culebra) (Powers 2003) shows that the larger deformation associated
19 with deeper units is reflected by the Culebra, although the structural relief is muted. In addition,
20 evaporite deformation in the northern part of the WIPP site, associated with the area earlier
21 termed the “disturbed zone” (Powers et al. 1978), is hardly observable on a map of Culebra
22 structure (Powers 2003). There is no evidence of more recent deformation at the WIPP site based
23 on such maps.

24 Deformed salt in the lower Salado and upper strata of the Castile has been encountered in a
25 number of boreholes around the WIPP site; the extent of existing salt deformation is summarized
26 in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.1, and further detail is provided in the CCA, Appendix
27 DEF.

28 A number of mechanisms may result in salt deformation: in massive salt deposits, buoyancy
29 effects or diapirism may cause salt to rise through denser, overlying units; and in bedded salt
30 with anhydrite or other interbeds, gravity foundering of the interbeds into the halite may take
31 place. Results from rock mechanics modeling studies (see the CCA, Appendix DEF) indicate
32 that the time scale for the deformation process is such that significant natural deformation is
33 unlikely to occur at the WIPP site over any time frame significant to waste isolation. Thus
34 natural salt deformation and diapirism severe enough to alter existing patterns of groundwater
35 flow or the behavior of the disposal system over the regulatory period has been eliminated from
36 PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 yrs.

1 **SCR-4.1.3.2 Fracture Development**

2 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1 FEP Number:** N8

3 **FEP Title:** *Formation of Fractures*

4 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-P, UP (Repository)**

5 *Formation of Fractures* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a low
6 probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs. The *Formation of Fractures* near the repository is
7 accounted for in PA through treatment of the DRZ.

8 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The formation of fractures requires larger changes in stress than are required for changes to the
12 properties of existing fractures to overcome the shear and tensile strength of the rock. It has been
13 concluded from the regional tectonic setting of the Delaware Basin that no significant changes in
14 regional stress are expected over the regulatory period. The EPA agrees that fracture formation
15 in the Rustler is likely a result of halite dissolution and subsequent overlying unit fracturing
16 loading/unloading, as well as the syn- and postdepositional processes. Intraformational
17 postdepositional dissolution of the Rustler has been ruled out as a major contributor to Rustler
18 salt distribution and thus to new fracture formation based on work by Holt and Powers in the
19 CCA (Appendix DEF, Section DEF3.2) and Powers and Holt (1999 and 2000), who believe that
20 depositional facies and syndepositional dissolution account for most of the patterns on halite
21 distribution in the Rustler. The argument against developing new fractures in the Rustler during
22 the regulatory period appears reasonable. The formation of new fracture sets in the Culebra has
23 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence
24 over 10,000 yrs.

25 Repository-induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
26 calculations.

27 A mechanism such as salt diapirism could develop fracturing in the Salado, but there is little
28 evidence of diapirism in the Delaware Basin. Salt deformation has occurred in the vicinity of the
29 WIPP, and fractures have developed in deeper Castile anhydrites as a consequence. Deformation
30 rates are slow, and it is highly unlikely that this process will induce significant new fractures in
31 the Salado during the regulatory time period. Surface domal features at the northwestern end of
32 Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but
33 extensive geophysical studies were conducted of these features as part of early WIPP studies (see
34 Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-
35 collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and
36 Gard 1982).

1 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2 FEP Number:** N9
2 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Fracture Properties*

3 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C, UP (near repository)**

4 Naturally induced *Changes in Fracture Properties* that may affect groundwater flow or
5 radionuclide transport in the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on
6 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. *Changes in Fracture*
7 *Properties* near the repository are accounted for in PA calculations through treatment of the
8 DRZ.

9 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

11 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

12 Groundwater flow in the region of the WIPP and transport of any released radionuclides may
13 take place along fractures. The rate of flow and the extent of transport will be influenced by
14 fracture characteristics. Changes in fracture properties could arise through natural changes in the
15 local stress field; for example, through tectonic processes, erosion or sedimentation changing the
16 amount of overburden, dissolution of soluble minerals along beds in the Rustler or upper Salado,
17 or dissolution or precipitation of minerals in fractures.

18 Tectonic processes and features (changes in regional stress [N3]; tectonics [N4]; regional uplift
19 and subsidence [N5]; salt deformation [N6]; diapirism [N7]) have been screened out of PA.
20 These processes are not expected to significantly change the character of fractures during the
21 regulatory period.

22 Surface erosion or deposition (e.g., N41–N49) are not expected to significantly change the
23 overburden on the Culebra during the regulatory period. The relationship between Culebra
24 transmissivity and depth is significant (Holt and Yarbrough 2002, Holt and Powers 2002), but
25 the potential change to Culebra transmissivity based on deposition or erosion from these
26 processes over the regulatory period is insignificant.

27 Shallow dissolution (N16), where soluble beds from the upper Salado or Rustler are removed by
28 groundwater, has been extensively considered. There are no direct effects on the Salado at depths
29 of the repository. Extensive study of the upper Salado and Rustler halite units (Holt and Powers
30 1988, the CCA, Appendix FAC, Powers and Holt 1999 and 2000, Powers 2003) indicates little
31 potential for dissolution at the WIPP site during the regulatory period. Existing fracture
32 properties are expressed through the relationship between Culebra transmissivity values and
33 geologic factors at and near the WIPP site (Holt and Yarbrough 2002; Holt and Powers 2002,
34 p. 215). These will be incorporated in PA (see N16, Shallow Dissolution).

35 Mineral precipitation within fractures (N22) is expected to be beneficial to performance, and it
36 has been screened out on the basis of low consequence. Natural dissolution of fracture fillings
37 within the Culebra is incorporated within FEP N16 (Shallow Dissolution). There is no new
38 information on the distribution of fracture fillings within the Culebra. The effects of fracture
39 fillings are also expected to be represented in the distribution of Culebra transmissivity values
40 around the WIPP site and are thus incorporated into PA.

1 Repository-induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
2 calculations (UP), and is discussed further in FEPs W18 and W19.

3 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3 FEP Numbers:** N10 and N11
4 **FEP Titles:** *Formation of New Faults* (N10)
5 *Fault Movement* (N11)

6 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

7 Naturally induced *Fault Movement* and *Formation of New Faults* of sufficient magnitude to
8 significantly affect the performance of the disposal system have been eliminated from PA
9 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

10 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No changes have been made to this FEP.

12 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

13 Faults are present in the Delaware Basin in both the units underlying the Salado and in the
14 Permian evaporite sequence (see the CCA, Section 2.1.5.3). According to Powers et al. (1978
15 included in the CCA, Appendix GCR), there is evidence that movement along faults within the
16 pre-Permian units affected the thickness of Early Permian strata, but these faults did not exert a
17 structural control on the deposition of the Castile, the Salado, or the Rustler. Fault zones along
18 the margins of the Delaware Basin were active during the Late Permian Period. Along the
19 eastern margin, where the Delaware Basin flanks the Central Basin Platform, Holt and Powers
20 (1988, also included in the CCA, Appendix FAC) note that there is displacement of the Rustler,
21 and Schiel (1994) notes that there is thinning of the Dewey Lake. There is, however, no surface
22 displacement along the trend of these fault zones, indicating that there has been no significant
23 Quaternary movement. Muehlberger et al. (1978, p. 338) note that the nearest faults on which
24 Quaternary movement has been identified lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains.

25 The WIPP is located in an area of tectonic quiescence. Seismic monitoring conducted for the
26 WIPP since the CCA continues to record small events at distance from the WIPP, and these
27 events are mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production. Two nearby events
28 (magnitude 3.5, October 1997, and magnitude 2.8, December 1998) are related to rockfalls in the
29 Nash Draw mine and are not tectonic in origin (U.S. Department of Energy 1999). These events
30 did not cause any damage at the WIPP. The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general
31 tectonic setting and understanding of its evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically induced
32 fault movement within the Delaware Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
33 of low probability over 10,000 yrs. The stable tectonic setting also allows the formation of new
34 faults within the basin over the next 10,000 yrs to be eliminated from PA calculations on the
35 basis of low probability of occurrence.

36 Evaporite dissolution at or near the WIPP site has the potential for developing fractures in the
37 overlying beds. Three zones with halite (top of Salado, M1/H1 of the Los Medaños Member, and
38 M2/H2 of the Los Medaños Member) underlie the Culebra at the site (Powers 2003). The upper
39 Salado is present across the site, and there is no indication that dissolution of this area will occur
40 in the regulatory period or cause faulting at the site. The Los Medaños units show both mudflat
41 facies and halite-bearing facies within or adjacent to the WIPP site (Powers 2003). Although the

1 distribution of halite in the Rustler is mainly the result of depositional facies and syndepositional
2 dissolution (Holt and Powers 1988, Powers and Holt 1999 and 2000), the possibility of past or
3 future halite dissolution along the margins cannot be ruled out (Holt and Powers 1988, Beauheim
4 and Holt 1999). If halite in the lower Rustler has been dissolved along the depositional margin, it
5 has not occurred recently or has been of no consequence, as there is no indication on the surface
6 or in Rustler structure of new (or old) faults in this area (e.g., Powers et al. 1978, Powers 2003).

7 The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general tectonic setting and understanding of its
8 evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically induced fault movement within the Delaware
9 Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability over 10,000 years.
10 The stable tectonic setting also allows the formation of new faults within the basin over the next
11 10,000 years to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence.

12 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4 FEP Number:** N12
13 **FEP Title:** *Seismic Activity*

14 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.1 Screening Decision: UP**

15 The postclosure effects of *Seismic Activity* on the repository and the DRZ are accounted for in
16 PA calculations.

17 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

18 Seismic monitoring conducted for the WIPP since the CRA-2004 continues to record small
19 events at a distance from the WIPP, mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production.
20 Three seismic events (magnitude 2.4, January 27, 2006; magnitude 3.8, December 19, 2005; and
21 magnitude 3.6, May 23, 2004) occurred within 300 km of the WIPP (see U.S. Department of
22 Energy 2005, 2006, 2007a). These events did not cause any damage at the WIPP.

23 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

24 The following subsections present the screening argument for seismic activity (groundshaking).

25 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.4 Causes of Seismic Activity**

26 Seismic activity describes transient ground motion that may be generated by several energy
27 sources. There are two possible causes of seismic activity that could potentially affect the WIPP
28 site: natural and human-induced. Natural seismic activity is caused by fault movement
29 (earthquakes) when the buildup of strain in rock is released through sudden rupture or
30 movement. Human-induced seismic activity may result from a variety of surface and subsurface
31 activities, such as explosions (H19 and H20), mining (H13, H14, H58, and H59), fluid injection
32 (H28), and fluid withdrawal (H25).

33 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.5 Groundshaking**

34 Ground vibration and the consequent shaking of buildings and other structures are the most
35 obvious effects of seismic activity. Once the repository and shafts have been sealed, however,
36 existing surface structures will be dismantled. Postclosure PAs are concerned with the effects of
37 seismic activity on the closed repository.

38 In regions of low and moderate seismic activity, such as the Delaware Basin, rocks behave
39 elastically in response to the passage of seismic waves, and there are no long-term changes in

1 rock properties. The effects of earthquakes beyond the DRZ have been eliminated from PA
2 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. An
3 inelastic response, such as cracking, is only possible where there are free surfaces, as in the roof
4 and walls of the repository prior to closure by creep. Seismic activity could, therefore, have an
5 effect on the properties of the DRZ.

6 An assessment of the extent of damage in underground excavations caused by groundshaking
7 depends largely on observations from mines and tunnels. Because such excavations tend to take
8 place in rock types more brittle than halite, these observations cannot be related directly to the
9 behavior of the WIPP. According to Wallner (1981, p. 244), the DRZ in brittle rock types is
10 likely to be more highly fractured and hence more prone to spalling and rockfalls than an
11 equivalent zone in salt. Relationships between groundshaking and subsequent damage observed
12 in mines will therefore be conservative with respect to the extent of damage induced at the WIPP
13 by seismic activity.

14 Dowding and Rozen (1978) classified damage in underground structures following seismic
15 activity and found that no damage (cracks, spalling, or rockfalls) occurred at accelerations below
16 0.2 gravities and that only minor damage occurred at accelerations up to 0.4 gravities. Lenhardt
17 (1988, p. 392) showed that a magnitude 3 earthquake would have to be within 1 km (0.6 mi) of a
18 mine to result in falls of loose rock. The risk of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP
19 reaching these thresholds is discussed below.

20 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.6 Seismic Risk in the Region of the WIPP**

21 Prior to the introduction of a seismic monitoring network in 1960, most recorded earthquakes in
22 New Mexico were associated with the Rio Grande Rift, although small earthquakes were
23 detected in other parts of the region. In addition to continued activity in the Rio Grande Rift, the
24 instrumental record has shown a significant amount of seismic activity originating from the
25 Central Basin Platform and a number of small earthquakes in the Los Medaños area. Seismic
26 activity in the Rio Grande Rift is associated with extensional tectonics in that area. Seismic
27 activity in the Central Basin Platform may be associated with natural earthquakes, but there are
28 also indications that this activity occurs in association with oil-field activities such as fluid
29 injection. Small earthquakes in the Los Medaños region have not been precisely located, but
30 may be the result of mining activity in the region. The CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.6.2 contains
31 additional discussion of seismic activity and risk in the WIPP region.

32 The instrumental record was used as the basis of a seismic risk study primarily intended for
33 design calculations of surface facilities rather than for postclosure PAs. The use of this study to
34 define probable ground accelerations in the WIPP region over the next 10,000 yrs is based on the
35 assumptions that hydrocarbon extraction and potash mining will continue in the region and that
36 the regional tectonic setting precludes major changes over the next 10,000 yrs.

37 Three source regions were used in calculating seismic risk: the Rio Grande Rift, the Central
38 Basin Platform, and part of the Delaware Basin province (including the Los Medaños). Using
39 conservative assumptions about the maximum magnitude event in each zone, the study indicated
40 a return period of about 10,000 years (annual probability of occurrence of 10^{-4}) for events
41 producing ground accelerations of 0.1 gravities. Ground accelerations of 0.2 gravities would
42 have an annual probability of occurrence of about 5×10^{-6} .

1 The results of the seismic risk study and the observations of damage in mines caused by
2 groundshaking give an estimated annual probability of occurrence of between 10^{-8} and 10^{-6} for
3 events that could increase the permeability of the DRZ. The DRZ is accounted for in PA
4 calculations as a zone of permanently high permeability (see Appendix PA-2009, Section
5 PA-4.2.4); this treatment is considered to account for the effects of any potential seismic activity.

6 **SCR-4.1.4 Crustal Process**

7 **SCR-4.1.4.1 FEP Number:** N13
8 **FEP Title:** *Volcanic Activity*

9 **SCR-4.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

10 *Volcanic Activity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
11 occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

12 **SCR-4.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 The Paleozoic and younger stratigraphic sequences within the Delaware Basin are devoid of
16 locally derived volcanic rocks. Volcanic ashes (dated at 13 million years and 0.6 million years)
17 do occur in the Gatuña Formation (hereafter referred to as the Gatuña), but these are not locally
18 derived. Within eastern New Mexico and northern, central, and western Texas, the closest
19 Tertiary volcanic rocks with notable areal extent or tectonic significance to the WIPP are
20 approximately 160 km (100 mi) to the south in the Davis Mountains volcanic area. The closest
21 Quaternary volcanic rocks are 250 km (150 mi) to the northwest in the Sacramento Mountains.
22 No volcanic rocks are exposed at the surface within the Delaware Basin.

23 Volcanic activity is associated with particular tectonic settings: constructive and destructive plate
24 margins, regions of intraplate rifting, and isolated hot-spots in intraplate regions. The tectonic
25 setting of the WIPP site and the Delaware Basin is remote from plate margins, and the absence of
26 past volcanic activity indicates the absence of a major hot spot in the region. Intraplate rifting
27 has taken place along the Rio Grande some 200 km (120 mi) west of the WIPP site during the
28 Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. Igneous activity along this rift valley is comprised of sheet
29 lavas intruded on by a host of small-to-large plugs, sills, and other intrusive bodies. However,
30 the geological setting of the WIPP site within the large and stable Delaware Basin allows
31 volcanic activity in the region of the WIPP repository to be eliminated from performance
32 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.1.4.2 FEP Number:** N14
2 **FEP Title:** *Magmatic Activity*

3 **SCR-4.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 The effects of *Magmatic Activity* have been eliminated from the PA calculations on the basis of
5 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

8 **SCR-4.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

9 Magmatic activity is defined as the subsurface intrusion of igneous rocks into country rock.
10 Deep intrusive igneous rocks crystallize at depths of several kilometers (several miles) and have
11 no surface or near-surface expression until considerable erosion has taken place. Alternatively,
12 intrusive rocks may form from magma that has risen to near the surface or in the vents that give
13 rise to volcanoes and lava flows. Magma near the surface may be intruded along subvertical and
14 subhorizontal discontinuities (forming dikes and sills, respectively), and magma in volcanic
15 vents may solidify as plugs. The formation of such features close to a repository or the existence
16 of a recently intruded rock mass could impose thermal stresses, inducing new fractures or
17 altering the hydraulic characteristics of existing fractures.

18 The principal area of magmatic activity in New Mexico is the Rio Grande Rift, where extensive
19 intrusions occurred during the Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. The Rio Grande Rift, however,
20 is in a different tectonic province than the Delaware Basin, and its magmatic activity is related to
21 the extensional stress regime and high heat flow in that region.

22 Within the Delaware Basin, there is a single identified outcrop of a lamprophyre dike about
23 70 km (40 mi) southwest of the WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5.4 and the CCA,
24 Appendix GCR for more detail). Closer to the WIPP site, similar rocks have been exposed
25 within potash mines some 15 km (10 mi) to the northwest, and igneous rocks have been reported
26 from petroleum exploration boreholes. Material from the subsurface exposures has been dated at
27 around 35 million years. Some recrystallization of the host rocks took place alongside the
28 intrusion, and there is evidence that minor fracture development and fluid migration also
29 occurred along the margins of the intrusion. However, the fractures have been sealed, and there
30 is no evidence that the dike acted as a conduit for continued fluid flow.

31 Aeromagnetic surveys of the Delaware Basin have shown anomalies that lie on a linear
32 southwest-northeast trend that coincides with the surface and subsurface exposures of magmatic
33 rocks. There is a strong indication, therefore, of a dike or a closely related set of dikes extending
34 for at least 120 km (70 mi) across the region (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5.4). The
35 aeromagnetic survey conducted to delineate the dike showed a magnetic anomaly that is several
36 kilometers (several miles) wide at depth and narrows to a thin trace near the surface. This
37 pattern is interpreted as the result of an extensive dike swarm at depths of less than

1 approximately 4.0 km (2.5 mi) near the Precambrian basement, from which a limited number of
2 dikes have extended towards the surface.

3 Magmatic activity has taken place in the vicinity of the WIPP site in the past, but the igneous
4 rocks have cooled over a long period. Any enhanced fracturing or conduits for fluid flow have
5 been sealed by salt creep and mineralization. Continuing magmatic activity in the Rio Grande
6 Rift is too remote from the WIPP location to be of consequence to the performance of the
7 disposal system. Thus the effects of magmatic activity have been eliminated from PA
8 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4 FEP Number:** N15
10 **FEP Title:** *Metamorphic Activity*

11 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**
12 *Metamorphic Activity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability
13 of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

14 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**
15 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

16 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.3 Screening Argument**
17 Metamorphic activity, that is, solid-state recrystallization changes to rock properties and
18 geologic structures through the effects of heat and/or pressure, requires depths of burial much
19 greater than the depth of the repository. Regional tectonics that would result in the burial of the
20 repository to the depths at which the repository would be affected by metamorphic activity have
21 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence; therefore,
22 metamorphic activity has also been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
23 probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

24 **SCR-4.1.5 Geochemical Processes**

25 **SCR-4.1.5.1 FEP Number:** N16
26 **FEP Title:** *Shallow Dissolution* (including lateral dissolution)

27 **SCR-4.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP
28 *Shallow Dissolution* is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-4.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

31 **SCR-4.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

32 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
33 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between shallow dissolution
34 involving circulation of groundwater, mineral dissolution in the Rustler and at the top of the

1 Salado in the region of the WIPP, and deep dissolution taking place in the Castile and the base of
2 the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
3 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
4 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
5 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
6 discussed further in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2.

7 **SCR-4.1.5.1.4 Shallow Dissolution**

8 In the region around the WIPP, shallow dissolution by groundwater flow has removed soluble
9 minerals from the upper Salado as well as the Rustler to form Nash Draw; extensive solution
10 within the closed draw has created karst features including caves and dolines in the sulfate beds
11 of the Rustler (see Lee, 1925, Bachman, 1980, 1985, and 1987a). An alluvial doline drilled at
12 WIPP 33, about 850 m (2800 ft) west of the WIPP site boundary, is the nearest karst feature
13 known in the vicinity of the site. Upper Salado halite dissolution in Nash Draw resulted in
14 fracture propagation upward through the overlying Rustler (Holt and Powers 1988). The margin
15 of dissolution of halite from the upper Salado has commonly been placed west of the WIPP site,
16 near, but east of, Livingston Ridge, the eastern boundary of Nash Draw. Halite occurs in the
17 Rustler east of Livingston Ridge, with the margin generally progressively eastward in higher
18 stratigraphic units (e.g., Snyder 1985; Powers and Holt 1995). The distribution of halite in the
19 Rustler has commonly been attributed to shallow dissolution (e.g., Powers et al. 1978; Lambert,
20 1983; Bachman 1985; Lowenstein 1987). During early studies for the WIPP, the variability of
21 Culebra transmissivity in the vicinity of the WIPP was commonly attributed to the effects of
22 Rustler halite dissolution and changes in fracturing as a consequence.

23 After a detailed sedimentologic and stratigraphic investigation of WIPP cores, shafts, and
24 geophysical logs from the region around WIPP, the distribution of halite in the Rustler was
25 attributed to depositional and syndepositional processes rather than postdepositional dissolution
26 (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 2000). Rustler exposures in shafts for the WIPP
27 revealed extensive sedimentary structures in clastic units (Holt and Powers 1984, 1986, 1990),
28 and the suite of features in these beds led these investigators (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and
29 Holt 1990, 2000) to reinterpret the clastic units. They conclude that the clastic facies represent
30 mainly mudflat facies tracts adjacent to a salt pan. Although some halite was likely deposited in
31 mudflat areas proximal to the salt pan, it was largely removed by syndepositional dissolution, as
32 indicated by soil structures, soft sediment deformation, bedding, and small-scale vertical
33 relationships (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 1990, 1999, 2000). The depositional
34 margins of halite in the Rustler are the likely points for past or future dissolution (e.g., Holt and
35 Powers 1988; Beauheim and Holt 1990). Cores from drillholes at the H-19 drillpad near the
36 Tamarisk Member halite margin show evidence of some dissolution of halite in the Tamarisk
37 (Mercer et al. 1998), consistent with these predictions. The distribution of Culebra transmissivity
38 values is not considered related to dissolution of Rustler halite, and other geological factors (e.g.,
39 depth, upper Salado dissolution) correlate well with Culebra transmissivity (e.g., Powers and
40 Holt 1995; Holt and Powers 2002).

41 Since the CCA was completed, the WIPP has conducted additional work on shallow dissolution,
42 principally of the upper Salado, and its possible relationship to the distribution of transmissivity
43 values for the Culebra as determined through testing of WIPP hydrology wells.

1 Analysis Plan 088 (AP-088) (Beauheim 2002) noted that potentiometric surface values for the
 2 Culebra in many monitoring wells were outside the uncertainty ranges used to calibrate models
 3 of steady-state heads for the unit. AP-088 directed the analysis of the relationship between
 4 geological factors and values of transmissivity at Culebra wells. The relationship between
 5 geological factors, including dissolution of the upper Salado as well as limited dissolution in the
 6 Rustler, and Culebra transmissivity is being used to evaluate differences between assuming
 7 steady-state Culebra heads and changing heads.

8 Task 1 for AP-088 (Powers 2003) evaluated geological factors, including shallow dissolution in
 9 the vicinity of the WIPP site related to Culebra transmissivity. A much more extensive drillhole
 10 geological database was developed than was previously available, utilizing sources of data from
 11 WIPP, potash exploration, and oil and gas exploration and development. The principal findings
 12 related to shallow dissolution are (1) a relatively narrow zone (~ 200 – 400 m [656 – 1,312 ft]
 13 wide) could be defined as the margin of dissolution of the upper Salado in much of the area
 14 around WIPP, (2) the upper Salado dissolution margin commonly underlies surface escarpments
 15 such as Livingston Ridge, and (3) there are possible extensions or reentrants of incipient upper
 16 Salado dissolution extending eastward from the general dissolution margin. The WIPP site
 17 proper is not affected by this process.

18 Culebra transmissivity correlates well with depth or overburden, which affects fracture apertures
 19 (Powers and Holt 1995, Holt and Powers 2002; Holt and Yarbrough 2002). Dissolution of the
 20 upper Salado appears to increase transmissivity by one or more orders of magnitude (Holt and
 21 Yarbrough 2002). Because there is no indication of upper Salado dissolution at the WIPP site,
 22 Holt and Yarbrough (2002) did not include this factor for the WIPP site in estimates of base
 23 transmissivity values for the WIPP site and surroundings.

24 The effects of shallow dissolution (including the impacts of lateral dissolution) have been
 25 included in PA calculations.

26 **SCR-4.1.5.2 FEP Numbers:** N18, N20, and N21
 27 **FEP Titles:** *Deep Dissolution* (N18)
 28 *Breccia Pipes* (N20)
 29 *Collapse Breccias* (N21)

30 **SCR-4.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

31 *Deep Dissolution* and the formation of associated features (for example, solution chimneys or
 32 *Breccia Pipes*, *Collapse Breccias*) at the WIPP site have been eliminated from PA calculations
 33 on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

34 **SCR-4.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

35 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
3 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between shallow dissolution,
4 involving circulation of groundwater and mineral dissolution in the Rustler and at the top of the
5 Salado in the region of the WIPP, and deep dissolution taking place in the Castile and the base of
6 the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
7 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
8 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
9 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
10 discussed further in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2.

11 **SCR-4.1.5.2.4 Deep Dissolution**

12 Deep dissolution is limited to processes involving dissolution of the Castile or basal Salado and
13 features such as breccia pipes (also known as solution chimneys) associated with this process
14 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2). Deep dissolution is distinguished from shallow and
15 lateral dissolution not only by depth, but also by the origin of the water. Dissolution by
16 groundwater from deep water-bearing zones can lead to the formation of cavities. Collapse of
17 overlying beds leads to the formation of collapse breccias if the overlying rocks are brittle, or to
18 deformation if the overlying rocks are ductile. If dissolution is extensive, breccia pipes or
19 solution chimneys may form above the cavity. These pipes may reach the surface or pass
20 upwards into fractures and then into microcracks that do not extend to the surface. Breccia pipes
21 may also form through the downward percolation of meteoric waters, as discussed earlier. Deep
22 dissolution is of concern because it could accelerate contaminant transport through the creation
23 of vertical flow paths that bypass low-permeability units in the Rustler. If dissolution occurred
24 within or beneath the waste panels themselves, there could be increased circulation of
25 groundwater through the waste, as well as a breach of the Salado host rock.

26 Features identified as being the result of deep dissolution are present along the northern and
27 eastern margins of the Delaware Basin. In addition to features that have a surface expression or
28 that appear within potash mine workings, deep dissolution has been cited by Anderson et al.
29 (1972, p. 81) as the cause of lateral variability within evaporite sequences in the lower Salado.

30 Exposures of the McNutt Potash Member of the Salado within a mine near Nash Draw have
31 shown a breccia pipe containing cemented brecciated fragments of formations higher in the
32 stratigraphic sequence. At the surface, this feature is marked by a dome, and similar domes have
33 been interpreted as dissolution features. The depth of dissolution has not been confirmed, but the
34 collapse structures led Anderson (1978, p. 52) and Snyder et al. (1982, p. 65) to postulate
35 dissolution of the Capitan Limestone at depth; collapse of the Salado, Rustler, and younger
36 formations; and subsequent dissolution and hydration by downward percolating waters. San
37 Simon Sink (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2), some 35 km (20 mi) east-southeast of
38 the WIPP site, has also been interpreted as a solution chimney. Subsidence has occurred there in
39 historical times according to Nicholson and Clebsch (1961, p. 14), suggesting that dissolution at
40 depth is still taking place. Whether this is the result of downward-percolating surface water or
41 deep groundwater has not been confirmed. The association of these dissolution features with the

1 inner margin of the Capitan Reef suggest that they owe their origins, if not their continued
2 development, to groundwaters derived from the Capitan Limestone.

3 **SCR-4.1.5.2.5 Dissolution within the Castile and Lower Salado**

4 The Castile contains sequences of varved anhydrite and carbonate (that is, laminae deposited on
5 a cyclical basis) that can be correlated between several boreholes. On the basis of these deposits,
6 a basin-wide uniformity in the depositional environment of the Castile evaporites was assumed.
7 The absence of varves from all or part of a sequence and the presence of brecciated anhydrite
8 beds have been interpreted by Anderson et al. (1972) as evidence of dissolution. Holt and
9 Powers (the CCA, Appendix FAC) have questioned the assumption of a uniform depositional
10 environment and contend that the anhydrite beds are lateral equivalents of halite sequences
11 without significant postdepositional dissolution. Wedges of brecciated anhydrite along the
12 margin of the Castile have been interpreted by Robinson and Powers (1987, p. 78) as gravity-
13 driven clastic deposits, rather than the result of deep dissolution.

14 Localized depressions at the top of the Castile and inclined geophysical marker units at the base
15 of the Salado have been interpreted by Davies (1983, p. 45) as the result of deep dissolution and
16 subsequent collapse or deformation of overlying rocks. The postulated cause of this dissolution
17 was circulation of undersaturated groundwaters from the Bell Canyon Formation (hereafter
18 referred to as Bell Canyon). Additional boreholes (notably WIPP-13, WIPP-32, and DOE-2) and
19 geophysical logging led Borns and Shaffer (1985) to conclude that the features interpreted by
20 Davies as being dissolution features are the result of irregularities at the top of Bell Canyon.
21 These irregularities led to localized depositional thickening of the Castile and lower Salado
22 sediments.

23 **SCR-4.1.5.2.6 Collapse Breccias at Basin Margins**

24 Collapse breccias are present at several places around the margins of the Delaware Basin. Their
25 formation is attributed to relatively fresh groundwater from the Capitan Limestone that forms the
26 margin of the basin. Collapse breccias corresponding to features on geophysical records that
27 have been ascribed to deep dissolution have not been found in boreholes away from the margins.
28 These features have been reinterpreted as the result of early dissolution prior to the deposition of
29 the Salado.

30 **SCR-4.1.5.2.7 Summary of Deep Dissolution**

31 Deep dissolution features have been identified within the Delaware Basin, but only in marginal
32 areas underlain by Capitan Reef. There is a low probability that deep dissolution will occur
33 sufficiently close to the waste panels over the regulatory period to affect groundwater flow in the
34 immediate region of the WIPP. Deep dissolution at the WIPP site has therefore been eliminated
35 from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.1.5.3 FEP Number:** N22
2 **FEP Title:** *Fracture Infill*

3 **SCR-4.1.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C – Beneficial

4 The effects of *Fracture Infill* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
5 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.1.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004. No changes have
8 been made.

9 **SCR-4.1.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

10 **SCR-4.1.5.3.3.1 Mineralization**

11 Precipitation of minerals as fracture infills can reduce hydraulic conductivities. The distribution
12 of infilled fractures in the Culebra closely parallels the spatial variability of lateral transmissivity
13 in the Culebra. The secondary gypsum veins in the Rustler have not been dated. Strontium
14 isotope studies (Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 5-53 to 5-57) indicate that the infilling minerals are locally
15 derived from the host rock rather than extrinsically derived, and it is inferred that they reflect an
16 early phase of mineralization and are not associated with recent meteoric waters.

17 Stable isotope geochemistry in the Rustler has also provided information on mineral stabilities in
18 these strata. Both Chapman (1986, p. 31) and Lambert and Harvey (1987, p. 207) imply that the
19 mineralogical characteristics of units above the Salado have been stable or subject to only minor
20 changes under the various recharge conditions that have existed during the past 0.6 million
21 years—the period since the formation of the Mescalero caliche and the establishment of a pattern
22 of climate change and associated changes in recharge that led to present-day hydrogeological
23 conditions. No changes in climate are expected other than those experienced during this period,
24 and for this reason, no changes are expected in the mineralogical characteristics other than those
25 expressed by the existing variability of fracture infills and diagenetic textures. Formation of
26 fracture infills will reduce transmissivities and will therefore be of beneficial consequence to the
27 performance of the disposal system.

28 **SCR-4.2 Subsurface Hydrological FEPs**

29 **SCR-4.2.1 Groundwater Characteristics**

30 **SCR-4.2.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N23, N24, N25, and N27
31 **FEP Titles:** *Saturated Groundwater Flow* (N23)
32 *Unsaturated Groundwater Flow* (N24)
33 *Fracture Flow* (N25)
34 *Effects of Preferential Pathways* (N27)

1 **SCR-4.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

2 *Saturated Groundwater Flow, Unsaturated Groundwater Flow, Fracture Flow, and Effects of*
3 *Preferential Pathways* are accounted for in PA calculations.

4 **SCR-4.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

5 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. They continue to be accounted for in
6 PA.

7 **SCR-4.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

8 Saturated groundwater flow, unsaturated groundwater flow, and fracture flow are accounted for
9 in PA calculations. Groundwater flow is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1; and
10 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5 and Section 6.4.6.

11 The hydrogeologic properties of the Culebra are also spatially variable. This variability,
12 including the effects of preferential pathways, is accounted for in PA calculations in the
13 estimates of transmissivity and aquifer thickness.

14 **SCR-4.2.1.2 FEP Number:** N26

15 **FEP Title:** *Density Effect on Groundwater Flow*

16 **SCR-4.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 *Density Effects on Groundwater Flow* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
18 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-4.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

21 **SCR-4.2.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

22 The most transmissive unit in the Rustler, and hence the most significant potential pathway for
23 transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment, is the Culebra. The properties of
24 Culebra groundwaters are not homogeneous, and spatial variations in groundwater density (the
25 CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.1.2) could influence the rate and direction of groundwater
26 flow. A comparison of the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component in
27 the Culebra, however, shows that only in the region to the south of the WIPP are head gradients
28 low enough for density gradients to be significant (Davies 1989, p. 53). Accounting for this
29 variability would rotate groundwater flow vectors towards the east (down-dip) and hence fluid in
30 the high-transmissivity zone would move away from the zone. Excluding brine density
31 variations within the Culebra from PA calculations is therefore a conservative assumption, and
32 density effects on groundwater flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
33 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.2.2 Changes in Groundwater Flow**

2 **SCR-4.2.2.1 FEP Number:** N28

3 **FEP Title:** *Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow*

4 **SCR-4.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Natural Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
6 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 The geothermal gradient in the region of the WIPP has been measured at about 30 °C (54 °F) per
11 kilometer (50 °C [90 °F] per mile). Given the generally low permeability in the region and the
12 limited thickness of units in which groundwater flow occurs (for example, the Culebra), natural
13 convection will be too weak to have a significant effect on groundwater flow. No natural FEPs
14 have been identified that could significantly alter the temperature distribution of the disposal
15 system or give rise to thermal effects on groundwater flow. Such effects have therefore been
16 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
17 disposal system.

18 **SCR-4.2.2.2 FEP Number:** N29

19 **FEP Title:** *Saline Intrusion* (hydrogeological effects)

20 **SCR-4.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

21 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Saline Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

23 **SCR-4.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

24 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

25 **SCR-4.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

26 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in saline intrusion into units
27 above the Salado or cause a significant increase in fluid density. Natural saline intrusion has
28 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
29 over the next 10,000 years. Saline intrusion arising from human events such as drilling into a
30 pressurized brine pocket is discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.4).

1 **SCR-4.2.2.3 FEP Number:** N30
2 **FEP Title:** *Freshwater Intrusion* (hydrogeological effects)

3 **SCR-4.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

4 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Freshwater Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

6 **SCR-4.2.2.3.2 Summary**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

8 **SCR-4.2.2.3.2.1 Screening Argument**

9 A number of FEPs, including climate change, can result in changes in infiltration and recharge
10 (see discussions for FEPs N53 through N55, Section SCR-4.5.3.1). These changes will affect the
11 height of the water table and, hence, could affect groundwater flow in the Rustler through
12 changes in head gradients. The generally low transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler,
13 however, will prevent any significant changes in groundwater density from occurring within the
14 Culebra over the timescales for which increased precipitation and recharge are anticipated. No
15 other natural events or processes have been identified that could result in freshwater intrusion
16 into units above the Salado or cause a significant decrease in fluid density. Freshwater intrusion
17 has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
18 over the next 10,000 years.

19 **SCR-4.2.2.4 FEP Number:** N31
20 **FEP Title:** Hydrological Response to Earthquakes

21 **SCR-4.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 *Hydrological Response to Earthquakes* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
23 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

27 **SCR-4.2.2.4.3.1 Hydrological Effects of Seismic Activity**

28 There are a variety of hydrological responses to earthquakes. Some of these responses, such as
29 changes in surface-water flow directions, result directly from fault movement. Others, such as
30 changes in subsurface water chemistry and temperature, probably result from changes in flow
31 pathways along the fault or fault zone. According to Bredehoeft et al. (1987, p. 139), further
32 away from the region of fault movement, two types of changes to groundwater levels may take
33 place as a result of changes in fluid pressure.

- 1 • The passage of seismic waves through a rock mass causes a volume change, inducing a
2 transient response in the fluid pressure, which may be observed as a short-lived
3 fluctuation of the water level in wells.

- 4 • Changes in volume strain can cause long-term changes in water level. A buildup of strain
5 occurs prior to rupture and is released during an earthquake. The consequent change in
6 fluid pressure may be manifested by the drying up or reactivation of springs some
7 distance from the region of the epicenter.

8 Fluid-pressure changes induced by the transmission of seismic waves can produce changes of up
9 to several meters (several yards) in groundwater levels in wells, even at distances of thousands of
10 kilometers from the epicenter. These changes are temporary, however, and levels typically
11 return to pre-earthquake levels in a few hours or days. Changes in fluid pressure arising from
12 changes in volume strain persist for much longer periods, but they are only potentially
13 consequential in tectonic regimes where there is a significant buildup of strain. The regional
14 tectonics of the Delaware Basin indicates that such a buildup has a low probability of occurring
15 over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N3 and N4, Section SCR-4.1.2.1).

16 The expected level of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP will be of low consequence to
17 the performance of the disposal system in terms of groundwater flow or contaminant transport.
18 Changes in groundwater levels resulting from more distant earthquakes will be too short in
19 duration to be significant. Thus hydrological response to earthquakes has been eliminated from
20 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.2.2.5 FEP Number:** N32
22 **FEP Title:** *Natural Gas Intrusion*

23 **SCR-4.2.2.5.1 Screening decision:** SO-P

24 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Natural Gas Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
25 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

26 **SCR-4.2.2.5.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

28 **SCR-4.2.2.5.2.1 Screening Argument**

29 Hydrocarbon resources are present in formations beneath the WIPP (the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
30 Section 2.3.1.2), and natural gas is extracted from the Morrow Formation. These reserves are,
31 however, some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface, and no natural events or processes have
32 been identified that could result in natural gas intrusion into the Salado or the units above.
33 Natural gas intrusion has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
34 probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.3 Subsurface Geochemical FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.3.1 Groundwater Geochemistry**

3 **SCR-4.3.1.1 FEP Number:** N33

4 **FEP Title:** *Groundwater Geochemistry*

5 **SCR-4.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 *Groundwater Geochemistry* in the hydrological units of the disposal system is accounted for in
7 PA calculations.

8 **SCR-4.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information for this FEP has been identified since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The most important aspect of groundwater geochemistry in the region of the WIPP in terms of
12 chemical retardation and colloid stability is salinity. Groundwater geochemistry is discussed in
13 detail in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2 and Section 2.4 and summarized here. The Delaware
14 Mountain Group, Castile, and Salado contain basinal brines. Waters in the Castile and Salado
15 are at or near halite saturation. Above the Salado, groundwaters are also relatively saline, and
16 groundwater quality is poor in all of the permeable units. Waters from the Culebra vary spatially
17 in salinity and chemistry. They range from saline sodium chloride-rich waters to brackish
18 calcium sulfate-rich waters. In addition, a range of magnesium-to-calcium ratios has been
19 observed, and some waters reflect the influence of potash mining activities, having elevated
20 potassium-to-sodium ratios. Waters from the Santa Rosa are generally of better quality than
21 those from the Rustler. Salado and Castile brine geochemistry is accounted for in PA
22 calculations of the actinide (An) source term (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.4). Culebra
23 brine geochemistry is accounted for in the retardation factors used in PA calculations of actinide
24 transport (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2).

25 **SCR-4.3.1.2 FEP Numbers:** N34 and N38

26 **FEP Titles:** *Saline Intrusion* (geochemical effects) (N34)

27 *Effects of Dissolution* (N38)

28 **SCR-4.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The effects of *Saline Intrusion* and *Dissolution* on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated
30 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 **SCR-4.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 Saline intrusion and effects of dissolution are considered together in this discussion because
3 dissolution of minerals such as halite (NaCl), anhydrite (CaSO₄), or gypsum (CaSO₄·2H₂O)
4 (N38) could – in the most extreme case – increase the salinity of groundwaters in the Culebra to
5 levels characteristic of those expected after saline intrusion (N34).

6 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in saline intrusion into units
7 above the Salado. Injection of Castile or Salado brines into the Culebra as a result of human
8 intrusion, an anthropogenically induced event, was included in past PA calculations. Laboratory
9 studies carried out to evaluate radionuclide transport in the Culebra following human intrusion
10 produced data that can also be used to evaluate the consequences of natural saline intrusion.

11 The possibility that dissolution of halite, anhydrite, or gypsum might result in an increase in the
12 salinity of low- to moderate-ionic-strength groundwaters in the Culebra also appears unlikely,
13 despite the presence of halite in the Los Medaños under most of the WIPP site (Siegel and
14 Lambert 1991, Figure 1-13), including the expected Culebra off-site transport pathway (the
15 direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository would enter the Culebra,
16 flow towards the south or south-southeast, and eventually to the boundary of the WIPP site).
17 (The Los Medaños Member of the Rustler, formerly referred to as the unnamed lower member of
18 the Rustler, underlies the Culebra.) A dissolution-induced increase in the salinity of Culebra
19 groundwaters is unlikely because (1) the dissolution of halite is known to be rapid;
20 (2) (moderate-ionic-strength) groundwaters along the off-site transport pathway (and at many
21 other locations in the Culebra) have had sufficient time to dissolve significant quantities of
22 halite, if this mineral is present in the subjacent Los Medaños and if Culebra fluids have been in
23 contact with it; and (3) the lack of high-ionic-strength groundwaters along the off-site transport
24 pathway (and elsewhere in the Culebra) implies that halite is present in the Los Medaños but
25 Culebra fluids have not contacted it, or that halite is not present in the Los Medaños. Because
26 halite dissolves so rapidly if contacted by undersaturated solutions, this conclusion does not
27 depend on the nature and timing of Culebra recharge (i.e., whether the Rustler has been a closed
28 hydrologic system for several thousand to a few tens of thousands of years, or is subject to
29 significant modern recharge).

30 Nevertheless, saline intrusion would not affect the predicted transport of thorium (Th), uranium
31 (U), plutonium (Pu), and americium (Am) in the Culebra. This is because (1) the laboratory
32 studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and Am for the CCA PA were carried out
33 with both moderate-ionic-strength solutions representative of Culebra groundwaters along the
34 expected off-site transport pathway and high-ionic-strength solutions representative of brines
35 from the Castile and the Salado (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996); and (2) the results obtained
36 with the Castile and Salado brines were – for the most part – used to predict the transport of
37 Pu(III) and Am(III); Th(IV), U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(IV); and U(VI). The results obtained with
38 the saline solutions were used for these actinide oxidation states because the extent to which
39 saline and Culebra brines will mix along the offsite transport pathway in the Culebra was unclear
40 at the time of the CCA PA; therefore, Brush (1996) and Brush and Storz (1996) recommended
41 that PA use the results that predict less retardation. In the case of Pu(III) and Am(III); Th(IV),
42 U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(IV); and U(VI), the retardation distribution coefficient (K_{ds}) obtained
43 with the saline solutions were somewhat lower than those obtained with the Culebra fluids. The

1 K_{ds} recommended by Brush and Storz (1996) are being used for the CRA-2009 PA. These K_{ds}
2 are also based mainly on results obtained with saline solutions.

3 Finally, it is important to reiterate that the use of results from laboratory studies with saline
4 solutions to predict radionuclide transport in the Culebra for previous PAs and the CRA-2009 PA
5 implement the effects of saline intrusion caused by human intrusion, not natural saline intrusion.
6 The conclusions that natural saline intrusion is unlikely, that significant dissolution is unlikely,
7 and that these events or processes would have no significant consequence – in the unlikely event
8 that they occur – continue to be valid.

9 **SCR-4.3.1.3 FEP Numbers:** N35, N36, and N37

10 **FEP Titles:** *Freshwater Intrusion* (Geochemical Effects) (N35)

11 *Change in Groundwater Eh* (N36)

12 *Changes in Groundwater pH* (N37)

13 **SCR-4.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

14 The effects of *Freshwater Intrusion* on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
15 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
16 *Changes in Groundwater Eh* and *Changes in Groundwater pH* have been eliminated from PA
17 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-4.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

20 **SCR-4.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

21 Natural changes in the groundwater chemistry of the Culebra and other units that resulted from
22 saline intrusion or freshwater intrusion could potentially affect chemical retardation and the
23 stability of colloids. Changes in groundwater Eh and groundwater pH could also affect the
24 migration of radionuclides (see FEPs W65 to W70, Section SCR-6.5.5.2, Section SCR-6.5.5.3,
25 Section SCR-6.5.6.1, and Section SCR-6.5.6.2). No natural EPs have been identified that could
26 result in saline intrusion into units above the Salado, and the magnitude of any natural temporal
27 variation from the effects of dissolution on groundwater chemistry, or because of changes in
28 recharge, is likely to be no greater than the present spatial variation. These FEPs related to the
29 effects of future natural changes in groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
30 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The most likely mechanism for (natural) freshwater intrusion into the Culebra (N35), changes in
32 groundwater Eh (N36), and changes in groundwater pH (N37) is (natural) recharge of the
33 Culebra. (Other FEPs consider possible anthropogenically induced recharge). These three FEPs
34 are closely related because an increase in the rate of recharge could reduce the ionic strength(s)
35 of Culebra groundwaters, possibly enough to saturate the Culebra with (essentially) fresh water,
36 at least temporarily. Such a change in ionic strength could, if enough atmospheric oxygen
37 remained in solution, also increase the Eh of Culebra groundwaters enough to oxidize Pu from
38 the relatively immobile III and IV oxidation states (Pu(III) and Pu(IV)) – the oxidation states

1 expected under current conditions (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996) – to the relatively mobile
2 V and VI oxidation states (Pu(V) and Pu(VI)). Similarly, recharge of the Culebra with
3 freshwater could also change the pH of Culebra groundwaters from the currently observed range
4 of about 6 to 7 to mildly acidic values, thus (possibly) decreasing the retardation of dissolved Pu
5 and Am. (These changes in ionic strength, Eh, and pH could also affect mobilities of Th, U, and
6 neptunium (Np), but the long-term performance of the WIPP is much less sensitive to the
7 mobilities of these radioelements than to those of Pu and Am.)

8 There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of recharge to the Culebra.
9 Lambert (1986), Lambert and Carter (1987), and Lambert and Harvey (1987) used a variety of
10 stable and radiogenic isotopic-dating techniques to conclude that the Rustler (and the Dewey
11 Lake) have been closed hydrologic systems for several thousand to a few tens of thousands of
12 years. In other words, the last significant recharge of the Rustler occurred during the late
13 Pleistocene in response to higher levels of precipitation and infiltration associated with the most
14 recent continental glaciation of North America, and the current flow field in the Culebra is the
15 result of the slow discharge of groundwater from this unit. Other investigators have agreed that
16 it is possible that Pleistocene recharge has contributed to present-day flow patterns in the
17 Culebra, but that current patterns are also consistent with significant current recharge (Haug et al.
18 1987; Davies 1989). Still others (Chapman 1986, 1988) have rejected Lambert's interpretations
19 in favor of exclusively modern recharge, at least in some areas. For example, the low salinity of
20 Hydrochemical Zone B south of the WIPP site could represent dilution of Culebra groundwater
21 with significant quantities of recently introduced meteoric water (see Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 2-
22 57–2-62 and Figure 2-17 for definitions and locations of the four hydrochemical facies in the
23 Culebra in and around the WIPP site).

24 The current program to explain the cause(s) of the rising water levels observed in Culebra
25 monitoring wells may elucidate the nature and timing of recharge. However, the justification of
26 this screening decision does not depend on how this issue is resolved. If recharge occurs mainly
27 during periods of high precipitation (pluvials) associated with periods of continental glaciation,
28 the consequences of such recharge are probably already reflected in the ranges of geochemical
29 conditions currently observed in the Culebra as a whole, as well as along the likely offsite
30 transport pathway (the direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository
31 would enter the Culebra in the event of human intrusion to the south or south-southeast and
32 eventually to the boundary of the WIPP site). Hence, the effects of recharge, (possible)
33 freshwater intrusion, and (possible) concomitant changes in groundwater Eh and pH can be
34 screened out on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the far-field barrier. The
35 reasons for the conclusion that the effects of pluvial recharge are inconsequential (i.e., are
36 already included among existing variations in geochemical conditions) are (1) as many as 50
37 continental glaciations and associated pluvials have occurred since the late Pliocene Epoch
38 2.5 million years ago (2.5 Ma BP); (2) the glaciations and pluvials that have occurred since about
39 0.5 to 1 Ma BP have been significantly more severe than those that occurred prior to 1 Ma BP
40 (see, for example, Servant 2001); (3) the studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and
41 Am for the CCA PA calculations and the CCA Performance Assessment Verification Test
42 (PAVT) were carried out under conditions that encompass those observed along the likely
43 Culebra off-site transport pathway (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996); and (4) these studies
44 demonstrated that conditions in the Culebra are favorable for retardation of actinides despite the
45 effects of as many as 50 periods of recharge.

1 It is also worth noting that the choice of the most recent glacial maximum as an upper limit for
2 possible climatic changes during the 10,000-year (yr) WIPP regulatory period (Swift 1991; the
3 CCA, Appendix CLI) established conservative upper limits for precipitation and recharge of the
4 Culebra at the WIPP site. The review by Swift (1991), later incorporated in the CCA, Appendix
5 CLI, provides evidence that precipitation in New Mexico did not attain its maximum level (about
6 60-100% of current precipitation) until a few thousand years before the last glacial maximum.
7 Swift (1991) pointed out,

8 Prior to the last glacial maximum 22 to 18 ka BP, evidence from mid- Wisconsin faunal
9 assemblages in caves in southern New Mexico, including the presence of extralimital species such
10 as the desert tortoise that are now restricted to warmer climates, suggests warm summers and mild,
11 relatively dry winters (Harris 1987, 1988). Lacustrine evidence confirms the interpretation that
12 conditions prior to and during the glacial advance that were generally drier than those at the glacial
13 maximum. Permanent water did not appear in what was later to be a major lake in the Estancia
14 Valley in central New Mexico until sometime before 24 ka BP (Bachhuber 1989). Late-
15 Pleistocene lake levels in the San Agustin Plains in western New Mexico remained low until
16 approximately 26.4 ka BP, and the $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ record from ostracode shells suggests that mean annual
17 temperatures at that location did not decrease significantly until approximately 22 ka BP (Phillips
18 et al. 1992).

19 Therefore, it is likely that precipitation and recharge did not attain levels characteristic of the
20 most recent glacial maximum until about 70,000 to 75,000 years after the last glaciations had
21 begun. High-resolution, deep-sea $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data (and other data) reviewed by Servant (2001, Figure
22 1 and Figure 2) support the conclusion that, although the volume of ice incorporated in
23 continental ice sheets can expand rapidly at the start of a glaciation, attainment of maximum
24 volume does not occur until a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of years prior to the
25 termination of the approximately 100,000-yr glaciations that have occurred during the last 0.5 to
26 1 Ma BP. Therefore, it is unlikely that precipitation and recharge will reach their maximum
27 levels during the 10,000-yr regulatory period.

28 If, on the other hand, significant recharge occurs throughout both phases of the glacial-
29 interglacial cycles, the conclusion that the effects of pluvial and modern recharge are
30 inconsequential (i.e., are already reflected by existing variations in geochemical conditions) is
31 also still valid. The effects of future natural changes in groundwater chemistry have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system.

34 **SCR-4.4 Geomorphological FEPs**

35 **SCR-4.4.1 Physiography**

36 **SCR-4.4.1.1 FEP Number:** N39

37 **FEP Title:** *Physiography*

38 **SCR-4.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

39 Relevant aspects of the *Physiography*, geomorphology, and topography of the region around the
40 WIPP are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 SCR-4.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

3 SCR-4.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

4 Physiography and geomorphology are discussed in detail in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.4,
5 and are accounted for in the setup of the PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2).

6 SCR-4.4.1.2 FEP Number: N40

7 **FEP Title:** *Impact of a Large Meteorite*

8 SCR-4.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

9 Disruption arising from the *Impact of a Large Meteorite* has been eliminated from PA
10 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

11 SCR-4.4.1.3 Summary of New Information

12 This FEP has been modified to correct errors discovered in Equations (SCR.5) and (SCR.6). As
13 a result of these error corrections, it is necessary to select an upper bound on the distribution of
14 meteorite sizes; Ceres, the largest known asteroid, has been used to determine the upper bound.

15 SCR-4.4.1.4 Screening Argument

16 Meteors frequently enter the earth's atmosphere, but most of these are small and burn up before
17 reaching the ground. Of those that reach the ground, most produce only small impact craters that
18 would have no effect on the postclosure integrity of a repository 650 m (2,150 ft) below the
19 ground surface. While the depth of a crater may be only one-eighth of its diameter, the depth of
20 the disrupted and brecciated material is typically one-third of the overall crater diameter (Grieve
21 1987, p. 248). Direct disruption of waste at the WIPP would only occur with a crater larger than
22 1.8 km (1.1 mi) in diameter. Even if waste were not directly disrupted, the impact of a large
23 meteorite could create a zone of fractured rocks beneath and around the crater. The extent of
24 such a zone would depend on the rock type. For sedimentary rocks, the zone may extend to a
25 depth of half the crater diameter or more (Dence et al. 1977, p. 263). The impact of a meteorite
26 causing a crater larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter could thus fracture the Salado above the
27 repository.

28 Geological evidence for meteorite impacts on earth is rare because many meteorites fall into the
29 oceans and erosion and sedimentation serve to obscure craters that form on land. Dietz (1961)
30 estimated that meteorites that cause craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter strike the earth
31 at the rate of about one every 10,000 years (equivalent to about 2×10^{-13} impacts per square
32 kilometer per year). Using observations from the Canadian Shield, Hartmann (1965, p. 161)
33 estimated a frequency of between 0.8×10^{-13} and 17×10^{-13} impacts/km²/yr for impacts causing
34 craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). Frequencies estimated for larger impacts in studies reported by
35 Grieve (1987, p. 263) can be extrapolated to give a rate of about 1.3×10^{-12} impacts/km²/yr for
36 craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). It is commonly assumed that meteorite impacts are randomly

1 distributed across the earth's surface, although Halliday (1964, pp. 267-277) calculated that the
 2 rate of impact in polar regions would be some 50 to 60 percent of that in equatorial regions. The
 3 frequencies reported by Grieve (1987) would correspond to an overall rate of about 1 per 1,000
 4 years on the basis of a random distribution.

5 Assuming the higher estimated impact rate of 17×10^{-13} impacts per square kilometer per year
 6 for impacts leading to fracturing of sufficient extent to affect a deep repository, and assuming a
 7 repository footprint of 1.4 km \times 1.6 km (0.9 mi \times 1.0 mi) for the WIPP, yields a frequency of
 8 about 4×10^{-12} impacts per year for a direct hit above the repository. This impact frequency is
 9 several orders of magnitude below the screening threshold of 10^{-4} per 10,000 years provided in
 10 40 CFR \S 194.32(d).

11 Meteorite hits directly above the repository footprint are not the only impacts of concern,
 12 however, because large craters may disrupt the waste panels even if the center of the crater is
 13 outside the repository area. It is possible to calculate the frequency of meteorite impacts that
 14 could disrupt a deep repository such as the WIPP by using the conservative model of a cylinder
 15 of rock fractured to a depth equal to one-half the crater diameter, as shown in the CCA,
 16 Appendix SCR, Figure SCR-1. The area within which a meteorite could impact the repository is
 17 calculated by

$$18 \quad S_D = \left(L + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right) \times \left(W + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right), \quad (\text{SCR.1})$$

19 where

- 20 L = length of the repository footprint (km)
- 21 W = width of the repository footprint (km)
- 22 D = diameter of the impact crater (km)
- 23 S_D = area of the region where the crater would disrupt the repository (km²)

24 There are insufficient data on meteorites that have struck the earth to derive a distribution
 25 function for the size of craters directly. Using meteorite impacts on the moon as an analogy,
 26 however, Grieve (1987, p. 257) derived the following distribution function:

$$27 \quad F_D \propto D^{-1.8} \quad (\text{SCR.2})$$

28 where

- 29 F_D = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than D (impacts/km²/yr).

30 If $f(D)$ denotes the frequency of impacts giving craters of diameter D , then the frequency of
 31 impacts giving craters larger than D is

$$32 \quad F_D = \int_D^{\infty} f(D) dD \quad (\text{SCR.3})$$

1 and

$$2 \quad f(D) = F_1 \times 1.8 \times D^{-2.8}, \quad (\text{SCR.4})$$

3 where

- 4 F_1 = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than 1 km (impacts/km²/yr)
 5 $f(D)$ = frequency of impacts resulting in craters of diameter D ((impacts/km²/yr)

6 The overall frequency of meteorite impacts, in the size range of interest, that could disrupt or
 7 fracture the repository is thus given by

$$8 \quad N = \int_{2h}^M f(D) \times S_D dD, \quad (\text{SCR.5})$$

9 where

- 10 h = depth to repository (kilometers),
 11 M = maximum size of meteorite considered (kilometers)
 12 N = frequency of impacts leading to disruption of the repository (impacts per year),
 13 and

$$14 \quad N = 1.8F_1 \left[\frac{(M)^{0.2} - (2h)^{0.2}}{0.2} - LW \frac{(M)^{-1.8} - (2h)^{-1.8}}{1.8} - (L + W) \frac{(M)^{-0.8} - (2h)^{-0.8}}{0.8} \right]. \quad (\text{SCR.6})$$

15 Conservatively using the size (933 km [550 mi]) of the largest known asteroid, Ceres (Tedesco
 16 1992), for the maximum size considered and if it is assumed that the repository is located at a
 17 depth of 650 m (2,150 ft) and has a footprint area of 1.4 km × 1.6 km (0.9 mi × 1.0 mi) and that
 18 meteorites creating craters larger than 1 km in diameter hit the earth at a frequency (F_1) of $17 \times$
 19 10^{-13} impacts/km²/yr, then Equation (SCR.6) gives a frequency of approximately 5.6×10^{-11}
 20 impacts per year for impacts disrupting the repository. If impacts are randomly distributed over
 21 time, this corresponds to a probability of 5.6×10^{-7} over 10,000 years.

22 Similar calculations have been performed that indicate rates of impact of between 10^{-12} and 10^{-13}
 23 per year for meteorites large enough to disrupt a deep repository (see, for example, Hartmann
 24 1979, Kärnbränslesakerhet 1978, Claiborne and Gera 1974, Cranwell et al. 1990, and Thorne
 25 1992). Meteorite impact can thus be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 26 probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

27 Assuming a random or nearly random distribution of meteorite impacts, cratering at any location
 28 is inevitable given sufficient time. Although repository depth and host-rock lithology may
 29 reduce the consequences of a meteorite impact, there are no repository locations or engineered
 30 systems that can reduce the probability of impact over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.4.1.5 FEP Number:** N41 and N42
2 **FEP Titles:** *Mechanical Weathering* (N41)
3 *Chemical Weathering* (N42)

4 **SCR-4.4.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 The effects of *Chemical Weathering* and *Mechanical Weathering* have been eliminated from PA
6 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.4.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.4.1.5.3 Screening Argument**

10 Mechanical weathering and chemical weathering are assumed to be occurring at or near the
11 surface around the WIPP site through processes such as exfoliation and leaching. The extent of
12 these processes is limited and they will contribute little to the overall rate of erosion in the area
13 or to the availability of material for other erosional processes. The effects of chemical
14 weathering and mechanical weathering have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
15 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-4.4.1.6 FEP Numbers:** N43, N44, and N45
17 **FEP Titles:** *Aeolian Erosion* (N43)
18 *Fluvial Erosion* (N44)
19 *Mass Wasting* (N45)

20 **SCR-4.4.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

21 The effects of *Fluvial Erosion*, *Aeolian Erosion*, and *Mass Wasting* in the region of the WIPP
22 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
23 of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.4.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.4.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

27 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
28 is dominated by aeolian processes. Dunes are present in the area, and although some are
29 stabilized by vegetation, aeolian erosion will occur as they migrate across the area. Old dunes
30 will be replaced by new dunes, and no significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian
31 material are likely to occur.

32 Currently, precipitation in the region of the WIPP is too low (about 33 centimeters [cm] [13
33 inches (in.)] per year) to cause perennial streams, and the relief in the area is too low for

1 extensive sheet flood erosion during storms. An increase in precipitation to around 61 cm
2 (24 in.) per year in cooler climatic conditions could result in perennial streams, but the nature of
3 the relief and the presence of dissolution hollows and sinks will ensure that these streams remain
4 small. Significant fluvial erosion is not expected during the next 10,000 years.

5 Mass wasting (the downslope movement of material caused by the direct effect of gravity) is
6 important only in terms of sediment erosion in regions of steep slopes. In the vicinity of the
7 WIPP, mass wasting will be insignificant under the climatic conditions expected over the next
8 10,000 years.

9 Erosion from wind, water, and mass wasting will continue in the WIPP region throughout the
10 next 10,000 years at rates similar to those occurring at present. These rates are too low to affect
11 the performance of the disposal system significantly. Thus the effects of fluvial erosion, aeolian
12 erosion, and mass wasting have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
13 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

14 **SCR-4.4.1.7 FEP Number:** N50

15 **FEP Title:** *Soil Development*

16 **SCR-4.4.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 *Soil Development* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
18 the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-4.4.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

21 **SCR-4.4.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

22 The Mescalero caliche is a well-developed calcareous remnant of an extensive soil profile across
23 the WIPP site and adjacent areas. Although this unit may be up to 3 m (10 ft) thick, it is not
24 continuous and does not prevent infiltration to the underlying formations. At Nash Draw, this
25 caliche, dated in Lappin et al. (1989, pp. 2-4) at 410,000 to 510,000 years old, is present in
26 collapse blocks, indicating some growth of Nash Draw in the late Pleistocene. Localized gypsite
27 spring deposits about 25,000 years old occur along the eastern flank of Nash Draw, but the
28 springs are not currently active. The Berino soil, interpreted as 333,000 years old (Rosholt and
29 McKinney 1980, Table 5), is a thin soil horizon above the Mescalero caliche. The persistence of
30 these soils on the Livingston Ridge and the lack of deformation indicates the relative stability of
31 the WIPP region over the past half-million years.

32 Continued growth of caliche may occur in the future but will be of low consequence in terms of
33 its effect on infiltration. Other soils in the area are not extensive enough to affect the amount of
34 infiltration that reaches underlying aquifers. Soil development has been eliminated from PA
35 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.5 Surface Hydrological FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.5.1 Depositional Processes**

- 3 **SCR-4.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N46, N47, N48, and N49
4 **FEP Titles:** *Aeolian Deposition* (N46)
5 *Fluvial Deposition* (47)
6 *Lacustrine Deposition* (N48)
7 *Mass Waste (Deposition)* (N49)

8 **SCR-4.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

9 The effects of *Aeolian Deposition*, *Fluvial Deposition*, and *Lacustrine Deposition* and
10 sedimentation in the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
11 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-4.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
16 is dominated by aeolian processes, but although some dunes are stabilized by vegetation, no
17 significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian material are expected to occur.
18 Vegetational changes during periods of wetter climate may further stabilize the dune fields, but
19 aeolian deposition is not expected to significantly increase the overall thickness of the superficial
20 deposits.

21 The limited extent of water courses in the region of the WIPP, under both present-day conditions
22 and under the expected climatic conditions, will restrict the amount of fluvial deposition and
23 lacustrine deposition in the region.

24 Mass wasting (deposition) may be significant if it results in dams or modifies streams. In the
25 region around the WIPP, the Pecos River forms a significant water course some 19 km (12 mi)
26 away, but the broadness of its valley precludes either significant mass wasting or the formation
27 of large impoundments.

28 Sedimentation from wind, water, and mass wasting is expected to continue in the WIPP region
29 throughout the next 10,000 years at the low rates similar to those occurring at present. These
30 rates are too low to significantly affect the performance of the disposal system. Thus the effects
31 of aeolian deposition, fluvial deposition, and lacustrine deposition and sedimentation resulting
32 from mass wasting have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

1 **SCR-4.5.2 Streams and Lakes**

2 **SCR-4.5.2.1 FEPs Number:** N51

3 **FEPs Title:** *Stream and River Flow*

4 **SCR-4.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Stream and River Flow* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 No perennial streams are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the literature
11 indicating that such features existed at this location since the Pleistocene (see, for example,
12 Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). The Pecos River is approximately
13 19 km (12 mi) from the WIPP site and more than 90 m (300 ft) lower in elevation. Stream and
14 river flow has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
15 performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-4.5.2.2 FEP Number:** N52

17 **FEP Title:** *Surface Water Bodies*

18 **SCR-4.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

19 The effects of *Surface Water Bodies* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
20 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 No standing surface water bodies are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the
25 literature indicating that such features existed at this location during or after the Pleistocene (see,
26 for example, Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). In Nash Draw, lakes
27 and spoil ponds associated with potash mines are located at elevations 30 m (100 ft) below the
28 elevation of the land surface at the location of the waste panels. There is no evidence in the
29 literature to suggest that Nash Draw was formed by stream erosion or was at any time the
30 location of a deep body of standing water, although shallow playa lakes have existed there at
31 various times. Based on these factors, the formation of large lakes is unlikely and the formation
32 of smaller lakes and ponds is of little consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 The effects of surface water bodies have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
2 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-4.5.3 Groundwater Recharge and Discharge**

4 **SCR-4.5.3.1 FEP Numbers:** N53, N54, and N55

5 **FEP Titles:** *Groundwater Discharge (N53)*
6 *Groundwater Recharge (N54)*
7 *Infiltration (N55)*

8 **SCR-4.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

9 *Groundwater Recharge, Groundwater Discharge, and Infiltration* are accounted for in PA
10 calculations.

11 **SCR-4.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

12 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

13 **SCR-4.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

14 The groundwater basin described in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4 is governed by flow
15 from areas where the water table is high to areas where the water table is low. The height of the
16 water table is governed by the amount of groundwater recharge reaching the water table, which
17 in turn is a function of the vertical hydraulic conductivity and the partitioning of precipitation
18 between evapotranspiration, runoff, and Infiltration. Flow within the Rustler is also governed by
19 the amount of groundwater discharge that takes place from the basin. In the region around the
20 WIPP, the principal discharge areas are along Nash Draw and the Pecos River. Groundwater
21 flow modeling accounts for infiltration, recharge, and discharge (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section
22 2.2.1.4 and Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.2).

23 **SCR-4.5.3.2 FEP Number:** N56

24 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge*

25 **SCR-4.5.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 *Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge* arising as a result of climate change are
27 accounted for in PA calculations.

28 **SCR-4.5.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has become available that would change the screening decision for this FEP.

30 **SCR-4.5.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

31 Changes in recharge may affect groundwater flow and radionuclide transport in units such as the
32 Culebra and Magenta dolomites. Changes in the surface environment driven by natural climate

1 change are expected to occur over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N59 to N63). Groundwater
2 basin modeling (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4) indicates that a change in recharge will
3 affect the height of the water table in the area of the WIPP, and that this will in turn affect the
4 direction and rate of groundwater flow.

5 The present-day water table in the vicinity of the WIPP is within the Dewey Lake at about 980 m
6 (3,215 ft) above mean sea level (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). An increase in
7 recharge relative to present-day conditions would raise the water table, potentially as far as the
8 local ground surface. Similarly, a decrease in recharge could result in a lowering of the water
9 table. The low transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler ensures that any such lowering
10 of the water table will be at a slow rate, and lateral discharge from the groundwater basin is
11 expected to persist for several thousand years after any decrease in recharge. Under the
12 anticipated changes in climate over the next 10,000 years, the water table will not fall below the
13 base of the Dewey Lake, and dewatering of the Culebra is not expected to occur during this
14 period (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4).

15 Changes in groundwater recharge and discharge is accounted for in PA calculations through
16 definition of the boundary conditions for flow and transport in the Culebra (the CCA, Chapter
17 6.0, Section 6.4.9).

18 **SCR-4.5.3.3 FEP Numbers:** N57 and N58
19 **FEP Titles:** *Lake Formation* (N57)
20 *River Flooding* (N58)

21 **SCR-4.5.3.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 The effects of *River Flooding* and *Lake Formation* have been eliminated from PA calculations
23 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.5.3.3.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.5.3.3.3 Screening Argument**

27 Intermittent flooding of stream channels and the formation of shallow lakes will occur in the
28 WIPP region over the next 10,000 years. These may have a short-lived and local effect on the
29 height of the water table, but are unlikely to affect groundwater flow in the Culebra.

30 Future occurrences of playa lakes or other longer-term floods will be remote from the WIPP and
31 will have little consequence on system performance in terms of groundwater flow at the site.
32 There is no reason to believe that any impoundments or lakes could form over the WIPP site
33 itself. Thus river flooding and lake formation have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
34 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.6 Climate EPs**

2 **SCR-4.6.1 Climate and Climate Changes**

3 **SCR-4.6.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N59 and N60

4 **FEP Titles:** *Precipitation (N59)*

5 *Temperature (N60)*

6 **SCR-4.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 *Precipitation and Temperature* are accounted for in PA calculations.

8 **SCR-4.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The climate and meteorology of the region around the WIPP are described in the CCA, Section
12 2.5.2. Precipitation in the region is low (about 33 cm [13 in.] per yr) and temperatures are
13 moderate with a mean annual temperature of about 63 °F (17 °C). Precipitation and temperature
14 are important controls on the amount of recharge that reaches the groundwater system and are
15 accounted for in PA calculations by use of a sampled parameter for scaling flow velocity in the
16 Culebra (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.6).

17 **SCR-4.6.1.2 FEP Number:** N61

18 **FEP Title:** *Climate Change*

19 **SCR-4.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

20 *Climate Change* is accounted for in PA calculations.

21 **SCR-4.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 Climate changes are instigated by changes in the earth's orbit and by feedback mechanisms
25 within the atmosphere and hydrosphere. Models of these mechanisms, combined with
26 interpretations of the geological record, suggest that the climate will become cooler and wetter in
27 the WIPP region during the next 10,000 years as a result of natural causes. Other changes, such
28 as fluctuations in radiation intensity from the sun and variability within the many feedback
29 mechanisms, will modify this climatic response to orbital changes. The available evidence
30 suggests that these changes will be less extreme than those arising from orbital fluctuations.

1 The effect of a change to cooler and wetter conditions is considered to be an increase in the
2 amount of recharge, which in turn will affect the height of the water table (see FEPs N53 through
3 N56, Section SCR-4.5.3.1 and SCR-4.5.3.2). The height of the water table across the
4 groundwater basin is an important control on the rate and direction of groundwater flow within
5 the Culebra (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4), and hence potentially on transport of
6 radionuclides released to the Culebra through the shafts or intrusion boreholes. Climate change
7 is accounted for in PA calculations through a sampled parameter used to scale groundwater flow
8 velocity in the Culebra (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.8).

9 **SCR-4.6.1.3 FEP Numbers:** N62 and N63

10 **FEP Titles:** *Glaciation* (N62)

11 *Permafrost* (N63)

12 **SCR-4.6.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

13 *Glaciation* and the effects of *Permafrost* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
14 of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

15 **SCR-4.6.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

17 **SCR-4.6.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

18 No evidence exists to suggest that the northern part of the Delaware Basin has been covered by
19 continental glaciers at any time since the beginning of the Paleozoic Era. During the maximum
20 extent of continental glaciation in the Pleistocene Epoch, glaciers extended into northeastern
21 Kansas at their closest approach to southeastern New Mexico. There is no evidence that alpine
22 glaciers formed in the region of the WIPP during the Pleistocene glacial periods.

23 According to the theory that relates the periodicity of climate change to perturbations in the
24 earth's orbit, a return to a full glacial cycle within the next 10,000 years is highly unlikely
25 (Imbrie and Imbrie 1980, p. 951).

26 Thus glaciation has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
27 occurrence over the next 10,000 years. Similarly, a number of processes associated with the
28 proximity of an ice sheet or valley glacier, such as permafrost and accelerated slope erosion
29 (solifluction) have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
30 occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.7 Marine FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.7.1 Seas, Sedimentation, and Level Changes**

3 **SCR-4.7.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N64 and N65

4 **FEP Titles:** *Seas and Oceans* (N64)
5 *Estuaries* (N65)

6 **SCR-4.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of *Estuaries* and *Seas and Oceans* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
8 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-4.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

11 **SCR-4.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and from the Gulf of
13 Mexico. Estuaries and seas and oceans have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on
14 the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

15 **SCR-4.7.1.2 FEPs Numbers:** N66 and N67

16 **FEPs Titles:** *Coastal Erosion* (N66)
17 *Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition* (N67)

18 **SCR-4.7.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

19 *Coastal Erosion* and *Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition* have been eliminated from PA
20 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.7.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.7.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The
25 effects of coastal erosion and marine sediment transport and deposition have therefore been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
27 disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.7.1.3 FEP Number:** N68
2 **FEP Title:** *Sea Level Changes*

3 **SCR-4.7.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 The effects of both short-term and long-term *Sea Level Changes* have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.7.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

8 **SCR-4.7.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

9 The WIPP site is some 1,036 m (3,400 ft) above sea level. Global sea level changes may result
10 in sea levels as much as 140 m (460 ft) below that of the present day during glacial periods,
11 according to Chappell and Shackleton (1986, p. 138). This can have marked effects on coastal
12 aquifers. During the next 10,000 years, the global sea level can be expected to drop towards this
13 glacial minimum, but this will not affect the groundwater system in the vicinity of the WIPP.
14 Short-term changes in sea level, brought about by events such as meteorite impact, tsunamis,
15 seiches, and hurricanes may raise water levels by several tens of meters. Such events have a
16 maximum duration of a few days and will have no effect on the surface or groundwater systems
17 at the WIPP site. Anthropogenic-induced global warming has been conjectured by Warrick and
18 Oerlemans (1990, p. 278) to result in longer-term sea level rise. The magnitude of this rise,
19 however, is not expected to be more than a few meters, and such a variation will have no effect
20 on the groundwater system in the WIPP region. Thus the effects of both short-term and long-
21 term sea level changes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
22 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 **SCR-4.8 Ecological FEPs**

24 **SCR-4.8.1 Flora and Fauna**

25 **SCR-4.8.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N69 and N70

26 **FEP Titles:** *Plants* (N69)
27 *Animals* (N70)

28 **SCR-4.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The effects of the natural *Plants* and *Animals* (flora and fauna) in the region of the WIPP have
30 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
31 disposal system.

32 **SCR-4.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 The terrestrial and aquatic ecology of the region around the WIPP is described in the CCA,
3 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.4.1. The plants in the region are predominantly shrubs and grasses. The
4 most conspicuous animals in the area are jackrabbits and cottontail rabbits. The effects of this
5 flora and fauna in the region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.8.1.2 FEP Number:** N71

8 **FEP Title:** *Microbes*

9 **SCR-4.8.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C *UP for colloidal effects and gas generation*

10 The effects of *Microbes* on the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations
11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-4.8.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.8.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 Microbes are presumed to be present with the thin soil horizons. Gillow et al. (2000)
16 characterized the microbial distribution in Culebra groundwater at the WIPP site. Culebra
17 groundwater contained $1.51 \pm 1.08 \times 10^5$ cells/milliliter (mL). The dimension of the cells are
18 0.75 micrometer (μm) in length and 0.58 μm in width, right at the upper limit of colloidal
19 particle size. Gillow et al. (2000) also found that at pH 5.0, Culebra denitrifier CDn (0.90 ± 0.02
20 $\times 10^8$ cells/mL) removed 32% of the U added to sorption experiments, which is equivalent to 180
21 ± 10 milligrams U/g of dry cells. Another isolate from the WIPP (*Halomonas* sp.) ($3.55 \pm 0.11 \times$
22 10^8 cells/mL) sorbed 79% of the added U. Because of their large sizes, microbial cells as
23 colloidal particles will be rapidly filtered out in the Culebra formation. Therefore, the original
24 FEP screening decision that microbes in groundwater have an insignificant impact on
25 radionuclide transport in the Culebra formation remains valid. A similar conclusion has also been
26 arrived at for Swedish repository environments (Pedersen 1999).

27 **SCR-4.8.1.3 FEP Number:** N72

28 **FEP Title:** *Natural Ecological Development*

29 **SCR-4.8.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

30 The effects of *Natural Ecological Development* likely to occur in the region of the WIPP have
31 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
32 disposal system.

33 **SCR-4.8.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

34 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.8.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 The region around the WIPP is sparsely vegetated as a result of the climate and poor soil quality.
3 Wetter periods are expected during the regulatory period, but botanical records indicate that,
4 even under these conditions, dense vegetation will not be present in the region (Swift 1992; see
5 the CCA, Appendix CLI, p. 17). The effects of the indigenous fauna are of low consequence to
6 the performance of the disposal system and no natural events or processes have been identified
7 that would lead to a change in this fauna that would be of consequence to system performance.
8 Natural ecological development in the region of the WIPP has therefore been eliminated from
9 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.0 Screening of Human-Induced EPs**

2 The following section presents screening arguments and decisions for human-induced EPs.
3 Table SCR-2 provides summary information regarding changes to human-induced EPs since the
4 CCA. Of the 58 human-induced EPs listed in the CRA-2004, 46 remain unchanged, 8 were
5 updated with new information or were edited for clarity and completeness, 1 screening decision
6 has been changed, and 3 EPs were split into 6 similar but more descriptive FEPs. Thus, for the
7 CRA-2009, there are now 61 human-induced EPs in the FEPs baseline.

8 **SCR-5.1 Human-Induced Geological EPs**

9 **SCR-5.1.1 Drilling**

10 **SCR-5.1.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H1, H2, H4, H8, and H9

11 **FEP Titles:** *Oil and Gas Exploration (H1)*
12 *Potash Exploration (H2)*
13 *Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4)*
14 *Other Resources (drilling for) (H8)*
15 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery (drilling for) (H9)*

16 **SCR-5.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
17 DP (Future)

18 The effects of historical, current, and near-future drilling associated with *Oil and Gas*
19 *Exploration, Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation, Drilling for Other Resources,* and
20 *Drilling for Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
21 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system (see screening discussion for
22 H21, H22, and H23). Oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil and gas exploitation,
23 drilling for other resources, and enhanced oil and gas recovery in the future is accounted for in
24 DP scenarios through incorporation of the rate of future drilling as specified in section 194.33.

25 **SCR-5.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

27 **SCR-5.1.1.1.3 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

28 Resource exploration and exploitation are the most common reasons for drilling in the Delaware
29 Basin and are the most likely reasons for drilling in the near future. The WIPP location has been
30 evaluated for the occurrence of natural resources in economic quantities. Powers et al. (1978)
31 (the CCA, Appendix GCR, Chapter 8) investigated the potential for exploitation of potash,
32 hydrocarbons, caliche, gypsum, salt, uranium, sulfur, and lithium. Also, in 1995, the New
33 Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources (NMBMMR) performed a reevaluation of the
34 mineral resources at and within 1.6 km (1 mi) around the WIPP site (New Mexico Bureau of
35 Mines and Mineral Resources 1995). While some resources do exist at the WIPP site, for the
36 HCN time frames, such drilling is assumed to only occur outside the WIPP site boundary. This

1 assumption is based on current federal ownership and management of the WIPP during
2 operations, and assumed effectiveness of institutional controls for the 100-yr period immediately
3 following site closure.

4 Drilling associated with oil and gas exploration and oil and gas exploitation currently takes place
5 in the vicinity of the WIPP. For example, gas is extracted from reservoirs in the Morrow
6 Formation, some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface, and oil is extracted from shallower units
7 within the Delaware Mountain Group, some 2,150 to 2,450 m (7,000 to 8,000 ft) below the
8 surface.

9 Potash resources in the vicinity of the WIPP are discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section
10 2.3.1.1. Throughout the Carlsbad Potash District (CPD), commercial quantities of potash are
11 restricted to the McNutt, which forms part of the Salado above the repository horizon. Potash
12 exploration and evaluation boreholes have been drilled within and outside the controlled area.
13 Such drilling will continue outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary, but no longer occurs
14 within the boundary because rights and controls have been transferred to the DOE. Moreover,
15 drilling for the evaluation of potash resources within the boundary will not occur throughout the
16 time period of active institutional controls (AICs).

17 Drilling for other resources has taken place within the Delaware Basin. For example, sulfur
18 extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and continued for three decades at the
19 Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas. In addition, brine wells have been in
20 operation in and about the Delaware Basin for at least as long. Solution mining processes for
21 sulfur, salt (brine), potash, or any other mineral are not addressed in this FEP; only the drilling of
22 the borehole is addressed here. Resource extraction through solution mining and any potential
23 effects are evaluated in Section SCR-5.2.2.3 (*Solution Mining for Potash* [H58]). Nonetheless,
24 the drilling activity associated with the production of other resources is not notably different than
25 drilling for petroleum exploration and exploitation.

26 Drilling for the purposes of reservoir stimulation and subsequent enhanced oil and gas recovery
27 does take place within the Delaware Basin, although systematic, planned waterflooding has not
28 taken place near the WIPP. Instead, injection near the WIPP consists of single-point injectors,
29 rather than broad, grid-type waterflood projects (Hall et al. 2008). In the vicinity of the WIPP,
30 fluid injection usually takes place using boreholes initially drilled as producing wells. Therefore,
31 regardless of the initial intent of a deep borehole, whether in search of petroleum reserves or as
32 an injection point, the drilling event and associated processes are virtually the same. These
33 drilling-related processes are addressed more fully in Section SCR-5.2.1.1 (*Drilling Fluid Flow*
34 [H21]), Section SCR-5.2.1.2 (*Drilling Fluid Loss* [H22]), and Section SCR-5.2.1.3 (*Blowouts*
35 [H23]). Discussion on the effects subsequent to drilling a borehole for the purpose of enhancing
36 oil and gas recovery is discussed in Section SCR-5.2.1.6 (*Enhanced Oil and Gas Production*
37 [H28]).

38 In summary, drilling associated with oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil and gas
39 exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling associated with Other Resources has
40 taken place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. The potential effects of existing
41 and possible near-future boreholes on fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the disposal
42 system are discussed in FEPs H25 through H36 (Section SCR-5.2.1.5, Section SCR-5.2.1.6,

1 Section SCR-5.2.1.7, Section SCR-5.2.1.8, Section SCR-5.2.1.9, Section SCR-5.2.1.10, Section
2 SCR-5.2.1.11, Section SCR-5.2.1.12, and Section SCR-5.2.1.13), where low-consequence
3 screening arguments are provided.

4 **SCR-5.1.1.1.4 Future Human EPs**

5 Criteria in section 194.33 require the DOE to examine the historical rate of drilling for resources
6 in the Delaware Basin. Thus consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3)(i), the DOE has used the
7 historical record of deep drilling associated with oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil
8 and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling associated with other resources
9 (sulfur exploration) in the Delaware Basin in calculations to determine the rate of future deep
10 drilling in the Delaware Basin (see Section 33 of this application).

11 **SCR-5.1.1.2 FEP Numbers:** H3 and H5

12 **FEP Titles:** *Water Resources Exploration* (H3)
13 *Groundwater Exploitation* (H5)

14 **SCR-5.1.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) 15 SO-C (Future)

16 The effects of HCN and future drilling associated with *Water Resources Exploration* and
17 *Groundwater Exploitation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
18 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Historical shallow drilling associated
19 with *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater Exploitation* is accounted for in
20 calculations to determine the rate of future shallow drilling.

21 **SCR-5.1.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 The Delaware Basin Monitoring Program records and tracks the development of deep and
23 shallow wells within the vicinity of the WIPP. Updated drilling data is reported annually in the
24 Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2007b). While this
25 information has been updated since the last recertification, it does not result in a change in the
26 screening arguments or decisions of these FEPs.

27 **SCR-5.1.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

28 Drilling associated with water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation has taken
29 place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. For the most part, water resources in the
30 vicinity of the WIPP are scarce. Elsewhere in the Delaware Basin, potable water occurs in
31 places while some communities rely solely on groundwater sources for drinking water. Even
32 though water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation occur in the Basin, all such
33 exploration/exploitation is confined to shallow drilling that extends no deeper than the Rustler.
34 Thus it will not impact repository performance because of the limited drilling anticipated in the
35 future and the sizeable thickness of low-permeability Salado salt between the waste panels and
36 the shallow groundwaters. Given the limited groundwater resources and minimal consequence
37 of shallow drilling on performance, the effects of HCN and future drilling associated with water
38 resources exploration and groundwater exploitation have been eliminated from PA calculations

1 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The screening
2 argument therefore remains the same as given previously in the CCA.

3 Although shallow drilling for water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation have
4 been eliminated from PA calculations, the Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
5 (DBDSP) continues to collect drilling data related to water resources, as well as other shallow
6 drilling activities. As shown in the DBDSP 2007 Annual Report (U.S. Department of Energy
7 2007b), the total number of shallow water wells in the Delaware Basin is currently 2,296,
8 compared to 2,331 shallow water wells reported in the CCA. This decrease of 35 wells is
9 attributed primarily to the reclassification of water wells to other types of shallow boreholes.
10 Based on these data, the shallow drilling rate for water resources exploration and groundwater
11 exploitation is essentially the same as reported in the CCA. The distribution of groundwater
12 wells in the Delaware Basin was included in the CCA, Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3.

13 **SCR-5.1.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

14 Water is currently extracted from formations above the Salado, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter
15 2.0, Section 2.3.1.3. The distribution of groundwater wells in the Delaware Basin is included in
16 the CCA, Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3. Water resources exploration and groundwater
17 exploitation are expected to continue in the Delaware Basin.

18 In summary, drilling associated with water resources exploration, groundwater exploitation,
19 potash exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas
20 recovery, and drilling to explore other resources has taken place and is expected to continue in
21 the Delaware Basin. The potential effects of existing and possible near-future boreholes on fluid
22 flow and radionuclide transport within the disposal system are discussed in Section SCR-5.2,
23 where low-consequence screening arguments are provided.

24 **SCR-5.1.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

25 Criteria in section 194.33 require that, to calculate the rates of future shallow and deep drilling in
26 the Delaware Basin, the DOE should examine the historical rate of drilling for resources in the
27 Delaware Basin.

28 Shallow drilling associated with water, potash, sulfur, oil, and gas extraction has taken place in
29 the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years. However, of these resources, only water and potash
30 are present at shallow depths (less than 655 m (2,150 ft) below the surface) within the controlled
31 area. Thus, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4), the DOE includes drilling associated with
32 water resources exploration, potash exploration, and groundwater exploitation in calculations to
33 determine the rate of future shallow drilling in the Delaware Basin. However, the effects of such
34 events are not included in PA calculations because of low consequence to the performance of the
35 disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.1.1.3 FEP Numbers:** H6, H7, H10, H11, and H12
2 **FEP Titles:** *Archeological Investigations* (H6)
3 *Geothermal Energy Production* (H7)
4 *Liquid Waste Disposal* (H10)
5 *Hydrocarbon Storage* (H11)
6 *Deliberate Drilling Intrusion* (H12)

7 **SCR-5.1.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
8 SO-R (Future)

9 Drilling associated with *Archeological Investigations*, *Geothermal Energy Production*, *Liquid*
10 *Waste Disposal*, *Hydrocarbon Storage*, and *Deliberate Drilling Intrusion* have been eliminated
11 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

12 **SCR-5.1.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-5.1.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 **SCR-5.1.1.3.3.1 Historic, Current, and Near-Future EPs**

16 No drilling associated with archeology or geothermal energy production has taken place in the
17 Delaware Basin. Consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR § 194.25(a) (U.S.
18 Environmental Protection Agency 1996), such drilling activities have been eliminated from PA
19 calculations on regulatory grounds.

20 While numerous archeological sites exist at and near the WIPP site, drilling for archeological
21 purposes has not occurred. Archeological investigations have only involved shallow surface
22 disruptions, and do not require deeper investigation by any method, drilling or otherwise.
23 Geothermal energy is not considered to be a potentially exploitable resource because
24 economically attractive geothermal conditions do not exist in the northern Delaware Basin.

25 Oil and gas production byproducts are disposed of underground in the WIPP region, but such
26 liquid waste disposal does not involve drilling of additional boreholes (see H27, Section SCR-
27 5.2.1.6); therefore drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of disposal has not occurred.

28 Hydrocarbon storage takes place in the Delaware Basin, but it involves gas injection through
29 existing boreholes into depleted reservoirs (see, for example, Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67).
30 Therefore, drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of hydrocarbon storage has not occurred.

31 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), all near-future Human EPs relating to deliberate drilling
32 intrusion into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
33 grounds.

1 **SCR-5.1.1.3.4 Future Human EPs**

2 Consistent with section 194.33 and the future states assumptions in section 194.25(a), drilling for
3 purposes other than resource recovery (such as WIPP site investigation) and drilling activities
4 that have not taken place in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years need not be considered in
5 determining future drilling rates. Thus drilling associated with archeological investigations,
6 geothermal energy production, liquid waste disposal, hydrocarbon storage, and deliberate drilling
7 intrusion have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.1.2 Excavation Activities**

9 **SCR-5.1.2.1 FEP Number:** H13

10 **FEP Title:** *Conventional Underground Potash Mining*

11 **SCR-5.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
12 DP (Future)

13 As prescribed by section 194.32(b), the effects of HCN and future *Conventional Underground*
14 *Potash Mining* are accounted for in PA calculations (see also FEP H37).

15 **SCR-5.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

17 **SCR-5.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
19 recovered by underground mining (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1). Potash is mined
20 extensively by conventional techniques in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km (1.5 mi)
21 from the boundaries of the controlled area of the WIPP. According to existing plans and leases
22 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1), potash mining is expected to continue in the vicinity
23 of the WIPP in the near future. The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in
24 the vicinity of the disposal system will be extracted in the near future, although there are no
25 economical reserves above the WIPP waste panels (Griswold and Griswold 1999).

26 In summary, conventional underground potash mining is currently taking place and is expected
27 to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. The potential effects of HCN and
28 future conventional underground potash mining are accounted for in PA calculations as
29 prescribed by section 194.32(b), and as further described in the supplementary information to
30 Part 194 Subpart C, "Compliance Certification and Recertification" and in the Compliance
31 Application Guidance (CAG), Subpart C, § 194.32, Scope of Performance Assessments.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.2 FEP Number:** H14
2 **FEP Title:** *Other Resources (mining for)*

3 **SCR-5.1.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 HCN *Mining for Other Resources* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Mining for Other Resources* has
7 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.1.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

9 Since the CCA, no changes in the resources sought via mining have occurred.

10 **SCR-5.1.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

11 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
12 recovered by underground mining. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad
13 and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. According to existing plans
14 and leases, potash mining is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.
15 The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the disposal system
16 will be extracted in the near future. Excavation for resources other than potash and
17 archaeological excavations have taken place or are currently taking place in the Delaware Basin.
18 These activities have not altered the geology of the controlled area significantly, and have been
19 eliminated from PA calculations for the HCN timeframe on the basis of low consequence to the
20 performance of the disposal system.

21 Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in a quality similar
22 to that currently mined elsewhere in the Delaware Basin. Future mining for other resources has
23 been eliminated from PA calculations on the regulatory basis of section 194.25(a).

24 **SCR-5.1.2.3 FEP Numbers:** H15 and H16
25 **FEP Titles:** *Tunneling* (H15)
26 *Construction of Underground Facilities* (H16)

27 **SCR-5.1.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
28 SO-R (Future)

29 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), near-future, human-induced EPs relating to *Tunneling* into
30 the WIPP excavation and *Construction of Underground Facilities* have been eliminated from PA
31 calculations on regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with section 194.25(a), future
32 human-induced EPs relating to *Tunneling* into the WIPP excavation and *Construction of*
33 *Underground Facilities* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

34 **SCR-5.1.2.3.2 Summary**

35 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 No tunneling or construction of underground facilities (for example, storage, disposal,
 3 accommodation [i.e., dwellings]) has taken place in the Delaware Basin. Mining for potash
 4 occurs (a form of tunneling), but is addressed specifically in (Section SCR-5.1.2.1 (*Conventional*
 5 *Underground Potash Mining* [H13])). Gas storage does take place in the Delaware Basin, but it
 6 involves injection through boreholes into depleted reservoirs, and not excavation (see, for
 7 example, Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66–67).

8 On April 26, 2001, the DOE formally requested approval for the installation of the OMNISita
 9 astrophysics experiment in the core storage alcove of the WIPP underground repository. The
 10 purpose of the project is to develop a prototype neutrino detector to test proof-of-concept
 11 principles and measure background cosmic radiation levels within the WIPP underground
 12 repository. EPA approved the request on August 29, 2001. This project does not require
 13 additional tunneling or excavation beyond the current repository footprint, and therefore does not
 14 impact the screening argument for this FEP.

15 Because tunneling and construction of underground facilities (other than WIPP) have not taken
 16 place in the Delaware Basin, and consistent with the future-states assumptions in section
 17 194.25(a), such excavation activities have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
 18 grounds.

19 **SCR-5.1.2.4 FEP Number:** H17

20 **FEP Title:** *Archeological Excavations*

21 **SCR-5.1.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 22 SO-R (Future)

23 HCN *Archeological Excavations* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 24 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Archeological Excavations* into
 25 the disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

26 **SCR-5.1.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

28 **SCR-5.1.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

29 Archeological excavations have occurred at or near the WIPP, but involved only minor surface
 30 disturbances. These archaeological excavations may continue into the foreseeable future as other
 31 archeological sites are discovered. These activities have not altered the geology of the controlled
 32 area significantly, and have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system for the HCN timeframe.

34 Also, consistent with section 194.32(a), which limits the scope of consideration of future human
 35 actions to mining and drilling, future archaeological excavations have been eliminated from PA
 36 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.5 FEP Number:** H18
2 **FEP Title:** *Deliberate Mining Intrusion*

3 **SCR-5.1.2.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), near-future, human-induced EPs relating to *Deliberate*
6 *Mining Intrusion* into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on
7 regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), future human-induced
8 EPs relating to *Deliberate Mining Intrusion* into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from
9 PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

10 **SCR-5.1.2.5.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

12 **SCR-5.1.2.5.3 Screening Argument**

13 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), all future human-related EPs relating to deliberate mining
14 intrusion into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
15 grounds.

16 **SCR-5.1.3 Subsurface Explosions**

17 **SCR-5.1.3.1 FEPs Number:** H19
18 **FEP Title:** *Explosions for Resource Recovery*

19 **SCR-5.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
20 SO-R (Future)

21 Historical underground *Explosions for Resource Recovery* have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future
23 underground *Explosions for Resource Recovery* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
24 regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

27 **SCR-5.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

28 This section discusses subsurface explosions associated with resource recovery that may result in
29 pathways for fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons. The potential effects of
30 explosions on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal system are discussed in Section
31 SCR-5.2.3.1 (*Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions* [H39]).

1 **SCR-5.1.3.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

2 Neither small-scale nor regional-scale explosive techniques to enhance the formation of
 3 hydraulic conductivity form a part of current mainstream oil- and gas-production technology.
 4 Instead, controlled perforating and hydrofracturing are used to improve the performance of oil
 5 and gas boreholes in the Delaware Basin. However, small-scale explosions have been used in
 6 the past to fracture oil- and natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery. The size of
 7 explosion used to fracture an oil- or gas-bearing unit is limited by the need to contain the damage
 8 within the unit being exploited. In the area surrounding the WIPP, the stratigraphic units with oil
 9 and gas resources are too deep for explosions to affect the performance of the disposal system.
 10 Thus the effects of explosions for resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations
 11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 Potash mining is currently taking place and is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
 13 the near future. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km
 14 (1.3 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. In earlier years conventional drill, blast, load,
 15 and rail-haulage methods were used. Today, continuous miners similar to those used in coal-
 16 mining have been adapted to fit the potash-salt formations. Hence, drilling and blasting
 17 technology is not used in the present day potash mines. Thus the effects of explosions for
 18 resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
 19 the performance of the disposal system.

20 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 21 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, future underground
 22 explosions for resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
 23 grounds.

24 **SCR-5.1.3.2 FEPs Number: H20**

25 **FEP Title:** *Underground Nuclear Device Testing*

26 **SCR-5.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 27 SO-R (Future)

28 Historical *Underground Nuclear Device Testing* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 29 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Underground*
 30 *Nuclear Device Testing* has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

31 **SCR-5.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

33 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

34 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

35 The Delaware Basin has been used for an isolated nuclear test. This test, Project Gnome
 36 (Rawson et al. 1965), took place in 1961 at a location approximately 13 km (8 mi) southwest of
 37 the WIPP waste disposal region. Project Gnome was decommissioned in 1979.

1 The primary objective of Project Gnome was to study the effects of an underground nuclear
2 explosion in salt. The Gnome experiment involved the detonation of a 3.1 kiloton nuclear device
3 at a depth of 360 m (1,190 ft) in the bedded salt of the Salado. The explosion created an
4 approximately spherical cavity of about 27,000 cubic meters (m³) (950,000 cubic feet [ft³]) and
5 caused surface displacements in a radius of 360 m (1,180 ft). No earth tremors perceptible to
6 humans were reported at distances over 40 km (25 mi) from the explosion. A zone of increased
7 permeability was observed to extend at least 46 m (150 ft) laterally from and 105 m (344 ft)
8 above the point of the explosion. The test had no significant effects on the geological
9 characteristics of the WIPP disposal system. Thus historical underground nuclear device testing
10 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
11 the disposal system. There are no existing plans for underground nuclear device testing in the
12 vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

13 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3.2 Future Human EPs**

14 The criterion in section 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of future
15 human actions to mining and drilling. Therefore, future underground nuclear device testing has
16 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

17 **SCR-5.2 Subsurface Hydrological and Geochemical EPs**

18 **SCR-5.2.1 Borehole Fluid Flow**

19 **SCR-5.2.1.1 FEP Number:** H21

20 **FEP Title:** *Drilling Fluid Flow*

21 **SCR-5.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
22 DP (Future)

23 *Drilling Fluid Flow* associated with historical, current, near-future, and future boreholes that do
24 not intersect the waste disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
25 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep
26 borehole penetrating a waste panel, such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of
27 radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for
28 in PA calculations. The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal region
29 and a Castile brine reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

31 The screening argument for this FEP has been revised slightly to remove confusion and
32 inconsistency as suggested by the EPA in "TSD for Section 194.25, 194.32, and 194.33" (U.S.
33 Environmental Protection Agency 2006).

34 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

35 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
36 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (blowout) or to a thief
37 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide

1 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
2 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
3 conductive units.

4 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through a borehole into potential thief zones such as
5 the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in geochemical changes and altered radionuclide
6 migration rates in these units.

7 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

8 Drilling fluid flow is a short-term event that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one
9 geologic stratum to another. However, long-term flow through abandoned boreholes would have
10 a greater hydrological impact in the Culebra than a short-term event like drilling-induced flow
11 outside the controlled area. Wallace (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through
12 abandoned boreholes in the future within the controlled area, and concluded that
13 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units could be eliminated from PA calculations
14 on the basis of low consequence. Thus the HCN of drilling fluid flow associated with boreholes
15 outside the controlled area has been screened out on the basis of low consequence to the
16 performance of the disposal system.

17 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36 (Section SCR-5.2.1.5, Section SCR-5.2.1.6, Section
18 SCR-5.2.1.7, Section SCR-5.2.1.8, Section SCR-5.2.1.9, Section SCR-5.2.1.10, Section SCR-
19 5.2.1.11, Section SCR-5.2.1.12, and Section SCR-5.2.1.13), drilling associated with water
20 resources exploration, groundwater exploitation, potash exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil
21 and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling to explore other resources has
22 taken place or is currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These
23 drilling activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3.2 Future Human EPs**

25 For the future, drill holes may intersect the waste disposal region and their effects could be more
26 profound. Thus the possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that drilling
27 fluid flow and, potentially, blowout results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or to
28 overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
30 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
31 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
32 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
33 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
34 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
35 accounted for in PA calculations.

36 Penetration of an underpressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
37 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
38 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
39 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
40 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
41 Thus the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below

1 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
2 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
3 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of
4 underpressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-5.2.1.2 FEP Number:** H22
7 **FEP Title:** *Drilling Fluid Loss*

8 **SCR-5.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
9 DP (Future)

10 *Drilling Fluid Loss* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste
11 disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
12 performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future *Drilling Fluid Loss* into waste
13 panels is accounted for in PA calculations.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

15 The screening argument for this FEP has been revised slightly to remove confusion and
16 inconsistency as suggested by the EPA in “TSD for Section 194.25, 194.32, and 194.33” (U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 2006).

18 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

19 Drilling fluid loss is a short-term event that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one
20 geologic stratum to another. Large fluid losses would lead a driller to inject materials to reduce
21 permeability, or it would lead to the borehole being cased and cemented to limit the loss of
22 drilling fluid. Assuming such operations are successful, drilling fluid loss in the near future
23 outside the controlled area will not significantly affect the hydrology of the disposal system.
24 Thus drilling fluid loss associated with historical, current, and near-future boreholes has been
25 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
26 disposal system.

27 In evaluating the potential consequences of drilling fluid loss to a waste panel in the future, two
28 types of drilling events need to be considered – those that intercept pressurized fluid in
29 underlying formations such as the Castile (defined in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.2.2 as
30 E1 events), and those that do not (E2 events). A possible hydrological effect would be to make a
31 greater volume of brine available for gas generation processes and thereby increase gas volumes
32 at particular times in the future. For either type of drilling event, on the basis of current drilling
33 practices, the driller is assumed to pass through the repository rapidly. Relatively small amounts
34 of drilling fluid loss might not be noticed and might not give rise to concern. Larger fluid losses
35 would lead to the driller injecting materials to reduce permeability, or to the borehole being
36 cased and cemented, to limit the loss of drilling fluid.

37 For boreholes that intersect pressurized brine reservoirs, the volume of fluid available to flow up
38 a borehole will be significantly greater than the volume of any drilling fluid that could be lost.

1 This greater volume of brine is accounted for in PA calculations, and is allowed to enter the
2 disposal room (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7). Thus the effects of drilling fluid loss
3 will be small by comparison to the potential flow of brine from pressurized brine reservoirs.
4 Therefore, the effects of drilling fluid loss for E1 drilling events have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 The consequences of drilling fluid loss into waste panels in the future are accounted for in PA
7 calculations for E2 events.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

9 Drilling fluid flow will not affect hydraulic conditions in the disposal system significantly unless
10 there is substantial drilling fluid loss to a thief zone, such as the Culebra. Typically, zones into
11 which significant borehole circulation fluid is lost are isolated through injection of materials to
12 reduce permeability or through casing and cementing programs. Assuming such operations are
13 successful, drilling fluid loss in the near future outside the controlled area will not affect the
14 hydrology of the disposal system significantly and be of no consequence.

15 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3.2 Future Human EPs**

16 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the
17 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
18 region. Hydraulic and geochemical conditions in the waste panel could be affected as a result of
19 drilling fluid loss to the panel.

20 Penetration of an underpressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
21 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
22 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
23 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
24 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
25 Thus the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below
26 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
27 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
28 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of
29 underpressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA
30 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 For boreholes that do not intersect pressurized brine reservoirs (but do penetrate the waste-
32 disposal region), the treatment of the disposal room implicitly accounts for the potential for
33 greater gas generation resulting from drilling fluid loss. Thus the hydrological effects of drilling
34 fluid loss for E2 drilling events are accounted for in PA calculations within the conceptual model
35 of the disposal room for drilling intrusions.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.3 FEP Number:** H23
2 **FEP Title:** *Blowouts*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 DP (Future)

5 *Blowouts* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal
6 region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
7 performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep borehole penetrating a
8 waste panel such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of radionuclides to the land
9 surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units is accounted for in PA calculations. The
10 possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal region and a Castile brine
11 reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-5.2.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information is available for this FEP.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 *Blowouts* are short-term events that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one geologic
16 stratum to another. For the near future, a blowout may occur in the vicinity of the WIPP but is
17 not likely to affect the disposal system because of the distance from the well to the waste panels,
18 assuming that AICs are in place which restrict borehole installation to outside the WIPP
19 boundary. *Blowouts* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste
20 disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
21 the performance of the disposal system. For the future, the drill holes may intersect the waste
22 disposal region and these effects could be more profound. Thus *blowouts* are included in the
23 assessment of future activities and their consequences are accounted for in PA calculations.

24 Fluid could flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (*blowout*) or to
25 a thief zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially,
26 radionuclide transport in the affected units. Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through
27 a borehole into potential thief zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in
28 geochemical changes and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

30 Drilling associated with water resources exploration, groundwater exploitation, potash
31 exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and
32 drilling to explore other resources has taken place or is currently taking place outside the
33 controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities are expected to continue in the
34 vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

35 Naturally occurring brine and gas pockets have been encountered during drilling in the Delaware
36 Basin. Brine pockets have been intersected in the Castile (as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
37 Section 2.2.1.3) and in the Salado above the WIPP horizon (the CCA, Section 2.2.1.2.2). Gas
38 blowouts have occurred during drilling in the Salado. Usually, such events result in brief

1 interruptions in drilling while the intersected fluid pocket is allowed to depressurize through flow
2 to the surface (for a period lasting from a few hours to a few days). Drilling then restarts with an
3 increased drilling mud weight. Under these conditions, blowouts in the near future will cause
4 isolated hydraulic disturbances, but will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system
5 significantly.

6 Potentially, the most significant disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
7 blowout during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
8 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
9 flow through the borehole to the Culebra over the long term, and, as a result, could affect
10 hydraulic conditions in the Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to
11 the effects of long-term fluid flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through
12 abandoned boreholes. Wallace (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through abandoned
13 boreholes in the future within the controlled area and concluded that interconnections between
14 the Culebra and deep units could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
15 consequence. Long-term flow through abandoned boreholes would have a greater hydrological
16 impact in the Culebra than short-term, drilling-induced flow outside the controlled area. Thus
17 the effects of fluid flow during drilling in the near future have been eliminated from PA
18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 In summary, blowouts associated with historical, current, and near-future boreholes have been
20 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
21 disposal system.

22 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.2 Future Human EPs—Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region**

23 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will depend primarily on the
24 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
25 region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be
26 transported as a result of drilling fluid flow: releases to the accessible environment may occur as
27 material entrained in the circulating drilling fluid is brought to the surface. Also, during drilling,
28 contaminated brine may flow up the borehole and reach the surface, depending on fluid pressure
29 within the waste disposal panels; blowout conditions could prevail if the waste panel were
30 sufficiently pressurized at the time of intrusion.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.3 Hydraulic Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow**

32 The possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that drilling fluid flow and,
33 potentially, blowout results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying
34 hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

35 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
36 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
37 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
38 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
39 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
40 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
41 accounted for in PA calculations.

1 Future boreholes could affect the hydraulic conditions in the disposal system. Intersection of
2 pockets of pressurized gas and brine would likely result in short-term, isolated hydraulic
3 disturbances, and will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system significantly. Potentially
4 the most significant hydraulic disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
5 blowout during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
6 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
7 flow through the borehole to the Culebra, and, as a result, could affect hydraulic conditions in the
8 Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to the effects of long-term fluid
9 flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through abandoned boreholes. Wallace
10 (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of such interconnections in the future within the controlled
11 area, concluding that flow through abandoned boreholes between the Culebra and deep units
12 could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

13 **SCR-5.2.1.4 FEP Number:** H24

14 **FEP Title:** *Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes*

15 **SCR-5.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

16 DP (Future)

17 *Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes* that occur within the controlled area as a result of HCN
18 and future drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information is available for this FEP.

21 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

22 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
23 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (blowout) or to a thief
24 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide
25 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
26 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
27 conductive units.

28 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through a borehole and into potential thief zones
29 such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes and altered
30 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

32 Drilling associated with resource exploration, exploitation, and recovery has taken place or is
33 currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities
34 are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. Chemical changes
35 induced by such drilling are discussed below.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.2 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow–HCN

Radionuclide migration rates are governed by the coupled effects of hydrological and geochemical processes (see discussions in FEPs W77 through W100, Section SCR-6.6.1.1, Section SCR-6.6.1.2, Section SCR-6.6.2.1, Section SCR-6.6.3.1, Section SCR-6.6.3.2, Section SCR-6.6.4.1, Section SCR-6.7.1.1, Section SCR-6.7.2.1, Section SCR-6.7.3.1, Section SCR-6.7.4.1, Section SCR-6.7.4.2, Section SCR-6.7.4.3, Section SCR-6.7.5.1, Section SCR-6.7.5.2, Section SCR-6.7.5.3, and Section SCR-6.7.5.4). Human EPs outside the controlled area could affect the geochemistry of units within the controlled area if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area. Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into potential thief zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could cause drilling-induced geochemical changes resulting in altered radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption (colloid transport may enhance radionuclide migration, while radionuclide migration may be retarded by sorption).

The treatment of colloids in PA calculations is described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.2. The repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. By comparison, Castile brines have relatively low total colloid concentrations. Therefore, changes in colloid transport in units within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2. The sorption model comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm approximation, employing K_{ds} applicable to dolomite in the Culebra (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-15.2). The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of K_{ds} used are derived from a suite of experimental studies that include measurements of K_{ds} for actinides in a range of chemical systems including Castile brines, Culebra brines, and Salado brines. Therefore, any changes in sorption geochemistry in the Culebra within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

Sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6. It is assumed that the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter the Dewey Lake from being released over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995). Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake and other units within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.3 Future Human EPs — Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region

The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the location of the borehole. Future deep drilling could potentially penetrate the waste disposal region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be transported as a result of drilling fluid flow and geochemical conditions in the waste panel could be affected as a result of drilling induced geochemical changes.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.4 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow-Future

Drilling fluid loss to a waste panel could modify the chemistry of disposal room brines in a manner that would affect the solubility of radionuclides and the source term available for subsequent transport from the disposal room. The majority of drilling fluids used are likely to be locally derived, and their bulk chemistry will be similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system. In addition, the presence of the MgO chemical conditioner in the disposal rooms will buffer the chemistry across a range of fluid compositions, as discussed in detail in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3.2. Furthermore, for E1 drilling events, the volume of Castile brine that flows into the disposal room will be greater than that of any drilling fluids; Castile brine chemistry is accounted for in PA calculations. Thus the effects on radionuclide solubility of drilling fluid loss to the disposal room have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes in the receiving units, and thus alter radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

The repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Thus colloid transport in the Culebra within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region is accounted for in PA calculations, as described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.1. The Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal system, and it is the most likely unit through which significant radionuclide transport could occur. Therefore, colloid transport in units other than the Culebra, as a result of drilling fluid loss associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The sorption model used incorporates the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region.

Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake inside the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.5 Future Human EPs — Boreholes That Do Not Intersect the Waste Disposal Region

Future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region could nevertheless encounter contaminated material by intersecting a region into which radionuclides have migrated from the disposal panels, or could affect hydrogeological conditions within the disposal system.

1 Consistent with the containment requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13(a), PAs need not evaluate the
2 effects of the intersection of contaminated material outside the controlled area.

3 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile, through a borehole and into thief
4 zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in drilling-induced geochemical
5 changes and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

6 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3.6 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow**

7 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief
8 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could cause geochemical changes resulting in
9 altered radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and
10 sorption.

11 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
12 system. Thus consistent with the discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1,
13 Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), colloid transport as a result of drilling-induced flow
14 associated with future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region has been
15 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
16 disposal system.

17 As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-
18 5.2.1.3), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The sorption model
19 accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of drilling-induced flow
20 associated with boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region.

21 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1,
22 Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake
23 within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that do
24 not intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
25 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological
26 units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
27 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

28 In summary, the effects of drilling-induced geochemical changes that occur within the controlled
29 area as a result of HCN and future drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.
30 Those that occur outside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.5 FEP Numbers:** H25 and H26
32 **FEP Titles:** *Oil and Gas Extraction*
33 *Groundwater Extraction*

34 **SCR-5.2.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
35 SO-R (Future)

36 HCN *Groundwater Extraction* and *Oil and Gas Extraction* outside the controlled area has been
37 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the

1 disposal system. *Groundwater Extraction and Oil and Gas Extraction* through future boreholes
 2 has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

4 The screening argument for this FEP has been updated with new information relating to a new
 5 water well used for ranching purposes near WIPP. No change to the screening decisions is
 6 merited.

7 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.1 Screening Argument**

8 The extraction of fluid could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons, or in overlying units
 9 as a result of a failed borehole casing. Also, the removal of confined fluid from oil- or gas-
 10 bearing units can cause compaction in some geologic settings, potentially resulting in subvertical
 11 fracturing and surface subsidence.

12 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.2 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

13 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36, water, oil, and gas production are the only activities
 14 involving fluid extraction through boreholes that have taken place or are currently taking place in
 15 the vicinity of the WIPP. These activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
 16 the near future.

17 Groundwater extraction outside the controlled area from formations above the Salado could
 18 affect groundwater flow. The Dewey Lake contains a productive zone of saturation south of the
 19 WIPP site. Several wells operated by the J.C. Mills Ranch south of the WIPP produce water
 20 from the Dewey Lake to supply livestock (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). Water
 21 has also been extracted from the Culebra at the Engle Well approximately 9.66 km (6 mi) south
 22 of the controlled area to provide water for livestock. In addition, a new water well was drilled in
 23 2007 at the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)-14 wellpad to provide livestock water for the
 24 Mills ranch. This well is approximately 3,000 ft (0.9 km) from the WIPP site boundary.

25 If contaminated water intersects a well while it is producing, then contaminants could be pumped
 26 to the surface. Consistent with the containment requirements in section 191.13(a), PAs need not
 27 evaluate radiation doses that might result from such an event. However, compliance assessments
 28 must include any such events in dose calculations for evaluating compliance with the individual
 29 protection requirements in section 191.15. As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, under
 30 undisturbed conditions, there are no calculated radionuclide releases to units containing
 31 producing wells.

32 Pumping from wells at the J.C. Mills Ranch may have resulted in reductions in hydraulic head in
 33 the Dewey Lake within southern regions of the controlled area, leading to increased hydraulic
 34 head gradients. However, these changes in the groundwater flow conditions in the Dewey Lake
 35 will have no significant effects on the performance of the disposal system, primarily because of
 36 the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6).
 37 Retardation of any radionuclides that enter the Dewey Lake will be such that no radionuclides
 38 will migrate through the Dewey Lake to the accessible environment within the 10,000-yr
 39 regulatory period.

1 The effects of groundwater extraction from the Culebra from a well 9.66 km (6 mi) south of the
2 controlled area have been evaluated by Wallace (1996b), using an analytical solution for Darcian
3 fluid flow in a continuous porous medium. Wallace (1996b) showed that such a well pumping at
4 about 0.5 gallon (gal) (1.9 liters [L]) per minute for 10,000 years will induce a hydraulic head
5 gradient across the controlled area of about 4×10^{-5} . The hydraulic head gradient across the
6 controlled area currently ranges from between 0.001 to 0.007. Therefore, pumping from the
7 Engle Well will have only minor effects on the hydraulic head gradient within the controlled area
8 even if pumping were to continue for 10,000 years. Thus the effects of HCN groundwater
9 extraction outside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
10 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 Oil and gas extraction outside the controlled area could affect the hydrology of the disposal
12 system. However, the horizons that act as oil and gas reservoirs are sufficiently below the
13 repository for changes in fluid-flow patterns to be of low consequence, unless there is fluid
14 leakage through a failed borehole casing. Also, oil and gas extraction horizons in the Delaware
15 Basin are well-lithified rigid strata, so oil and gas extraction is not likely to result in compaction
16 and subsidence (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 52, 61). Furthermore, the plasticity of the salt
17 formations in the Delaware Basin will limit the extent of any fracturing caused by compaction of
18 underlying units. Thus, neither the extraction of gas from reservoirs in the Morrow Formation
19 (some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface), nor extraction of oil from the shallower units
20 within the Delaware Mountain Group (about 1,250 to 2,450 m (about 4,000 to 8,000 ft) below
21 the surface) will lead to compaction and subsidence. In summary, historical, current, and near-
22 future oil and gas extraction outside the controlled area has been eliminated from PA calculations
23 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.3 Future Human EPs**

25 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
26 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, groundwater
27 extraction and oil and gas extraction through future boreholes have been eliminated from PA
28 calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.6 FEP Numbers:** H27, H28, and H29

30 **FEP Titles:** *Liquid Waste Disposal – OB (H27)*
31 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB (H28)*
32 *Hydrocarbon Storage – OB (H29)*

33 **SCR-5.2.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
34 SO-C (Future)

35 The hydrological effects of HCN fluid injection (*Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas*
36 *Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage*) through boreholes outside the controlled area have been
37 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
38 disposal system. *Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas Production, and Hydrocarbon*
39 *Storage* in the future have been eliminated from PA calculations based on low consequence.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

2 These FEPs are specific to activities outside the WIPP boundary, although past descriptions have
3 sometimes confused these activities with possible events occurring inside the WIPP boundary, or
4 IB. Section 194.33(d) excludes activities subsequent to drilling the borehole from further
5 consideration in PA. It has historically been understood that this exclusion implicitly applies to
6 activities within the WIPP boundary, and not those outside the boundary, or OB. Therefore,
7 three new FEPs have been created to address analogous IB activities (see Section SCR-5.2.1.7,
8 FEPs H60, *Liquid Disposal-IB*; H61 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production-IB*; and H62
9 *Hydrocarbon Storage-IB*).

10 Recent monitoring activities have identified a salt water disposal well that had hardware failure
11 resulting in migration of the injected fluid away from the wellbore in a shallow freshwater
12 producing zone. This leak may have persisted up to 22 months, based on inspection and test
13 records on file with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. Once the failure was identified,
14 the well was repaired and returned to service. Details of this event are discussed in Hall (2008).

15 Fluid injection modeling conducted since the CCA has demonstrated that injection of fluids will
16 not have a significant effect upon the WIPP's ability to contain radioactive materials (Stoelzel
17 and Swift 1997). Conservative assumptions used by Stoelzel and Swift include a leaking well
18 that persists for many years (150) with pressures above maximum allowable permitted pressures
19 in the area. Therefore, current modeling conservatively bounds the effects of the recent injection
20 well failure mentioned above. Neither liquid waste disposal nor waterflooding conducted in
21 wells outside the controlled area have the potential to affect the disposal system in any
22 significant way.

23 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

24 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
25 accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
26 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
27 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

28 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

29 The only historical and current activities involving fluid injection through boreholes in the
30 Delaware Basin are enhanced oil and gas production (waterflooding or carbon dioxide (CO₂)
31 injection), hydrocarbon storage (gas reinjection), and liquid waste disposal (byproducts from oil
32 and gas production). These fluid injection activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of
33 the WIPP in the near future.

34 Hydraulic fracturing of oil- or gas-bearing units is currently used to improve the performance of
35 hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware Basin. Fracturing is induced during a short period of
36 high-pressure fluid injection, resulting in increased hydraulic conductivity near the borehole.
37 Normally, this controlled fracturing is confined to the pay zone and is unlikely to affect
38 overlying strata.

1 Secondary production techniques, such as waterflooding, that are used to maintain reservoir
2 pressure and displace oil are currently employed in hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware
3 Basin (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 29-30). Tertiary recovery techniques, such as CO₂ miscible
4 flooding, have been implemented with limited success in the Delaware Basin, but CO₂ miscible
5 flooding is not an attractive recovery method for reservoirs near the WIPP (Melzer 2008). Even
6 if CO₂ flooding were to occur, the effects, if any, would be very similar to those associated with
7 waterflooding.

8 ReInjection of gas for storage currently takes place at one location in the Delaware Basin in a
9 depleted gas field in the Morrow Formation at the Washington Ranch near Carlsbad Caverns
10 (Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67; the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment A). This field is
11 too far from the WIPP site to have any effect on WIPP groundwaters under any circumstances.
12 Disposal of liquid by-products from oil and gas production involves injection of fluid into
13 depleted reservoirs. Such fluid injection techniques result in repressurization of the depleted
14 target reservoir and mitigates any effects of fluid withdrawal.

15 The most significant effects of fluid injection would arise from substantial and uncontrolled fluid
16 leakage through a failed borehole casing. The highly saline environment of some units can
17 promote rapid corrosion of well casings and may result in fluid loss from boreholes.

18 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

19 The Vacuum Field (located in the Capitan Reef, some 30 km [20 mi] northeast of the WIPP site)
20 and the Rhodes-Yates Field (located in the back reef of the Capitan, some 70 km (45 mi)
21 southeast of the WIPP site) have been waterflooded for 40 years with confirmed leaking wells,
22 which have resulted in brine entering the Salado and other formations above the Salado (see, for
23 example, Silva 1994, pp. 67-68). Currently, saltwater disposal takes place in the vicinity of the
24 WIPP into formations below the Castile. However, leakages from saltwater disposal wells or
25 waterflood wells in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP are unlikely to occur because of
26 the following:

- 27 • There are significant differences between the geology and lithology in the vicinity of the
28 disposal system and that of the Vacuum and Rhodes-Yates Fields. The WIPP is located
29 in the Delaware Basin in a fore-reef environment, where a thick zone of anhydrite and
30 halite (the Castile) exists. In the vicinity of the WIPP, oil is produced from the Brushy
31 Canyon Formation at depths greater than 2,100 m (7,000 ft). By contrast, the Castile is
32 not present at either the Vacuum or the Rhodes-Yates Field, which lie outside the
33 Delaware Basin. Oil production at the Vacuum Field is from the San Andres and
34 Grayburg Formations at depths of approximately 1,400 m (4,500 ft), and oil production at
35 the Rhodes-Yates Field is from the Yates and Seven Rivers Formations at depths of
36 approximately 900 m (3,000 ft). Waterflooding at the Rhodes-Yates Field involves
37 injection into a zone only 60 m (200 ft) below the Salado. There are more potential thief
38 zones below the Salado near the WIPP than at the Rhodes-Yates or Vacuum Fields; the
39 Salado in the vicinity of the WIPP is therefore less likely to receive any fluid that leaks
40 from an injection borehole. Additionally, the oil pools in the vicinity of the WIPP are
41 characterized by channel sands with thin net pay zones, low permeabilities, high
42 irreducible water saturations, and high residual oil saturations. Therefore, waterflooding

1 of oil fields in the vicinity of the WIPP on the scale of that undertaken in the Vacuum or
2 the Rhodes-Yates Field is unlikely.

- 3 • New Mexico state regulations require the emplacement of a salt isolation casing string for
4 all wells drilled in the potash enclave, which includes the WIPP area, to reduce the
5 possibility of petroleum wells leaking into the Salado. Also, injection pressures are not
6 allowed to exceed the pressure at which the rocks fracture. The injection pressure
7 gradient must be kept below 4.5×10^3 pascals per meter above hydrostatic if fracture
8 pressures are unknown. Such controls on fluid injection pressures limit the potential
9 magnitude of any leakages from injection boreholes.
- 10 • Recent improvements in well completion practices and reservoir operations management
11 have reduced the occurrences of leakages from injection wells. For example, injection
12 pressures during waterflooding are typically kept below about 23×10^3 pascals per meter
13 to avoid fracture initiation. Also, wells are currently completed using cemented and
14 perforated casing, rather than the open-hole completions used in the early Rhodes-Yates
15 wells. A recent report (Hall et al. 2008) concludes that injection well operations near the
16 WIPP have a low failure rate, and that failures are remedied as soon as possible after
17 identification.

18 Any injection well leakages that do occur in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future are more
19 likely to be associated with liquid waste disposal than waterflooding. Disposal typically involves
20 fluid injection through old and potentially corroded well casings and does not include monitoring
21 to the same extent as waterflooding. Such fluid injection could affect the performance of the
22 disposal system if sufficient fluid leaked into the Salado interbeds to affect the rate of brine flow
23 into the waste disposal panels.

24 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996) evaluated the potential effects on the disposal system of leakage
25 from a hypothetical salt water disposal borehole near the WIPP. Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996)
26 used the two-dimensional BRAGFLO model (vertical north-south cross-section) to simulate
27 saltwater disposal to the north and to the south of the disposal system. The disposal system
28 model included the waste disposal region, the marker beds (MBs) and anhydrite intervals near
29 the excavation horizon, and the rock strata associated with local oil and gas developments. A
30 worst-case simulation was run using high values of borehole and anhydrite permeability and a
31 low value of halite permeability to encourage flow to the disposal panels via the anhydrite. The
32 boreholes were assumed to be plugged immediately above the Salado (consistent with the
33 plugging configurations described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Saltwater disposal
34 into the Upper Bell Canyon was simulated, with annular leakage through the Salado. A total of
35 approximately 7×10^5 m³ (2.47×10^7 ft³) of brine was injected through the boreholes during a
36 50-year simulated disposal period. In this time, approximately 50 m³ (1,765.5 ft³) of brine
37 entered the anhydrite interval at the horizon of the waste disposal region. For the next 200 years,
38 the boreholes were assumed to be abandoned (with open-hole permeabilities of 1×10^{-9} square
39 meters (m²) (4×10^{-8} in.²)). Cement plugs (of permeability 1×10^{-17} m² (4×10^{-16} in.²)) were
40 assumed to be placed at the injection interval and at the top of the Salado. Subsequently, the
41 boreholes were prescribed the permeability of silty sand (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section
42 6.4.7.2), and the simulation was continued until the end of the 10,000-yr regulatory period.
43 During this period, approximately 400 m³ (14,124 ft³) of brine entered the waste disposal region

1 from the anhydrite interval. This value of cumulative brine inflow is within the bounds of the
2 values generated by PA calculations for the UP scenario. During the disposal well simulation,
3 leakage from the injection boreholes would have had no significant effect on the inflow rate at
4 the waste panels.

5 Stoelzel and Swift (1997) expanded on Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) work by considering
6 injection for a longer period of time (up to 150 years) and into deeper horizons at higher
7 pressures. They developed two computational models (a modified cross-sectional model and an
8 axisymmetric radial model) that are alternatives to the cross-sectional model used by Stoelzel
9 and O'Brien (1996). Rather than repeat the conservative and bounding approach used by
10 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996), Stoelzel and Swift (1997) focused on reasonable and realistic
11 conditions for most aspects of the modeling, including setting parameters that were sampled in
12 the CCA at their median values. Model results indicate that, for the cases considered, the largest
13 volume of brine entering MB 139 (the primary pathway to the WIPP) from the borehole is
14 approximately 1,500 m³ (52,974 ft³), which is a small enough volume that it would not affect
15 Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) conclusion even if it somehow all reached the WIPP. Other cases
16 showed from 0 to 600 m³ (21,190 ft³) of brine entering MB 139 from the injection well. In all
17 cases, high-permeability fractures created in the Castile and Salado anhydrite layers by the
18 modeled injection pressures were restricted to less than 400 m (1,312 ft) from the wellbore, and
19 did not extend more than 250 m in MB 138 and MB 139.

20 No flow entered MB 139, nor was fracturing of the unit calculated to occur away from the
21 borehole, in cases in which leaks in the cement sheath had permeabilities of 10^{-12.5} m²
22 (corresponding to the median value used to characterize fully degraded boreholes in the CCA) or
23 lower. The cases modeled in which flow entered MB 139 from the borehole and fracturing
24 occurred away from the borehole required injection pressures conservatively higher than any
25 currently in use near the WIPP and either 150 years of leakage through a fully degraded cement
26 sheath or 10 years of simultaneous tubing and casing leaks from a waterflood operation. These
27 conditions are not likely to occur in the future. If leaks like these do occur from brine injection
28 near the WIPP, however, results of the Stoelzel and Swift (1997) modeling study indicate that
29 they will not affect the performance of the repository.

30 Thus the hydraulic effects of leakage through HCN boreholes outside the controlled area have
31 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
32 disposal system.

33 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.3 Effects of Density Changes Resulting from Leakage Through Injection** 34 **Boreholes**

35 Leakage through a failed borehole casing during a fluid injection operation in the vicinity of the
36 WIPP could alter fluid density in the affected unit, which could result in changes in fluid flow
37 rates and directions within the disposal system. Disposal of oil and gas production byproducts
38 through boreholes could increase fluid densities in transmissive units affected by leakage in the
39 casing. Operations such as waterflooding use fluids derived from the target reservoir, or fluids
40 with a similar composition, to avoid scaling and other reactions. Therefore, the effects of
41 leakage from waterflood boreholes would be similar to leakage from disposal wells.

1 Denser fluids have a tendency to sink relative to less dense fluids, and, if the hydrogeological
 2 unit concerned has a dip, there will be a tendency for the dense fluid to travel in the downdip
 3 direction. If this direction is the same as the direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there
 4 would be an increase in flow velocity, and conversely, if the downdip direction is opposed to the
 5 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a decrease in flow velocity. In
 6 general terms, taking account of density-related flow will cause a rotation of the flow vector
 7 towards the downdip direction that is dependent on the density contrast and the dip.

8 Wilmot and Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from
 9 leakage through an injection borehole outside the controlled area will not affect fluid flow in the
 10 Culebra significantly. Potash mining activities assumed on the basis of regulatory criteria to
 11 occur in the near future outside the controlled area will have a more significant effect on
 12 modeled Culebra hydrology. The distribution of existing leases suggests that near-future mining
 13 will take place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
 14 Section 2.3.1.1). The effects of such potash mining are accounted for in calculations of UP of
 15 the disposal system (through an increase in the transmissivity of the Culebra above the mined
 16 region, as discussed in FEPs H37, H38, and H39 [Section SCR-5.2.2.1, Section SCR-5.2.2.2, and
 17 Section SCR-5.2.3.1]). Groundwater modeling that accounts for potash mining shows a change
 18 in the fluid pressure distribution and a consequent shift of flow directions towards the west in the
 19 Culebra within the controlled area (Wallace 1996c). A localized increase in fluid density in the
 20 Culebra resulting from leakage from an injection borehole would rotate the flow vector towards
 21 the downdip direction (towards the east).

22 Wilmot and Galson (1996) compared the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and
 23 the gravitational gradient and showed that the density effect is of low consequence to the
 24 performance of the disposal system. According to Darcy's Law, flow in an isotropic porous
 25 medium is governed by the gradient of fluid pressure and a gravitational term

26
$$\bar{v} = -\frac{k}{\mu}[\nabla p - \rho \bar{g}] \quad (\text{SCR.7})$$

27 where

- 28 v = Darcy velocity vector (m s⁻¹)
 29 k = intrinsic permeability (m²)
 30 μ = fluid viscosity (Pa s)
 31 ∇p = gradient of fluid pressure (Pa m⁻¹)
 32 ρ = fluid density (kg m⁻³)
 33 g = gravitational acceleration vector (m s⁻²)

34 The relationship between the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component
 35 can be shown by expressing the velocity vector in terms of a freshwater head gradient and a
 36 density-related elevation gradient

37
$$\bar{v} = -K \left[\nabla H_f + \frac{\Delta \rho}{\rho_f} \nabla E \right] \quad (\text{SCR.8})$$

1 where

- 2 K = hydraulic conductivity (m s⁻¹)
 3 ∇H_f = gradient of freshwater head
 4 $\Delta\rho$ = difference between actual fluid
 5 density and reference fluid density (kg m⁻³)
 6 ρ_f = density of freshwater (kg m⁻³)
 7 ∇E = gradient of elevation

8 Davies (1989, p. 28) defined a driving force ratio (DFR) to assess the potential significance of
 9 the density gradient

$$10 \quad DFR = \frac{\Delta\rho |\nabla E|}{\rho_f |\nabla H_f|} \quad (\text{SCR.9})$$

11 and concluded that a DFR of 0.5 can be considered an approximate threshold at which density-
 12 related gravity effects may become significant (Davies 1989, p. 28).

13 The dip of the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP is about 0.44 degrees or 8 m/km (26 ft/mi) to
 14 the east (Davies 1989, p. 42). According to Davies (1989, pp. 47–48), freshwater head gradients
 15 in the Culebra between the waste panels and the southwestern and western boundaries of the
 16 accessible environment range from 4 m/km (13 ft/mi) to 7 m/km (23 ft/mi). Only small changes
 17 in gradient arise from the calculated effects of near-future mining. Culebra brines have densities
 18 ranging from 998 to 1,158 kilograms per cubic meter (kg/m³) (998 to 1,158 parts per million
 19 [ppm]) (Cauffman et al. 1990, Table E1.b). Assuming the density of fluid leaking from a
 20 waterflood borehole or a disposal well to be 1,215 kg/m³ (1,215 ppm) (a conservative high value
 21 similar to the density of Castile brine [Popielak et al. 1983, Table C-2]) leads to a DFR of
 22 between 0.07 and 0.43. These values of the DFR show that density-related effects caused by
 23 leakage of brine into the Culebra during fluid injection operations are not significant.

24 In summary, the effects of HCN fluid injection (liquid waste disposal, enhanced oil and gas
 25 production, and hydrocarbon storage) through boreholes outside the controlled area have been
 26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 27 disposal system.

28 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.4 Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

29 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
 30 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such fluid injection-induced geochemical
 31 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
 32 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
 33 transport and sorption.

34 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
 35 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
 36 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
 37 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs discussion for H21

1 through H24, Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-
 2 5.2.1.4). The repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system.
 3 Therefore, colloid transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA
 4 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section
 6 SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations.
 7 The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the Culebra as a
 8 result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

9 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
 10 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
 11 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
 12 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
 13 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 14 performance of the disposal system.

15 Nonlocally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
 16 fluid-injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
 17 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
 18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.5 Future Human EPs**

20 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 21 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole within the site boundary.
 22 Liquid waste disposal (byproducts from oil and gas production), enhanced oil and gas
 23 production, and hydrocarbon storage are techniques associated with resource recovery and are
 24 expected to continue into the future outside the site boundary. Analyses have shown that these
 25 activities have little consequence on repository performance (Stoelzel and Swift 1997).
 26 Therefore, activities such as liquid waste disposal, enhanced oil and gas production, and
 27 hydrocarbon storage outside the site boundary have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 28 basis of low consequence.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.7 FEP Numbers:** H60, H61, and H62

30 **FEP Titles:** *Liquid Waste Disposal – IB (H60)*
 31 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – IB (H61)*
 32 *Hydrocarbon Storage – IB (H62)*

33 **SCR-5.2.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
 34 SO-R (Future)

35 The hydrological effects of HCN fluid injection (*Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas*
 36 *Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage*) through boreholes inside the controlled area have been
 37 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds (section 194.25(a)). *Liquid Waste*
 38 *Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage* (within the controlled
 39 area) in the future have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds (section
 40 194.33(d)).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

2 These FEPs are specific to activities inside the WIPP boundary, or IB, although past discussions
3 have sometimes confused these activities with possible events occurring outside the WIPP
4 boundary or OB. Section 194.33(d) excludes activities subsequent to drilling the borehole from
5 further consideration in PA. It has historically been understood that this exclusion applies only
6 to IB activities, and not those OB. Therefore, these FEPs deal specifically with IB activities.
7 These three new FEPs have been created to address IB activities analogous to FEPs H27, *Liquid*
8 *Disposal-OB*; H28 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production-OB*; and H29 *Hydrocarbon Storage-OB*.
9 The descriptions of the OB activities (H27 – H29, Section SCR-5.2.1.6) have been clarified to be
10 specifically related to activities OB.

11 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

12 The injection of fluids in a borehole within the WIPP boundary could alter fluid-flow patterns in
13 the target horizons or, if there is accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other
14 intersected hydraulically conductive zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole within
15 the WIPP boundary could also result in geochemical changes and altered radionuclide migration
16 rates in the thief units.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

18 Injection of fluids for the purposes of liquid disposal, enhanced oil and gas production, or
19 hydrocarbon storage has not occurred within the WIPP boundary. Therefore, based on the future
20 states assumption provided by section 194.25(a), it is assumed that such activities will not occur
21 within the near-future time frame, which includes the period of WIPP AICs. These activities are
22 excluded from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

23 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3.2 Future Human EPs**

24 The provisions of section 194.33(d) state, “that performance assessments need not analyze the
25 effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.”
26 Therefore, the future injection of fluids for the purposes of liquid disposal, enhanced oil and gas
27 production, and hydrocarbon storage within the WIPP boundary have been excluded from PA
28 calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.8 FEP Number:** H30

30 **FEP Title:** *Fluid Injection-Induced Geochemical Changes*

31 **SCR-5.2.1.8.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

32 SO-R (Future)

33 Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of fluid flow associated
34 with HCN fluid injection are accounted for in PA calculations. Geochemical changes resulting
35 from fluid injection in the future inside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA
36 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.8.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information regarding this FEP has been identified.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3 Screening Argument**

4 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
5 accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
6 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
7 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3.1 Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

9 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
10 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such fluid injection-induced geochemical
11 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
12 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
13 transport and sorption.

14 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
15 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
16 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
17 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs H21 through H24,
18 Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4). The
19 repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Therefore, colloid
20 transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
21 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section
23 SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations.
24 The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the Culebra as a
25 result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

26 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
27 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
28 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
29 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
30 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
31 performance of the disposal system.

32 Nonlocally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
33 fluid injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
34 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
35 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

36 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3.2 Future Human EPs**

37 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
38 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Liquid waste disposal

1 (byproducts from oil and gas production), enhanced oil and gas production, and hydrocarbon
 2 storage are techniques associated with resource recovery. Therefore, the use of future boreholes
 3 for such activities and fluid injection-induced geochemical changes have been eliminated from
 4 PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

5 **SCR-5.2.1.9 FEP Number:** H31

6 **FEP Title:** *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31)*

7 **SCR-5.2.1.9.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)

8 SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels)

9 DP (Future, holes through waste panels)

10 The effects of *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through existing or near-future abandoned
 11 boreholes, known or unknown, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 12 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through a
 13 future borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in PA calculations. The effects of
 14 *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through a future borehole that does not intersect the waste-disposal
 15 region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 16 performance of the disposal system.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.9.2 Summary of New Information**

18 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3 Screening Argument**

20 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
 21 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
 22 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
 23 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

24 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
 25 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
 26 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

27 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
 28 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
 29 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
 30 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
 31 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
 32 precipitation.

33 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

34 Abandoned water, potash, oil, and gas exploration and production boreholes exist within and
 35 outside the controlled area. Most of these boreholes have been plugged in some way, but some
 36 have simply been abandoned. Over time, even the boreholes that have been plugged may
 37 provide hydraulic connections among the units they penetrate as the plugs degrade. The DOE

1 assumes that records of past and present drilling activities in New Mexico are largely accurate
2 and that evidence of most boreholes would be included in these records. However, the potential
3 effects of boreholes do not change depending on whether their existence is known, hence flow
4 through undetected boreholes and flow through detected boreholes can be evaluated together.

5 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Flow through Abandoned Boreholes**

6 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
7 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep, overpressurized or
8 underpressurized units, or if boreholes provide interconnections for flow between shallow units.

9 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.3 Connections Between the Culebra and Deeper Units**

10 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
11 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep, overpressurized or
12 underpressurized units. Over the past 80 years, a large number of deep boreholes have been
13 drilled within and around the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2). The
14 effects on the performance of the disposal system of long-term hydraulic connections between
15 the Culebra and deep units depends on the locations of the boreholes. In some cases, changes in
16 the Culebra flow field caused by interconnections with deep units could decrease lateral
17 radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment.

18 As part of an analysis to determine the impact of such interconnections, Wallace (1996a)
19 gathered information on the pressures, permeabilities, and thicknesses of potential oil- or gas-
20 bearing sedimentary units; such units exist to a depth of about 5,500 m (18,044 ft) in the vicinity
21 of the WIPP. Of these units, the Atoka, some 4,000 m (13,123 ft) below the land surface, has the
22 highest documented pressure of about 64 megapascals (MPa) (9,600 pounds per square inch
23 [psi]), with permeability of about $2 \times 10^{-14} \text{ m}^2$ (2.1×10^{-13} square feet [ft^2]) and thickness of
24 about 210 m (689 ft). The Strawn, 3,900 m (12,795 ft) below the land surface, has the lowest
25 pressures (35 MPa [5,000 psi], which is lower than hydrostatic) and highest permeability (10^{-13}
26 m^2 [$1.1 \times 10^{-12} \text{ ft}^2$]) of the deep units, with a thickness of about 90 m (295 ft).

27 PA calculations indicate that the shortest radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment
28 through the Culebra occur when flow in the Culebra in the disposal system is from north to
29 south. Wallace (1996a) ran the steady-state SECOFL2D model with the PA data that generated
30 the shortest radionuclide travel times (with and without mining in the controlled area) but
31 perturbed the flow field by placing a borehole connecting the Atoka to the Culebra just north of
32 the waste disposal panels and a borehole connecting the Culebra to the Strawn just south of the
33 controlled area. The borehole locations were selected to coincide with the end points of the
34 fastest flow paths modeled, which represents an unlikely worst-case condition. Although the
35 Atoka is primarily a gas-bearing unit, Wallace (1996a) assumed that the unit is brine saturated.
36 This assumption is conservative because it prevents two-phase flow from occurring in the
37 Culebra, which would decrease the water permeability and thereby increase transport times. It
38 was conservatively assumed that the pressure in the Atoka would not have been depleted by
39 production before the well was plugged and abandoned. Furthermore, it was conservatively
40 assumed that all flow from the Atoka would enter the Culebra and not intermediate or shallower
41 units, and that flow from the Culebra could somehow enter the Strawn despite intermediate
42 zones having higher pressures than the Culebra. The fluid flux through each borehole was
43 determined using Darcy's Law, assuming a borehole hydraulic conductivity of 10^{-4} m/s (for a

1 permeability of about 10^{-11} m^2 [$1.1 \times 10^{-10} \text{ ft}^2$]) representing silty sand, a borehole radius of
2 0.25 m (.82 ft), and a fluid pressure in the Culebra of 0.88 MPa (132 psi) at a depth of about 200
3 m (650 ft). With these parameters, the Atoka was calculated to transmit water to the Culebra at
4 about $1.4 \times 10^{-5} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (0.22 gallons per minute [gpm]), and the Strawn was calculated to receive
5 water from the Culebra at about $1.5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (0.024 gpm).

6 Travel times through the Culebra to the accessible environment were calculated using the
7 SECOFL2D velocity fields for particles released to the Culebra above the waste panels,
8 assuming no retardation by sorption or diffusion into the rock matrix. Mean Darcy velocities
9 were then determined from the distance each radionuclide traveled, the time taken to reach the
10 accessible environment, and the effective Culebra porosity. The results show that, at worst,
11 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units under the unrealistically conservative
12 assumptions listed above could cause less than a twofold increase in the largest mean Darcy
13 velocity expected in the Culebra in the absence of such interconnections.

14 These effects can be compared to the potential effects of climate change on gradients and flow
15 velocities through the Culebra. As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9 (and Corbet
16 and Knupp 1996), the maximum effect of a future, wetter climate would be to raise the water
17 table to the ground surface. This would raise heads and gradients in all units above the Salado.
18 For the Culebra, the maximum change in gradient was estimated to be about a factor of 2.1. The
19 effect of climate change is incorporated in compliance calculations through the Climate Index,
20 which is used as a multiplier for Culebra groundwater velocities. The Climate Index has a
21 bimodal distribution, with the range from 1.00 to 1.25 having a 75% probability, and the range
22 from 1.50 to 2.25 having a 25% probability. Because implementation of the Climate Index leads
23 to radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are orders of magnitude lower than the
24 regulatory limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper units through abandoned
25 boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

26 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.4 Connections Between the Culebra and Shallower Units**

27 Abandoned boreholes could also provide interconnections for long-term fluid flow between
28 shallow units (overlying the Salado). Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for
29 downward flow of water from the Dewey Lake and/or Magenta to the Culebra because the
30 Culebra hydraulic head is lower than the hydraulic heads of these units. Magenta freshwater
31 heads are as much as 45 m (148 ft) higher than Culebra freshwater heads. Because the Culebra
32 is generally at least one order of magnitude more transmissive than the Magenta at any location,
33 a connection between the Magenta and Culebra would cause proportionally more drawdown in
34 the Magenta head than rise in the Culebra head. For example, for a one-order-of-magnitude
35 difference in transmissivity and a 45-m (148-ft) difference in head, the Magenta head would
36 decrease by approximately 40 m (131 ft) while the Culebra head increased by 5 m (16 ft). This
37 head increase in the Culebra would also be a localized effect, decreasing with radial distance
38 from the leaking borehole. The primary flow direction in the Culebra across the WIPP site is
39 from north to south, with the Culebra head decreasing by approximately 20 m (66 ft) across this
40 distance. A 5-m (16-ft) increase in Culebra head at the northern WIPP boundary would,
41 therefore, increase gradients by at most 25%.

42 The Dewey Lake freshwater head at the WQSP-6 pad is 55 m (180 ft) higher than the Culebra
43 freshwater head. Leakage from the Dewey Lake could have a greater effect on Culebra head

1 than leakage from the Magenta if the difference in transmissivity between the Dewey Lake and
2 Culebra observed at the WQSP-6 pad, where the Dewey Lake is two orders of magnitude more
3 transmissive than the Culebra (Beauheim and Ruskauff 1998), persists over a wide region.
4 However, the saturated, highly transmissive zone in the Dewey Lake has only been observed
5 south of the WIPP disposal panels. A connection between the Dewey Lake and the Culebra
6 south of the panels would tend to decrease the north-south gradient in the Culebra across the site,
7 not increase it.

8 In any case, leakage of water from overlying units into the Culebra could not increase Culebra
9 heads and gradients as much as might result from climate change, discussed above. Because
10 implementation of the Climate Index leads to radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are
11 orders of magnitude lower than the regulatory limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and
12 shallower units through abandoned boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low
13 consequence.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.5 Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned** 15 **Boreholes**

16 Leakage from historical, current, and near-future abandoned boreholes that penetrate pressurized
17 brine pockets in the Castile could give rise to fluid density changes in affected units. Wilmot and
18 Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from leakage through
19 an abandoned borehole would not have a significant effect on the Culebra flow field. A
20 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra resulting from leakage from an abandoned
21 borehole would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east). A
22 comparison of the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and the gravitational
23 gradient, based on an analysis similar to that presented in Section SCR-5.2.1.6 (FEPs H27, H28,
24 and H29), shows that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal
25 system.

26 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.6 Future Human EPs**

27 The EPA provides criteria for analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in section
28 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete, the
29 borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see the CCA, Chapter
30 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid
31 flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones.
32 The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily
33 depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

34 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.7 Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

35 A future borehole that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine
36 flow from the reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the
37 waste panel. Long-term natural borehole fluid flow through such a borehole is accounted for in
38 PA calculations (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.8).

39 Deep, abandoned boreholes that intersect the Salado interbeds near the waste disposal panels
40 could provide pathways for long-term radionuclide transport from the waste panels to the land
41 surface or to overlying units. The potential significance of such events were assessed by the
42 WIPP PA Department (1991, B-26 to B-27), which examined single-phase flow and transport

1 between the waste panels and a borehole intersecting MB 139 outside the DRZ. The analysis
2 assumed an in situ pressure of 11 MPa in MB 139, a borehole pressure of 6.5 MPa (975 psi)
3 (hydrostatic) at MB 139, and a constant pressure of 18 MPa (2,700 psi) as a source term in the
4 waste panels representing gas generation. Also, MB 139 was assigned a permeability of
5 approximately $3 \times 10^{-20} \text{ m}^2$ ($3.2 \times 10^{-19} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.01%. The disturbed zone was
6 assumed to exist in MB 139 directly beneath the repository only and was assigned a permeability
7 of $1.0 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ ($1.1 \times 10^{-16} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.055%. Results showed that the rate of flow
8 through a borehole located just 0.25 m (0.8 ft) outside the DRZ would be more than two orders
9 of magnitude less than the rate of flow through a borehole located within the DRZ because of the
10 contrast in permeability. Thus any releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment
11 through deep boreholes that do not intersect waste panels would be insignificant compared to the
12 releases that would result from transport through boreholes that intersect waste panels. Thus
13 radionuclide transport through deep boreholes that do not intersect waste panels has been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
15 disposal system.

16 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.8 Fluid Flow and Radionuclide Transport in the Culebra**

17 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if future boreholes
18 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and either deeper or shallower units. Over
19 the 10,000-yr regulatory period, a large number of deep boreholes could be drilled within and
20 around the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2). The effects on the
21 performance of the disposal system of long-term hydraulic connections between the Culebra and
22 deeper or shallower units would be the same as those discussed above for historic, current, and
23 near-future conditions. Thus the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper or shallower
24 units through abandoned future boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

25 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.9 Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned** 26 **Boreholes**

27 A future borehole that intersects a pressurized brine reservoir in the Castile could also provide a
28 source for brine flow to the Culebra in the event of borehole casing leakage, with a consequent
29 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra. The effect of such a change in fluid density
30 would be to increase any density-driven component of groundwater flow. If the downdip
31 direction, along which the density-driven component would be directed, is different from the
32 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a slight rotation of the flow vector
33 towards the downdip direction. The groundwater modeling presented by Davies (1989, p. 50)
34 indicates that a borehole that intersects a pressurized brine pocket and causes a localized increase
35 in fluid density in the Culebra above the waste panels would result in a rotation of the flow
36 vector slightly towards the east. However, the magnitude of this effect would be small in
37 comparison to the magnitude of the pressure gradient (see screening argument for FEPs H27,
38 H28, and H29, Section SCR-5.2.1.6, where this effect is screened out on the basis of low
39 consequence).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.10 FEP Number:** H32
2 **FEP Title:** *Waste-Induced Borehole Flow*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.10.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
4 DP (Future)

5 Waste-induced flow through boreholes drilled in the near future has been eliminated from PA
6 calculations on regulatory grounds. *Waste-Induced Borehole Flow* through a future borehole
7 that intersects a waste panel are accounted for in PA calculations.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.10.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3 Screening Argument**

11 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
12 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
13 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
14 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

15 Continued resource exploration and production in the near future will result in the occurrence of
16 many more abandoned boreholes in the vicinity of the controlled area. Institutional controls will
17 prevent drilling (other than that associated with the WIPP development) from taking place within
18 the controlled area in the near future. Therefore, no boreholes will intersect the waste disposal
19 region in the near future, and waste-induced borehole flow in the near future has been eliminated
20 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

21 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1 Future Human EPs**

22 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
23 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is
24 complete, the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see the
25 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in
26 connections for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected
27 hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and
28 abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole
29 casing and plugging methods used.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

31 An abandoned future borehole that intersects a waste panel could provide a connection for
32 contaminant transport away from the repository horizon. If the borehole has degraded casing
33 and/or plugs, and the fluid pressure within the waste panel is sufficient, radionuclides could be
34 transported to the land surface. Additionally, if brine flows through the borehole to overlying
35 units, such as the Culebra, it may carry dissolved and colloidal actinides that can be transported
36 laterally to the accessible environment by natural groundwater flow in the overlying units.
37 Long-term waste-induced borehole flow is accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix
38 PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.11 FEP Number:** H34
2 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.11.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* associated with existing, near-future,
6 and future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.11.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3 Screening Argument**

11 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
12 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
13 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
14 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
15 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
16 precipitation.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

18 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**

19 During the period covered by HCN FEPs, drilling within the land withdrawn for the WIPP will
20 be controlled, and boreholes will be plugged according to existing regulations. Under these
21 circumstances and during this time period, borehole-induced solution and subsidence at WIPP is
22 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence to the disposal system.

23 Outside the area withdrawn for the WIPP, drilling has been regulated, but conditions of historical
24 and existing boreholes are highly variable. Borehole-induced solution and subsidence may occur
25 in these areas, although it is expected to be limited and should not affect the disposal system, as
26 discussed in the following paragraphs.

27 Three features are required for significant borehole-induced solution and subsidence to occur: a
28 borehole, an energy gradient to drive unsaturated (with respect to halite) water through the
29 evaporite-bearing formations, and a conduit to allow migration of brine away from the site of
30 dissolution. Without these features, minor amounts of halite might be dissolved in the immediate
31 vicinity of a borehole, but percolating water would become saturated with respect to halite and
32 stagnant in the bottom of the drillhole, preventing further dissolution.

33 At, and in the vicinity of, the WIPP site, drillholes penetrating into, but not through, the
34 evaporite-bearing formations have little potential for dissolution. Brines coming from the Salado
35 and Castile, for example, have high total dissolved solids and are likely to precipitate halite, not
36 dissolve more halite during passage through the borehole. Water infiltrating from the surface or
37 near-surface units may not be saturated with halite. For drillholes with a total depth in halite-

1 bearing formations, there is little potential for dissolution because the halite-bearing units have
2 very low permeability and provide little outlet for the brine created as the infiltrating water fills
3 the drillhole. ERDA-9 is the deepest drillhole in the immediate vicinity of the waste panels at the
4 WIPP; the bottom of the drillhole is in the uppermost Castile, with no known outlet for brine at
5 the bottom.

6 Drillholes penetrating through the evaporite-bearing formations provide possible pathways for
7 circulation of water. Underlying units in the vicinity of the WIPP site with sufficient
8 potentiometric levels or pressures to reach or move upward through the halite units generally
9 have one of two characteristics: (1) high-salinity brines, which limit or eliminate the potential
10 for dissolution of evaporites, or (2) are gas producers. Wood et al. (1982) analyzed natural
11 processes of dissolution of the evaporites by water from the underlying Bell Canyon. They
12 concluded that brine removal in the Bell Canyon is slow, limiting the movement of dissolution
13 fronts or the creation of natural collapse features. Existing drillholes that are within the
14 boundaries of the withdrawn land and also penetrate through the evaporites are not located in the
15 immediate vicinity of the waste panels or WIPP workings.

16 There are three examples in the region that appear to demonstrate the process for borehole-
17 induced solution and subsidence, but the geohydrologic setting and drillhole completions differ
18 from those at or near the WIPP.

19 An example of borehole-induced solution and subsidence occurred in 1980 about 160 km (100
20 mi) southeast of the WIPP site (outside the Delaware Basin) at the Wink Sink (Baumgardner
21 et al. 1982; Johnson 1989), where percolation of shallow groundwater through abandoned
22 boreholes, dissolution of the Salado, and subsidence of overlying units led to a surface collapse
23 feature 110 m (360 ft) in width and 34 m (110 ft) deep. At the Wink Sink, the Salado is
24 underlain by the Tansill, Yates, and Capitan Formations, which contain vugs and solution
25 cavities through which brine could migrate. Also, the hydraulic head of the Santa Rosa (the
26 uppermost aquifer) is greater than those of the deep aquifers (Tansill, Yates, and Capitan),
27 suggesting downward flow if a connection were established. A second sink (Wink Sink 2)
28 formed in May 2002, near the earlier sink (Johnson et al. 2003). Its origin is similar to the earlier
29 sink. By February 2003, Wink Sink 2 had enlarged by surface collapse to a length of about 305
30 m (1,000 ft) and a width of about 198 m (650 ft).

31 A similar, though smaller, surface collapse occurred in 1998 northwest of Jal, New Mexico
32 (Powers 2000). The most likely cause of collapse appears to be dissolution of Rustler, and
33 possibly Salado, halite as relatively low salinity water from the Capitan Reef circulated through
34 breaks in the casing of a deep water supply well. Much of the annulus behind the casing through
35 the evaporite section was uncemented, and work in the well at one time indicated bent and
36 ruptured casing. The surface collapse occurred quickly, and the sink was initially about 23 m
37 (75 ft) across and a little more than 30 m (100 ft) deep. By 2001, the surface diameter was about
38 37 m (120 ft), and the sink was filled with collapse debris to about 18 m (60 ft) below the ground
39 level (Powers, in press).

40 The sinkholes near Wink, Texas and Jal, New Mexico, occurred above the Capitan Reef (which
41 is by definition outside the Delaware Basin), and the low-salinity water and relatively high
42 potentiometric levels of the Capitan Reef appear to be integral parts of the process that formed

1 these sinkholes. They are reviewed as examples of the process of evaporite dissolution and
2 subsidence related to circulation in drillholes. Nevertheless, the factors of significant low salinity
3 water and high potentiometric levels in units below the evaporites do not appear to apply at the
4 WIPP site.

5 Beauheim (1986) considered the direction of natural fluid flow through boreholes in the vicinity
6 of the WIPP. Beauheim (1986, p. 72) examined hydraulic heads measured using drill stem tests
7 in the Bell Canyon and the Culebra at well DOE-2 and concluded that the direction of flow in a
8 cased borehole open only to the Bell Canyon and the Culebra would be upward. Bell Canyon
9 waters in the vicinity of the WIPP site are saline brines (e.g., Lambert 1978; Beauheim et al.
10 1983; Mercer et al. 1987), limiting the potential for dissolution of the overlying evaporites.
11 However, dissolution of halite in the Castile and the Salado would increase the relative density of
12 the fluid in an open borehole, causing a reduction in the rate of upward flow. The direction of
13 borehole fluid flow could potentially reverse, but such a flow could be sustained only if
14 sufficient driving pressure, porosity, and permeability exist for fluid to flow laterally within the
15 Bell Canyon. A further potential sink for Salado-derived brine is the Capitan Limestone.
16 However, the subsurface extent of the Capitan Reef is approximately 16 km (10 mi) from the
17 WIPP at its closest point, and this unit will not provide a sink for brine derived from boreholes in
18 the vicinity of the controlled area. A similar screening argument is made for natural deep
19 dissolution in the vicinity of the WIPP (see N16 and N18, Section SCR-4.1.5.1 and Section
20 SCR-4.1.5.2).

21 The effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence through a waste panel are considered
22 below. The principal effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence in the remaining parts
23 of the disposal system should be to change the hydraulic properties of the Culebra and other
24 rocks in the system. The features are local (limited lateral dimensions) and commonly nearly
25 circular. If subsidence occurs along the expected travel path and the transmissivity of the Culebra
26 is increased, as in the calculations conducted by Wallace (1996c), the travel times should
27 increase. If the transmissivity along the expected flow path decreased locally as a result of such a
28 feature, the flow path should be lengthened by travel around the feature. Thus the effects of
29 borehole-induced solution and subsidence around existing abandoned boreholes, and boreholes
30 drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
31 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.2 Future Human EPs**

33 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
34 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
35 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
36 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
37 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive
38 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
39 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
40 used.

1 SCR-5.2.1.11.3.2.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence

2 Future boreholes that do not intersect the WIPP excavation do not differ in long-term behavior or
3 consequences from existing boreholes, and can be eliminated from PA on the basis of low
4 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 The condition of more apparent concern is a future borehole that intersects the WIPP excavation.
6 Seals and casings are assumed to degrade, connecting the excavation to various units. For a
7 drillhole intersecting the excavation, but not connecting to a brine reservoir or to formations
8 below the evaporites, downward flow is limited by the open volume of the disposal room(s),
9 which is dependent with time, gas generation, or brine inflow to the disposal system from the
10 Salado.

11 Maximum dissolution, and maximum increase in borehole diameter, will occur at the top of the
12 Salado; dissolution will decrease with depth as the percolating water becomes salt saturated.
13 Eventually, degraded casing and concrete plug products, clays, and other materials will fill the
14 borehole. Long-term flow through a borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in
15 DP calculations by assuming that the borehole is eventually filled by such materials, which have
16 the properties of a silty sand (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). However, these
17 calculations assume that the borehole diameter does not increase with time. Under the conditions
18 assumed in the CCA for an E2 drilling event at 1,000 years, about 1,000 m³ (35,316 ft³) would
19 be dissolved from the lower Rustler and upper Salado. If the dissolved area is approximately
20 cylindrical or conical around the borehole, and the collapse/subsidence propagates upward as
21 occurred in breccia pipes (e.g., Snyder and Gard 1982), the diameter of the collapsed or subsided
22 area through the Culebra and other units would be a few tens of meters across. Changes in
23 hydraulic parameters for this small zone should slow travel times for any hypothesized
24 radionuclide release, as discussed for HCN occurrences. This does not change the argument for
25 low consequence due to borehole-induced solution and subsidence for these circumstances.

26 If a drillhole through a waste panel and into deeper evaporites intercepts a Castile brine reservoir,
27 the brine has little or no capability of dissolving additional halite. The Castile brine flow is
28 considered elsewhere as part of DP. There is, however, no *Borehole-Induced Solution and*
29 *Subsidence* under this circumstance, and therefore there is no effect on performance because of
30 this EP.

31 If a borehole intercepts a waste panel and also interconnects with formations below the evaporite
32 section, fluid flow up or down is determined by several conditions and may change over a period
33 of time (e.g., as dissolution increases the fluid density in the borehole). Fluid flow downward is
34 not a concern for performance, as fluid velocities in units such as the Bell Canyon are slow and
35 should not be of concern for performance (Wilson et al., 1996). As with boreholes considered
36 for HCN, the local change in hydraulic parameters, if it occurs along the expected flow path,
37 would be expected to cause little change in travel time and should increase the travel time.

38 In summary, the effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence around future abandoned
39 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
40 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.12 FEP Number:** H35
2 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.12.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*, associated with existing, near-future, and future
6 abandoned boreholes, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.12.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.12.3 Screening Argument**

11 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
12 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
13 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
14 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

15 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
16 changes in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
17 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

18 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
19 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
20 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
21 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
22 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
23 precipitation.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.12.3.1 Borehole-Induced Mineralization**

25 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a borehole may result in changes
26 in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. For example:

- 27
- 28 • Limited calcite precipitation may occur as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately
29 surrounding the borehole, and calcite dissolution may occur as the brines migrate away
from the borehole as a result of variations in water chemistry along the flow path.
 - 30 • Gypsum may be dissolved as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately surrounding the
31 borehole but may precipitate as the waters migrate through the Culebra.

32 The effects of these mass transfer processes on groundwater flow depend on the original
33 permeability structure of the Culebra rocks and the location of the mass transfer. The volumes of
34 minerals that may precipitate or dissolve in the Culebra as a result of the injection of Castile or

1 Salado brine through a borehole will not affect the existing spatial variability in the permeability
 2 field significantly.

3 Predicted radionuclide transport rates in the Culebra assume that the dolomite matrix is
 4 diffusively accessed by the contaminants. The possible inhibition of matrix diffusion by
 5 secondary mineral precipitation on fracture walls as a result of mixing between brines and
 6 Culebra porewater was addressed by Wang (1998). Wang showed that the volume of secondary
 7 minerals precipitated because of this mechanism was too small to significantly affect matrix
 8 porosity and accessibility.

9 Consequently, the effects of borehole-induced mineralization on permeability and groundwater
 10 flow within the Culebra, as a result of brines introduced via any existing abandoned boreholes
 11 and boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near future, have been eliminated from PA
 12 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-5.2.1.12.4 Future Human EPs**

14 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
 15 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
 16 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
 17 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
 18 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive
 19 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
 20 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
 21 used.

22 **SCR-5.2.1.12.4.1 Borehole-Induced Mineralization**

23 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a future borehole may result in
 24 changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. However, the effects
 25 of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through a future borehole in the controlled area will
 26 be similar to the effects of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through an existing or near-
 27 future borehole (see FEP H32, Section SCR-5.2.1.10). Thus borehole-induced mineralization
 28 associated with flow through a future borehole has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 29 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.13 FEP Number: H36**

31 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes*

32 **SCR-5.2.1.13.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

33 DP (Future)

34 SO-C for units other than the Culebra

35 Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of long-term flow
 36 associated with HCN and future abandoned boreholes are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.13.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.13.3 Screening Argument**

4 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
5 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
6 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
7 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

8 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
9 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
10 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

11 **SCR-5.2.1.13.3.1 Geochemical Effects of Borehole Flow**

12 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
13 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such geochemical
14 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
15 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area, or if they occur as a result of
16 flow through existing boreholes within the controlled area through their effects on colloid
17 transport and sorption.

18 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
19 system. Thus, consistent with the discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4 (*Borehole-Induced*
20 *Geochemical Changes* [H24]), colloid transport as a result of flow through existing and near-
21 future abandoned boreholes has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
22 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
24 sorption model used accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of
25 flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes.

26 Consistent with the screening discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, the effects of changes in
27 sorption in the Dewey Lake inside the controlled area as a result of flow through existing and
28 near-future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
29 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units
30 of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-5.2.1.13.4 Future Human EPs**

33 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
34 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
35 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
36 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
37 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive

1 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
 2 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
 3 used.

4 **SCR-5.2.1.13.4.1 Geochemical Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

5 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
 6 changes in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such geochemical
 7 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
 8 through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

9 The waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Colloid
 10 transport within the Culebra as a result of long-term flow associated with future abandoned
 11 boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region are accounted for in PA calculations, as
 12 described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.1. Consistent with the
 13 discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, colloid transport as a result of flow through future abandoned
 14 boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region has been eliminated from PA
 15 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The
 16 Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal system and it is the most likely unit through
 17 which significant radionuclide transport could occur. Therefore, colloid transport in units other
 18 than the Culebra, as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes, has been eliminated
 19 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

20 As discussed in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
 21 calculations. The sorption model accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra
 22 as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes.

23 Consistent with the screening discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, the effects of changes in
 24 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of flow through future
 25 abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 26 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units
 27 of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 28 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

29 **SCR-5.2.2 Excavation-Induced Flow**

30 **SCR-5.2.2.1 FEP Number:** H37

31 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*

32 **SCR-5.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
 33 DP (Future)

34 *Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Mining* (HCN and future) are accounted for in PA
 35 calculations.

36 **SCR-5.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

37 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Excavation activities may result in hydrological disturbances of the disposal system. Subsidence
3 associated with excavations may affect groundwater flow patterns through increased hydraulic
4 conductivity within and between units. Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may also
5 result in changes in brine density and geochemistry in the disposal system.

6 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 Currently, potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of
8 the WIPP that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system.
9 Potash is mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the
10 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt Potash Zone in the Salado is expected to continue in the
11 vicinity of the WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all
12 economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be
13 extracted in the near future.

14 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3.2 Hydrogeological Effects of Mining**

15 Potash mining in the Delaware Basin typically involves constructing vertical shafts to the
16 elevation of the ore zone and then extracting the minerals in an excavation that follows the trend
17 of the ore body. Potash has been extracted using conventional room-and-pillar mining,
18 secondary mining where pillars are removed, and modified long-wall mining methods. Mining
19 techniques used include drilling and blasting (used for mining langbeinite) and continuous
20 mining (commonly used for mining sylvite). The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-19)
21 reported investigations of subsidence associated with potash mining operations located near the
22 WIPP. The reported maximum total subsidence at potash mines is about 1.5 m (5 ft),
23 representing up to 66% of initial excavation height, with an observed angle of draw from the
24 vertical at the edge of the excavation of 58 degrees. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994 pp. 2-22 to
25 2-23) found no evidence that subsidence over local potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient
26 to connect the mining horizon to water-bearing units or the surface. However, subsidence and
27 fracturing associated with mining in the McNutt in the vicinity of the WIPP may allow increased
28 recharge to the Rustler units and affect the lateral hydraulic conductivity of overlying units, such
29 as the Culebra, which could influence the direction and magnitude of fluid flow within the
30 disposal system. Such changes in groundwater flow due to mining are accounted for in
31 calculations of UP of the disposal system. The effects of any increased recharge that may be
32 occurring are, in effect, included by using heads measured in 2000 (which should reflect that
33 recharge) to calibrate Culebra transmissivity fields (T fields) and calculate transport through
34 those fields (Beauheim 2002). Changes (increases) in Culebra transmissivity are incorporated
35 directly in the modeling of flow and transport in the Culebra (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section
36 6.4.6.2.3).

37 Potash mining, and the associated processing outside the controlled area, have changed fluid
38 densities within the Culebra, as demonstrated by the areas of higher densities around boreholes
39 WIPP-27 and WIPP-29 (Davies 1989, p. 43). Transient groundwater flow calculations (Davies
40 1989, pp. 77–81) show that brine density variations to the west of the WIPP site caused by
41 historical and current potash processing operations will not persist because the rate of
42 groundwater flow in this area is fast enough to flush the high-density groundwaters to the Pecos
43 River. These calculations also show that accounting for the existing brine density variations in

1 the region east of the WIPP site, where hydraulic conductivities are low, would have little effect
 2 on the direction or rate of groundwater flow. Therefore, changes in fluid densities from
 3 historical and current human EPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 4 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 The distribution of existing leases and potash grades suggests that near-future mining will take
 6 place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see the CCA, Appendix DEL). A
 7 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra, in the mined region or elsewhere outside the
 8 controlled area, would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east).
 9 A comparison of the relative magnitudes of the pressure gradient and the density gradient (based
 10 on an analysis identical to that presented for fluid leakage to the Culebra through boreholes)
 11 shows that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-5.2.2.1.4 Future Human EPs**

13 Consistent with section 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
 14 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
 15 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
 16 area is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence
 17 modeling of future mining are provided in section 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be
 18 limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal
 19 system. Thus, consistent with section 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow due to mining
 20 within the controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal system (see
 21 the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3).

22 **SCR-5.2.2.2 FEP Number:** H38

23 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining*

24 **SCR-5.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 25 SO-R (Future)

26 *Changes in Geochemistry due to Mining* (HCN) have been eliminated from PA calculations on
 27 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Changes in*
 28 *Geochemistry due to Mining* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

31 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

32 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

33 Potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP
 34 that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. Potash is
 35 mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (1.5 mi) from the boundaries of the
 36 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt in the Salado is expected to continue in the vicinity of the
 37 WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all economically

1 recoverable potash in the vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be extracted in
2 the near future.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.2 Geochemical Effects of Mining**

4 Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may result in geochemical disturbances of the
5 disposal system. Some waters from the Culebra reflect the influence of current potash mining,
6 having elevated potassium to sodium ratios. However, potash mining has had no significant
7 effect on the geochemical characteristics of the disposal system. Solution mining, which
8 involves the injection of freshwater to dissolve the ore body, can be used for extracting sylvite.
9 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in greater detail by
10 D'Appolonia (1982). D'Appolonia noted that attempts to solution mine sylvite in the Delaware
11 Basin failed because of low ore grade, thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and
12 pumping injection water. See discussion in Section SCR-5.1.2.1 (*Conventional Underground*
13 *Potash Mining* [H13]). Thus changes in geochemistry due to mining (HCN) have been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
15 disposal system.

16 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.3 Future Human EPs**

17 Consistent with section 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
18 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
19 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
20 area is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence
21 modeling of future mining are provided in section 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be
22 limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal
23 system. Thus, consistent with section 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow as a result of
24 mining within the controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal
25 system (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3). Other potential effects, such as changes in
26 geochemistry due to mining, have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

27 **SCR-5.2.2.3 FEP Number** H58

28 **FEP Title:** *Solution Mining for Potash*

29 **SCR-5.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)

30 SO-R (Future)

31 HCN and future *Solution Mining for Potash* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
32 regulatory grounds. HCN and future solution mining for other resources has been eliminated
33 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

34 **SCR-5.2.2.3.2 Summary of New Information**

35 Plans for the development of a potash solution mine in the region continue, although the solution
36 process has not begun; the project remains in the permitting and planning stage. The project lies
37 outside the Delaware Basin, but the DOE maintains communication with the leaseholder and the
38 U.S. Bureau of Land Management to monitor project status.

1 **SCR-5.2.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 Currently, no solution mining for potash occurs in the CPD. The prospect of using solution-
 3 mining techniques for extracting potash has been identified in the region, but has not been
 4 implemented. A pilot plant for secondary solution mining of sylvite in the Clayton Basin, just
 5 north of the Delaware Basin was permitted, and concept planning took place during the mid-
 6 1990s and was noted by the EPA in their Response to Comments to the CCA (U.S.
 7 Environmental Agency 1998c). Continued progress has been made towards initiating this
 8 project, but as of the submittal of this recertification application, the project has not begun. The
 9 project intends to solution mine sylvite from retired underground mine workings at the old
 10 Potash Corporation of America lease. To date, discharge permits have been filed with the State
 11 of New Mexico, but are pending. Therefore, it is premature to consider this an operational
 12 solution mining activity. More importantly, the proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin.

13 The potash reserves evaluated by Griswold and Griswold (1999) and New Mexico Bureau of
 14 Mines and Mineral Resources (1995) at the WIPP are of economic importance in only two ore
 15 zones; the 4th and the 10th contain two minerals of economic importance, langbeinite and sylvite.
 16 The ore in the 10th ore zone is primarily sylvite with some langbeinite and the ore in the 4th zone
 17 is langbeinite with some sylvite. Langbeinite falls between gypsum and polyhalite in solubility
 18 and dissolves at a rate 1000 times slower than sylvite (Heyn 1997). Halite, the predominate
 19 gangue mineral present, is much more soluble than the langbeinite. Because of the insolubility of
 20 langbeinite, sylvite is the only potash ore in the WIPP vicinity that could be mined using a
 21 solution mining process. Mining for sylvite by solutioning would cause the langbeinite to be lost
 22 because conventional mining could not be done in conjunction with a solution mining process.

23 Communiqués with IMC Global (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003) indicate that rock temperature is
 24 critical to the success of a solution-mining endeavor. IMC Global's solution mines in Michigan
 25 and Saskatchewan are at depths of around 914 m (3,000 ft) or greater, at which rock
 26 temperatures are higher. The ore zones at the WIPP are shallow, at depths of 457 to 549 m
 27 (1,500 to 1,800 ft), with fairly cool rock temperatures. Prichard (2003) states that solution mining
 28 is energy intensive and the cool temperature of the rock would add to the energy costs. In
 29 addition, variable concentrations of confounding minerals (such as kainite and leonite) will cause
 30 problems with the brine chemistry.

31 Typically, solution mining is used for potash

- 32 • When deposits are at depths in excess of 914 m (3,000 ft) and rock temperatures are high,
 33 or are geologically too complex to mine profitably using conventional underground
 34 mining techniques
- 35 • To recover the potash pillars at the end of a mine's life
- 36 • When a mine is unintentionally flooded with waters from underlying or overlying rock
 37 strata and conventional mining is no longer feasible

38 Douglas W. Heyn (chief chemist of IMC Kalium) provided written testimony to the EPA related
 39 to the Agency's rulemaking activities on the CCA. Heyn concluded that "the rational choice for

1 extracting WIPP potash ore reserves would be by conventional room and pillar mechanical
2 means” (Heyn 1997). It is the opinion of IMC Global that no company will ever attempt solution
3 mining of the ores in or near the WIPP (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003).

4 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines and the possible effects of solution mining
5 for potash or other evaporite minerals were examined in detail by D’Appolonia (1982).
6 According to D’Appolonia (1982), and in agreement with Heyn (1997) of IMC Global, Inc.,
7 solution mining of langbeinite is not technically feasible because the ore is less soluble than the
8 surrounding evaporite minerals. Solution mining of sylvite was unsuccessfully attempted in the
9 past by the Potash Company of America and Continental Potash. Both ore bodies are currently
10 owned by Mississippi Chemical. Failure of solution mining was attributed to low ore grade,
11 thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and pumping injection water. Unavailability
12 of water in the area would also impede implementation of this technique. For these reasons,
13 solution mining is not currently used in the CPD.

14 Serious technical and economic obstacles exist that render solution mining for potash very
15 unlikely in the vicinity of the WIPP. Expectedly, no operational example of this technology
16 exists in the CPD; that is, solution mining for potash is not considered a current practice in the
17 area. For this reason, consideration of solution mining on the disposal system in the future may
18 be excluded on regulatory grounds. For example, the EPA stated in their Response to
19 Comments, Section 8, Issue GG (EPA 1998c):

20 ...However, the Agency emphasizes that, in accordance with the WIPP compliance criteria,
21 solution mining does not need to be included in the PA. As previously discussed, potash solution
22 mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin. Section 194.32(b) of the rule limits
23 assessment of mining effects to excavation mining. Thus the solution mining scenarios proposed
24 are excluded on regulatory grounds after repository closure. Prior to or soon after disposal,
25 solution mining is an activity that could be considered under Section 194.32(c). However, DOE
26 found that potash solution mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin; and one pilot
27 project examining solution mining in the Basin is not substantive evidence that such mining is
28 expected to occur in the near future. (Even if mining were assumed to occur in the near future, the
29 proposed scenarios would not be possible because, even though solution mining might occur, there
30 would be no intruding borehole to provide a pathway into the repository: active institutional
31 controls would preclude such drilling during the first 100 years after disposal.) Furthermore,
32 Section 194.33(d) states that PA need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource
33 recovery (e.g. solution mining) after a borehole is drilled in the future.

34 No new data or information have become available that compromise, reduce, or invalidate the
35 project’s position on whether solution mining for potash should be included in the PA
36 calculations. Therefore, conventional mining activities will continue to be incorporated into the
37 WIPP PA as directed by the EPA CAG (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996b). It
38 remains to be seen if a viable potash solution mining project (or others like it) ever progress
39 beyond the planning phase. Construction of a facility for solution mining is an expensive
40 undertaking, and its use as a final recovery method implies that marginal (residual) ore quantities
41 are available. Because the CPD mines are in their mature (declining) stages of production, the
42 significant financing required for a solution mining facility may not become available.
43 Nonetheless, at the time of this FEP reassessment, this technology is not being employed.
44 Therefore, a screening based on the future states assumption at section 194.25(a) is appropriate

1 for this mining technique. Further, the proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin, making it
2 outside the scope of consideration.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.4 FEP Number:** H59

4 **FEP Title:** *Solution Mining for Other Resources*

5 **SCR-5.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
6 SO-C (Future)

7 HCN and future *Solution Mining for Other Resources* have been eliminated from PA
8 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-5.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 Brine well information provided in Table SCR-3 has been updated based on new information
11 from the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program (U.S. Department of Energy 2007b). Since the
12 CRA-2004, active brine wells have increased from 11 to 12 wells.

13 **SCR-5.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

14 Brine wells (solution mining for brine) exist within the Delaware Basin, although none within
15 the vicinity of the WIPP. Sulfur extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and
16 continued for three decades at the Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas.
17 Solution mining for the purposes of creating a storage cavity has not occurred within the New
18 Mexico portion of the Delaware Basin.

19 **SCR-5.2.2.4.4 Solution Mining for Brine**

20 Oil and gas reserves in the Delaware Basin are located in structures within the Delaware
21 Mountain Group and lower stratigraphic units. Boreholes drilled to reach these horizons pass
22 through the Salado and Castile that comprise thick halite and other evaporite units. To avoid
23 dissolution of the halite units during drilling and prior to casing of the borehole, the fluid used
24 for lubrication, rotating the drilling-bit cutters, and transporting cuttings (drilling mud) must be
25 saturated with respect to halite. Most oil- and gas-field drilling operations in the Delaware Basin
26 therefore use saturated brine (10 to 10.5 pounds per gallon [lb/gal]) as a drilling fluid until
27 reaching the Bell Canyon, where intermediate casing is set.

28 One method of providing saturated brine for drilling operations is solution mining, whereby fresh
29 water is pumped into the Salado, allowed to reach saturation with respect to halite, and then
30 recovered. This manufactured brine is then transported to the drilling site by water tanker.

31 Two principal techniques are used for solution mining: single-borehole operations and doublet or
32 two-borehole operations.

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Eddy	22S-26E-36	3001521842	City of Carlsbad #WS-1	Key Energy Services	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-03	3001520331	Tracy #3	Ray Westall	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001522574	Eugenie #WS-1	I & W Inc	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001523031	Eugenie #WS-2	I & W Inc	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-23	3001528083	Dunaway #1	Mesquite SWD, Inc.	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-03	4230110142	Lineberry Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-82	4230130680	Chapman Ford #BR1	Herricks & Son Co.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 33-80	4230180318	Mentone Brine Station #1D	Basic Energy Services	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-28	4230180319	East Mentone Brine Station #1	Permian Brine Sales, Inc.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-83	4230180320	North Mentone #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 56-30	4238900408	Orla Brine Station #1D	Mesquite SWD Inc.	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 04-08	4238920100	North Pecos Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 07-21	4238980476	Coyanosa Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 17-20	4247531742	Pyote Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 01-13	4247534514	Quito West Unit #207	Seaboard Oil Co.	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 34-174	4247582265	Barstow Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well

1

2 In single-borehole operations, a borehole is drilled into the upper part of the halite unit. After
 3 casing and cementing this portion of the borehole, the borehole is extended, uncased, into the
 4 halite formation. An inner pipe is installed from the surface to the base of this uncased portion
 5 of the borehole. During operation, fresh water is pumped down the annulus of the borehole.
 6 This dissolves halite over the uncased portion of the borehole, and saturated brine is forced up
 7 the inner tube to the surface.

8 In doublet operations, a pair of boreholes are drilled, cased, and cemented into the upper part of
 9 the halite unit. The base of the production well is set some feet below the base of the injection
 10 well. In the absence of natural fractures or other connections between the boreholes,
 11 hydrofracturing is used to induce fractures around the injection well. During operation, fresh
 12 water is pumped down the injection well. This initially dissolves halite from the walls of the
 13 fractures and the resulting brine is then pumped from the production well. After a period of
 14 operation a cavity develops between the boreholes as the halite between fractures is removed.
 15 Because of its lower density, fresh water injected into this cavity will rise to the top and dissolve

1 halite from the roof of the cavity. As the brine density increases it sinks within the cavern and
2 saturated brine is extracted from the production well.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.4.4.1 Current Brine Wells within the Delaware Basin**

4 Brine wells are classified as Class II injection wells. In the Delaware Basin, the process includes
5 injecting fresh water into a salt formation to create a saturated brine solution which is then
6 extracted and utilized as a drilling agent. These wells are tracked by the DBDSP on a continuing
7 basis. Supplemental information provided to the EPA in 1997 showed 11 brine wells in the
8 Delaware Basin. Since that time, additional information has shown that there are 16 brine wells
9 within the Delaware basin, of which 4 are plugged and abandoned. This results in 12 currently
10 active brine wells. Table SCR-3 provides information on these wells.

11 While these wells are within the Delaware Basin, none are within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
12 nearest brine well to the WIPP is the Eugenie #WS-1, located within the city limits of Carlsbad,
13 New Mexico. This well is approximately 48 km (30 mi) from the WIPP site.

14 **SCR-5.2.2.4.5 Solution Mining for Other Minerals**

15 Currently, there are no ongoing solution mining activities within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
16 Rustler Springs sulfur mine located in Culberson County, Texas, began operations in 1969 and
17 continued until it was officially closed in 1999. This mine used the Frasch process (superheated
18 water injection) to extract molten sulfur (Cunningham 1999).

19 **SCR-5.2.2.4.6 Solution Mining for Gas Storage**

20 No gas storage cavities have been solution mined within the New Mexico portion of the
21 Delaware Basin. Five gas storage facilities exist within the general vicinity of the WIPP;
22 however, only one is within the Delaware basin. This one New Mexico Delaware Basin facility
23 uses a depleted gas reservoir for storage and containment; it was not solution mined (see the
24 CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment A, Section DATA-A-5.4).

25 **SCR-5.2.2.4.7 Solution Mining for Disposal**

26 Solution mining can be used to create a disposal cavity in bedded salt. Such disposal cavities can
27 be used for the disposal of naturally occurring radioactive material or other wastes. No such
28 cavities have been mined or operated within the vicinity of the WIPP.

29 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8 Effects of Solution Mining**

30 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.1 Subsidence**

31 Regardless of whether the single-borehole or two-borehole technique is used for solution mining,
32 the result is a subsurface cavity which could collapse and lead to subsidence of overlying strata.
33 Gray (1991) quoted earlier analyses that show cavity stability is relatively high if the cavity has
34 at least 15 m (50 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of cavity volume (26.9 m per
35 50,000 m³). There are two studies – discussed below – on the size of solution-mining cavities in
36 the Carlsbad, New Mexico region. These studies concern the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine Wells and

1 the Carlsbad Brine Well and show that neither of these cavities are currently close to this critical
2 ratio, but that subsidence in the future, given continued brine extraction, is a possibility.

3 Hickerson (1991) considered the potential for subsidence resulting from operation of the
4 Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells, where fresh water is injected into a salt section at a depth of
5 178 m (583 ft) and brine is recovered through a borehole at a depth of 179 m (587 ft). The
6 boreholes are 100 m (327 ft) apart. Hickerson noted that the fresh water, being less dense than
7 brine, tends to move upwards, causing the dissolution cavern to grow preferentially upwards.
8 Thus the dissolution cavern at the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells is approximately triangular in
9 cross-section, being bounded by the top of the salt section and larger near the injection well.
10 Hickerson estimated that brine production from 1979 until 1991 had created a cavern of about
11 $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$). The size of this cavern was estimated as 107 m (350 ft) by 47 m
12 (153 ft) at the upper surface of the cavern with a depth of 39 m (127 ft).

13 Gray (1991) investigated the potential for collapse and subsidence at the Carlsbad Brine Well.
14 Based on estimated production rates between 1976 and 1991, approximately $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times$
15 10^6 ft^3) of salt has been dissolved at this site. The well depth is 216 m (710 ft), and thus there are
16 about 64 m (210 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of capacity (112 m of overburden per
17 $50,000 \text{ m}^3$ of capacity).

18 Gray (1991) also estimated the time required for the cavity at the Carlsbad Brine Well to reach
19 the critical ratio. At an average cavity growth rate of $6.4 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per year ($2.25 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per
20 year), a further 50 years of operation would be required before cavity stability was reduced to
21 levels of concern. A similar calculation for the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine well, based on an
22 overburden of 140 m (460 ft) and an estimated average cavity growth rate of $7.9 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per
23 year ($2.8 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per year), shows that a further 15 years of operation is required before the
24 cavity reaches the critical ratio.

25 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.2 Hydrogeological Effects**

26 In regions where solution mining takes place, the hydrogeology could be affected in a number
27 ways:

- 28 • Subsidence above a large dissolution cavity could change the vertical and lateral
29 hydraulic conductivity of overlying units.
- 30 • Extraction of fresh water from aquifers for solution mining could cause local changes in
31 pressure gradients.
- 32 • Loss of injected fresh water or extracted brine to overlying units could cause local
33 changes in pressure gradients.

34 The potential for subsidence to take place above solution mining operations in the region of
35 Carlsbad, New Mexico is discussed above. Some subsidence could occur in the future if brine
36 operations continue at existing wells. Resulting fracturing may change permeabilities locally in
37 overlying formations. However, because of the restricted scale of the solution mining at a
38 particular site, and the distances between such wells, such fracturing will have no significant
39 effect on hydrogeology near the WIPP.

1 Solution mining operations in the Delaware Basin extract water from shallow aquifers so that,
2 even if large drawdowns are permitted, the effects on the hydrogeology will be limited to a
3 relatively small area around the operation. Since all the active operations are more than 32 km
4 (20 mi) from the WIPP, there will be no significant effects on the hydrogeology near the WIPP.

5 Discharge plans for solution mining operations typically include provision for annual mechanical
6 integrity tests at one and one-half the normal operating pressure for four hours (New Mexico Oil
7 Conservation Division 1994). Thus the potential for loss of integrity and consequent leakage of
8 freshwater or brine to overlying formations is low. If, despite these annual tests, large water
9 losses did take place from either injection or production wells, the result would be low brine
10 yields and remedial actions would most likely be taken by the operators.

11 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.3 Geochemical Effects**

12 Solution mining operations could affect the geochemistry of surface or subsurface water near the
13 operation if there were brine leakage from storage tanks or production wells. Discharge plans for
14 solution mining operations specify the measures to be taken to prevent leakage and to mitigate
15 the effects of any that do take place. These measures include berms around tanks and annual
16 mechanical integrity testing of wells (New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1994). The
17 potential for changes in geochemistry is therefore low, and any brine losses that did take place
18 would be limited by remedial actions taken by the operator. In the event of leakage from a
19 production well, the effect on geochemistry of overlying formation waters would be localized
20 and, given the distance of such wells from the WIPP site, such leakage would have no significant
21 effect on geochemistry near the WIPP.

22 **SCR-5.2.2.4.9 Conclusion of Low Consequence**

23 Brine production through solution mining takes place in the Delaware Basin, and the DOE
24 assumes it will continue in the near future. Because of the existence of these solution operations,
25 it is not possible to screen this activity based on the provisions of section 194.25(a). However,
26 despite oil and gas exploration and production taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP site, the
27 nearest operating solution mine is more than 32 km (20 mi) from the WIPP site. These locations
28 are too far from the WIPP site for any changes in hydrogeology or geochemistry, from
29 subsidence or fresh water or brine leakage, to affect the performance of the disposal system.
30 Thus the effects of HCN and future solution mining for other resources in the Delaware Basin
31 can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
32 the disposal system.

33 **SCR-5.2.3 Explosion-Induced Flow**

34 **SCR-5.2.3.1 FEP Number:** H39

35 **FEPs Title:** Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions

36 **SCR-5.2.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
37 SO-R (Future)

38 *Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Explosions* (HCN) have been eliminated from PA
39 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 Changes in groundwater flow that may be caused by future explosions have been eliminated
2 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.2.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

4 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

5 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

6 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 The small-scale explosions that have been used in the Delaware Basin to fracture oil- and
8 natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery have been too deep to have disturbed the
9 hydrology of the disposal system (see FEP H19, Section SCR-5.1.3.1).

10 Also, as discussed in Section SCR-5.1.3.2 (*Underground Nuclear Device Testing [H20]*), the
11 Delaware Basin has been used for an isolated nuclear test (Project Gnome), approximately 13 km
12 (8 mi) southwest of the WIPP waste disposal region. An induced zone of increased permeability
13 was observed to extend 46 m (150 ft) laterally from the point of the explosion. The increase in
14 permeability was primarily associated with motions and separations along bedding planes, the
15 major preexisting weaknesses in the rock. This region of increased permeability is too far from
16 the WIPP site to have had a significant effect on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal
17 system. Thus changes in groundwater flow due to explosions in the past have been eliminated
18 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3.2 Future Human EPs**

20 The criterion in section 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of future
21 human actions to mining and drilling. Also, consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not
22 analyze the effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future
23 borehole. Therefore, changes in groundwater flow due to explosions in the future have been
24 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.3 Geomorphological EPS**

26 **SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes**

27 **SCR-5.3.1.1 FEP Number:** H40

28 **FEP Title:** *Land Use Changes*

29 **SCR-5.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
30 SO-R (Future)

31 *Land Use Changes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

32 **SCR-5.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
3 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
4 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
5 through H46 (Section SCR-5.4.1.1, Section SCR-5.4.1.2, and Section SCR-5.4.1.3).

6 **SCR-5.3.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
8 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
9 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
10 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
11 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
12 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
13 potash and WIPP), and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
14 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

15 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
16 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately
17 10 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash
18 Draw, and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in
19 Nash Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East
20 site, the youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
21 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
22 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
23 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
24 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
25 Culebra flow models. The Culebra T fields developed for the CRA used water levels measured
26 in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus the effects of brine disposal at the tailings
27 piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are expected to continue
28 in the near future.

29 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
30 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (U.S.
31 Department of Energy 2007b). Therefore, consistent with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and 40
32 CFR § 194.54(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), land use changes in the near
33 future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
34 grounds.

35 **SCR-5.3.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

36 The criterion in section 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
37 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
38 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
39 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no

1 future land use changes need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
2 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.3.1.2 FEP Number:** H41
4 **FEP Title:** *Surface Disruptions*

5 **SCR-5.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
6 SO-C (Future)

7 The effects of HCN *Surface Disruptions* are accounted for in PA calculations. The effects of
8 future *Surface Disruptions* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
9 consequence.

10 **SCR-5.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

11 The screening decision has been changed from SO-R to SO-C. The EPA's TSD for Features,
12 Events, and Processes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006) identified an inconsistency
13 between the screening decision and the screening rationale. After review, it has been determined
14 that SO-C is the correct screening decision and the previous classification of SO-R is not correct.

15 **SCR-5.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

16 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
17 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
18 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
19 through H46.

20 **SCR-5.3.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

21 Most surface activities have no potential to affect the disposal system and are, therefore,
22 screened out on the basis of low consequence (e.g., archaeological excavations and arable
23 farming). However, the effects of activities capable of altering the disposal system (disposal of
24 potash effluent) are included in the modeling of current conditions (i.e., heads) at and around the
25 site. Discussion regarding these anthropogenic effects is found in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0,
26 Section 2.2.1.4.2.2.

27 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
28 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
29 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
30 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
31 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
32 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
33 potash and WIPP), and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
34 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

35 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
36 the WIPP site. These are the MPI East tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due north of the

1 WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash Draw, and the IMC Kalium
2 tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in Nash Draw. These tailings
3 piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East site, the youngest of the piles,
4 began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler groundwaters in Nash Draw, as
5 shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine
6 disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects likely propagate to the WIPP
7 site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level monitoring for the WIPP and have been
8 implicitly included when defining boundary heads for Culebra flow models. The Culebra T
9 fields developed for the CRA used water levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary
10 conditions. Thus the effects of brine disposal at the tailings piles can be considered to be
11 included in PA calculations. These effects are expected to continue in the near future.

12 **SCR-5.3.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

13 Future tailings ponds, if situated in Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta)
14 heads, similar to existing ones. Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be
15 expected to alter Culebra heads because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate
16 through the low-permeability lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the
17 Culebra during the 100 years or less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA
18 calculations already include the present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as
19 well as the effects of future potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much
20 greater potential to alter flow than changes in head), future surface disruptions affecting
21 hydrologic or geologic conditions (such as potash tailings ponds) may be screened out on the
22 basis of low consequence.

23 **SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological EPs**

24 **SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use**

25 **SCR-5.4.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H42, H43, and H44

26 **FEP Titles:** *Damming of Streams and Rivers* (H42)
27 *Reservoirs* (H43)
28 *Irrigation* (H44)

29 **SCR-5.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) 30 SO-R (Future)

31 The effects of HCN *Damming of Streams and Rivers*, *Reservoirs*, and *Irrigation* have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system. Future *Damming of Streams and Rivers*, *Reservoirs*, and *Irrigation* have been
34 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

35 **SCR-5.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

36 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

1 **SCR-5.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
3 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
4 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake.

5 **SCR-5.4.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

6 In the WIPP area, two topographically low features, the Pecos River and Nash Draw, are
7 sufficiently large to warrant consideration for damming. Dams and reservoirs already exist along
8 the Pecos River. However, the Pecos River is far enough from the waste panels (19 km [12 mi])
9 that the effects of damming of streams and rivers and reservoirs can be eliminated from PA
10 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Nash
11 Draw is not currently dammed, and based on current hydrological and climatic conditions, there
12 is no reason to believe it will be dammed in the near future.

13 Irrigation uses water from rivers, lakes, impoundments, and wells to supplement the rainfall in an
14 area to grow crops. Irrigation in arid environments needs to be efficient and involves the
15 spreading of a relatively thin layer of water for uptake by plants, so little water would be
16 expected to infiltrate beyond the root zone. However, some water added to the surface may
17 infiltrate and reach the water table, affecting groundwater flow patterns. Irrigation currently
18 takes place on a small scale within the Delaware Basin but not in the vicinity of the WIPP, and
19 the extent of irrigation is not expected to change in the near future. Such irrigation has no
20 significant effect on the characteristics of the disposal system. Thus the effects of irrigation have
21 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
22 disposal system.

23 **SCR-5.4.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

24 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
25 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
26 effects of future damming of streams and rivers, reservoirs, and irrigation have been eliminated
27 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

28 **SCR-5.4.1.2 FEP Number:** H45
29 **FEP Title:** *Lake Usage*

30 **SCR-5.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
31 SO-R (Future)

32 The effects of *Lake Usage* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

33 **SCR-5.4.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

34 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.4.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 3 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 4 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
 5 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry. Note that the
 6 potential effects of geomorphological changes through land use are discussed in Section SCR-
 7 5.3.1.1 and Section SCR-5.3.1.2.

8 **SCR-5.4.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

9 As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.2, there are no major natural lakes or ponds
 10 within 8 km (5 mi) of the site. To the northwest, west, and southwest, Red Lake, Lindsey Lake,
 11 and Laguna Grande de la Sal are more than 8 km (5 mi) from the site, at elevations of 914 to
 12 1,006 m (3,000 to 3,300 ft). Laguna Gatuña, Laguna Tonto, Laguna Plata, and Laguna Toston
 13 are playas more than 16 km (10 mi) north and are at elevations of 1,050 m (3,450 ft) or higher.

14 Waters from these lakes are of limited use. Therefore human activities associated with lakes
 15 have been screened out of PA calculations based on regulatory grounds supported by section
 16 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b).

17 **SCR-5.4.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

18 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
 19 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
 20 effects of future lake usage have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

21 **SCR-5.4.1.3 FEP Number:** H46

22 **FEP Title:** *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human*
 23 *Activities*

24 **SCR-5.4.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 25 SO-R (Future)

26 The effects of HCN *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities* have been
 27 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 28 disposal system. Future *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities* have been
 29 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

30 **SCR-5.4.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

31 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

32 **SCR-5.4.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

33 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 34 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow

1 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
2 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry.

3 **SCR-5.4.1.3.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

4 Potash mining effluent and runoff from oil fields have altered soil and surface water chemistry in
5 the vicinity of the WIPP. However, the performance of the disposal system will not be sensitive
6 to soil and surface water chemistry. Therefore, altered soil or surface water chemistry by human
7 activities has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
8 performance of the disposal system. The effects of effluent from potash processing on
9 groundwater flow are discussed in H37 (Section SCR-5.2.2.1).

10 **SCR-5.4.1.3.5 Future Human EPs**

11 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
12 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
13 effects of future altered soil or surface water chemistry by human activities have been eliminated
14 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.5 Climatic EPs**

16 **SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change**

17 **SCR-5.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H47, H48, and H49

18 **FEP Titles:** *Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)*
19 *Acid Rain (H48)*
20 *Damage to the Ozone Layer (N49)*

21 **SCR-5.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN) 22 SO-R (Future)

23 The effects of anthropogenic climate change (*Acid Rain, Greenhouse Gas Effects, and Damage*
24 *to the Ozone Layer*) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

27 **SCR-5.5.1.1.3 Anthropogenic Climate Change**

28 The effects of the current climate and natural climatic change are accounted for in PA
29 calculations, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9 and Appendix PA-2009,
30 Section PA-4.8. However, human activities may also affect the future climate and thereby
31 influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. The effects of anthropogenic climate
32 change may be on a local to regional scale (acid rain) or on a regional to global scale
33 (greenhouse gas effects and damage to the ozone layer). Of these anthropogenic effects, only the
34 greenhouse gas effect could influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. However,

1 consistent with the future states assumptions in section 194.25, compliance assessments and PAs
2 need not consider indirect anthropogenic effects on disposal system performance. Therefore, the
3 effects of anthropogenic climate change have been eliminated from PA calculations on
4 regulatory grounds.

5 **SCR-5.6 Marine EPs**

6 **SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities**

7 **SCR-5.6.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H50, H51, and H52

8 **FEP Titles:** *Coastal Water Use (H50)*

9 *Seawater Use (H51)*

10 *Estuarine Water Use (H52)*

11 **SCR-5.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)

12 SO-R (Future)

13 HCN, and future *Coastal Water Use*, *Seawater Use*, and *Estuarine Water Use* have been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

17 **SCR-5.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 This section discusses the potential for human EPs related to marine activities to affect
19 infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP.

20 **SCR-5.6.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

21 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the nearest seas, and hydrological conditions
22 in the vicinity of the WIPP have not been affected by marine activities. Furthermore, consistent
23 with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b), consideration of HCN human
24 activities is limited to those activities that have occurred or are expected to occur in the vicinity
25 of the disposal system. Therefore, Human EPs related to marine activities (such as coastal water
26 use, seawater use, and estuarine water use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on
27 regulatory grounds.

28 **SCR-5.6.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

29 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
30 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
31 effects of future marine activities (such as coastal water use, seawater use, and estuarine water
32 use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.7 Ecological EPs**

2 **SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities**

3 **SCR-5.7.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H53, H54, and H55

4 **FEP Titles:** *Arable Farming* (H53)

5 *Ranching* (H54)

6 *Fish Farming* (H55)

7 **SCR-5.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) (H53, H54)

8 SO-R (HCN) (H55)

9 SO-R (Future) (H53, H54, H55)

10 The effects of HCN *Ranching* and *Arable Farming* have been eliminated from PA calculations
11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effects of
12 changes in future *Ranching* and *Arable Farming* practices have been eliminated from PA
13 calculations on regulatory grounds. *Fish Farming* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
14 regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

17 **SCR-5.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Agricultural activities could affect infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the
19 WIPP. Also, application of acids, oxidants, and nitrates during agricultural practice could alter
20 groundwater geochemistry.

21 **SCR-5.7.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

22 Grazing leases exist for all land sections immediately surrounding the WIPP and grazing occurs
23 within the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.2.2). Although grazing and
24 related crop production have had some control on the vegetation at the WIPP site, these activities
25 are unlikely to have affected subsurface hydrological or geochemical conditions. The climate,
26 soil quality, and lack of suitable water sources all mitigate against agricultural development of
27 the region in the near future. Therefore, the effects of HCN ranching and arable farming have
28 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
29 disposal system. Consistent with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b),
30 agricultural activities, such as fish farming, that have not taken place and are not expected to take
31 place in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on
32 regulatory grounds.

33 **SCR-5.7.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

34 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
35 the scope of consideration of future human activities in PAs to mining and drilling. Also, the

1 criterion in section 194.25(a) concerned with predictions of the future states of society requires
2 that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future remain what
3 they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.” Therefore, the effects of changes in
4 future agricultural practices (such as ranching, arable farming, and fish farming) have been
5 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

6 **SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development**

7 **SCR-5.7.2.1 FEP Number:** H56

8 **FEP Title:** *Demographic Change and Urban Development*

9 **SCR-5.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
10 SO-R (Future)

11 *Demographic Change and Urban Development* in the near future and in the future have been
12 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

13 **SCR-5.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

15 **SCR-5.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

16 Social and technological changes in the future could result in the development of new
17 communities and new activities in the vicinity of the WIPP that could have an impact on the
18 performance of the disposal system.

19 Demography in the WIPP vicinity is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.2.1. The
20 community nearest to the WIPP site is the town of Loving, 29 km (18 mi) west-southwest of the
21 site center. There are no existing plans for urban developments in the vicinity of the WIPP in the
22 near future. Furthermore, the criterion in section 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the
23 future states of society, requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that
24 characteristics of the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is
25 prepared.” Therefore, demographic change and urban development in the vicinity of the WIPP
26 and technological developments have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
27 grounds.

28 **SCR-5.7.2.2 FEP Number:** H57

29 **FEP Title:** *Loss of Records*

30 **SCR-5.7.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** **Not Applicable** (N/A) (HCN)
31 DP (Future)

32 *Loss of Records* in the future is accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-5.7.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-5.7.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

4 Because the DOE will maintain control for the current period throughout the active institutional
5 period (100 years after closure), inadvertent drilling intrusion resulting from the loss of records is
6 not applicable during the HCN period. However, PAs must consider the potential effects of
7 human activities that might take place within the controlled area at a time when institutional
8 controls cannot be assumed to eliminate completely the possibility of human intrusion.
9 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.41(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), the DOE
10 assumes no credit for AICs for more than 100 years after disposal. Also, consistent with 40 CFR
11 § 194.43(c) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), the DOE originally assumed in the
12 CCA that passive institutional controls (PICs) do not eliminate the likelihood of future human
13 intrusion entirely. The provisions at section 194.43(c) allow credit for PICs by reducing the
14 likelihood of human intrusions for several hundred years. In U.S. Department of Energy 1996a,
15 the DOE took credit for these controls that include records retention by reducing the probability
16 of intrusion for the first 600 years after active controls cease. The EPA disallowed this credit
17 during the original certification (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The DOE no
18 longer takes credit for PICs in PA, effectively assuming that all public records and archives
19 relating to the repository are lost 100 years after closure. Therefore, the DOE continues to
20 include the loss of records FEP within PA and does not include credit for PICs.

1 **SCR-6.0 Waste and Repository-Induced FEPs**

2 This section presents screening arguments and decisions for waste- and repository-induced FEPs.
3 There are 114 waste- and repository-induced FEPs used in the CRA-2009. Of these, 74 remain
4 unchanged since the CRA-2004 and 26 were updated with new information. Further, 7 FEPs
5 have been split into 14 similar, but more descriptive, FEPs since the CRA-2004.

6 **SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics**

7 **SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics**

8 **SCR-6.1.1.1 FEP Number:** W1
9 **FEP Title:** *Disposal Geometry*

10 **SCR-6.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

11 The WIPP repository *Disposal Geometry* is accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 Representation of the repository within the PA has not changed since the CRA-2004; the
14 screening argument and decision remain unchanged. Disposal geometry is accounted for in PA
15 calculations.

16 **SCR-6.1.1.2 Screening Argument**

17 Disposal geometry is described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.2 and is accounted for
18 in the setup of PA calculations (the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2).

19 **SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics**

20 **SCR-6.1.2.1 FEP Number:** W2 and W3
21 **FEP Title:** *Waste Inventory*
22 *Heterogeneity of Waste Forms*

23 **SCR-6.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (W2)
24 DP (W3)

25 The *Waste Inventory* and *Heterogeneity of Waste Forms* are accounted for in PA calculations.

26 **SCR-6.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

27 The waste inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA calculations is the same as used for the
28 CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) (see Clayton 2008 and Leigh
29 et al. 2005). Since these FEPs are accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from
30 that used in the in previous PAs; however, the screening decision has not changed.

1 **SCR-6.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Waste characteristics, comprising the waste inventory and heterogeneity of waste forms, are
3 described in the CCA, Appendix BIR. The waste inventory is accounted for in PA calculations
4 in deriving the dissolved actinide source term (see the CRA-2004, Appendix SOTERM) and gas
5 generation rates (see Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005, Section 2.3). The distribution of contact-
6 handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-
7 TRU) waste within the repository leads to room-scale heterogeneity of the waste forms, which is
8 accounted for in PA calculations when considering the potential activity of waste material
9 encountered during inadvertent borehole intrusion (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-3.8).

10 **SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics**

11 **SCR-6.1.3.1 FEP Number:** W4

12 **FEP Title:** *Container Form*

13 **SCR-6.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C – Beneficial

14 The *Container Form* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
15 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-6.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

17 The physical form of the containers is conservatively ignored in performance calculations. Some
18 inventory information has been updated since the CRA-2004. This inventory is slightly different
19 than that used for the CRA-2004, although no changes affect the container form. As such,
20 changes represented in the inventory used for this application do not affect this FEP or its
21 screening decision.

22 **SCR-6.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

23 The container form has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of its beneficial effect
24 on retarding radionuclide release. The PA assumes instantaneous container failure and waste
25 dissolution consistent with the source-term model, even though WIPP performance calculations
26 show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain undegraded over
27 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). All these undegraded container materials will (1) prevent
28 contact between brine and radionuclides; (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide
29 transport because of high tortuosity along the flow pathways and, as a result, increase
30 opportunities for metallic iron (Fe) and corrosion products to beneficially reduce radionuclides to
31 lower oxidation states. Therefore, the container form can be eliminated on the basis of its
32 beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. In the CCA, Appendix WCL, a minimum
33 quantity of metallic Fe was specified to ensure sufficient reactants to reduce radionuclides to
34 lower and less soluble oxidation states. This requirement is met as long as there are no
35 substantial changes in container materials. The inventory used for the CRA-2009 indicates that
36 the density of steel in container materials currently reported by the sites has an average value of
37 170 kg/m³. This is the same value used for the CRA-2004, but represents an increase over what
38 was reported for the CCA (139 to 230 kg/m³) (8.6 to 14.3 lb/ft³). Therefore, the current

1 inventory estimates indicate that there is a sufficient quantity of metallic iron to ensure reduction
2 of radionuclides to lower and less soluble oxidation states.

3 **SCR-6.1.3.2 FEP Number:** W5
4 **FEP Title:** *Container Material Inventory*

5 **SCR-6.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 The *Container Material Inventory* is accounted for in PA calculations.

7 **SCR-6.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified that relates to this FEP.

9 **SCR-6.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

10 The container material inventory is described in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), and is accounted
11 for in PA calculations through the estimation of gas generation rates (see Appendix PA-2009,
12 Section PA-4.2.5).

13 **SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics**

14 **SCR-6.1.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W6, W7, W109, and W110
15 **FEP Titles:** *Shaft Seal Geometry (W6)*
16 *Shaft Seal Physical Properties (W7)*
17 *Panel Closure Geometry (W109)*
18 *Panel Closure Physical Properties (W110)*

19 **SCR-6.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

20 The *Shaft Seal Geometry*, *Shaft Seal Physical Properties*, *Panel Closure Geometry*, and *Panel*
21 *Closure Properties* are accounted for in PA calculations.

22 **SCR-6.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

23 FEPs related to seals (generic) have been renamed to differentiate between panel closures and
24 shaft seals. While analyzing the impacts of redesigned panel closures on the FEPs baseline, it
25 was concluded that the current FEPs do not accurately represent these seal types (Kirkes 2006).
26 Because a redesigned panel closure system has not been approved or implemented, new
27 screening arguments are not appropriate at this time, but if the request for a redesigned panel
28 closure system is approved, revised screening arguments may be warranted to better describe the
29 panel closure physical properties (i.e., crushed salt versus concrete).

30 **SCR-6.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including shaft seal geometry,
32 panel closure geometry, seal physical properties, and panel closure physical properties are

1 described in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.2 and are accounted for in PA calculations
2 through the representation of the seal system and panel closures in BRAGFLO and the
3 permeabilities assigned to the shaft seal and panel closure materials (see Appendix PA-2009,
4 Section PA-4.2.7 and Section PA-4.2.8).

5 **SCR-6.1.4.2 FEP Numbers:** W8, W111

6 **FEP Titles:** *Shaft Seal Chemical Composition (W8)*

7 *Panel Closure Chemical Composition (W111)*

8 **SCR-6.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

9 The *Shaft Seal Chemical Composition* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
10 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 **SCR-6.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

12 These FEPs have been retitled as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure
13 Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006).

14 **SCR-6.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 The effect of shaft seal chemical composition and panel closure chemical composition on
16 actinide speciation and mobility has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
17 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-6.1.4.2.4 Repository Seals (Shaft and Panel Closures)**

19 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
20 alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
21 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
22 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 – 325). At high pH values, the speciation and
23 adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced
24 in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in
25 dissolved form.

26 Several publications describe strong actinide (or actinide analog) sorption by cement
27 (Altenheinhaese et al. 1994; Wierczinski et al. 1998; Pointeau et al. 2001), or sequestration by
28 incorporation into cement alteration phases (Gougar et al. 1996, Dickson and Glasser 2000).
29 These provide support for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement
30 seals and the brine will be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The effects of cementitious materials in shaft seals and panel closures on groundwater chemistry
32 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
33 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics**

2 **SCR-6.1.5.1 FEP Number:** W9

3 **FEP Title:** *Backfill Physical Properties*

4 **SCR-6.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Backfill Physical Properties* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

9 **SCR-6.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 A chemical backfill is being added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
11 backfill characteristics were previously described in the CCA, Appendix BACK with additional
12 information contained in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.3.4.3.
13 The mechanical and thermal effects of backfill are discussed in W35 (Section SCR-6.3.5.4) and
14 W72 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1) respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA calculations
15 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill will result
16 in an initial permeability for the disposal room lower than that of an empty cavity, so neglecting
17 the hydrological effects of backfill is a conservative assumption with regard to brine inflow and
18 radionuclide migration. Thus backfill physical properties have been eliminated from PA
19 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

20 **SCR-6.1.5.2 FEP Number:** W10

21 **FEP Title:** *Backfill Chemical Composition*

22 **SCR-6.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

23 The *Backfill Chemical Composition* is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 **SCR-6.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

26 **SCR-6.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

27 A chemical backfill is added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
28 backfill characteristics are described in Appendix MgO-2009, Section MgO-3.0. The
29 mechanical and thermal effects of backfill are discussed in W35 (Section SCR-6.3.5.4) and W72
30 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1), respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA calculations on
31 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill chemical
32 composition is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving the dissolved and colloidal actinide

1 source terms (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-5.0 and Appendix MgO-2009,
2 Section MgO-5.0).

3 **SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics**

4 **SCR-6.1.6.1 FEPs Number:** W11

5 **FEP Title:** *Post-Closure Monitoring*

6 **SCR-6.1.6.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The potential effects of *Post-Closure Monitoring* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
8 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.1.6.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified that relates to this FEP.

11 **SCR-6.1.6.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 Post-closure monitoring is required by 40 CFR § 191.14(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection
13 Agency 1993) as an assurance requirement to “detect substantial and detrimental deviations from
14 expected performance.” The DOE has designed the monitoring program (see the CCA,
15 Appendix MON) so that the monitoring methods employed are not detrimental to the
16 performance of the disposal system (40 CFR § 194.42(d)) (U.S. Environmental Protection
17 Agency 1996a). Nonintrusive monitoring techniques are used so that post-closure monitoring
18 would not impact containment or require remedial activities. In summary, the effects of
19 monitoring have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
20 performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.2 Radiological FEPs**

22 **SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat**

23 **SCR-6.2.1.1 FEP Number:** W12

24 **FEP Title:** *Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*

25 **SCR-6.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 Radionuclide decay and ingrowth are accounted for in PA calculations.

27 **SCR-6.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

1 **SCR-6.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Radionuclide decay and ingrowth are accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix PA-2009,
3 Section PA-4.3).

4 **SCR-6.2.1.2 FEP Number:** W13

5 **FEP Title:** *Heat From Radioactive Decay*

6 **SCR-6.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of temperature increases as a result of *Heat From Radioactive Decay* have been
8 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

11 The radionuclide inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA calculations (Leigh, Trone, and Fox
12 2005a) is lower than previously estimated for the CCA. Thus all CRA-2009 radioactive decay
13 heat screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments.

14 **SCR-6.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 Radioactive decay of the waste emplaced in the repository will generate heat. The importance of
16 heat from radioactive decay depends on the effects that the induced temperature changes would
17 have on mechanics (W29 - W31, Section SCR-6.3.4.1), fluid flow (W40 and W41, Section SCR-
18 6.4.1.1), and geochemical processes (W44 through W75, Section SCR-6.5.1.1, Section SCR-
19 6.5.1.2, Section SCR-6.5.1.3, Section SCR-6.5.1.4, Section SCR-6.5.1.5, Section SCR-6.5.1.6,
20 Section SCR-6.5.1.7, Section SCR-6.5.1.8, Section SCR-6.5.1.9, Section SCR-6.5.2.1, Section
21 SCR-6.5.2.2, Section SCR-6.5.3.1, Section SCR-6.5.4.1, Section SCR-6.5.5.1, Section SCR-
22 6.5.5.2, Section SCR-6.5.5.3, Section SCR-6.5.6.1, Section SCR-6.5.7.1, Section SCR-6.5.7.1,
23 and Section SCR-6.5.7.2). For example, extreme temperature increases could result in thermally
24 induced fracturing, regional uplift, or thermally driven flow of gas and brine in the vicinity of the
25 repository.

26 The design basis for the WIPP requires that the thermal loading does not exceed 10 kilowatts
27 (kW) per acre. Transportation restrictions also require that the thermal power generated by
28 waste in an RH-TRU container shall not exceed 300 watts (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
29 Commission 2002).

30 The DOE has conducted numerous studies related to heat from radioactive decay. The following
31 presents a brief summary of these past analyses. First, a numerical study to calculate induced
32 temperature distributions and regional uplift is reported in DOE (1980, pp. 9-149 through 9-150).
33 This study involved estimation of the thermal power of CH-TRU waste containers. The DOE
34 (1980, p. 9-149) analysis assumed the following:

- 35
 - All CH-TRU waste drums and boxes contain the maximum permissible quantity of Pu.
36 The fissionable radionuclide content for CH-TRU waste containers was assumed to be no

1 greater than 200 grams (g) per 0.21 m³ (7 ounces [oz] per 7.4 ft³) drum and 350 g/1.8 m³
2 (12.3 oz/63.6 ft³) standard waste box (²³⁹Pu fissile gram equivalents).

- 3 • The Pu in CH-TRU waste containers is weapons grade material producing heat at 0.0024
4 watts per gram (W/g). Thus the thermal power of a drum is approximately 0.5 W, and
5 that of a box is approximately 0.8 W.
- 6 • Approximately 3.7×10^5 m³ (1.3×10^7 ft³) of CH-TRU waste are distributed within a
7 repository enclosing an area of 7.3×10^5 m² (7.9×10^6 ft²). This is a conservative
8 assumption in terms of quantity and density of waste within the repository, because the
9 maximum capacity of the WIPP is 1.756×10^5 m³ (6.2×10^6 ft³) for all waste (as
10 specified by the LWA) to be placed in an enclosed area of approximately 5.1×10^5 m²
11 (16 mi²).
- 12 • Half of the CH-TRU waste volume is placed in drums and half in boxes so that the
13 repository will contain approximately 900,000 drums and 900,000 boxes. Thus a
14 calculated thermal power of 0.7 W/m² (2.8 kW/acre) of heat is generated by the CH-TRU
15 waste.
- 16 • Insufficient RH-TRU waste would be emplaced in the repository to influence the total
17 thermal load.

18 Under these assumptions, Thorne and Rudeen (1981) estimated the long-term temperature
19 response of the disposal system to waste emplacement. Calculations assumed a uniform initial
20 power density of 2.8 kW/acre (0.7 W/m²) which decreases over time. Thorne and Rudeen (1981)
21 attributed this thermal load to RH-TRU waste, but the DOE (1980) more appropriately attributed
22 this thermal load to CH-TRU waste based on the assumptions listed above. Thorne and Rudeen
23 (1981) estimated the maximum rise in temperature at the center of a repository to be 1.6 °C
24 (2.9 °F) at 80 years after waste emplacement.

25 More recently, Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated the maximum thermal power of an RH-
26 TRU waste container. The Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis involved inverse shielding
27 calculations to evaluate the thermal power of an RH-TRU container corresponding to the
28 maximum permissible surface dose of 1,000 rem per hour (rem/hr). The following calculational
29 steps were taken in the Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis:

- 30 • Calculate the absorbed dose rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the maximum
31 surface dose equivalent rate of 1,000 rem/hr. Beta and alpha radiation are not included in
32 this calculation because such particles will not penetrate the waste matrix or the container
33 in significant quantities. Neutrons are not included in the analysis because the maximum
34 dose rate from neutrons is 270 millirems/hr, and the corresponding neutron heating rate
35 will be insignificant.
- 36 • Calculate the exposure rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the absorbed dose rate
37 for gamma radiation.

- 1 • Calculate the gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container corresponding to
2 the exposure rate for gamma radiation. Assuming the gamma energy is 1.0 megaelectron
3 volts, the maximum allowable gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container
4 is about 5.8×10^8 gamma rays/cm²/seconds (s).
- 5 • Determine the distributed gamma source strength, or gamma activity, in an RH-TRU
6 container from the surface gamma flux density. The source is assumed to be shielded
7 such that the gamma flux is attenuated by the container and by absorbing material in the
8 container. The level of shielding depends on the matrix density. Scattering of the
9 gamma flux, with loss of energy, is also accounted for in this calculation through
10 inclusion of a gamma buildup factor. The distributed gamma source strength is
11 determined assuming a uniform source in a right cylindrical container. The maximum
12 total gamma source (gamma curies [Ci]) is then calculated for a RH-TRU container
13 containing 0.89 m³ (31.4 ft³) of waste. For the waste of greatest expected density (about
14 6,000 kg/m³ (360 lb/ft³), the gamma source is about 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³).
- 15 • Calculate the total Ci load of a RH-TRU container (including alpha and beta radiation)
16 from the gamma load. The ratio of the total Ci load to the gamma Ci load was estimated
17 through examination of the radionuclide inventory presented in the CCA, Appendix BIR.
18 The gamma Ci load and the total Ci load for each radionuclide listed in the WIPP BIR
19 were summed. Based on these summed loads the ratio of total Ci load to gamma Ci load
20 of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be 1.01.
- 21 • Calculate the thermal load of a RH-TRU container from the total Ci load. The ratio of
22 thermal load to Ci load was estimated through examination of the radionuclide inventory
23 presented in the CCA, Appendix BIR. The thermal load and the total Ci load for each
24 radionuclide listed in the WIPP inventory were summed. Based on these summed loads
25 the ratio of thermal load to Ci load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be about 0.0037
26 watts per curie (W/Ci). For a gamma source of 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³), the maximum
27 permissible thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). Thus the
28 maximum thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 60 W, and the transportation
29 limit of 300 W will not be achieved.

30 Note that Sanchez and Trelue (1996) calculated the average thermal load for a RH-TRU
31 container to be less than 1 W. Also, the total RH-TRU heat load is less than 10% of the total
32 heat load in the WIPP. Thus the total thermal load of the RH-TRU waste will not significantly
33 affect the average rise in temperature in the repository resulting from decay of CH-TRU waste.

34 Temperature increases will be greater at locations where the thermal power of an RH-TRU
35 container is 60 W, if any such containers are emplaced. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated
36 the temperature increase at the surface of a 60 W RH-TRU waste container. Their analysis
37 involved solution of a steady-state thermal conduction problem with a constant heat source term
38 of 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). These conditions represent conservative assumptions because the thermal
39 load will decrease with time as the radioactive waste decays. The temperature increase at the
40 surface of the container was calculated to be about 3 °C (5.4 °F).

1 In summary, previous analyses have shown that the average temperature increase in the WIPP
2 repository caused by radioactive decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste will be less
3 than 2 °C (3.6 °F). Temperature increases of about 3 °C (5.4 °F) may occur in the vicinity of
4 RH-TRU containers with the highest allowable thermal load of about 60 W (based on the
5 maximum allowable surface dose equivalent for RH-TRU containers). Potential heat generation
6 from nuclear criticality is discussed in Section SCR-6.2.1.4 and exothermic reactions and the
7 effects of repository temperature changes on mechanics are discussed in the set of FEPs grouped
8 as W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1). These FEPs have been eliminated
9 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 Additionally, WIPP transportation restrictions and WIPP design basis loading configurations do
11 not allow the thermal load of the WIPP to exceed 10 kW/acre (NRC 2002). Transportation
12 requirements restrict the thermal load from RH-TRU waste containers to no more than 30 W per
13 container (NRC 2002). However, the limit on the surface dose equivalent rate of the RH-TRU
14 containers (1,000 rem/hr) is more restrictive and equates to a thermal load of only about 60 W
15 per container. Based on the thermal loads permitted, the maximum temperature rise in the
16 repository from radioactive decay heat should be less than 2 °C (3.6 °F).

17 The previous FEPs screening arguments for the CCA used a bounding radioactivity heat load of
18 0.5 W/drum for the CH-TRU waste containers. With a total CH-TRU volume of 168,500 m³
19 (~5,950,000 ft³) this corresponds to approximately 810,000 55-gal drum equivalents with a
20 corresponding heat load of > 400 kW used for the CCA FEPs screening arguments. From
21 Sanchez and Trellue (1996), it can be seen that a realistic assessment of the heat load, based on
22 radionuclide inventory data in the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (TWBIR) is less
23 than 100 kW. Thus the CCA FEPs incorporate a factor of safety of at least four, and heat loads
24 from the CRA-2009 inventory would be even less.

25 **SCR-6.2.1.4 FEPs Number:** W14

26 **FEPs Title:** Nuclear Criticality: Heat

27 **SCR-6.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

28 *Nuclear Criticality* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
29 occurrence over 10,000 years.

30 **SCR-6.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

31 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.2 states that the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA is based
32 on Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). This is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC.
33 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005) show that the disposal inventory of fissile material continues to
34 decrease below that used for the CCA. Thus CRA-2009 criticality screening arguments are
35 conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000,
36 and 2001).

1 **SCR-6.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

2 Nuclear criticality refers to a sustained fission reaction that may occur if fissile radionuclides
3 reach both a sufficiently high concentration and total mass (where the latter parameter includes
4 the influence of enrichment of the fissile radionuclides). In the subsurface, the primary effect of
5 a nuclear reaction is the production of heat.

6 Nuclear criticality (near and far field) was eliminated from PA calculations for the WIPP for
7 waste contaminated with TRU radionuclides. The probability for criticality within the repository
8 is low (there are no mechanisms for concentrating fissile radionuclides dispersed amongst the
9 waste). Possible mechanisms for concentration in the waste disposal region include high
10 solubility, compaction, sorption, and precipitation. First, the maximum solubility of ^{239}Pu in the
11 WIPP repository, the most abundant fissile radionuclide, is orders of magnitude lower than
12 necessary to create a critical solution. The same is true for ^{235}U , the other primary fissile
13 radionuclide. Second, the waste is assumed to be compacted by repository processes to one
14 fourth its original volume. This compaction is still an order of magnitude too disperse (many
15 orders of magnitude too disperse if neutron absorbers that prevent criticality (for example, ^{238}U)
16 are included). Third, any potential sorbents in the waste would be fairly uniformly distributed
17 throughout the waste disposal region; consequently, concentration of fissile radionuclides in
18 localized areas through sorption is improbable. Fourth, precipitation requires significant
19 localized changes in brine chemistry; small local variations are insufficient to separate
20 substantial amounts of ^{239}Pu from other actinides in the waste disposal region (for example, 11
21 times more ^{238}U is present than ^{239}Pu).

22 Criticality away from the repository (following an inadvertent human intrusion) has a low
23 probability because (1) the amount of fissile material transported from the repository is small; (2)
24 host rock media have small porosities (insufficient for the generation of a sizable precipitation
25 zone); and (3) no credible mechanism exists for concentrating fissile material during transport
26 (the natural tendency is for transported material to be dispersed). As discussed in the CRA-2004,
27 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2 and the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section
28 MASS-15.0, the dolomite porosity consists of intergranular porosity, vugs, microscopic
29 fractures, and macroscopic fractures. As discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
30 6.4.5.2, porosity in the MBs consists of partially healed fractures that may dilate as pressure
31 increases. Advective flow in both units occurs mostly through macroscopic fractures.
32 Consequently, any potential deposition through precipitation or sorption is constrained by the
33 depth to which precipitation and sorption occur away from fractures. This geometry is not
34 favorable for fission reactions and eliminates the possibility of criticality. Thus nuclear
35 criticality has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
36 occurrence.

37 Additionally, screening arguments made in Rechar et al. (1996) are represented in greater detail
38 in Rechar et al. (2000, 2001). A major finding among the analysis results in the screening
39 arguments is the determination that fissile material would need to be reconcentrated by three
40 orders of magnitude in order to be considered in a criticality scenario. Because inventory
41 estimates reported in Leigh, Trone and Fox (2005) are below that used in previous calculations,
42 screening analyses for nuclear criticality are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA
43 screening arguments (Rechar et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

1 **SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties**

2 **SCR-6.2.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W15, W16, W17, and W112

3 **FEP Titles:** *Radiological Effects on Waste (W15)*
4 *Radiological Effects on Containers (W16)*
5 *Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals (W17)*
6 *Radiological Effects on Panel Closures (W112)*

7 **SCR-6.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

8 *Radiological Effects* on the properties of the *Waste, Containers, Shaft Seals, and Panel Closures*
9 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
10 of the disposal system.

11 **SCR-6.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

12 These FEPs have been retitled as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure
13 Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006), and the screening arguments for these FEPs
14 have been updated to include references to the radionuclide inventory used for CRA-2009 PA
15 calculations.

16 **SCR-6.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

17 Ionizing radiation can change the physical properties of many materials. Strong radiation fields
18 could lead to damage of waste matrices, brittleness of the metal containers, and disruption of any
19 crystalline structure in the seals. The low level of activity of the waste in the WIPP is unlikely to
20 generate a strong radiation field. According to the inventory data presented in Leigh, Trone, and
21 Fox (2005), the overall activity for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci
22 reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. This
23 decrease will not change the original screening argument. Furthermore, PA calculations assume
24 instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to the source-term model (see the
25 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.4, Section 6.4.3.5, and Section 6.4.3.6). Therefore, radiological
26 effects on the properties of the waste, container, shaft seals, and panel closures have been
27 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
28 disposal system.

29 **SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical FEPs**

30 **SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes**

31 **SCR-6.3.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W18 and W19

32 **FEP Titles:** *Disturbed Rock Zone (W18)*
33 *Excavation-Induced Change in Stress (W19)*

1 **SCR-6.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

2 Excavation-induced host rock fracturing through formation of a *Disturbed Rock Zone* and
3 *Changes in Stress* are accounted for in PA calculations.

4 **SCR-6.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

5 No new information has been identified relating to the screening of these two FEPs.

6 **SCR-6.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

7 Construction of the repository has caused local excavation-induced changes in stress in the
8 surrounding rock as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.1.5. Excavation-induced
9 changes in stress has led to failure of intact rock around the opening, creating a DRZ of fractures.
10 On completion of the WIPP excavation, the extent of the induced stress field perturbation will be
11 sufficient to have caused dilation and fracturing in the anhydrite layers “a” and “b,” MB 139,
12 and, possibly, MB 138. The creation of the DRZ around the excavation and the disturbance of
13 the anhydrite layers and MBs will alter the permeability and effective porosity of the rock around
14 the repository, providing enhanced pathways for flow of gas and brine between the waste-filled
15 rooms and the nearby interbeds. This excavation-induced, host-rock fracturing is accounted for
16 in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.3).

17 The DRZ around repository shafts and panel closures could provide pathways for flow from the
18 repository to hydraulically conductive units above the repository horizon. The effectiveness of
19 long-term shaft seals and panel closures are dependent upon providing sufficient backstress for
20 salt creep to heal the DRZ around them, so that connected flow paths out of the repository
21 horizon will cease to exist. These factors are considered in the current designs.

22 **SCR-6.3.1.2 FEP Numbers:** W20 and W21

23 **FEP Titles:** *Salt Creep* (W20)
24 *Change in the Stress Field* (W21)

25 **SCR-6.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 *Salt Creep* in the Salado and any resultant *Changes in the Stress Field* are accounted for in PA
27 calculations.

28 **SCR-6.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs.

30 **SCR-6.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

31 Salt creep will lead to changes in the stress field, compaction of the waste and containers, and
32 consolidation of the long-term components of the sealing system. It will also tend to close
33 fractures in the DRZ, leading to reductions in porosity and permeability, increases in pore fluid
34 pressure, and reductions in fluid flow rates in the repository. Salt creep in the Salado is

1 accounted for in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.1). The long-term
2 repository seal system relies on the consolidation of the crushed-salt seal material and healing of
3 the DRZ around the shaft seals and panel closures to achieve a low permeability under stresses
4 induced by salt creep. Shaft seal and panel closure performance is discussed further in Section
5 SCR-6.3.5.1 (FEPs W36, W37, W113, and W114).

6 **SCR-6.3.1.3 FEP Number:** W22
7 **FEP Title:** *Roof Falls*

8 **SCR-6.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** UP

9 The potential effects of *Roof Falls* on flow paths are accounted for in PA calculations.

10 **SCR-6.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP.

12 **SCR-6.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

13 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized roof falls in the first few hundred years. If
14 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
15 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
16 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
17 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep. In the long term,
18 the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor because salt creep will reduce the
19 void space and the potential for roof falls as well as promote healing of any roof material that has
20 fallen into the rooms. However, because of uncertainty in the process by which the disposal
21 room DRZ heals, the flow model used in PA assumes that a higher permeability zone remains for
22 the long term. Thus the potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA
23 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

24 **SCR-6.3.1.4 FEP Numbers:** W23 and W24
25 **FEP Titles:** *Subsidence* (W23)
26 *Large Scale Rock Fracturing* (W24)

27 **SCR-6.3.1.4.1 Screening Decision(s):** SO-C (W23)
28 SO-P (W24)

29 Fracturing within units overlying the Salado and surface displacement caused by *Subsidence*
30 associated with repository closure have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The potential for excavation- or
32 repository-induced *Subsidence* to create *Large Scale Rock Fracturing* and fluid flow paths
33 between the repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations
34 on the basis of the low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-6.3.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

2 Continuous survey data, reported annually, reaffirm that subsidence is minimal and near the
3 accuracy of the survey itself (see annual COMPs reports in Appendix DATA-2009).

4 **SCR-6.3.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

5 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized roof falls in the first few hundred years. If
6 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
7 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
8 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
9 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep and the local
10 lithologies. In the long term, the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor
11 because salt creep will reduce the void space and the potential for roof falls as well as promote
12 healing of any roof material that has fallen into the rooms. Because of uncertainty in the process
13 by which the disposal room DRZ heals, the flow model used in PA assumed that a higher-
14 permeability zone remained for the long term. The CCA PAVT modified the DRZ permeability
15 to a sampled range. Thus the potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA
16 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

17 The amount of subsidence that can occur as a result of salt creep closure or roof collapse in the
18 WIPP excavation depends primarily on the volume of excavated rock, the initial and compressed
19 porosities of the various emplaced materials (waste, backfill, panel and drift closures, and seals),
20 the amount of inward creep of the repository walls, and the gas and fluid pressures within the
21 repository. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994) has analyzed potential excavation-induced
22 subsidence with the primary objective of determining the geomechanical advantage of
23 backfilling the WIPP excavation. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 through 3-23) used
24 mass conservation calculations, the influence function method, the National Coal Board
25 empirical method, and the two-dimensional, finite-difference-code, Fast Lagrangian Analysis of
26 Continua (FLAC) to estimate subsidence for conditions ranging from no backfill to emplacement
27 of a highly compacted crushed-salt backfill. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-23)
28 also investigated subsidence at potash mines located near the WIPP site to gain insight into the
29 expected subsidence conditions at the WIPP and to calibrate the subsidence calculation methods.

30 Subsidence over potash mines will be much greater than subsidence over the WIPP because of
31 the significant differences in stratigraphic position, depth, extraction ratio, and layout. The
32 WIPP site is located stratigraphically lower than the lowest potash mine, which is near the base
33 of the McNutt. At the WIPP site, the base of the McNutt is about 150 m (490 ft) above the
34 repository horizon. The WIPP rock extraction ratio in the waste disposal region will be about
35 22%, as compared to 65% for the lowest extraction ratios within potash mines investigated by
36 the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-17).

37 The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-22) reported the maximum total subsidence at potash mines
38 to be about 1.5 m (5 ft). This level of subsidence has been observed to have caused surface
39 fractures. However, the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-23) found no evidence that subsidence
40 over potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient to connect the mining horizon to water-
41 bearing units or the land surface. The level of disturbance caused by subsidence above the WIPP

1 repository will be less than that associated with potash mining and thus, by analogy, will not
2 create fluid flow paths between the repository and the overlying units.

3 The various subsidence calculation methods used by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to
4 3-23) provided similar and consistent results, which support the premise that subsidence over the
5 WIPP will be less than subsidence over potash mines. Estimates of maximum subsidence at the
6 land surface for the cases of no backfill and highly compacted backfill are 0.62 m (2 ft) and
7 0.52 m (1.7 ft), respectively. The mass conservation method gave the upper bound estimate of
8 subsidence in each case. The surface topography in the WIPP area varies by more than 3 m
9 (10 ft), so the expected amount of repository-induced subsidence will not create a basin, and will
10 not affect surface hydrology significantly. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, Table 3-13) also
11 estimated subsidence at the depth of the Culebra using the FLAC model for the case of an empty
12 repository (containing no waste or backfill). The FLAC analysis assumed the Salado to be halite
13 and the Culebra to have anhydrite material parameters.

14 Maximum subsidence at the Culebra was estimated to be 0.56 m (1.8 ft). The vertical strain was
15 concentrated in the Salado above the repository. Vertical strain was less than 0.01% in units
16 overlying the Salado and was close to zero in the Culebra (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-40).
17 The maximum horizontal displacement in the Culebra was estimated to be 0.02 m (0.08 ft), with
18 a maximum tensile horizontal strain of 0.007%. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, 4-1 to 4-2)
19 concluded that the induced strains in the Culebra will be uniformly distributed because no large-
20 scale faults or discontinuities are present in the vicinity of the WIPP. Furthermore, strains of this
21 magnitude would not be expected to cause extensive fracturing.

22 At the WIPP site, the Culebra transmissivity varies spatially over approximately five orders of
23 magnitude (see Appendix TFIELD-2009, Figure TFIELD-64). Where transmissive horizontal
24 fractures exist, hydraulic conductivity in the Culebra is dominated by flow through the fractures.
25 An induced tensile vertical strain may result in an increase in fracture aperture and corresponding
26 increases in hydraulic conductivity. The magnitude of increase in hydraulic conductivity can be
27 estimated by approximating the hydrological behavior of the Culebra with a simple conceptual
28 model of fluid flow through a series of parallel fractures with uniform properties. A conservative
29 estimate of the change in hydraulic conductivity can be made by assuming that all the vertical
30 strain is translated to fracture opening (and none to rock expansion). This method for evaluating
31 changes in hydraulic conductivity is similar to that used by the EPA in estimating the effects of
32 subsidence caused by potash mining (Peake 1996, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
33 1996c).

34 The equivalent porous medium hydraulic conductivity, K (m/s), of a system of parallel fractures
35 can be calculated assuming the cubic law for fluid flow (Witherspoon et al. 1980):

$$36 \quad K = \frac{w^3 \rho g N}{12 \mu D} \quad (\text{SCR.10})$$

37 where w is the fracture aperture, ρ is the fluid density (taken to be 1,000 kg/m³), g is the
38 acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s² (32 ft) per second squared), μ is the fluid viscosity (taken
39 as 0.001 pascal seconds), D is the effective Culebra thickness (7.7 m (26.3 ft)), and N is the
40 number of fractures. For 10 fractures with a fracture aperture, w , of 6×10^{-5} m (2×10^{-4} ft), the

1 Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , is approximately 7 m per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per
2 second). The values of the parameters used in this calculation are within the range of those
3 expected for the Culebra at the WIPP site (Appendix TFIELD-2009).

4 The amount of opening of each fracture as a result of subsidence-induced tensile vertical strain,
5 ε , (assuming rigid rock), is $D\varepsilon/N$ meters. Thus, for a vertical strain of 0.0001, the fracture
6 aperture, w , becomes approximately 1.4×10^{-4} m. The Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , then
7 increases to approximately 85 m (279 ft) per year (2.7×10^{-6} m (8.9×10^{-6} ft) per second). Thus,
8 on the basis of a conservative estimate of vertical strain, the hydraulic conductivity of the
9 Culebra may increase by an order of magnitude. In PA calculations, multiple realizations of the
10 Culebra T fields are generated as a means of accounting for spatial variability and uncertainty
11 (Appendix TFIELD-2009). A change in hydraulic conductivity of one order of magnitude
12 through vertical strain is within the range of uncertainty incorporated in the Culebra T fields
13 through these multiple realizations. Thus changes in the horizontal component of Culebra
14 hydraulic conductivity resulting from repository-induced subsidence have been eliminated from
15 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

16 A similar calculation can be performed to estimate the change in vertical hydraulic conductivity
17 in the Culebra as a result of a horizontal strain of 0.00007 m/m (Westinghouse 1994, p. 3-20).
18 Assuming this strain to be distributed over about 1,000 fractures (neglecting rock expansion),
19 with zero initial aperture, in a lateral extent of the Culebra of about 800 m (2,625 ft)
20 (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-39), then the subsidence-induced fracture aperture is
21 approximately 6×10^{-5} m (1.9×10^{-4} ft). Using the values for ρ , g , and μ , above, the vertical
22 hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra can then be calculated, through an equation similar to
23 above, to be 7 m (23 ft) per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second). Thus vertical hydraulic
24 conductivity in the Culebra may be created as a result of repository-induced subsidence, although
25 this is expected to be insignificant.

26 In summary, as a result of observations of subsidence associated with potash mines in the
27 vicinity of the WIPP, the potential for subsidence to create fluid flow paths between the
28 repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
29 of low probability. The effects of repository-induced subsidence on hydraulic conductivity in the
30 Culebra have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
31 performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes**

33 **SCR-6.3.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W25 and W26

34 **FEP Titles:** *Disruption Due to Gas Effects (W25)*
35 *Pressurization (W26)*

36 **SCR-6.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

37 The mechanical effects of gas generation through *Pressurization* and *Disruption Due to Gas*
38 *Effects* flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-6.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified relating to these FEPs.

3 **SCR-6.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

4 The mechanical effects of gas generation, including the slowing creep closure of the repository
5 because of gas pressurization and the fracturing of interbeds in the Salado through disruption due
6 to gas effects are accounted for in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.2 and
7 Section 6.4.3.1).

8 **SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions**

9 **SCR-6.3.3.1 FEP Number:** W27

10 **FEP Title:** *Gas Explosions*

11 **SCR-6.3.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

12 The potential effects of *Gas Explosions* are accounted for in PA calculations.

13 **SCR-6.3.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

15 **SCR-6.3.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

16 Explosive gas mixtures could collect in the head space above the waste in a closed panel. The
17 most explosive gas mixture potentially generated will be a mixture of hydrogen, methane (CH₄),
18 and oxygen, which will convert to CO₂ and water on ignition. This means that there is little
19 likelihood of a gas explosion in the long term because the rooms and panels are expected to
20 become anoxic and oxygen depleted. Compaction through salt creep will also greatly reduce any
21 void space in which the gas can accumulate. Analysis (see the CRA-2004, Appendix
22 BARRIERS, Attachment PCS) indicates that the most explosive mixture of hydrogen, CH₄, and
23 oxygen will be present in the void space approximately 20 years after panel-closure
24 emplacement. This possibility of an explosion prior to the occurrence of anoxic conditions is
25 considered in the design of the operational panel closure. The effect of such an explosion on the
26 DRZ is expected to be no more severe than a roof fall, which is accounted for in the PA
27 calculations (FEP W22).

28 **SCR-6.3.3.2 FEP Number:** W28

29 **FEP Title:** *Nuclear Explosions*

30 **SCR-6.3.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

31 *Nuclear Explosions* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
32 occurrence over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-6.3.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

2 This FEP has been updated to include the most recent inventory information as presented in
3 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005).

4 **SCR-6.3.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

5 Nuclear explosions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
6 occurrence over 10,000 years. For a nuclear explosion to occur, a critical mass of Pu would have
7 to undergo rapid compression to a high density. Even if a critical mass of Pu could form in the
8 system, there is no mechanism for rapid compression. Inventory information used for the CCA,
9 the CRA-2004, and the CRA-2009 are presented in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). The updated
10 inventory information for the CRA-2009 shows a reduction of TRU radionuclides from previous
11 estimates. Thus current criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the
12 previous CCA screening arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

13 **SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects**

14 **SCR-6.3.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73

15 **FEP Titles:** *Thermal Effects on Material Properties (W29)*
16 *Thermally-Induced Stress Changes (W30)*
17 *Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components*
18 *(W31)*
19 *Exothermic Reactions (W72)*
20 *Concrete Hydration (W73)*

21 **SCR-6.3.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 The effects of *Thermally-Induced Stress, Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository*
23 *Components, and Thermal Effects on Material Properties* in the repository have been eliminated
24 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.

25 The thermal effects of *Exothermic Reactions*, including *Concrete Hydration*, have been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
27 disposal system.

28 **SCR-6.3.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 This FEP has been updated to include the most recent inventory information as presented in
30 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). Thermal calculations have been updated with the updated
31 quantities of reactants and provided below.

32 **SCR-6.3.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

33 Thermally induced stress could result in pathways for groundwater flow in the DRZ, in the
34 anhydrite layers and MBs, and through seals, or it could enhance existing pathways. Conversely,
35 elevated temperatures will accelerate the rate of salt creep and mitigate fracture development.

1 Thermal expansion could also result in uplift of the rock and ground surface overlying the
2 repository, and thermal buoyancy forces could lift the waste upward in the salt rock.

3 The distributions of thermal stress and strain changes depend on the induced temperature field
4 and the differing thermal expansion of components of the repository, which depends on the
5 components' elastic properties. Thermal effects on material properties (such as permeability and
6 porosity) could potentially affect the behavior of the repository.

7 Exothermic reactions in the WIPP repository include MgO hydration, MgO carbonation,
8 aluminum (Al) corrosion, and cement hydration (Bennett et al. 1996). Wang (1996) has shown
9 that the temperature rise by an individual reaction is proportional to \sqrt{VM} , where V is the
10 maximum rate of brine inflow into a waste panel for a reaction limited by brine inflow (or a
11 specified maximum reaction rate for a reaction limited by its own kinetics) and M is the quantity
12 of the reactant. MgO hydration, cement hydration, and Al corrosion are assumed to be limited by
13 brine inflow because they all consume water and have high reaction rates. The amounts of
14 reactants are tabulated in Table SCR-4.

15 **Table SCR-4. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA-2009**

Inventory	CCA	CRA-2004	CRA-2009
MgO (tons)	85,600 ^a	72,760 (because of the elimination of mini-sacks) ^a	59,385 ^c
Cellulosics (tons)	5,940 ^b	8,120 ^c	8,907 ^f
Plastics (tons)	3,740 ^b	8,120 ^c	10,180 ^f
Rubber (tons)	1,100 ^b	1,960 ^c	1,885 ^f
Aluminum alloys (tons)	1,980 ^b	1,960 ^c	2,030 ^f
Cement (tons)	8,540 ^b	9,971 ^d	13,888 ^g

^a U.S. Department of Energy (2000a)

^b U.S. Department of Energy (1996b). Only CH-TRU wastes are considered. Total volume of CH-TRU wastes is 1.1×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

^c CRA-2004 Appendix DATA, Attachment F. Only CH-TRU wastes are considered. Total volume of CH-TRU waste is 1.4×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

^d This estimate is derived from data in Leigh (2003) includes both reacted and unreacted cement. $(1.2 \times 10^7 \text{ kg} \times 1.4 \times 10^5 / 168485 / 1000 \text{ kg/ton} = 9971 \text{ tons cement})$.

^e This estimate is derived by assuming that Panel 1 has an MgO excess factor of 1.95, three panel equivalents have a 1.67 excess factor, and the remaining 6 panel equivalents have a 1.2 excess factor, resulting in a 1.416 projected excess factor for a full repository. The projected excess factor is then multiplied by the equivalent cellulose value of $28,098 \times (40.3/27)$ (the MgO molar ratio).

^f This value is derived using material densities reported in Leigh et al., (2005a) and total CH-TRU waste volume (1.45×10^5 m³ reported in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005)).

^g This value is derived from data in Leigh (2003) and Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). $((1.2 \times 10^7 \text{ kg}) \times 39/29 \times (1.45 \times 10^5) / 168485 / 1000 \text{ kg/ton} = 13,888 \text{ tons cement})$.

16

17 Similarly, MgO carbonation, which consumes CO₂, is limited by CO₂ generation from microbial
18 degradation. Given a biodegradation rate constant, the total CO₂ generated per year is
19 proportional to the total quantity of biodegradable materials in the repository. Using the
20 computational methods in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b), the inventory of biodegradable
21 materials has been changed from 23,884 (8,120 + 1.7 × 8,120 + 1,960) tons for the CRA-2004¹

¹The 1.7 molar conversion rate for plastic is based on analyses presented in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b).

1 to 28,098 (8,907 + 1.7 × 10,180 + 1,885) tons of equivalent cellulose for the CRA-2009.¹ This
 2 increase in biodegradable materials corresponds to a proportional increase in CO₂ generation.
 3 For MgO carbonation and microbial degradation, the calculated temperature rises have been
 4 updated for the changes in both microbial gas generation and waste inventory and are presented
 5 in Table SCR-5.

6 Temperature rises (°C) by exothermic reactions are revised as follows:

7 CCA conditions following a drilling event show that Al corrosion could, at most, result in a
 8 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6 °C (10.8 °F) above ambient room
 9 temperature (about 27 °C (80 °F)) (Bennett et al. 1996). A temperature rise of 6 °C (10.8 °F)
 10 represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of exothermic
 11 reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by exothermic reactions
 12 for CRA-2009 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F) (as shown in Table SCR-5). Such small
 13 temperature changes cannot affect material properties. Thus thermal effects on material
 14 properties in the repository have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 15 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **Table SCR-5. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises**

Reactant	CCA ^a	CRA-2004 ^a	CRA-2009 ^a
MgO hydration	< 4.5	< 4.7	< 4.2
MgO carbonation	< 0.6	< 0.7	< 0.6
Microbial degradation	< 0.8	< 1.4	< 1.5
Aluminum corrosion	< 6.0	< 6.8	< 6.9
Cement hydration	< 2.0	< 2.5	< 3.0

^a All values are in degrees Celsius.

17

18 All potential sources of heat and elevated temperature have been evaluated and found not to
 19 produce high enough temperature changes to affect the repository's performance. Sources of
 20 heat within the repository include radioactive decay and exothermic chemical reactions such as
 21 backfill hydration and metal corrosion. The rates of these exothermic reactions are limited by
 22 the availability of brine in the repository. Concrete hydration in the seals is a significant source
 23 of heat, but it is relatively short-lived (Loken 1994 and Loken and Chen 1994). Energy released
 24 by the hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately
 25 53 °C (127 °F), and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38 °C (100 °F), one week after
 26 seal emplacement. Elevated temperatures will persist for a short period of time, perhaps a few
 27 years or a few decades. The thermal stresses from these temperatures and the temperatures in the
 28 concrete itself have been calculated to be below the design compressive strength for the concrete.
 29 Thus thermal stresses should not degrade the long-term performance of the seals. In general, the
 30 various sources of heat do not appear to be great enough to jeopardize the performance of the
 31 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties**

2 **SCR-6.3.5.1 FEP Numbers:** W32, W36, W37, W39, W113, and W114

3 **FEP Titles:** *Consolidation of Waste (W32)*
4 *Consolidation of Shaft Seals (W36)*
5 *Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W37)*
6 *Underground Boreholes (W39)*
7 *Consolidation of Panel Closures (W113)*
8 *Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures (W114)*

9 **SCR-6.3.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

10 *Consolidation of Waste* is accounted for in PA calculations. *Consolidation of Shaft Seals* and
11 *Panel Closures* and *Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals* and *Panel Closures* are accounted
12 for in PA calculations. Flow through isolated, unsealed *Underground Boreholes* is accounted for
13 in PA calculations.

14 **SCR-6.3.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

15 The titles of W36 and W37 have been modified to specifically apply to shaft seals. New FEPs
16 W113, *Consolidation of Panel Closures*, and W114, *Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures*,
17 have been added to comprehensively address these repository components. These changes were
18 made as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure Redesign planned change
19 request (Kirkes 2006).

20 **SCR-6.3.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

21 Consolidation of waste is accounted for in PA calculations in the modeling of creep closure of
22 the disposal room (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.3).

23 Consolidation of shaft seals, consolidation of panel closures, mechanical degradation of shaft
24 seals, and mechanical degradation of panel closures are accounted for in PA calculations through
25 the permeability ranges assumed for the seal and closure systems (Appendix PA-2009, Section
26 PA-4.2.7 and Section PA-4.2.8).

27 The site investigation program has also involved the drilling of boreholes from within the
28 excavated part of the repository. Following their use for monitoring or other purposes, these
29 underground boreholes will be sealed where practical, and salt creep will also serve to
30 consolidate the seals and to close the boreholes. Any boreholes that remain unsealed will
31 connect the repository to anhydrite interbeds within the Salado, and thus provide potential
32 pathways for radionuclide transport. PA calculations account for fluid flow to and from the
33 interbeds by assuming that the DRZ has a permanently enhanced permeability that allows flow
34 of repository brines into specific anhydrite layers and interbeds. This treatment is also
35 considered to account for the effects of any unsealed boreholes.

1 **SCR-6.3.5.2 FEP Number:** W33
2 **FEP Title:** *Movement of Containers*

3 **SCR-6.3.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
5 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.3.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

7 The FEP description has been updated to reflect new waste inventory data.

8 **SCR-6.3.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

9 Movement of waste containers placed in salt may occur as a result of two buoyancy mechanisms
10 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978): (1) the density contrast between the waste container and the
11 surrounding salt, and (2) the temperature contrast between a salt volume that includes a heat
12 source and the surrounding unheated salt. When the density of the waste container is greater
13 than the density of the surrounding salt, the container sinks relative to the salt, whereas when the
14 salt density is greater than the container density, the container rises relative to the salt. Similarly,
15 when a discrete volume of salt within a large salt mass is heated, the heat raises the temperature
16 of the discrete volume above that of the surrounding salt, thereby inducing density contrasts and
17 buoyant forces that initiate upward flow of the heated salt volume. In a repository setting, the
18 source of the heat may be radioactive decay of the waste itself or exothermic reactions of the
19 backfill materials and waste constituents, e.g., MgO hydration, MgO carbonation, Al corrosion,
20 cement hydration, and calcium oxide hydration.

21 For the CCA, the density of the compacted waste and the grain density of the halite in the Salado
22 were assumed to be 2,000 kg/m³ and 2,163 kg/m³, respectively. Because this density contrast is
23 small, the movement of containers relative to the salt was considered minimal, particularly when
24 drag forces on the waste containers were also considered. In addition, vertical movement
25 initiated in response to thermally induced density changes for high-level waste containers of a
26 similar density to those at the WIPP were calculated to be approximately 0.35 m (1.1 ft)
27 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978, p. 22). This calculated movement was considered conservative,
28 given that containers at the WIPP will generate much less heat and will, therefore, move less. As
29 a result, container movement was eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
30 consequences to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The calculations performed for the DOE (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a) were based on
32 estimates of the waste inventory. However, with the initiation of waste disposal, actual waste
33 inventory is tracked and future waste stream inventories have been refined. Based on an
34 evaluation of these data, two factors may affect the conclusions reached in DOE (U.S.
35 Department of Energy 1996a) concerning container movement.

36 The first factor is changes in density of the waste form. According to CRA-2009 inventory data
37 (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005), the waste density has changed only slightly since that anticipated
38 for the CCA (see Leigh et al. 2005a, Table 9). Some future waste streams may, however, be

1 more highly compacted, perhaps having a density roughly three times greater than that assumed
2 in the CCA, while others may be less dense. In calculations of container movement, Dawson
3 and Tillerson (1978, p. 22) varied container density by nearly a factor of 3 (from 2,000 kg/m³
4 (125 lb/ft³) to 5,800 kg/m³ (362 lb/ft³)) and found that an individual dense container could move
5 vertically as much as about 28 m (92 ft). Given the geologic environment of the WIPP, a
6 container would likely encounter a dense stiff unit (such as an anhydrite stringer) that would
7 arrest further movement far short of this upper bound; however, because of the massive thickness
8 of the Salado salt, even a movement of 28 m (92 ft) would have little impact on performance.

9 The second inventory factor that could affect container movement is the composition of the
10 waste (and chemical buffer) relative to its heat production. Radioactive decay, nuclear
11 criticality, and exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository.
12 According to Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), the TRU radionuclide inventory has decreased from
13 3.44×10^6 Ci reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the
14 CRA-2009. Such a small change will not result in a significant deviation from the possible
15 temperature rise predicted in the CCA. Additionally, and as shown in Section SCR-6.3.4.1
16 (FEPs W72 and W73), temperature rises from exothermic reactions are quite small (see Table
17 SCR-5). Note that the revised maximum temperature increases caused by exothermic reactions
18 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F).

19 Based on the small differences between the temperature and density assumed in the CCA and
20 those determined using new inventory data (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005), the conclusion about
21 the importance of container movement reported in the CCA will not be affected, even when more
22 highly compacted future waste streams are considered. The effects of the revised maximum
23 temperature rise and higher-density future waste streams on container movement are competing
24 factors (high-density waste will sink, whereas the higher-temperature waste-salt volume will
25 rise) that may result in even less movement. Therefore, movement of waste containers has been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

27 **SCR-6.3.5.3 FEP Number:** W34
28 **FEP Title:** *Container Integrity*

29 **SCR-6.3.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

30 *Container Integrity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-6.3.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP.

34 **SCR-6.3.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

35 Container integrity is required only for waste transportation. Past PA calculations show that a
36 significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain undegraded over 10,000
37 years (see, for example, Helton et al. 1998). In addition, it is assumed in both CCA and
38 CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial degradation of plastic container materials in

1 75% of PA realizations (Wang and Brush 1996). All these undegraded container materials will
2 (1) prevent the contact between brine and radionuclides; and (2) decrease the rate and extent of
3 radionuclide transport because of high tortuosity along the flow pathways and, as a result,
4 increase opportunities for metallic iron and corrosion products to beneficially reduce
5 radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, container integrity can be eliminated on the
6 basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. PA assumes instantaneous
7 container failure and waste dissolution according to the source-term model.

8 **SCR-6.3.5.4 FEP Number:** W35
9 **FEP Title:** *Mechanical Effects of Backfill*

10 **SCR-6.3.5.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

11 The *Mechanical Effects of Backfill* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
12 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-6.3.5.4.2 Summary of New Information**

14 In February 2008, the EPA approved a reduction in the minimum amount of MgO to be placed in
15 the repository (Reyes 2008). This reduction is described fully in Appendix MgO-2009. While
16 this reduction is important to WIPP operations, it has no bearing on PA calculations and the
17 screening decisions and arguments for FEPs that are related to backfill, buffers, and barriers.

18 **SCR-6.3.5.4.3 Screening Argument**

19 The chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room will act to resist creep closure.
20 However, calculations have shown that because of the high porosity and low stiffness of the
21 waste and the high waste to potential backfill volume, inclusion of backfill does not significantly
22 decrease the total subsidence in the waste emplacement area or disposal room (Westinghouse
23 1994). In 2001, the DOE eliminated MgO mini-sacks from the repository, reducing the total
24 inventory from 85,600 short tons to 74,000 short tons, which reduced the potential backfill
25 volume (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001). More recently, the required amount of
26 MgO has been further reduced (see Appendix MgO-2009 and Reyes [2008]). Therefore, the
27 mechanical effects of backfill have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
28 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic FEPs**

2 **SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow**

3 SCR-6.4.1.1 **FEP Numbers:** W40 and W41

4 **FEP Titles:** *Brine Inflow (W40)*

5 *Wicking (W41)*

6 **SCR-6.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 Two-phase brine and gas flow and capillary rise (wicking) in the repository and the Salado are
8 accounted for in PA calculations.

9 **SCR-6.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

11 **SCR-6.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 Brine inflow to the repository may occur through the DRZ, impure halite, anhydrite layers, or
13 clay layers. Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of
14 brine that flows into the rooms and drifts. Two-phase flow of brine and gas in the repository and
15 the Salado is accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

16 Capillary rise (or wicking) is a potential mechanism for liquid migration through unsaturated
17 zones in the repository. Capillary rise in the waste material could affect gas generation rates,
18 which are dependent on water availability. Potential releases caused by drilling intrusion are
19 also influenced by brine saturations and therefore by wicking. Capillary rise is therefore
20 accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

21 **SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation**

22 **SCR-6.4.2.1 FEP Number:** W42

23 **FEP Title:** *Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production*

24 **SCR-6.4.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

25 *Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production* in the repository and the Salado is accounted for in PA
26 calculations.

27 **SCR-6.4.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

1 **SCR-6.4.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of brine that flows
 3 into the rooms and drifts. Gas may flow from the repository through the DRZ, impure halite,
 4 anhydrite layers, or clay layers. The amount of water available for reactions and microbial
 5 activity will impact the amounts and types of gases produced (W44 through W55, Section SCR-
 6 6.5.1.1, Section SCR-6.5.1.2, Section SCR-6.5.1.3, Section SCR-6.5.1.4, Section SCR-6.5.1.5,
 7 Section SCR-6.5.1.6, Section SCR-6.5.1.7, Section SCR-6.5.1.8, and Section SCR-6.5.1.9). Gas
 8 generation rates, and therefore repository pressure, may change as the water content of the
 9 repository changes. Pressure changes and fluid flow due to gas production in the repository and
 10 the Salado are accounted for in PA calculations through modeling the two-phase flow (Appendix
 11 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

12 **SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects**

13 **SCR-6.4.3.1 FEP Number:** W43

14 **FEP Title:** *Convection*

15 **SCR-6.4.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

16 *Convection* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 17 performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-6.4.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified relative to the screening of this FEP.

20 **SCR-6.4.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

21 Temperature differentials in the repository could initiate convection. The resulting thermally
 22 induced brine flow or thermally-induced, two-phase flow could influence contaminant transport.
 23 Thermal gradients in the disposal rooms could potentially drive the movement of water vapor.
 24 For example, temperature increases around waste located at the edges of the rooms could cause
 25 evaporation of water entering from the DRZ. This water vapor could condense on cooler waste
 26 containers in the rooms and could contribute to brine formation, corrosion, and gas generation.

27 The characteristic velocity, V_i , for convective flow of fluid component I in an unsaturated porous
 28 medium is given by (from Hicks 1996)

29
$$V_i \approx -\frac{k_i}{\mu_i} (\alpha_i \rho_{i0} g \Delta T) \tag{SCR.11}$$

30 where α_i (per degree Kelvin) is the coefficient of expansion of the i^{th} component, k_i is the
 31 intrinsic permeability (m^2), μ_i is the fluid viscosity (pascal second), ρ_{i0} (kg/m^3) is the fluid
 32 density at a reference point, g is the acceleration due to gravity, and ΔT is the change in
 33 temperature. This velocity may be evaluated for the brine and gas phases expected in the waste
 34 disposal region.

1 For a temperature increase of 10 °C (18 °F), the characteristic velocity for convective flow of
2 brine in the DRZ around the concrete shaft seals is approximately 7×10^{-4} m (2.3×10^{-3} ft) per
3 year (2×10^{-11} m (6.6×10^{-11} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for convective flow
4 of gas in the DRZ is approximately 1×10^{-3} m (3.2×10^{-3} ft) per year (3×10^{-11} m ($9.8 \times$
5 10^{-11} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). For a temperature increase of 25 °C (45 °F), the
6 characteristic velocity for convective flow of brine in the concrete seals is approximately
7 2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per year (6×10^{-15} m (1.9×10^{-14} ft) per second), and the characteristic
8 velocity for convective flow of gas in the concrete seals is approximately 3×10^{-7} m (9.8×10^{-7}
9 ft) per year (8×10^{-15} m (2.6×10^{-4} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). These values of Darcy velocity
10 are much smaller than the expected values associated with brine inflow to the disposal rooms of
11 fluid flow resulting from gas generation. In addition, the buoyancy forces generated by smaller
12 temperature contrasts in the DRZ, resulting from backfill, concrete hydration, and radioactive
13 decay will be short-lived and insignificant compared to the other driving forces for fluid flow.
14 The short-term concrete seals will be designed to function as barriers to fluid flow for at least
15 100 years after emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995).
16 Thus temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant
17 buoyancy-driven fluid flow through the concrete seal system. In summary, temperature changes
18 in the disposal system will not cause significant thermal convection. Furthermore, the induced
19 temperature gradients will be insufficient to generate water vapor and drive significant moisture
20 migration.

21 Temperature effects on fluid viscosity would be most significant in the DRZ surrounding the
22 hydrating concrete seals (where temperatures of approximately 38 °C (100 °F) are expected).
23 The viscosity of pure water decreases by about 19% over a temperature range of between 27 °C
24 (80 °F) and 38 °C (100 °F) (Batchelor 1973, p. 596). Although at a temperature of 27 °C
25 (80 °F), the viscosity of Salado brine is about twice that of pure water (Rechard et al. 1990,
26 a-19), the magnitude of the variation in brine viscosity between 27 °C (80 °F) and 38 °C (100 °F)
27 will be similar to the magnitude of the variation in viscosity of pure water. The viscosity of air
28 over this temperature range varies by less than 7% (Batchelor 1973, p. 594) and the viscosity of
29 gas in the waste disposal region over this temperature range is also likely to vary by less than
30 7%. The Darcy fluid flow velocity for a porous medium is inversely proportional to the fluid
31 viscosity. Thus increases in brine and gas flow rates may occur as a result of viscosity variations
32 in the vicinity of the concrete seals. However, these viscosity variations will persist only for a
33 short period in which temperatures are elevated, and, thus, the expected variations in brine and
34 gas viscosity in the waste disposal region will not significantly affect the long-term performance
35 of the disposal system.

36 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, Al corrosion could, at most, result in a short-
37 lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6 °C (10.8 °F). A temperature rise of 6 °C
38 (10.8 °F) represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
39 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by
40 exothermic reactions for CRA-2009 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F) (as shown in Table SCR-5).
41 Such small temperature changes cannot affect material properties.

1 In summary, temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermally
2 induced two-phase flow. Thermal convection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
3 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

4 **SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical FEPs**

5 **SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation**

6 **SCR-6.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W44, W45, and W48

7 **FEP Titles:** *Degradation of Organic Material (W44)*

8 *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation*

9 (W45)

10 *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation (W48)*

11 **SCR-6.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

12 Microbial gas generation from *Degradation of Organic Material* is accounted for in PA
13 calculations, and the *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation* and the *Effects of*
14 *Biofilm Formation on Microbial Gas Generation* are incorporated in the gas generation rates
15 used.

16 **SCR-6.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

17 These FEPs have been updated to be consistent with the latest inventory information.

18 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

19 Microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic materials,
20 will produce mainly CO₂, but also nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen, and
21 CH₄. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon the nature of the microbial
22 populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas
23 generation from degradation of organic material is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 The following subsections discuss the effects of temperature, pressure, radiation, and biofilms on
25 gas production rates via their control of microbial gas generation processes.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3.1 Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation**

27 Calculations and experimental studies of induced temperature distributions within the repository
28 have been undertaken and are described in FEPs W29, W30, and W31 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1).
29 Numerical analysis suggests that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository caused
30 by radioactive decay of the emplaced CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste is likely to be less than 3 °C
31 (5.4 °F) (FEP W13).

32 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in FEPs W72 and W73
33 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1). Potentially the most significant exothermic reactions are concrete
34 hydration, backfill hydration, and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could

1 raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately 53 °C (127 °F) and that of the surrounding
2 salt to approximately 38 °C (100 °F) one week after seal emplacement (W73).

3 As discussed in FEPs W72 and W73 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1), the maximum temperature rise in
4 the disposal panels as a consequence of backfill hydration will be less than 4.2 °C (7.6 °F),
5 resulting from brine inflow following a drilling intrusion into a waste disposal panel. Note that
6 AICs will prevent drilling within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. By this time,
7 any heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration will have decreased
8 substantially, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will have decreased to close to initial
9 values.

10 Under similar conditions following a drilling event, Al corrosion could, at most, result in a short-
11 lived (two years) temperature rise of about 6.9 °C (12.4 °F) (see W72). These calculated
12 maximum heat generation rates resulting from Al corrosion and backfill hydration could not
13 occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation assumes
14 that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus the temperature rise of
15 10 °C (18 °F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
16 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously.

17 Relatively few data exist on the effects of temperature on microbial gas generation under
18 expected WIPP conditions. Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates
19 observed during a range of experiments. Increases in temperature from ambient up to 40 °C
20 (104 °F) or 50 °C (122 °F) were reported to increase gas production, mainly via the degradation
21 of cellulosic waste under either aerobic or anaerobic conditions (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Above
22 70 °C (158 °F), however, gas generation rates were generally observed to decrease. The
23 experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical conditions and for
24 different substrates, representing likely states within the repository. Gas generation rates were
25 presented as ranges with upper and lower bounds as estimates of uncertainty (Molecke 1979, p.
26 7). Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation rate data
27 reported by Molecke (1979). These experiments investigated microbial gas generation under a
28 wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the presence of
29 microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional nutrients,
30 electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. These experiments were
31 carried out at a reference temperature of 30 °C (86 °F) based on the average temperature
32 expected in the repository. Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations are described in
33 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of temperature on microbial gas generation
34 are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates used.

35 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3.2 Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation**

36 The location of microbial activity within the repository is likely to be controlled by the
37 availability of substrates and nutrients. Biofilms may develop on surfaces where nutrients are
38 concentrated. They consist of one or more layers of cells with extracellular polymeric material,
39 and serve to maintain an optimum environment for growth. Within such a biofilm ecosystem,
40 nutrient retention and recycling maximize microbe numbers on the surface (see, for example,
41 Stroes-Gascoyne and West 1994, pp. 9–10).

1 Biofilms can form on almost any moist surface, but their development is likely to be restricted in
2 porous materials. Even so, their development is possible at locations throughout the disposal
3 system. The effects of biofilms on microbial gas generation may affect disposal system
4 performance through control of microbial population size and their effects on radionuclide
5 transport.

6 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates observed during a range of
7 experimental studies. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and
8 chemical conditions and for different substrates representing likely states within the repository.
9 However, the effect of biofilm formation in these experiments was uncertain. Molecke (1979,
10 p. 7), presented gas generation rates as ranges, with upper and lower bounds as estimates of
11 uncertainty. Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation
12 rate data reported by Molecke (1979). Their experiments investigated microbial gas generation
13 under a wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the
14 presence of microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional
15 nutrients, electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. Under the more
16 favorable conditions for microbial growth established during the experiments, the development
17 of populations of halophilic microbes and associated biofilms was evidenced by observation of
18 an extracellular, carotenoid pigment, bacterioruberin, in the culture bottles (Francis and Gillow
19 1994, p. 59). Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available
20 experimental data and are described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of
21 biofilms on microbial gas generation rates are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates.

22 Biofilms may also influence contaminant transport rates through their capacity to retain and thus
23 retard both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. This effect is not accounted for in PA
24 calculations, but is considered potentially beneficial to calculated disposal system performance.
25 Microbial transport is discussed in Section SCR-6.6.3.1.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.2 FEP Number:** W46

27 **FEP Title:** *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation*

28 **SCR-6.5.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* has been eliminated from PA calculations
30 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 **SCR-6.5.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

33 **SCR-6.5.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

34 Directly relevant to WIPP conditions, the gas generation experiments with actual waste
35 components at Argonne National Laboratory provide no indication of any enhancement of
36 pressured nitrogen atmosphere (2,150 pounds per square inch absolute [psia]) on microbial gas
37 generation (Felicione et al. 2001). In addition, microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and
38 possibly plastics and other synthetic materials in the repository, will produce mainly CO₂ and

1 CH₄ with minor amounts of nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen sulfide. The accumulation of
2 these gaseous species will contribute the total pressure in the repository. Increases in the partial
3 pressures of these reaction products could potentially limit gas generation reactions. However,
4 such an effect is not taken into account in WIPP PA calculations. The rate of microbial gas
5 production will depend upon the nature of the microbial populations established, the prevailing
6 conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas generation from degradation of organic
7 material is accounted for in PA calculations.

8 Chemical reactions may occur depending on, among other things, the concentrations of available
9 reactants, the presence of catalysts and the accumulation of reaction products, the biological
10 activity, and the prevailing conditions (for example, temperature and pressure). Reactions that
11 involve the production or consumption of gases are often particularly influenced by pressure
12 because of the high molar volume of gases. The effect of high total pressures on chemical
13 reactions is generally to reduce or limit further gas generation.

14 Few data exist from which the effects of pressure on microbial gas generation reactions that may
15 occur in the WIPP can be assessed and quantified. Studies of microbial activity in deep-sea
16 environments (for example, Kato et al. 1994, p. 94) suggest that microbial gas generation
17 reactions are less likely to be limited by increasing pressures in the disposal rooms than are
18 inorganic gas generation reactions (for example, corrosion). Consequently, the effects of
19 pressure on microbial gas generation have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
20 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.5.1.3 FEP Number:** W47

22 **FEP Title:** *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation*

23 **SCR-6.5.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

24 The *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation* has been eliminated from PA calculations
25 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

27 The FEP screening argument has been updated to reflect the radionuclide inventory used for
28 CRA-2009 calculations, although the screening decision has not changed.

29 **SCR-6.5.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

30 Radiation may slow down microbial gas generation rates, but such an effect is not taken into
31 account in WIPP PA calculations. According to the inventory data presented in Leigh, Trone,
32 and Fox (2005), the overall activity for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci
33 reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. This
34 decrease will not affect the original screening argument.

35 Experiments investigating microbial gas generation rates suggest that the effects of alpha
36 radiation from TRU waste is not likely to have significant effects on microbial activity (Barnhart
37 et al. 1980; Francis 1985). Consequently, the effects of radiation on microbial gas generation

1 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
2 of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.4 FEP Numbers:** W49 and W51

4 **FEP Titles:** *Gasses from Metal Corrosion*
5 *Chemical Effects of Corrosion*

6 **SCR-6.5.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 Gas generation from metal corrosion is accounted for in PA calculations, and the effects of
8 chemical changes from metal corrosion are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.

9 **SCR-6.5.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

11 **SCR-6.5.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

12 Oxidic corrosion of waste drums and metallic waste will occur at early times following closure of
13 the repository and will deplete its oxygen content. Anoxic corrosion will follow the oxidic phase
14 and will produce hydrogen while consuming water. Gases from metal corrosion are accounted
15 for in PA calculations.

16 The predominant chemical effect of corrosion reactions on the environment of disposal rooms
17 will be to lower the oxidation state of the brines and maintain reducing conditions.

18 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized gas generation rates that were observed during a range of
19 experiments. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical
20 conditions representing likely states within the repository. Later experiments reported by
21 Telander and Westerman (1993) support the gas generation rate data reported by Molecke
22 (1979). Their experiments investigated gas generation from corrosion under a wide range of
23 possible conditions in the repository. The studies included corrosion of low-carbon steel waste
24 packaging materials in synthetic brines, representative of intergranular Salado brines at the
25 repository horizon, under anoxic (reducing) conditions.

26 Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available experimental
27 data and are described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of chemical changes
28 from metal corrosion are, therefore, accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-6.5.1.5 FEP Number:** W50

30 **FEP Title:** *Galvanic Coupling (within the repository)*

31 **SCR-6.5.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

32 The effects of *Galvanic Coupling* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.5.3 Screening Argument**

4 Galvanic coupling (i.e. establishing an electrical current through chemical processes) could lead
5 to the propagation of electric potential gradients between metals in the waste form, canisters, and
6 other metals external to the waste form, potentially influencing corrosion processes, gas
7 generation rates, and chemical migration.

8 Metallic ore bodies external to the repository are nonexistent (see the CCA, Appendix GCR) and
9 therefore galvanic coupling between the waste and metals external to the repository would not
10 occur. However, a variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and
11 containers, creating a potential for formation of galvanic cells over short distances. As an
12 example, the presence of copper could influence rates of hydrogen gas production resulting from
13 the corrosion of iron. The interactions between metals depend upon their physical disposition
14 and the prevailing solution conditions, including pH and salinity. Good physical and electrical
15 contact between the metals is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells.

16 Consequently, given the preponderance of iron over other metals within the repository and the
17 likely passivation of many nonferrous materials, the influence of these electrochemical
18 interactions on corrosion, and therefore on gas generation, is expected to be minimal. Therefore,
19 the effects of galvanic coupling have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
20 consequence.

21 **SCR-6.5.1.6 FEP Number:** W52

22 **FEP Title:** *Radiolysis of Brine*

23 **SCR-6.5.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

24 Gas generation from *Radiolysis of Brine* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
25 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information has been identified relative to this FEP.

28 **SCR-6.5.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

29 Radiolysis of brine in the WIPP disposal rooms, and of water in the waste, will lead to the
30 production of gases and may significantly affect the oxygen content of the rooms. This, in turn,
31 will affect the prevailing chemical conditions and potentially the concentrations of radionuclides
32 that may be mobilized in the brines.

33 The overall reaction for the radiolysis of water in the waste and brine is

34
$$\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightarrow \text{H}_2 + \frac{1}{2} \text{O}_2. \quad (\text{SCR.12})$$

- 1 N_D = number of CH-TRU drums in the repository ($\sim 8 \times 10^5$)
2 N_A = Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} molecules per mole)

3 The value of G used in this calculation has been set at 0.015, the upper limit of the range of
4 values observed (0.011 to 0.015) during experimental studies of the effects of radiation on WIPP
5 brines (Reed et al. 1993). A maximum estimate of the volume of brine that could potentially be
6 present in the disposal region has been made from its excavated volume of 436,000 m³ (520,266
7 cubic yards [yd³]). This estimate, in particular, is considered to be highly conservative because it
8 makes no allowance for creep closure of the excavation, or for the volume of waste and backfill
9 that will be emplaced, and takes no account of factors that may limit brine inflow. These
10 parameter values lead to an estimate of the potential rate of gas production caused by the
11 radiolysis of brine of 0.6 moles per drum per year or less.

12 Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30 °C (86 °F) and 14.8 MPa
13 (lithostatic pressure), this is equivalent to approximately 6.8×10^4 L (1.8×10^4 gal) per year.

14 Potential gas production rates from other processes that will occur in the repository are
15 significantly greater than this. For example, under water-saturated conditions, microbial
16 degradation of cellulosic waste has the potential to yield between 1.3×10^6 and 3.8×10^7 L (3.4
17 $\times 10^5$ and 1.0×10^7 gal) per year; anoxic corrosion of steels has the potential to yield up to 6.3
18 $\times 10^5$ L (1.6×10^5 gal) per year.

19 In addition to the assessment of the potential rate of gas generation by radiolysis of brine given
20 above, a study of the likely consequences on disposal system performance has been undertaken
21 by Vaughn et al. (1995). A model was implemented in BRAGFLO to estimate radiolytic gas
22 generation in the disposal region according to the equation above.

23 A set of BRAGFLO simulations was performed to assess the magnitude of the influence of the
24 radiolysis of brine on contaminant migration to the accessible environment. The calculations
25 considered radiolysis of water by 15 isotopes of Th, Pu, U, and Am. Conditional CCDFs of
26 normalized contaminated brine releases to the Culebra via a human intrusion borehole and the
27 shaft system, as well as releases to the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment via the
28 Salado interbeds, were constructed and compared to the corresponding baseline CCDFs
29 calculated excluding radiolysis. The comparisons indicated that radiolysis of brine does not
30 significantly affect releases to the Culebra or the subsurface boundary of the accessible
31 environment under disturbed or undisturbed conditions (Vaughn et al. 1995). Although the
32 analysis of Vaughn et al. (1995) used data that are different than those used in the PA
33 calculations, estimates of total gas volumes in the repository are similar to those considered in
34 the analysis performed by Vaughn et al. (1995).

35 Therefore, gas generation by radiolysis of brine has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
36 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.1.7 FEP Number:** W53
2 **FEP Title:** *Radiolysis of Cellulose*

3 **SCR-6.5.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 Gas generation from *Radiolysis of Cellulose* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
5 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.5.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

7 This FEP has been updated with new inventory data related to cellulose content.

8 **SCR-6.5.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

9 Molecke (1979) compared experimental data on gas production rates caused by radiolysis of
10 cellulose and other waste materials with gas generation rates by other processes, including
11 bacterial (microbial) waste degradation. The comparative gas generation rates reported by
12 Molecke (1979, p. 4) are given in terms of most probable ranges, using units of moles per year
13 per drum, for drums of 0.21 m³ (0.27 yd³) in volume. A most probable range of 0.005 to 0.011
14 moles per year per drum is reported for gas generation caused by radiolysis of cellulosic material
15 (Molecke 1979, p. 4). As a comparison, a most probable range of 0.0 to 5.5 moles per year per
16 drum is reported for gas generation by bacterial degradation of waste.

17 The data reported by Molecke (1979) are consistent with more recent gas generation
18 investigations made under the WIPP program, and indicate that radiolysis of cellulosic materials
19 will generate significantly less gas than other gas generation processes. Gas generation from
20 radiolysis of cellulose therefore can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 Radiolytic gas generation is controlled by the radioactivity of wastes and the waste properties.
23 According to the new inventory presented in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), the overall activity
24 for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6
25 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. Such decreasing activity levels imply
26 that the radiolytic effects will be decreased from those presented in the CCA.

27 Radiolytic gas generation is also limited by transportation requirements, which state that the
28 hydrogen generated in the innermost layer of confinement must be no more than 5% over 60
29 days (U.S. Department of Energy 2000b). Thus the maximum rate allowed for transportation is
30 $0.201 \text{ m}^3/\text{drum} \times 5\% \times 1,000 \text{ L/m}^3/60 \text{ days} \times 365 \text{ days/yr} = 61 \text{ L/drum/yr}$, smaller than the
31 maximum microbial gas generation rate. Note that this estimate is very conservative and the
32 actual rates are even smaller. It is a general consensus within the international research
33 community that the effect of radiolytic gas generation on the long-term performance of a
34 low/intermediate level waste repository is negligible (Rodwell et al. 1999).

1 **SCR-6.5.1.8 FEP Number:** W54
 2 **FEP Title:** *Helium Gas Production*

3 **SCR-6.5.1.8.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C


4 Gas generation from helium production has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
 5 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.5.1.8.2 Summary of New Information**

7 The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
 8 radionuclide activity (2.32 million Ci of TRU isotopes) (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) is less than
 9 previously estimated in TWBIR Rev 3 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b). Thus the helium gas
 10 production argument for CRA-2009 is conservatively bounded by the CCA screening argument.
 11 The FEP screening argument and screening decision remain unchanged except for editorial
 12 changes.

13 **SCR-6.5.1.8.3 Screening Argument**

14 Helium gas production will occur by the reduction of α -particles (helium nuclei) emitted from
 15 the waste. The maximum amount of helium that could be produced can be calculated from the
 16 number of α -particles generated during radioactive decay. The α -particles are converted to
 17 helium gas by the following reaction:



19 For the screening argument used in the CCA, the inventory (I) that may be emplaced in the
 20 repository is approximately 4.07 million Ci or 1.5×10^{17} Bq (see the CCA, Appendix BIR).
 21 Assuming that the inventory continues to yield α -particles at this rate throughout the 10,000-yr
 22 regulatory period, the maximum rate of helium gas produced (R_{He}) may be calculated from

$$23 \quad R_{\text{He}} = \frac{I \left(\frac{1 \text{ He atom}}{\alpha - \text{decay}} \right)}{N_A} \quad (\text{SCR.16})$$

24 R_{He} is the rate of helium gas production in the repository (mole per second).

25 I is the waste inventory, 1.5×10^{17} Bq, assuming that 1 Bq is equal to 1 α -decay per second, and
 26 N_A is Avogadro's constant (6.022×10^{23} atoms per mole). These assumptions regarding the
 27 inventory lead to maximum estimates for helium production because some of the radionuclides
 28 will decay by beta and gamma emission.

29 R_{He} is approximately 5.5×10^{-7} moles per second based on an α -emitting inventory of 4.07
 30 million Ci (much greater than current inventory estimates) (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005).
 31 Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30 °C (86 °F) and 14.8 MPa or 146
 32 atmospheres (lithostatic pressure) yields approximately 1.3 L (0.34 gal) per year.

1 The effects of helium gas production have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
2 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.9 FEP Number:** W55
4 **FEP Title:** *Radioactive Gases*

5 **SCR-6.5.1.9.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

6 The formation and transport of *Radioactive Gases* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
7 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-6.5.1.9.2 Summary of New Information**

9 This FEP has been updated with references to the latest inventory information.

10 **SCR-6.5.1.9.3 Screening Argument**

11 Based on the composition of the anticipated waste inventory, as described in the CRA-2004,
12 Appendix DATA, Attachment F, the radioactive gases that will be generated in the repository are
13 radon (Rn) and ¹⁴C-labeled CO₂ and CH₄.

14 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005) indicates that a small amount of carbon-14 (2.41 Ci) will be
15 disposed in the WIPP. This amount is insignificant in comparison with the section 191.13
16 cumulative release limit for ¹⁴C.

17 Notwithstanding this comparison, consideration of transport of radioactive gases could
18 potentially be necessary in respect of the section 191.15 individual protection requirements. ¹⁴C
19 may partition into CO₂ and CH₄ formed during microbial degradation of cellulosic and other
20 organic wastes (for example, rubbers and plastics). However, total fugacities of CO₂ in the
21 repository are expected to be very low because of the action of the MgO backfill, which will lead
22 to incorporation of CO₂ in solid magnesite. Similarly, interaction of CO₂ with cementitious
23 wastes will limit CO₂ fugacities by the formation of solid calcium carbonate. Thus, because of
24 the formation of solid carbonate phases in the repository, significant transport of ¹⁴C as carbon
25 dioxide-14 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
26 performance of the disposal system.

27 Potentially significant volumes of CH₄ may be produced during the microbial degradation of
28 cellulosic waste. However, volumes of methane-14 will be small given the low total inventory
29 of carbon-14 and the tendency of carbon-14 to be incorporated into solid carbonate phases in the
30 repository. Therefore, although transport of carbon-14 could occur as methane-14, this effect has
31 been eliminated from the current PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
32 performance of the disposal system.

33 Rn gas will contain proportions of the alpha emitters ²¹⁹Rn, ²²⁰Rn, and ²²²Rn. All of these have
34 short half-lives, but ²²²Rn is potentially the most important because it is produced from the
35 abundant waste isotope, ²³⁸Pu, and because it has the longest half-life of the radon isotopes (≈ 4
36 days). ²²²Ra will exhibit secular equilibrium with its parent ²²⁶Rn, which has a half-life of 1600

1 years. Consequently, ^{222}Rn will be produced throughout the 10,000-yr regulatory time period.
2 Conservative analysis of the potential ^{222}Rn inventory suggests activities of less than 716 Ci at
3 10,000 years (Bennett 1996).

4 Direct comparison of the estimated level of ^{222}Rn activity with the release limits specified in
5 section 191.13 cannot be made because the release limits do not cover radionuclides with half-
6 lives less than 20 years. For this reason, production of Rn gas can be eliminated from the PA
7 calculations on regulatory grounds. Notwithstanding this regulatory argument, the small
8 potential Rn inventory means that the formation and transport of Rn gas can also be eliminated
9 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.5.2 Speciation**

11 **SCR-6.5.2.1 FEP Number:** W56

12 **FEP Title:** *Speciation*

13 **SCR-6.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – Disposal Room

14 UP – Culebra

15 SO-C – Beneficial – Shaft Seals

16 Chemical *Speciation* is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide
17 solubility in the disposal rooms and the degree of chemical retardation estimated during
18 contaminant transport. The effects of cementitious seals on chemical *Speciation* have been
19 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
20 disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP.

23 **SCR-6.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

24 Chemical speciation refers to the form in which elements occur under a particular set of chemical
25 or environmental conditions. Conditions affecting chemical speciation include the temperature,
26 pressure, and salinity (ionic strength) of the water in question. The importance of chemical
27 speciation lies in its control of the geochemical reactions likely to occur and the consequences
28 for actinide mobility.

29 **SCR-6.5.2.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

30 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in any brines present in the disposal rooms
31 after repository closure will depend on the stability of the chemical species that form under the
32 prevailing conditions (for example, temperature, pressure, and ionic strength). The method used
33 to derive radionuclide solubilities in the disposal rooms (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section
34 SOTERM-4.0) considers the expected conditions. The MgO backfill will buffer pH values in the
35 disposal room to between 9 and 10. Thus chemical *Speciation* is accounted for in PA
36 calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the disposal rooms.

SCR-6.5.2.1.3.2 Repository Seals

Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315–25). At high pH values, the speciation and adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in dissolved form. The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.2.1.3.3 Culebra

Chemical speciation will affect actinide retardation in the Culebra. The dependence of An retardation on speciation in the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations by sampling over ranges of K_{ds} . The ranges of K_{ds} are based on the range of groundwater compositions and speciation in the Culebra, including consideration of nonradionuclide solutes. The methodology used to simulate sorption in the Culebra is described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.9.

SCR-6.5.2.2 FEP Number: W57

FEP Title: *Kinetics of Speciation*

SCR-6.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

The effects of reaction kinetics in chemical speciation reactions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has been identified for this FEP.

SCR-6.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument

Chemical speciation of actinides describes the composition and relative distribution of dissolved species, such as the hydrated metal ion, or complexes, whether with organic or inorganic ligands. Conditions affecting chemical speciation include temperature, ionic strength, ligand concentration, and pH of the solution. Some ligands, such as hydroxide, may act to decrease An solubility, while others, such as citrate, frequently have the opposite influence, often increasing An solubility.

SCR-6.5.2.2.4 Disposal Room Equilibrium Conditions

The concentrations of radionuclides that can be dissolved in brines within the disposal rooms will depend on the thermodynamic stabilities and solubilities of the respective metal complexes. The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) calculations and database input used to determine the brine solubilities of radionuclides takes into account the expected conditions, including temperature, ionic strength, pH, and ligand concentration. The chemical speciation at

1 equilibrium is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the
2 disposal rooms.

3 **SCR-6.5.2.2.5 Kinetics of Complex Formation**

4 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or An-
5 bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and contaminated
6 objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of dissolved
7 radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition and by the kinetics of dissolution of
8 the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation. Solution
9 complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as carbonate
10 and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and ethylene diamine
11 tetra-acetate (EDTA) are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an
12 inconsequential short time increment on the scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period.
13 Reactions of these types are generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure
14 the reaction rates; as a practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal
15 solutions are combined with ligand solutions. As a result, the rate of approach to an equilibrium
16 distribution of solution species takes place much more rapidly than dissolution, making the
17 dissolution reaction the rate-limiting step. The effects of reaction kinetics in aqueous systems
18 are discussed by Lasaga et al. (1994), who suggest that in contrast to many heterogeneous
19 reactions, homogeneous aqueous geochemical speciation reactions involving relatively small
20 inorganic species occur rapidly and are accurately described by thermodynamic equilibrium
21 models that neglect explicit consideration of reaction kinetics.

22 For that reason, the rate at which solution species approach equilibrium distribution is of no
23 consequence to repository performance. Kinetics of chemical speciation may be eliminated from
24 PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

25 **SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution**

26 **SCR-6.5.3.1 FEP Numbers:** W58, W59, and W60

27 **FEP Titles:** *Dissolution of Waste (W58)*
28 *Precipitation of Secondary Minerals (W59)*
29 *Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution (W60)*

30 **SCR-6.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – W58
31 SO-C Beneficial – W59
32 SO-C – W60

33 Waste dissolution and the release of radionuclides in the disposal rooms are accounted for in PA
34 calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from groundwaters and brines
35 and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
36 basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effect of reaction
37 kinetics in controlling the rate of waste dissolution within the disposal rooms has been eliminated
38 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
39 system.

1 **SCR-6.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

3 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

4 Dissolution of waste and precipitation of secondary minerals control the concentrations of
5 radionuclides in brines and can influence rates of contaminant transport. Waste dissolution is
6 accounted for in PA calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from
7 groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated
8 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
9 system.

10 At low temperatures, precipitation and dissolution reactions are caused by changes in fluid
11 chemistry that result in chemical undersaturation or oversaturation (Bruno and Sandino 1987).
12 Precipitation can be divided into two stages: nucleation and crystal growth. Following
13 nucleation, growth rates depend on the rates of surface processes and the transport of materials to
14 the growth site. Mineral dissolution often depends on whether a surface reaction or transport of
15 material away from the reaction site acts as the rate-controlling process. The former case may
16 cause selective dissolution along crystallographically controlled features, whereas the latter may
17 induce rapid bulk dissolution (Berner 1981). Thus a range of kinetic behaviors will be exhibited
18 by different mineral precipitation and dissolution reactions in geochemical systems.

19 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

20 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or An-
21 bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and contaminated
22 objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of dissolved
23 radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition and the kinetics of dissolution of the
24 solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation. Solution complexation
25 reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as carbonated and hydroxide,
26 and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are kinetically very fast,
27 reaching equilibrium in less than 1 s, which is infinitesimally small on the time scale of the
28 10,000-yr regulatory period. The rate at which thermodynamic equilibrium is approached
29 between solution composition and the solubility-controlling solid phases will be limited by rate
30 of dissolution of the solid materials in the waste. As a result, until equilibrium is reached, the
31 solution concentration of the actinides will be lower than the concentration predicted based upon
32 equilibrium of the solution phase components with the solubility-limiting solid phases. The
33 WIPP An source term model, which describes interactions of the waste and brine, is described in
34 detail in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.5. The assumption of instantaneous equilibrium in
35 waste dissolution reactions is a conservative approach, yielding maximum concentration
36 estimates for radionuclides in the disposal rooms because a time-weighted average resulting from
37 a kinetically accurate estimate of solution compositions would have lower concentrations at early
38 times. Waste dissolution at the thermodynamic equilibrium solubility limit is accounted for in
39 PA calculations. However, the kinetics of dissolution within the disposal rooms has been
40 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
41 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3.2 Geological Units**

2 During groundwater flow, radionuclide precipitation processes that occur will lead to reduced
 3 contaminant transport. No credit is given in PA calculations to the potentially beneficial
 4 occurrence of precipitation of secondary minerals. The formation of radionuclide-bearing
 5 precipitates from groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have
 6 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to disposal system
 7 performance. As a result, kinetics of precipitation has also been eliminated from PA calculations
 8 because no credit is taken for precipitation reactions.

9 **SCR-6.5.4 Sorption**

10 **SCR-6.5.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W61, W62, and W63

11 **FEP Titles:** *Actinide Sorption (W61)*
 12 *Kinetics of Sorption (W62)*
 13 *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces (W63)*

14 **SCR-6.5.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – (W61, W62) In the Culebra and Dewey Lake
 15 SO-C – Beneficial – (W61, W62) In the Disposal
 16 Room, Shaft Seals, Panel Closures, Other Geologic
 17 Units
 18 UP – (W63)

19 Sorption within the disposal rooms, which would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations,
 20 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 21 performance of the disposal system. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel
 22 closures have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 23 performance of the disposal system. Sorption within the Culebra and the Dewey Lake is
 24 accounted for in PA calculations. Sorption processes within other geological units of the
 25 disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 26 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Mobile adsorbents (for example,
 27 microbes and humic acids), and the sorption of radionuclides at their surfaces, are accounted for
 28 in PA calculations in the estimates of the concentrations of actinides that may be carried. The
 29 potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes and of *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces*
 30 are accounted for in PA calculations.

31 **SCR-6.5.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

33 **SCR-6.5.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

34 Sorption may be defined as the accumulation of matter at the interface between a solid and an
 35 aqueous solution. Within PA calculations, including those made for the WIPP, the use of
 36 isotherm representations of An sorption prevails because of their computational simplicity in
 37 comparison with other models (Serne 1992, pp. 238–39).

1 The mechanisms that control the kinetics of sorption processes are, in general, poorly
2 understood. Often, sorption of inorganic ions on mineral surfaces is a two-step process
3 consisting of a short period (typically minutes) of diffusion-controlled, rapid uptake, followed by
4 slower processes (typically weeks to months) including surface rearrangement, aggregation and
5 precipitation, and solid solution formation (Davis and Kent 1990, p. 202). Available data
6 concerning rates of sorption reactions involving the important radionuclides indicate that, in
7 general, a range of kinetic behavior is to be expected.

8 The relevance to the WIPP of sorption reaction kinetics lies in their effects on chemical
9 transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to static surfaces of the disposal system, such as seals
10 and host rocks, acts to retard chemical transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to potentially
11 mobile surfaces, such as colloids, however, may act to enhance chemical transport, particularly if
12 the kinetics of contaminant desorption are slow or the process is irreversible (nonequilibrium).

13 The following subsections discuss sorption in the disposal rooms, shaft seals, panel closures, the
14 Culebra, and other geological units of the WIPP disposal system. Sorption on colloids,
15 microbes, and particulate material is also discussed.

16 **SCR-6.5.4.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

17 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in waters entering the disposal room will be
18 controlled by a combination of sorption and dissolution reactions. However, because sorption
19 processes are surface phenomena, the amount of material likely to be involved in sorption mass
20 transfer processes will be small relative to that involved in the bulk dissolution of waste. WIPP
21 PA calculations therefore assume that dissolution reactions control radionuclide concentrations.
22 Sorption on waste, containers, and backfill within the disposal rooms, which would serve to
23 reduce radionuclide concentrations, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
24 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

25 **SCR-6.5.4.1.4 Shaft Seals and Panel Closures**

26 The CCA, Chapter 3.0 and Appendix SEAL describe the seals that are to be placed at various
27 locations in the access shafts and waste panel access tunnels. The materials to be used include
28 crushed salt, bentonite clay, and cementitious grouts. Of these, the latter two in particular
29 possess significant sorption capacities. No credit is given for the influence of sorption processes
30 that may occur in seal materials and their likely beneficial effects on radionuclide migration
31 rates. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel closures have been eliminated
32 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
33 system.

34 **SCR-6.5.4.1.4.1 Culebra**

35 Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in the CCA, Chapter
36 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2. The model used comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm
37 approximation, employing constructed CDFs of K_{ds} applicable to dolomite in the Culebra. The
38 potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes are encompassed in the ranges of
39 K_{ds} used. The geochemical speciation of the Culebra groundwaters and the effects of changes in
40 sorptive surfaces are implicitly accounted for in PA calculations for the WIPP in the ranges of
41 K_{ds} used.

1 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.2 Other Geological Units

2 During groundwater flow, any radionuclide sorption processes that occur between dissolved or
3 colloidal actinides and rock surfaces will lead to reduced rates of contaminant transport. The
4 sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter
5 it from being released to the accessible environment over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995).
6 Thus sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations, as discussed in the
7 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6. No credit is given to the potentially beneficial occurrence of
8 sorption in other geological units outside the Culebra. Sorption processes within other
9 geological units of the disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
10 of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.3 Sorption on Colloids, Microbes, and Particulate Material

12 The interactions of sorption processes with colloidal, microbial, or particulate transport are
13 complex. Neglecting sorption of contaminants on immobile surfaces in the repository shafts and
14 Salado (for example, the clays of the Salado interbeds) is a conservative approach because it
15 leads to overestimated transport rates. However, neglecting sorption on potentially mobile
16 adsorbents (for example, microbes and humic acids) cannot be shown to be conservative with
17 respect to potential releases, because mobile adsorbents may act to transport radionuclides
18 sorbed to them. Consequently, the concentrations of actinides that may be carried by mobile
19 adsorbents are accounted for in PA calculations (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6).

20 SCR-6.5.5 Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry**21 SCR-6.5.5.1 FEP Numbers: W64 and W66**

22 **FEP Titles:** *Effects of Metal Corrosion*
23 *Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*

24 SCR-6.5.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

25 The effects of reduction-oxidation reactions related to metal corrosion on reduction-oxidation
26 conditions are accounted for in PA calculations. Reduction-oxidation reaction kinetics are
27 accounted for in PA calculations.

28 SCR-6.5.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

30 SCR-6.5.5.1.3 Screening Argument**31 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.1 Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics**

32 In general, investigation of the reduction-oxidation couples present in aqueous geochemical
33 systems suggests that most reduction-oxidation reactions are not in thermodynamic equilibrium
34 (Wolery 1992, p. 27). The lack of data characterizing the rates of reactions among trace element
35 reduction-oxidation couples leads to uncertainty in elemental speciation. This uncertainty in
36 reduction-oxidation kinetics is accounted for in PA calculations in the dissolved An source term
37 model (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-4.0), which estimates the probabilities
38 that particular actinides occur in certain oxidation states.

SCR-6.5.5.1.3.2 Corrosion

Other than gas generation, which is discussed in FEPs W44 through W55, the main effect of metal corrosion will be to influence the chemical conditions that prevail within the repository. Ferrous metals will be the most abundant metals in the WIPP, and these will corrode on contact with any brines entering the repository. Initially, corrosion will occur under oxic conditions owing to the atmospheric oxygen present in the repository at the time of closure. However, consumption of the available oxygen by corrosion reactions will rapidly lead to anoxic (reducing) conditions. These changes and controls on conditions within the repository will affect the chemical speciation of the brines and may affect the oxidation states of the actinides present. Changes to the oxidation states of the actinides will lead to changes in the concentrations that may be mobilized during brine flow. The oxidation states of the actinides are accounted for in PA calculations by the use of parameters that describe probabilities that the actinides exist in particular oxidation states and, as a result, the likely An concentrations. Therefore, the effects of metal corrosion are accounted for in PA calculations.

SCR-6.5.5.2 FEP Number: W65**FEP Title: *Reduction-Oxidation Fronts*****SCR-6.5.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

The migration of *Reduction-Oxidation Fronts* through the repository has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

SCR-6.5.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has been identified for this FEP.

SCR-6.5.5.2.3 Screening Argument

The development of reduction-oxidation fronts in the disposal system may affect the chemistry and migration of radionuclides. Reduction-oxidation fronts separate regions that may be characterized, in broad terms, as having different oxidation potentials. On either side of a reduction-oxidation front, the behavior of reduction-oxidation-sensitive elements may be controlled by different geochemical reactions. Elements that exhibit the greatest range of oxidation states (for example, U, Np, and Pu) will be the most affected by reduction-oxidation front development and migration. The migration of reduction-oxidation fronts may occur as a result of diffusion processes, or in response to groundwater flow, but will be restricted by the occurrence of heterogeneous buffering reactions (for example, mineral dissolution and precipitation reactions). Indeed, these buffering reactions cause the typically sharp, distinct nature of reduction-oxidation fronts.

Of greater significance is the possibility that the flow of fluids having different oxidation potentials from those established within the repository might lead to the development and migration of a large-scale reduction-oxidation front. Reduction-oxidation fronts have been observed in natural systems to be the loci for both the mobilization and concentration of radionuclides, such as U. For example, during investigations at two U deposits at Poços de Caldas, Brazil, U was observed by Waber (1991) to be concentrated along reduction-oxidation

1 fronts at the onset of reducing conditions by its precipitation as U oxide. In contrast, studies of
 2 the Alligator Rivers U deposit in Australia by Snelling (1992) indicated that the movement of the
 3 relatively oxidized weathered zone downwards through the primary ore body as the deposit was
 4 eroded and gradually exhumed led to the formation of secondary uranyl-silicate minerals and the
 5 mobilization of U in its more soluble U(VI) form in near-surface waters. The geochemical
 6 evidence from these sites suggests that the reduction-oxidation fronts had migrated only slowly,
 7 at most on the order of a few tens of meters per million years. These rates of migration were
 8 controlled by a range of factors, including the rates of erosion, infiltration of oxidizing waters,
 9 geochemical reactions, and diffusion processes.

10 The migration of large-scale reduction-oxidation front through the repository as a result of
 11 regional fluid flow is considered unlikely over the regulatory period on the basis of comparison
 12 with the slow rates of reduction-oxidation front migration suggested by natural system studies.
 13 This comparison is considered conservative because the relatively impermeable nature of the
 14 Salado suggests that reduction-oxidation front migration rates at the WIPP are likely to be slower
 15 than those observed in the more permeable lithologies of the natural systems studied. Large-
 16 scale reduction-oxidation fronts have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 17 basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

18 **SCR-6.5.5.3 FEP Number:** W67
 19 **FEP Title:** *Localized Reducing Zones*

20 **SCR-6.5.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

21 The formation of *Localized Reducing Zones* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 22 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 **SCR-6.5.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

24 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

25 **SCR-6.5.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

26 The dominant reduction reactions in the repository include steel corrosion and microbial
 27 degradation. The following bounding calculation shows that molecular diffusion alone will be
 28 sufficient to mix brine chemistry over a distance of meters and therefore the formation of
 29 localized reducing zones in the repository is of low consequence.

30 The diffusion of a chemical species in a porous medium can be described by Fick's equation
 31 (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.132):

$$32 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial X} \left(D_{eff} \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} \right) \quad (\text{SCR.17})$$

33 where C is the concentration of the diffusing chemical species, t is the time, X is the distance,
 34 and D_{eff} is the effective diffusivity of the chemical species in a given porous medium. D_{eff} is
 35 related to the porosity (ϕ) of the medium by (e.g., Oelkers 1996):


1
$$D_{eff} = \phi^2 D \tag{SCR.18}$$

2 where D is the diffusivity of the species in pure solution. The D values for most aqueous species
 3 at room temperatures fall into a narrow range, and 10^{-5} cm^2 ($1.5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ in.}^2$) per s is a good
 4 approximation (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.138). From the WIPP PA calculations
 5 (Bean et al. 1996, p.7-29; WIPP Performance Assessment, 1993, Equation B-8), the porosity in
 6 the WIPP waste panels after room closure is calculated to be 0.4 to 0.7. From Equation
 7 (SCR.19), the effective diffusivity D_{eff} in the waste is estimated to be $2 - 5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ cm}^2$ (7×10^{-7}
 8 in.^2) per second ($= 6 - 16 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^2/\text{year}$).

9 Given a time scale of T , the typical diffusion penetration distance (L) can be determined by
 10 scaling:

11
$$L = \sqrt{D_{eff} T} \tag{SCR.19}$$

12 Using Equation (SCR.20), the diffusion penetration distance in the WIPP can be calculated as a
 13 function of diffusion time, as shown in Figure SCR-1.



14
 15 **Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion**
 16 **Time**

17 Direct brine release requires the repository gas pressure to be at least 8 MPa (Stoelzel et al.
 18 1996). The CRA-2009 calculations show that it will take at least 100 years for the repository
 19 pressure to reach this critical value by gas generation processes (see Nemer and Clayton 2008,

1 Figure 6-24). Over this time scale, according to Equation (SCR.20) and Figure SCR-1, molecular
2 diffusion alone can mix brine composition effectively at least over a distance of ~ 1 m (3.3 ft).

3 The above calculation assumes diffusion only through liquid water. This assumption is
4 applicable to steel corrosion, the humid rate of which is zero. Note that microbial reactions can
5 also consume or release gaseous species. The diffusion of a gaseous species is much faster than
6 an aqueous one. Thus molecular diffusion can homogenize microbial reactions even at a much
7 larger scale.

8 The height of waste stacks in the repository after room closure (h) can be calculated by:

$$9 \quad h = \frac{h_0(1 - \phi_0)}{1 - \phi} \quad (\text{SCR.20})$$

10 where h_0 and ϕ_0 are the initial height of waste stacks and the initial porosity of wastes, which are
11 assumed to be 4 m and 0.88, respectively, in the WIPP PA. For $\phi = 0.4 - 0.7$, h is estimated to be
12 0.8 to 1.4 m. This means that molecular diffusion alone can homogenize redox reaction in the
13 vertical dimension of the repository. Therefore, the formation of localized reducing zones is
14 unlikely. The general repository environment will become reducing shortly after room closure
15 because of metal corrosion and microbial reactions. Therefore, localized reducing zones can be
16 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

17 **SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation**

18 **SCR-6.5.6.11** **FEP Numbers:** W68, W69, and W71
19 **FEP Titles:** *Organic Complexation (W68)*
20 *Organic Ligands (W69)*
21 *Kinetics of Organic Complexation (W71)*

22 **SCR-6.5.6.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – W68 and W69
23 SO-C – W71

24 The effects of anthropogenic *Organic Complexation* reactions, including the effects of *Organic*
25 *Ligands*, humic, and fulvic acids, have been incorporated in the PA calculations. The kinetics of
26 organic ligand complexation is screened out because the rate at which organic ligands are
27 complexed to actinide is so fast that it has no consequence to repository performance.

28 **SCR-6.5.6.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

30 **SCR-6.5.6.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 From a PA standpoint, the most important actinides are Th, U, Np, Pu, and Am. Dissolved Th,
32 U, Np, Pu, and Am will essentially speciate entirely as Th(IV), U(IV) or U(VI), Np(IV) or
33 Np(V), Pu(III) or Pu(IV), and Am(III) under the strongly reducing conditions expected as a

1 result of the presence of Fe(II) and microbes (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment
2 SOTERM, Section SOTERM-2.2.5).

3 Some organic ligands can increase the actinide solubilities. An estimate of the complexing
4 agents in the TRU solidified waste forms scheduled for disposal in the WIPP is presented in the
5 CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Table DATA-F-33. Acetate, citrate, oxalate, and
6 EDTA were determined to be the only water-soluble and actinide-complexing organic ligands
7 present in significant quantities in the TWBIR. These ligands and their complexation with
8 actinides (Th(IV), U(VI), Np(V), and Am(III)) in a variety of ionic strength media were studied
9 at Florida State University (FSU) (Choppin et al. 2001). The FSU studies showed that acetate,
10 citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved An concentrations.
11 Lactate behavior was also studied at FSU because it appeared in the preliminary inventory of
12 nonradioactive constituents of the TRU waste to be emplaced in the WIPP (Brush 1990); lactate
13 did not appear in the CRA-2004 inventory, nor does it appear in the inventory used for the
14 CRA-2009.

15 The solubility of the actinides is calculated using FMT, a computer code for calculating actinide
16 concentration limits based on thermodynamic parameters. The parameters for FMT are derived
17 both from experimental investigations specifically designed to provide parameter values for this
18 model and from the published literature.

19 Although the FSU experimental work on organic ligands complexation showed that acetate,
20 citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved An concentrations,
21 SNL did not include the results in the FMT calculations for the CCA PA because (1) the
22 thermodynamic database for organic complexation of actinides was not considered adequate at
23 the time, and (2) side-calculations using thermodynamic data for low-ionic-strength NaCl
24 solutions showed that transition metals (in particular iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium, and
25 manganese present in waste drum steel) would compete effectively with the actinides for the
26 binding sites on the organic ligands, thus preventing significant complexation of actinides.

27 The CRA-2009 calculations include the effects of organic ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and
28 oxalate) on actinide solubilities in the FMT calculations (Brush and Xiong 2003). The FMT
29 database includes all of the results of experimental studies (Choppin et al. 2001) required to
30 predict the complexation of dissolved An(III), An(IV), and An(V) species by acetate, citrate,
31 EDTA, and oxalate (Giambalvo 2002a, 2002b).

32 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
33 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands, such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA,
34 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an inconsequentially short
35 time increment on the scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period. Reactions of these types are
36 generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure the reaction rates; as a
37 practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal solutions are
38 combined with ligand solutions.

39 For that reason, the rate at which organic ligands are complexed to actinide is of no consequence
40 to repository performance. Kinetics of organic complexation may be eliminated from PA
41 calculations on the basis of no consequence.

1 **SCR-6.5.6.2 FEP Number:** W70
2 **FEP Title:** *Humic and Fulvic Acids*

3 **SCR-6.5.6.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

4 The presence of *Humic Acids* and *Fulvic Acids* is incorporated in PA calculations.

5 **SCR-6.5.6.2.2 Summary of New Information**

6 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

7 **SCR-6.5.6.2.3 Screening Argument**

8 The occurrence of humic acids and fulvic acids is incorporated in PA calculations in the models
9 for radionuclide transport by humic colloids (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.2).

10 **SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties**

11 **SCR-6.5.7.1 FEP Numbers:** W74, W76, and W115
12 **FEP Titles:** *Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W74)*
13 *Microbial Growth on Concrete (W76)*
14 *Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures (W115)*

15 **SCR-6.5.7.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

16 The effects of *Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals*, *Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures*,
17 and *Microbial Growth on Concrete* are accounted for in PA calculations.

18 **SCR-6.5.7.1.2 Summary of New Information**

19 Changes to the titles of these FEPs are a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel
20 Closure Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006).

21 **SCR-6.5.7.1.3 Screening Argument**

22 The concrete used in the seal systems and panel closure systems will degrade as a result of
23 chemical reaction with the infiltrating groundwater. Degradation could lead to an increase in
24 permeability of the seal system. The main uncertainties with regard to cement degradation rates
25 at the WIPP are the effects of groundwater chemistry, the exact nature of the cementitious phases
26 present, and the rates of brine infiltration. The PA calculations take a conservative approach to
27 these uncertainties by assuming a large increase in permeability of the concrete seals only a few
28 hundred years after closure. These permeability values are based on seal design considerations
29 and consider the potential effects of degradation processes. Therefore, the effects of chemical
30 degradation of seals and chemical degradation of panel closures are accounted for in PA
31 calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

1 Concrete can be inhabited by alkalophilic bacteria, which could produce acids, thereby
2 accelerating the seal degradation process. Nitrification processes, which will produce nitric acid,
3 tend to be aerobic, and will be further limited at the WIPP by the low availability of ammonium
4 in the brines (Pedersen and Karlsson 1995, p. 75). Because of the limitations on growth caused
5 by the chemical conditions, it is likely that the effects of microbial growth on concrete will be
6 small. The effects of such microbial activity on seal properties are, therefore, implicitly
7 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

8 **SCR-6.5.7.2 FEP Number:** W75
9 **FEP Title:** *Chemical Degradation of Backfill*

10 **SCR-6.5.7.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

11 The effects on material properties of the *Chemical Degradation of Backfill* have been eliminated
12 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

13 **SCR-6.5.7.2.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

15 **SCR-6.5.7.2.3 Screening Argument**

16 Degradation of the chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room is a prerequisite
17 of their function in buffering the chemical environment of the disposal room. However, the
18 chemical reactions (Snider 2001) and dissolution involved will change the physical properties of
19 the material. Because the mechanical and hydraulic characteristics of the backfill have been
20 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
21 disposal system, the effects of the chemical degradation of backfill on material properties have
22 been eliminated from PA calculations on the same basis.

23 **SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode FEPs**

24 **SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport**

25 **SCR-6.6.1.1 FEP Number:** W77
26 **FEP Title:** *Solute Transport*

27 **SCR-6.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

28 Transport of dissolved radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-6.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-6.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Solute transport may occur by advection, dispersion, and diffusion down chemical potential
3 gradients, and is accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.4).

4 **SCR-6.6.1.2 FEP Numbers:** W78, W79, W80, and W81

5 **FEP Titles:** *Colloidal Transport (W78)*
6 *Colloidal Formation and Stability (W79)*
7 *Colloidal Filtration (W80)*
8 *Colloidal Sorption (W81)*

9 **SCR-6.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

10 Formation of colloids, transport of colloidal radionuclides, and colloid retardation through
11 filtration and sorption are accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-6.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

14 **SCR-6.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 Colloids typically have sizes of between 1 nm and 1 μm and may form stable dispersions in
16 groundwaters. Colloid formation and stability depends on their composition and the prevailing
17 chemical conditions (for example, salinity). Depending on their size, colloid transport may occur
18 at different rates than those of fully dissolved species. They may be physically excluded from
19 fine porous media, and their migration may be accelerated through fractured media in channels
20 where velocities are greatest. However, they can also interact with the host rocks during
21 transport and become retarded. These interactions may be of a chemical or physical nature and
22 include electrostatic effects leading to colloid sorption, and sieving leading to colloid filtration
23 and pore blocking. Colloidal formation and stability is accounted for in PA calculations through
24 estimates of colloid numbers in the disposal room based on the prevailing chemical conditions
25 (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8). Colloidal sorption, colloidal filtration, and
26 colloidal transport in the Culebra are accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix
27 SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8).

1 **SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport**

2 **SCR-6.6.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W82, W83, W84, W85, and W86

3 **FEP Titles:** *Suspension of Particles* (W82)

4 *Rinse* (W83)

5 *Cuttings* (W84)

6 *Cavings* (W85)

7 *Spallings* (W86)

8 **SCR-6.6.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** DP – W82, W84, W85, W86

9 SO-C – W83

10 The formation of particulates through *Rinse* and subsequent transport of radionuclides in
11 groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for undisturbed conditions on
12 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The transport of
13 radionuclides as particulates (cuttings, cavings, and spallings) during penetration of the
14 repository by a borehole, is accounted for in PA calculations.

15 **SCR-6.6.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

17 **SCR-6.6.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Suspensions of particles that have sizes larger than colloids are unstable because the particles
19 undergo gravitational settling. It is unlikely that brine flow will be rapid enough within the
20 WIPP disposal rooms to generate particulate suspensions through rinse and transport under
21 undisturbed conditions. Mobilization of suspensions would effect a local and minor
22 redistribution of radionuclides within the room and would not result in increased radionuclide
23 transport from the repository. The formation of particulates through rinse and transport of
24 radionuclides in groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for
25 undisturbed conditions on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal
26 system.

27 Inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by a borehole could result in transport of waste
28 material to the ground surface through drilling-induced flow and blowouts (FEPs H21 and H23,
29 Section SCR-5.2.1.1 and Section SCR-5.2.1.3). This waste could include material intersected by
30 the drill bit (cuttings), material eroded from the borehole wall by circulating drilling fluid
31 (cavings), and material that enters the borehole as the repository depressurizes (spallings).
32 Transport of radionuclides by these materials and in brine is accounted for in PA calculations
33 and is discussed in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.5.

1 **SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport**

2 **SCR-6.6.3.1 FEP Number:** W87

3 **FEP Title:** *Microbial Transport*

4 **SCR-6.6.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

5 Transport of radionuclides bound to microbes is accounted for in PA calculations.

6 **SCR-6.6.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

8 **SCR-6.6.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

9 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
10 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.
11 Because of their colloidal size, microbes, and any radionuclides bound to them, may be
12 transported at different rates than radionuclides in solution. Microbial transport of radionuclides
13 is accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-5.0).

14 **SCR-6.6.3.2 FEP Number:** W88

15 **FEP Title:** *Biofilms*

16 **SCR-6.6.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

17 The effects of *Biofilms* on microbial transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
18 basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-6.6.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

21 **SCR-6.6.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

22 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
23 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.

24 Biofilms may influence microbial and radionuclide transport rates through their capacity to
25 retain, and therefore retard, both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. The formation of
26 biofilms in deep subsurface environments such as in the WIPP is controversial. Since the
27 microbial degradation experiments at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) bracket expected
28 repository conditions, the potential effect of biofilms formation on microbial degradation and
29 transport, if any, has been captured in the PA parameters derived from those experiments
30 (Francis and Gillow 1994; Francis et. al 1997; Francis and Gillow 2000; Gillow and Francis
31 2001a; Gillow and Francis 2001b; Gillow and Francis 2002a; Gillow and Francis 2002b). As a
32 matter of fact, no apparent formation of stable biofilms was observed in the BNL experiments.

1 The formation of biofilms tends to reduce cell suspension and mobility. This effect has been
2 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
3 disposal system.

4 **SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport**

5 **SCR-6.6.4.1 FEP Number:** W89

6 **FEP Title:** *Transport of Radioactive Gases*

7 **SCR-6.6.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

8 The *Transport of Radioactive Gases* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
9 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.6.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

11 This FEP discussion has been updated to include recent inventory information.

12 **SCR-6.6.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

13 The production and potential transport of radioactive gases are eliminated from PA calculations
14 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Transportable
15 radioactive gases are comprised mainly of isotopes of Rn and ¹⁴C. Rn gases are eliminated from
16 PA because their inventory is small (<7 Ci; (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005)) and their half-lives
17 are short (<4 days), resulting in insignificant potential for release from the repository.

18 **SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes**

19 **SCR-6.7.1 Advection**

20 **SCR-6.7.1.1 FEP Number:** W90

21 **FEP Title:** *Advection*

22 **SCR-6.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

23 *Advection* of contaminants is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 **SCR-6.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

26 **SCR-6.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

27 Advection (that is, the transport of dissolved and solid material by flowing fluid) is accounted for
28 in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.5).

1 **SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion**

2 **SCR-6.7.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W91 and W92

3 **FEP Titles:** *Diffusion* (W91)

4 *Matrix Diffusion* (W92)

5 **SCR-6.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 *Diffusion* of contaminants and retardation by *Matrix Diffusion* are accounted for in PA
7 calculations.

8 **SCR-6.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-6.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 Diffusion (that is, the movement of molecules or particles both parallel to and transverse to the
12 direction of advection in response to Brownian forces) and, more specifically matrix diffusion,
13 whereby movement is transverse to the direction of advection within a fracture and into the
14 surrounding rock matrix, are accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section
15 PA-4.9).

16 **SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena**

17 **SCR-6.7.3.1 FEP Number:** W93

18 **FEP Title:** *Soret Effect*

19 **SCR-6.7.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

20 The effects of thermochemical transport phenomena (the *Soret Effect*) have been eliminated from
21 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 **SCR-6.7.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

23 This FEP has been updated with new thermal heat rise values for Al corrosion, based on the
24 latest inventory data.

25 **SCR-6.7.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

26 According to Fick's law, the diffusion flux of a solute is proportional to the solute concentration
27 gradient. In the presence of a temperature gradient there will also be a solute flux proportional to
28 the temperature gradient (the Soret Effect). Thus the total solute flux, J , in a liquid phase may be
29 expressed as

30
$$J = -D\bar{V}C - ND\bar{V}T \quad (\text{SCR.21})$$

1 where C is the solute concentration, T is the temperature of the liquid, D is the solute diffusion
2 coefficient, and

$$3 \quad N = S_T C (1 - C) \quad (\text{SCR.22})$$

4 in which S_T is the Soret coefficient. The mass conservation equation for solute diffusion in a
5 liquid is then

$$6 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot (D \nabla C + N D \nabla T) \quad (\text{SCR.23})$$

7 When temperature gradients exist in solutions with both light and heavy solute molecules, the
8 heavier molecules tend to concentrate in the colder regions of the solution. Typically, large
9 temperature gradients are required for Soret diffusion to be significant compared to Fickian
10 diffusion.

11 Radioactive decay, nuclear criticality, and exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat
12 in the WIPP repository. The U.S. Department of Energy (1980) estimated that radioactive decay
13 of CH-TRU waste will result in a maximum temperature rise at the center of the repository of
14 1.6 °C (2.9 °F) at 80 years after waste emplacement. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) have shown
15 that the total thermal load of RH-TRU waste will not significantly affect the average temperature
16 increase in the repository. Temperature increases of about 3 °C (5.4 °F) may occur at the
17 locations of RH-TRU containers with maximum thermal power (60 W). Such temperature
18 increases are likely to be short-lived on the time scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period because
19 of the rapid decay of heat-producing nuclides in RH-TRU waste, such as ^{137}Cs (cesium), ^{90}Sr
20 (strontium), ^{241}Pu , and ^{147}Pm (promethium), whose half-lives are approximately 30, 29, 14, and 3
21 years, respectively. Soret diffusion generated by such temperature gradients will be negligible
22 compared to other radionuclide transport mechanisms.

23 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in Section SCR-6.3.4.1.
24 Potentially the most significant exothermic reactions are concrete hydration, backfill hydration,
25 and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the
26 concrete to approximately 50 °C (122 °F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38 °C
27 (100 °F) one week after seal emplacement.

28 However, the concrete seals will act as barriers to fluid flow for at least 100 years after
29 emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995). As a result, short-
30 term temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant Soret
31 diffusion through the seal system.

32 The maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels will be less than 5 °C (9 °F) as a
33 consequence of MgO hydration. Note that AICs will prevent drilling within the controlled area
34 for 100 years after disposal. Heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration
35 will have decreased substantially after 100 years, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will
36 have decreased nearly to the temperature of the undisturbed host rock.

1 If the repository were to be inundated following a drilling intrusion, Al corrosion could, at most,
2 result in a short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6.9 °C (12.4 °F). These
3 calculated maximum heat generation rates resulting from Al corrosion and backfill hydration
4 could not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation
5 assumes that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus the temperature
6 rise of 6.9 °C (12.4 °F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of a combination of
7 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Temperature increases of this magnitude will
8 not result in significant Soret diffusion within the disposal system.

9 The limited magnitude and spatial scale of temperature gradients in the disposal system indicate
10 that Soret diffusion will be insignificant, allowing the effects of thermochemical transport (soret
11 effect) to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
12 performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena**

14 **SCR-6.7.4.1 FEP Number:** W94

15 **FEP Title:** *Electrochemical Effects*

16 **SCR-6.7.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by electrochemical reactions have
18 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
19 disposal system.

20 **SCR-6.7.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

21 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

22 **SCR-6.7.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

23 The variety of waste metals and metal packaging in the repository may allow galvanic cells
24 spanning short distances to be established. The interactions among the metals depend upon their
25 physical characteristics and the chemical conditions in the repository. For example, good
26 physical and electrical contact, which is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells, may be
27 impeded by electrically nonconductive waste materials. Additionally, in order to establish a
28 galvanic cell, it is necessary that the metals have different values for standard reduction
29 potentials. For example, a galvanic cell is not expected to be formed by contact of two segments
30 of metals with identical compositions. As a result, galvanic cells can only be established by
31 contact of dissimilar metals, as might happen because of contact between a waste drum and the
32 contents, or between contents within a waste package. The localized nature of electrochemical
33 transport is restricted to the size scale over which galvanic cells can develop, i.e., on the order of
34 size of waste packages. Since the possible range of transport is restricted by the physical extent
35 of galvanic activity, electrochemical effects cannot act as long-range transport mechanisms for
36 radionuclides and therefore are of no consequence to the performance of the repository.

1 **SCR-6.7.4.2 FEP Number:** W95
2 **FEP Title:** *Galvanic Coupling* (outside the repository)

3 **SCR-6.7.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

4 The effects of *Galvanic Coupling* between the waste and metals external to the repository on
5 transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
6 occurrence over 10,000 years.

7 **SCR-6.7.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

9 **SCR-6.7.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

10 With regard to the WIPP, galvanic coupling refers to the establishment of galvanic cells between
11 metals in the waste form, canisters, and other metals external to the waste form.

12 Long-range electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a result of groundwater
13 flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of electric potential gradients may be
14 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
15 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
16 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
17 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of electric potentials is usually less than about 100
18 millivolts (mV) and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet
19 (Telford et al. 1976). Metals external to the waste form can include natural metallic ore bodies
20 in the host rock. However, metallic ore bodies and metallic sulfide ores do not exist in the region
21 of the repository (the CCA, Appendix GCR). As a result, galvanic coupling between the waste
22 and metallic materials outside the repository cannot occur. Therefore, galvanic coupling is
23 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

24 **SCR-6.7.4.3 FEP Number:** W96
25 **FEP Title:** *Electrophoresis*

26 **SCR-6.7.4.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

27 The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by *Electrophoresis* have been
28 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
29 disposal system.

30 **SCR-6.7.4.3.2 Summary of New Information**

31 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

1 **SCR-6.7.4.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 Long range (in terms of distance) electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a
3 result of groundwater flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of potentials may be
4 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
5 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
6 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
7 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of such potentials is usually less than about 100 mV and
8 the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet (Telford et al. 1976,
9 p. 458). Short range potential gradients caused by the corrosion of metals within the waste may
10 be set up over distances that are restricted to the size scale of the waste packages.

11 A variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and metal packaging,
12 which may allow electrochemical cells to be established over short distances. The types of
13 interactions that will occur depend on the metals involved, their physical characteristics, and the
14 prevailing solution conditions. Electrochemical cells that may be established will be small
15 relative to the size of the repository, limiting the extent to which migration of contaminants by
16 electrophoresis can occur. The electric field gradients will be of small magnitude and confined
17 to regions of electrochemical activity in the area immediately surrounding the waste material.
18 As a result, electrophoretic effects on migration behavior caused by both long and short range
19 potential gradients have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
20 to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena**

22 **SCR-6.7.5.1 FEP Number:** W97
23 **FEP Title:** *Chemical Gradients*

24 **SCR-6.7.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

25 The effects of enhanced diffusion across *Chemical Gradients* have been eliminated from PAs on
26 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

27 **SCR-6.7.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

29 **SCR-6.7.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

30 Chemical gradients within the disposal system, whether induced naturally or resulting from
31 repository material and waste emplacement, may influence the transport of contaminants.
32 Gradients will exist at interfaces between different repository materials and between repository
33 and geological materials. Distinct chemical regimes will be established within concrete seals and
34 adjoining host rocks. Similarly, chemical gradients will exist between the waste and the
35 surrounding rocks of the Salado. Other chemical gradients may exist because of the
36 juxtaposition of relatively dilute groundwaters and brines or between groundwaters with

1 different compositions. Natural gradients currently exist between different groundwaters in the
2 Culebra.

3 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of chemical gradients that occur at material
4 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
5 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Processes that may be induced by chemical
6 gradients at material boundaries include the formation or destabilization of colloids. For
7 example, cementitious materials that will be emplaced in the WIPP as part of the waste and the
8 seals contain colloidal-sized materials, such as calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and alkaline pore
9 fluids. Chemical gradients will exist between the pore fluids in the cementitious materials and
10 the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these interfaces may lead to the
11 generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type. Colloidal compositions may
12 include calcium and magnesium oxides, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum silicates,
13 calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Experimental investigations of the stability of
14 inorganic, mineral fragment colloidal dispersions have been carried out as part of the WIPP
15 colloid-facilitated actinide transport program (Papenguth and Behl 1996). Results of the
16 investigations indicate that the salinities of the WIPP brines are sufficient to cause destabilization
17 of mineral fragment colloidal dispersions. Therefore, concentrations of colloidal suspensions
18 originating from concrete within the repository are expected to be extremely low, and are
19 considered in PA calculations for completeness.

20 **SCR-6.7.5.2 FEP Number:** W98
21 **FEP Title:** *Osmotic Processes*

22 **SCR-6.7.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

23 The effects of *Osmotic Processes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
24 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

25 **SCR-6.7.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

27 **SCR-6.7.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

28 Osmotic processes, i.e., diffusion of water through a semipermeable or differentially permeable
29 membrane in response to a concentration gradient, may occur at interfaces between waters of
30 different salinities. Osmotic processes can occur if waters of different salinities and/or
31 compositions exist on either side of a particular lithology such as clay, or a lithological boundary
32 that behaves as a semipermeable membrane. At the WIPP, clay layers within the Salado may act
33 as semipermeable membranes across which osmotic processes may occur.

34 In the absence of a semipermeable membrane, water will move from the more dilute water into
35 the more saline water. However, the migration of dissolved contaminants across an interface
36 may be restricted depending upon the nature of the membrane. A hydrological gradient across a
37 semipermeable membrane may either enhance or oppose water movement by osmosis depending
38 on the direction and magnitude of the gradient. Dissolved contaminants that cannot pass through

1 a semipermeable membrane may be moved towards the membrane and concentrated along the
2 interface when advection dominates over osmosis and reverse osmosis occurs. Thus both
3 osmosis and reverse osmosis can restrict the migration of dissolved contaminants and possibly
4 lead to concentration along interfaces between different water bodies. The effects of osmotic
5 processes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to
6 the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.7.5.3 FEP Number:** W99
8 **FEP Title:** *Alpha Recoil*

9 **SCR-6.7.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

10 The effects of *Alpha Recoil* processes on radionuclide transport have been eliminated from PA
11 calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-6.7.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

14 **SCR-6.7.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 Alpha particles are emitted with sufficiently high energies that daughter nuclides recoil
16 appreciably to conserve system momentum. For example, ^{238}U decays to ^{234}Th with emission of
17 a 4.1 megaelectron volt (MeV) alpha particle. The law of conservation of momentum requires
18 that the daughter nuclide, ^{234}Th , recoils in the opposite direction with an energy of approximately
19 0.07 MeV. The energy is great enough to break chemical bonds or cause ^{234}Th to move a short
20 distance through a crystal lattice. If the ^{234}Th is close enough to the surface of the crystal, it will
21 be ejected into the surroundings. ^{234}Th decays to ^{234}Pa which decays to ^{234}U with respective
22 half-lives of 24.1 days and 1.17 minutes. The recoil and decay processes can lead to the apparent
23 preferential dissolution or leaching of ^{234}U relative to ^{238}U from crystal structures and amorphous
24 or adsorbed phases. Preferential leaching may be enhanced because of radiation damage to the
25 host phase resulting from earlier radioactive decay events. Consequently, ^{234}U sometimes
26 exhibits enhanced transport behavior relative to ^{238}U .

27 The influence of alpha recoil processes on radionuclide transport through natural geologic media
28 is dependent on many site-specific factors, such as mineralogy, geometry, and microstructure of
29 the rocks, as well as geometrical constraints on the type of groundwater flow, e.g., porous or
30 fracture flow. Studies of natural radionuclide-bearing groundwater systems often fail to discern
31 a measurable effect of alpha-recoil processes on radionuclide transport above the background
32 uncertainty introduced by the spatial heterogeneity of the geological system. Consequently, the
33 effects of the alpha recoil processes that occur on radionuclide transport are thought to be minor.
34 These effects have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
35 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.7.5.4 FEP Number:** W100
2 **FEP Title:** *Enhanced Diffusion*

3 **SCR-6.7.5.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of chemical gradients that occur at material
5 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
6 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Therefore, the effects of *Enhanced Diffusion*
7 across chemical gradients at material boundaries have been eliminated from PAs on the basis of
8 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.7.5.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

11 **SCR-6.7.5.4.3 Screening Argument**

12 Enhanced diffusion only occurs where there are higher than average chemical gradients. The
13 spatial extent of chemical gradients should be quite limited and as enhanced diffusion occurs, it
14 will tend to reduce the chemical gradient. Thus the driving force for the enhanced diffusion will
15 be reduced and eventually eliminated as the system approaches steady state or equilibrium
16 conditions. Because of the limited spatial extent of enhanced diffusion, its effect on radionuclide
17 transport should be small.

18 Processes that may be induced by chemical gradients at material boundaries include the
19 formation or destabilization of colloids. For example, cementitious materials, emplaced in the
20 WIPP as part of the waste and the seals, contain colloidal-sized phases such as calcium-silicate-
21 hydrate gels and alkaline pore fluids. Chemical gradients will exist between the pore fluids in
22 the cementitious materials and the less-alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these
23 interfaces may lead to the generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral-fragment type.
24 Colloidal compositions may include calcium and MgO, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum
25 silicates, calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Concentrations of colloidal suspensions
26 originating from concrete within the repository are considered in PA calculations even though
27 expected to be extremely low.

28 Distinct interfaces between waters of different salinities and different densities may limit mixing
29 of the water bodies and affect flow and contaminant transport. Such effects have been
30 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
31 disposal system.

32 The effects of enhanced diffusion across chemical gradients at material boundaries have been
33 eliminated from PAs on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.8 Ecological FEPs**

2 **SCR-6.8.1 Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake**

3 **SCR-6.8.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W101, W102, and W103

4 **FEP Titles:** *Plant Uptake* (W101)
5 *Animal Uptake* (W102)
6 *Accumulation in Soils* (W103)

7 **SCR-6.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R for section 191.13 – W101, W102
8 SO-C Beneficial for section 191.13 – W103
9 SO-C for section 191.15 – W101, W102, W103

10 *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils* have been eliminated from compliance
11 assessment calculations for section 191.15 on the basis of low consequence. *Plant Uptake* and
12 *Animal Uptake* in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA calculations for
13 section 191.13 on regulatory grounds. *Accumulation in Soils* within the controlled area has been
14 eliminated from PA calculations for section 191.13 on the basis of beneficial consequences.

15 **SCR-6.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

17 **SCR-6.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 The results of the calculations presented in Section 34, “Results of Performance Assessment,”
19 show that releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to
20 lateral releases through the DRZ at repository depth. Thus, for evaluating compliance with the
21 EPA’s individual protection requirements in section 191.15, FEPs that relate to plant uptake,
22 animal uptake, and accumulation in soils have been eliminated from compliance assessment
23 calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in section
25 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore, FEPs
26 that relate to plant uptake and animal uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated
27 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Accumulation in soils that may occur within the
28 controlled area would reduce releases to the accessible environment and can, therefore, be
29 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence.

1 **SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake**

2 **SCR-6.8.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W104, W105, W106, W107, and W108

3 **FEP Titles:** *Ingestion* (W104)
4 *Inhalation* (W105)
5 *Irradiation* (W106)
6 *Dermal Sorption* (W107)
7 *Injection* (W108)

8 **SCR-6.8.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R
9 SO-C for section 191.15

10 *Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection* have been eliminated from
11 compliance assessment calculations for section 191.15 and Part 191 Subpart C on the basis of
12 low consequence. FEPs that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment have been
13 eliminated from PA calculations for section 191.13 on regulatory grounds.

14 **SCR-6.8.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

15 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

16 **SCR-6.8.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

17 As described in Section 54, “Scope of Compliance Assessments,” releases to the accessible
18 environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite
19 interbeds within the Salado. Because of the bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance
20 with the EPA’s individual protection requirements in section 191.15 and the groundwater
21 protection requirements in Part 191 Subpart C (see Section 54), FEPs that relate to human uptake
22 by ingestion, inhalation, irradiation, dermal sorption, and injection have been eliminated from
23 compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in section
25 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore, FEPs
26 that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA
27 calculations on regulatory grounds.

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